Hostname: page-component-74656f9884-8rzl6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2026-11-05T22:38:11.264Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

THE ENGLISH CRISIS, EMPEROR LEOPOLD, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE DUTCH INTERVENTION IN 1688*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2012

CHRISTOPH KAMPMANN
CHRISTOPH KAMPMANN*
Affiliation:
University of Marburg
*
Philipps-Universität Marburg, Seminar für Neuere Geschichte, Wilhelm-Röpke-Str. 6 C, D-35032 Marburg/Lahn, Germanychristoph.kampmann@uni-marburg.de
Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent scholarly debate about the Glorious Revolution has put renewed focus on the fear of a new aggressive Catholic confessionalism that was widespread among English and European Protestants. One important example is the threat of an imminent French-led joint Catholic aggression against the Netherlands and other Protestant states. This fear was shared by William of Orange and contributed to his decision to risk invading England in the autumn of 1688. Thanks to new archival sources, it is clear that Emperor Leopold contributed substantially to increasing this fear. In July 1688, the imperial government informed William of Orange about unprecedented French offers to Leopold to win over the emperor for a new Catholic alliance. Almost certainly these offers were fictitious, but nevertheless they had an alarming effect on William: he was convinced that an autonomous, ‘uncontrolled’ development in England (regardless of whether it would lead to a ‘popish’ despotism or to a Protestant republic) would only benefit France and should be avoided in this decisive situation. Consequently, after July 1688 William and his diplomats repeatedly referred to the supposed ‘indiscretions’ from Vienna to demonstrate the necessity of intervening in England.

Information

Type
Communication
Information
The Historical Journal , Volume 55 , Issue 2 , June 2012 , pp. 521 - 532
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

I

Recent scholarly debate about the Glorious Revolution has put renewed focus on the expectations and fears of the Protestant opposition at the end of James II's reign. In particular, Steve Pincus has placed great emphasis on the deep concern about an impending popish-‘Gallican’ despotism in England.Footnote 1 From Pincus's point of view, this applied both to the opposition in England itself,Footnote 2 and to the Dutch stadholder William of Orange,Footnote 3 whose intervention initiated the dramatic change in autumn and winter 1688–9.Footnote 4 It is already clear that these widespread Protestant fears can only be understood in the broader European context.Footnote 5 In particular, it was the renewed aggressive confessionalism of Louis XIV in the 1680s which created a feeling of threat among European Protestants – a feeling which reached a peak in the decisive summer of 1688.

In this connection, it is very revealing to consider the great Roman Catholic rival of Louis XIV, Emperor Leopold I (1658–1705), and his relations to William of Orange. There is clear evidence that Leopold played a major role by raising William's fears of an imminent French-inspired joint Roman Catholic aggression against the Protestant princes and states. Consequently, the traditional image of Leopold I as a benevolent and rather ambivalent observer of the events in England in 1688 is somewhat misleading.Footnote 6 Instead, deliberate indiscretions of the imperial government contributed substantially to the Dutch decision to risk invading England. Thus, a closer examination of the imperial policy in 1688 underlines the necessity to interpret the Glorious Revolution within a wider European framework, not only with respect to its consequences, but also to its origins.

This argument is developed in two main parts. First, I outline the expectations and assessments of the prince of Orange and his advisers concerning the political and confessional situation in England and its European consequences on the eve of intervention. With this in place, I secondly show how the revelations and information transmitted by the Vienna government in the summer 1688 had such an alarming effect on the prince and his allies.

II

It is well known that the negotiations of Prince William with the Dutch and his potential German allies were crucially important in facilitating the Dutch expedition of October–November 1688.Footnote 7 During these negotiationsFootnote 8 the stadholder and his envoys seem to have taken a clear and consistent stand in appraising the political situation, especially with regard to England.Footnote 9 According to the prince of Orange, there was an irreconcilable split within the British kingdoms – a split which was caused by the religious policy of James II. The bitter conflicts between the crown and the ‘nation’Footnote 10 had led to a total paralysis of all regular political processes. To the prince of Orange and his diplomats this unbearable situation would have inevitable far-reaching consequences, both in the short and medium term. For the time being, English divisions would significantly constrain its foreign policy.Footnote 11 It could not play any active role in a conflict between France and his enemies and the unstable government of the extremely unpopular king would not even be able to defend its own kingdom effectively because of widespread disloyalty in the army.Footnote 12

But the Orangist diplomats were sure that this insecurity of the British monarchy would not last very long. This was a crucial point in their reckoning: if the English crisis continued without any interference by Protestant Europe, this would eventually lead to two alternative, absolutely different, but in both cases extremely dangerous scenarios for their interests.

One possible result would be the total victory of James after the complete elimination of the Protestant opposition. This could have been enabled by a kind of ‘packed parliament’, by which the king would declare himself absolutely independent from unwelcome political participation; he would become souverain, as Bentinck put it during his negotiations with the councillor of the elector of Brandenburg, Fuchs.Footnote 13 The preparation for such a fundamental change of the traditional constitution had already begun and could lead to a sort of unprecedented despotism.Footnote 14 However, in the view of the prince of Orange and his envoys, there existed an alternative scenario. Due to the widespread aversion to the confessional popish politics of James, it appeared possible that he would succumb to the Protestant opposition and the English nation would prevail without any foreign Protestant help. According to William's diplomacy, the effect of such a radical change was obvious: the re-emergence of an English republic.Footnote 15

In confessional terms and with regard to the political systems in Britain, the differences between both solutions could not be any greater: on the one hand, the arbitrary government of a popish monarch and, on the other hand, a republic, which would result in – as the Orange diplomats admitted directly or indirectly during the negotiations – a Protestant, indeed radically Protestant, commonwealth.Footnote 16 However, interestingly enough, in the eyes of the prince of Orange, both had one general characteristic in common. Either way, England would become a political entity which would be fiercely hostile towards the United Provinces. The emergence of an unrestricted domination by King James (and his popish entourage) left no doubt about this development; King James had never made a secret about his annoyance with the Netherlands.Footnote 17 But an English republic would also be a powerful opponent to the Netherlands within Europe. The prince of Orange illustrated during the negotiations that the history of the first republican experiment in Britain had shown one thing: such an English republic would soon turn against the Netherlands in general and especially against the House of Orange.Footnote 18 Remarkably enough, the prince used this quite anti-republican argument not only in his negotiations with German Protestant princes but also in his conversations with the emissaries of the United Provinces and the province of Holland. During these negotiations, he reminded the States General and, not surprisingly, the province of Holland of the hostility in the 1650s of the English republic towards the Dutch. Notoriously, the English republican government had done as much as it could to damage the Dutch economy.Footnote 19

However, it is important to stress here that William's argument went one step further. Both possible outcomes of the English crisis would not only lead to growing Anglo-Dutch tensions but almost inevitably to the total ruin of the Netherlands and the House of OrangeFootnote 20 and, consequently, the destruction of Protestantism across Europe.Footnote 21 Such a conclusion rested on William's warnings during the negotiations of an imminent offensive of Louis XIV and potential Roman Catholic allies against European Protestantism. Again and again, William stressed the new confessional aggressiveness of the French king in his quest for universal monarchy.Footnote 22

From the point of view of the stadholder, the first victim of the renewed French aggressiveness would be the United Provinces, which had always been regarded by Louis XIV as an extremely annoying political obstacle to his far-reaching confessional and political aims. Supposedly the French king had long been waiting for an opportunity to destroy this persistently obstinate political entity.Footnote 23 And this opportunity would come soon if nothing happened. In William's view, French hostility against the United Provinces had been the true reason for the massive support of King James's religious policy granted by LouisFootnote 24 and that a firm alliance between Britain and France was threatened.Footnote 25 But French aggression against the Netherlands would be just a first step: victory over the United Provinces would put Louis XIV and his Catholic allies into a position to scheme even more vigorously against Protestants, including in Germany. It had to be assumed that the French king and possible Catholic allies would turn against the German Protestant princes in the following course of events.Footnote 26 The danger for the Protestant cause was unparalleled.

III

William and his diplomats purported to have strong evidence for such disquieting views. They regularly referred to top-secret information about an attempted rapprochement between Versailles and Vienna Hofburg which they had acquired at the imperial court. Obviously, Louis XIV tried hard to ally with the emperor in order to strengthen the anti-Protestant bloc. Versailles had made almost incredibly generous offers to the emperor, such as the cession of the French possessions in the Alsace and the facilitation of a hereditary, centralized, and absolutist Holy Roman Empire under the House of Austria.Footnote 27 This must have been extremely alarming for the German princes who were always worried about their freedom of action, their famous ‘Libertät’.Footnote 28

In contrast to the ill-advised English king, the imperial government had reacted reluctantly to the French offers: the prince of Orange was told by secret sources at the Vienna court that hitherto the imperial government held on to its old alliance with The Hague.Footnote 29 But, William told the States General, should James crush domestic opposition and Louis the United Provinces, the emperor would change sides almost necessarily.Footnote 30 Then Louis's dream (and the Protestant nightmare) of the great Roman Catholic alliance between Bourbon, Austria, and Stuart would become reality. In this light, the intervention in England had to be considered as a matter of self-defence of Protestant communities, at least in Western and central Europe. Therefore it was seen as vital for the foreign Protestant powers to intervene in England and to guide England's development in the right direction.Footnote 31

To protect him, the prince did not name his source at the Vienna court, not to his German nor even to his Dutch partners. Therefore, this top-secret information was called the ‘secretum secretorum’ during the negotiations.Footnote 32 But the archival records make it possible to trace the route of this alleged information from Vienna to the prince of Orange. In fact, it is clear that the top-secret source was none other than Emperor Leopold himself.

William received his information about the French offers during his secret negotiations with Vienna between May and July 1688. It has long been known that in May 1688 the prince of Orange had sent an unofficial envoy to the Vienna court to negotiate a renewal of the old defensive treaty between the United Provinces and the emperor.Footnote 33 His envoy was a councillor of the landgrave of Hessen-Cassel, Baron Johann von Görtz, who officially negotiated at the court of Vienna on behalf of his Hessian master and the Upper Rhenanian Circle (Oberrheinischer Kreis), but whose real task was the renewal of the long-suspended relations between The Hague and Vienna.Footnote 34

Early in July 1688, the emperor agreed to the renewal of the old imperial–Dutch defensive treaty, for the moment informally and secretly – an important step towards the emergence of the Great Alliance against Louis XIV in May 1689.Footnote 35 On this occasion, the emperor informed Görtz and, thereby, the prince of Orange about the extremely generous offers made by the French king in utmost secrecy.Footnote 36 On the explicit order of Louis XIV, the extraordinary French ambassador in Vienna, Lusignan, had offered the cession of Alsace and even his non-intervention in the possible future Spanish Succession crisis, if the emperor was willing to take his side or remain neutral in a coming conflict between France and the United Provinces.Footnote 37 According to the emperor, the ambassador of James II, Carlingford, had supported Lusignan at the Vienna court.Footnote 38

Almost certainly, this imperial information has to be regarded as fictitious. In general, the supposed French offers were absolutely incompatible with the principal aims of French foreign policy in 1688. Detailed research of the policy of Louis XIV has given us a reliable insight into the political priorities of Louis XIV in these years. Obviously, two objectives were vital for the French government. First, was the security of the French eastern border against the emperor, whose power was – thanks to the Austrian successes at the Ottoman frontier – steadily growing.Footnote 39 In this light, territorial concessions of Louis XIV in favour of the House of Austria in the Alsace, or the transfer of fortresses at the Upper Rhine, were hardly imaginable. For the same reason, Louis XIV was utterly opposed to any attempt to establish an hereditary Austrian monarchy in the Holy Roman Empire.Footnote 40 Secondly, the offer concerning the non-intervention of France in Spanish matters was even more implausible. The Bourbon claim to the Spanish monarchy, or at least parts of it, was the great leitmotif of Louis XIV throughout his reign.Footnote 41 It has to be regarded as almost impossible that Louis XIV would have abandoned the central objectives of his foreign policy in return for the imperial promise of temporary neutrality.

Archival evidence also argues strongly against the existence of such an offer. The imperial government let the prince of Orange know that it was no less than the French ambassador in Vienna, Lusignan, who communicated the offers of his royal master and who got the support of his English colleague Carlingford in his diplomatic efforts. Thanks to the diplomatic correspondence of LusignanFootnote 42 and CarlingfordFootnote 43 with their respective governments it is clear that the French government never made such a proposal to the imperial government.Footnote 44 Moreover, we know about ‘real’ secret French proposals to the emperor in 1687–8. The government in Versailles used the imperial envoy in The Hague, Kramprich, as an agent, because Kramprich was well known for his fiercely anti-Dutch and pro-Catholic stand.Footnote 45 These verifiable secret French offers to the emperor were totally different from those which were communicated to Görtz and in general far less sensational. The French king secretly offered that he might renounce parts of the Palatine heritage of his brother respecting his sister-in-lawFootnote 46 in return for the official recognition of all French territorial gains since 1648 (i.e. all French possessions in the Alsace including the city of Strasbourg and all other ‘réunions’ until 1684).Footnote 47 The French king made these offers to achieve his general intentions (to secure France's eastern border and to retain the claims to the Spanish heritage). There is hitherto no archival evidence that Louis XIV had any intention of abandoning his long-term objectives, just the opposite is true.

What was the underlying political strategy behind these positions? Obviously, the Vienna government tried to achieve two aims. One was to prepare the ground for later demands and wishes of the emperor.Footnote 48 In an indirect but quite effective way the emperor communicated the conditions of a closer co-operation to his Dutch partners. He let it be known that he expected the support of the States General in those matters which were supposedly offered by France. Indeed, in the end this was effective: the Dutch support of the House of Austria in Spain against any Bourbon claim and of the Austrian succession to the imperial throne were part of the treaty between the emperor and the States General in May 1689.Footnote 49

Second, the imperial government was well aware of the psychological effect that an attempted Austrian–Bourbon rapprochement would have on the prince of Orange, his closest advisers, and potential Protestant allies. For the prince, the information was very alarming, of course. For approximately 200 years, the differences between the Houses of France and Austria seemed to be irreconcilable; a détente or a formal treaty would mark a radical change in the European state system at the expense of the Protestant princes and states. Such a threat could toughen the anti-French stance of the stadholder and his Protestant partners, and accelerate the final breach between the States General and France. Since July 1688 at the latest, the emperor and his closest advisers like Stratmann were convinced that the next war with France would come sooner or later.Footnote 50 So the imperial use of misinformation has to be regarded as part of the efforts of Vienna to build up a powerful anti-French coalition.

IV

It is very clear that the stadholder, William of Orange, was fundamentally suspicious of Louis XIV.Footnote 51 On the eve of the Nine Years War William's anti-French position reached a new level because of anxieties of an imminent joint Roman Catholic aggression against the Netherlands and other Protestant powers initiated by France. Fundamental to this was (mis)information distributed by the imperial government about unprecedented French offers to the emperor. This had an alarming effect on the stadholder and contributed to his plans to intervene in England as soon as possible: William and his advisers were convinced that an autonomous, ‘uncontrolled’ development in England (regardless of whether it would lead to a ‘popish’ despotism or to a Protestant republic)Footnote 52 would serve France's interests and ruin the States General. Consequently, after July 1688 William repeatedly referred to the supposed ‘indiscretions’ from the Vienna court to demonstrate the necessity of an early intervention in England. Thus the emperor made a substantial contribution to the speeding up of the military expedition – a remarkable and hitherto overlooked contribution of the Roman Catholic emperor to the overthrow of his Roman Catholic fellow monarch James II.

Footnotes

*

I am greatly indebted to the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, which generously supported the archival research in Vienna, The Hague, London, Paris, and Marburg.

References

1 Pincus, S., 1688: the first modern revolution (New Haven, CT, and London, 2009), pp. 179–217Google Scholar.

2 Ibid., pp. 179–217.

3 Ibid., pp. 330–2.

4 Formally, William carried out the English expedition as prince of Orange, not as Dutch stadholder. For different reasons, especially those of international law, officially William acted as ‘Christian Sovereign’, who had the right to intervene and to protect foreign subjects. For the official legitimation in the ‘Orange manifesto’, see Claydon, T., ‘William III's declaration of reasons and the Glorious Revolution’, Historical Journal, 39 (1996), pp. 87–109CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Formally, the States General acted as William's allies. In political and military practice, it was the support of the Netherlands (especially that of the Province of Holland), and the role of William as stadholder and captain general, which facilitated the whole intervention. J. Israel, ‘The Dutch role in the Glorious Revolution’, in idem, ed., The Anglo-Dutch moment: essays on the Glorious Revolution and its world impact (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 105–62, especially at pp. 105–6; Troost, W., William III, the stadholder-king: a political biography (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 195–6Google Scholar.

5 Scott, H., ‘The making of a revolution?’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 41 (2010), pp. 227–42CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at pp. 236–8.

6 In this way, very characteristically, Baxter, S. B., William III (London, 1966), p. 223Google Scholar : ‘For the rest of the year [1688] he [Emperor Leopold] watched the rapid progress of events in England with a grim smile.’

7 Carswell, J., The descent of England: a study of the English Revolution of 1688 and its European background (London, 1969), pp. 232–7Google Scholar.

8 For recent treatments of these negotiations see D. Onnekink, ‘The last war of religion: the Dutch and the Nine Years War’, in idem, ed., War and religion after Westphalia, 1648–1713 (Farnham, 2009), pp. 69–88; idem, The Anglo-Dutch favourite: the career of Hans Willem Bentinck, 1st earl of Portland (1649–1709) (Aldershot, 2007), pp. 36–62Google Scholar; Carswell, The descent of England, pp. 155–63; Höbelt, L., ‘Imperial diplomacy and the Glorious Revolution’, Parliaments, Estates and Representations, 11 (1991), pp. 61–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Still very useful are the older works by Grew, M. E., William Bentinck and William III (prince of Orange): the life of Bentinck earl of Portland from the Wellbeck correspondence (London, 1924)Google Scholar; Japikse, N., Correspondentie van Willem III en van Hans Willem Bentinck, eersten Graaf van Portland (2 vols., The Hague, 1927–37)Google Scholar, i, p. 2; Klopp, O., Der Fall des Hauses Stuart und die Succession des Hauses Hannover in Groß-Britannien und Irland im Zusammenhange der europäischen Angelegenheiten von 1660–1714 (14 vols., Vienna, 1875–88)Google Scholar, iv: Die Katastrophe Jacobs II., die neue Thronfolge und die große Allianz von 1689; Müller, P. L., Wilhelm III. von Oranien und Georg Friedrich von Waldeck: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Kampfes um das europäische Gleichgewicht (2 vols., The Hague, 1873–80)Google Scholar, ii: 1684–1692, and Wiebe, R., Untersuchungen über die Hilfeleistung der deutschen Staaten für Wilhelm III. von Oranien im Jahre 1688 (Göttingen, 1939)Google Scholar.

9 The following remarks are based on the decisive negotiations of William of Orange with the elector of Brandenburg, the province of Holland, and the States General. The negotiations with Brandenburg were conducted by his closest friend and adviser, Willem van Bentinck, whose expositions were reported by the Brandenburg envoy Paul Fuchs on 27 July 1688 to Berlin; Fuchs to Elector Frederic III, 27 July 1688, Berlin, Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz, HA, Rep. 11, No. 1779, fos. 15–27v (hereafter ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’); the report of William of Orange to the States of Holland (29 Sept. 1688) is edited in the Secreete Resolutien van de Ed. Groot Mog. Heeren Staten van Hollandt en Westvrieslandt. Beginnende met den jaare 1679 en eydinge met den jaare 1696 incluis, n.p., v, pp. 229–35 (hereafter ‘William to the States of Holland’); the report of William of Orange to the deputation of the States General, 8 Oct. 1688, The Hague, National Archives, SG 4030, 8 Oct. 1688 (no pagination) (hereafter ‘William to the States General’). Additional evidence is contained in a memorial (not dated, from early summer 1688) to the imperial court (Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (hereafter HHSA), Hollandica 9, Kart. 1678–89, Konv. 10: 1687–8, fos. 34–42v) (hereafter ‘Memorial to the emperor’).

10 The term ‘nation’ was regularly used during the negotiation as the description of the Protestant opposition to the crown; e.g. see ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 27v; accordingly William of Orange with the term ‘de natie oppositie’; see ‘William to the States General’. See also ‘William to the States of Holland’, pp. 231–2.

11 It was stressed regularly in the negotiations that the deep crisis of the British kingdoms led to a total incapacity to act in foreign matters; Bentinck was convinced of the widespread disloyalty of the English armed forces; ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 20. See also ‘Memorial to the emperor’, fo. 37, and its pessimistic prediction, that the internal troubles of the British kingdoms would prevent the king from doing anything ‘useful’ in foreign politics.

12 Therefore Pincus's, 1688, pp. 332–3, assertion that the States General and especially William of Orange were full of fear for an English aggression in the nearer future and that they saw his invasion as a ‘preemptive strike’ against an imminent English attack is not completely convincing. Quite the reverse, Orange diplomats claimed throughout 1688 that England's internal divisions would prevent James doing anything against the States General; definitely England would be too weak ‘om yets nadruckelijcks tegens den Staat te onderneemen’ (‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231). This assessment corresponded to the judgement of the Dutch ambassador in London, Citters, who reported explicitly that James II was not prepared to attack the Netherlands. E.g. Citters to States General, 3 Feb./24 Jan. 1688, The Hague, National Archives, Collectie van Citters, vol. 6, fo. 24.

13 See ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 26.

14 See the statement of Bentinck that James could succeed by manipulating the parliamentary election, ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 17v; in the long run, the king would be able to achieve all his aims with regard to religion and foreign politics (fo. 18). Similarly, ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 234.

15 See ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 18v: ‘But in case that would happen and the English nation would have the upper hand without the prince's [of Orange] support, then England would turn itself into a republic.’ ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231; cf. verbatim in ‘William to the States General’; ‘Memorial to the emperor’, fo. 41r–41v.

16 It was seen as self-evident that an English republic would be a strictly Protestant commonwealth. More detailed about the fiercely Protestant politics of such a republic was the ‘Memorial to the emperor’ which pointed out, fo. 41v, that the Roman Catholics in England had to expect a bitter persecution and would be in extreme danger (ibid., fo. 42), because the vast majority of the English population had been taught an aversion to Catholics from the cradle. Accordingly, ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 21v, regarding the permanent agitation of Protestant preachers in England against Catholics. Due to the widespread anti-Catholic hatred of the common people (Gemeiner Mann) nobody would dare to speak in favour of the Catholics after an overthrow of King James's government.

17 ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 230; verbatim in ‘William to the States General’.

18 ‘William to the States General’: ‘de experientie van den vorigen tyt [had shown], wat den staet [of the United Provinces] van soo een republicq’ had to expect. Nearly verbatim in the ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231; ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 19r–19v.

19 ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 19. The republic would try to monopolize the whole trade, ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231, and ‘William to the States General’.

20 ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 19v: ‘and by that means ruin both Prince and States’.

21 Ibid., fo. 16: Bentinck reported that Protestantism everywhere, especially in England, the Netherlands, and in Germany, was in danger, indeed, in much greater danger than one could have expected a short time before.

22 For the central role of the terrifying vision of the French universal monarchy, see S. Pincus, ‘The English debate over universal monarchy’, in J. Robertson, ed., A union for empire: political thought and the British Union of 1707 (Cambridge, 1995), pp. 37–62, and Pincus, 1688, pp. 339–50. This was also true in William's diplomatic efforts; he stressed in his letters to his German friend Waldeck, who was indispensable for his diplomatic networks in the Holy Roman Empire, that it was the main task of his diplomacy in Germany, ‘de répresenter à tous les Princes de l'Empire le péril où toute la chrestienté est d'une Monarchie Universelle’; cf. Wiebe, Hilfeleistung, p. 4. For the connection of universal monarchy with confessional ideas see Onnekink, ‘The last war of religion’, pp. 84–6.

23 See ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 26r–26v; and ‘William to the States General’, that it would be the present aim of France to ruin and to subdue the United Provinces. See also ‘William to the States General’, pp. 230–1 and p. 234, about the French endeavour to overpower the States General as soon as possible.

24 The envoy of the prince of Orange at the imperial court, Baron Görtz, expounded that clearly to his negotiating partners: the king of France had to be regarded as the real protagonist of all changes in England, because he gained the greatest profit; see Vienna, HHSA, Hollandica 9, Kart. 1678–89, Konv. 10: 1687–8, fos. 90–5 [‘Nachtrag’ 1] .D. [May 1688]. For the mission of Baron Görtz, see below.

25 ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231, and ‘William to the States General’: ‘The king of England is only waiting for an opportunity to announce his annoyance about the states and to declare the new friendship between France and England’; ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fos. 16, 17r–17v.

26 ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 16, where it was stated that the victory of Catholic absolutism in England would lead to a strategy for the gradual destruction of Protestantism everywhere. Recently, Onnekink, ‘The last war of religion’, p. 87, has used the appropriate term ‘Protestant domino theory’. It is important to see that William's idea had nothing to do with confessional blind rage: from his point of view a necessary consequence of the fight against the French strategy was the alliance with the Roman Catholic emperor and the prevention of a radical Protestant republic in England.

27 See ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 26v, where he reports to his master ‘that if the emperor joins [the alliance against the Netherlands] or remains neutral, France would be prepared to surrender the Alsace including all fortresses to him and to allow the emperor to turn the empire into a hereditary monarchy’; ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231: ‘it is an incontestable proof [of the new French aggressiveness] that the kings [of France and England] had tried to persuade the House of Austria to abandon the Netherlands’; verbatim in ‘William to the States General’; for the promising attempts to impress the emperor by religious arguments, see ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231. The sacrifice of the Alsace would not be too great for Louis, because he aimed to compensate the losses by much greater gains in the Netherlands; see ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 26v.

28 The crucial importance of this ‘Libertät’ (liberty) of the German princes and estates for the political culture of the Holy Roman Empire is described lucidly by Wilson, P. H., Europe's tragedy: a history of the Thirty Years War (London, 2009), pp. 23–5Google Scholar.

29 ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 17: ‘By God's miraculous deed the emperor came to turn down the French proposal.’

30 The existence of powerful Protestant allies against France, especially the States General, would be the only reason for the pious Roman Catholic emperor not to ally himself with Louis XIV. Without them, he would almost necessarily have changed sides; ‘William to the States of Holland’, p. 231, and nearly verbatim in ‘William to the States General’. From the point of view of William of Orange, the emperor connected potentially religious considerations with power politics; in the case of the attitude of the prince of Orange towards the emperor, he did not suppose that all Catholic powers tended to apolitical religious fanaticism (see Onnekink, ‘The last war of religion’, p. 84).

31 ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 19v, where William points out that after a successful Dutch intervention, England would be again ‘a useful ally [against France] for his friends and allies and especially for our State [the Dutch States General]’.

32 See ‘Bentinck to elector of Brandenburg’, fo. 27.

33 It was Müller, Wilhelm III. von Oranien, who made known these secret negotiations between the prince of Orange and the emperor for the first time. See also the valuable remarks of Ritter von Srbik, H., ed., Österreichische Staatsverträge, Niederlande, i (Vienna, 1912), pp. 245–52Google Scholar; more recently Troost, William III, pp. 191–2.

34 The relations between The Hague and Vienna had been characterized by mutual suspicion since the end of the Dutch War. The rapprochement in summer 1688 was of crucial importance for European politics until the War of Spanish Succession. From the beginning of July 1688 onwards, the emperor constantly backed the policy of William of Orange, notwithstanding the extremely difficult confessional situation: the defensive treaty was officially concluded in September 1688, when no political observer could have had any doubts about the plans of an intervention of the Protestant prince against the Roman Catholic James II. From the point of view of Emperor Leopold I, the co-operation with the Netherlands was important, because he pursued a very ambitious political intention in Western and central Europe. For a more detailed treatment of the Dutch–imperial relations during the preparation of the intervention see now Kampmann, C., ‘Ein großes Bündnis der katholischen Dynastien 1688? Neue Perspektiven auf die Entstehung des Neunjährigen Kriegs und der Glorious Revolution’, Historische Zeitschrift, 294 (2012), pp. 31–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

35 Görtz to Landgraf Carl / William of Orange, 2 July 1688, Marburg, Hessisches Staatsarchiv, 4 e 89, fos. 126–8, especially fo. 126v. The decision of the emperor in favour of the Dutch treaty was seen as major political breakthrough by William of Orange. Even the stadholder, normally well known for his self-restraint and moderation, expressed his relief: ‘C'est assurément une providence divine que le M. Baron de Görtz a été envoyé à Vienne.’

36 Ibid., fo. 127v.

37 Ibid., fo. 127 (original German): ‘His Imperial Maj. conferred the honour on me to let me know in utmost secrecy what the French envoy [Lusignan] had offered him on behalf of his king [Louis XIV]: On the sole condition that the Emperor will not support the Dutch States and remain neutral these [French] offers include (1) To make peace with the House of Austria (2) to restore the whole of Alsace (3) not to attack the Palatinate and to renounce all respective claims (4) not to interfere into the Spanish succession and to reach a friendly and reasonable agreement with the Emperor in this respect.’

38 Ibid.

39 Malettke, K., Les relations entre la France et le Saint-Empire au XVIIe siècle (Paris, 2001), pp. 187–216Google Scholar; G. Symcox, ‘Louis XIV and the outbreak of the Nine Years War’, in R. Hatton, ed., Louis XIV and Europe (London, 1976), pp. 179–212.

40 J. Ulbert, ‘Die österreichischen Habsburger in bourbonischer Sicht’, in C. Kampmann et al., eds., Bourbon – Habsburg – Oranien. Konkurrierende Modelle im dynastischen Europa (Cologne, 2008), pp. 241–54.

41 A. Lossky, ‘“Maxims of state” in Louis XIV's foreign policy in the 1680s’, in R. Hatton and J. S. Bromley, William III and Louis XIV: essays, 1680–1720 (Liverpool, 1968), pp. 7–23, at pp. 20–3; K. Malettke, Die Bourbonen (3 vols., Stuttgart, 2008–9), i, pp. 200–3. There is clear evidence that the French king held on to the traditional Bourbon claim on Spain in summer 1688. For example, the instruction of the ambassador extraordinary of Louis XIV in Madrid, Rébenac, respecting the accompanying ‘Memoire très secret’, 30 June 1688, which explicitly stressed the legitimate claim of the dauphin to be universal heir of Charles II of Spain; Legrelle, A., ed., La mission de Rébenac à Madrid et le mort de Marie Louise (Paris, 1894), pp. 17–35Google Scholar, especially at p. 17.

42 There is no evidence about such offers in the correspondence between Louis XIV and Lusignan (Paris, Archives des Affaires Etrangères, Correspondance Politique, Autriche 63). Louis XIV and Lusignan knew about the real task of Baron Görtz, but were convinced that Leopold would refuse any co-operation with the United Provinces and William of Orange. The correspondence shows that a substantial proposal to the emperor was regarded as unnecessary, not to speak of offers concerning important matters like Alsace and Spain.

43 The correspondence of the earl of Carlingford with the government of James II in London, London, British Library, Add. MSS 4842 (Middleton Misc.). It reveals that Carlingford did not take any action to win over the emperor in the summer of 1688 or to guarantee his neutrality, because he underestimated the danger and showed a remarkable ignorance concerning the intervention plans of William of Orange (and their indirect imperial backing). This ignorance seemed to have been shared by many other envoys of James II at European courts apart from the ambassador in France, Bevil Skelton.

44 See Kampmann, ‘Ein großes Bündnis der katholischen Dynastien 1688?’.

45 For the fiercely anti-Dutch political position of Kramprich, see V. Jarren, ‘Macht- und Konfessionspolitik in der zweiten Hälfte des 17. Jahrhunderts: Die Berichte des kaiserlichen Gesandten Johann Daniel Kramprich von Kronenfeld über die Lage der Katholiken und katholischen Ordensgeistlichen in den Vereinigten Niederlanden 1667–1693’, Jahrbuch des Zentrums für Niederlande-Studien, 5/6 (1994–5), pp. 219–30. He can be regarded as a member of the court party which has been later called ‘Easterners’. For the activities of Kramprich as intermediary of secret French offers see V. Jarren, ‘Die Vereinigten Niederlande und das Haus Österreich, 1648–1748: Fremdbildwahrnehmung und politisches Handeln kaiserlicher Gesandter und Minister’, in H. Gabel and V. Jarren, Kaufleute und Fürsten: Außenpolitik und politisch-kulturelle Perzeption im Spiegel niederländisch-deutscher Beziehungen, 1648–1748 (Munich etc., 1998), pp. 39–354, at pp. 208–9.

46 On the whole controversial matter of the Palatine heritage, see Boutant, C., L'Europe au grand tournant des années 1680: la succession palatine (Paris, 1985)Google Scholar.

47 Kramprich to Leopold I, 22 Apr. 1688, Vienna, HHSA, Österreichische geheime Staatsregistratur, Rep. N, Kart. 71, fos. 161–6, with a summary of the secret French offers transmitted by the French ambassador in the Hague, d'Avaux.

48 For a detailed assessment of the political strategy of Leopold see now Kampmann, ‘Ein großes Bündnis der katholischen Dynastien 1688?’.

49 ‘Treaty between Emperor Leopold I and the States General against France’, 12 May 1689, in Srbik, ed., Staatsverträge, Niederlande, i, pp. 271–6, at p. 275. ‘Articuli separati’ concerning Dutch assistance to the emperor; cf. von Aretin, K. O., Das Alte Reich, 1648–1806 (4 vols., 2nd edn, Stuttgart 1997–2000)Google Scholar, ii, p. 32.

50 After the Cologne affair, no one in Vienna (as in many other European capitals) believed that peace could be maintained among the Christian states; Boutant, Grand tournant, pp. 827–8; Aretin, Das Alte Reich, ii, pp. 25–8.

51 Claydon, T., William III (London, 2002), p. 39Google Scholar, who emphasizes that this ‘obsession with France’ was William's lifelong dominant conviction as stadholder and later as king.

52 At the first glance there seem to be some similarities between the interpretation of the ‘pre-revolutionary’ situation in England under James II advanced by Steven Pincus (characterized by two radical opposing political movements, the Gallican-royalist and the Protestant-parlamentarian) and the assessment of William of Orange during the negotiations. In some sense, the prince of Orange expected the imminent confrontation between the Roman Catholic crown and the opposing ‘Protestant nation’ to have an uncertain outcome. The crucial point is that the prince and his advisers saw the necessity to intervene in England in order to prevent both possible results. This was not primarily an option for a moderate via media solution in England for domestic, constitutional reasons. Their position towards England was rather determined by foreign policy, i.e. by the pressures of continental European power relations. That confirms the suggestion of Claydon, William III, p. 32, that the expedition of 1688 should be interpreted as part of William's continental strategy.