Nearly forty years after her death, Hannah Arendt's political theory continues to provoke, inspire, and expand in influence. Indeed, some of the best recent work in the field of Arendt studies has been in areas Arendt herself could scarcely have anticipated. To cite just a few examples, recent contributions in international relations, peace and reconciliation studies, postcolonial history, and feminist theory have all creatively appropriated Arendt's work. To be sure, some of these appropriations have been highly critical of perceived lacunae in her work. Others have noted a profound debt, while extending her ideas in directions she may well not have approved of. Be that as it may, there is little doubt that the broad project of “thinking with and against Hannah Arendt” (to borrow Seyla Benhabib's felicitous phrase) continues apace.
The three essays collected here are notable contributions to this project. Jeremy Arnold's essay, “Arendt's Jeremiad: Reading On Revolution in a Time of Decline,” critically engages charges that Arendt's comparative study of the French and American Revolutions is bad history, implausible theory, or both. Arnold suggests that On Revolution should be viewed as a narrative of spiritual decline, one in which the properly political American Revolution turns out to be almost as much failure as success. While the Founders succeeded where the Jacobins failed—namely, in the constitution of a new form of government and a new space of public freedom—they came up short when it came to providing vehicles for the preservation of the “revolutionary spirit.” The result, which many have interpreted as a twist on tragic narratives (an interpretation boosted by Arendt's invocation of Sophocles's Oedipus at Colonus at the end of On Revolution) is, in Arnold's view, a new version of an old—and classically American—genre, the jeremiad which warns of America's precipitous spiritual decline into crass materialism. Such narratives, established well before the republic itself, have always stressed the baneful consequences of a falling away from original, inspiring principles. For the Puritans, economic and political changes heralded a religious decline; for Jefferson, they heralded a political decline, a repudiation of the principles of “public spirit, public freedom and public happiness” that guided the revolutionary spirit and which gave birth to the republic.
Viewed as jeremiad, On Revolution serves to warn Americans that, despite the ostensible success of their revolution, they have lost their “treasure”: the revolutionary spirit and the widespread desire among ordinary people to be a “participator in government.” Such a warning should not be construed as yet another instance of nostalgic Verfallsgeschichte that seems the stock in trade of German philosophy after Hegel. Rather, Arnold notes, Arendt's jeremiad is eminently practical in motivation, a call to actively reappropriate our heritage rather than submit to some bogus fatality.
Peter Verovšek's “Unexpected Support for European Integration: Memory, Rupture, and Totalitarianism in Arendt's Political Theory” departs from Arendt's suggestion (in The Human Condition) that the political association is a form of organized remembrance, a space in which the words and deeds of our civic predecessors are both preserved and actively augmented and extended in the present. Viewed in light of this perspective, the antipolitics Arendt analyzed in The Origins of Totalitarianism takes on a particular cast. Totalitarian government through terror not only threatens to destroy the phenomenon of human plurality (the conditio sine qua non of political life); it also threatens to destroy the space for organized remembrance. Converting governmental institutions into mere props disguising the relentless forward thrust of the “movement”; casting into oblivion all facts and populations that do not fit into the guiding ideological fictions; making the “sharing” of words and deeds virtually impossible, totalitarianism effects a radical discontinuity between past and future, a caesura that demands nothing less than the rethinking of the foundations of political life.
In “Authority without Foundations: Arendt and the Paradox of Postwar German Memory Politics,” J. Matthew Hoye and Benjamin Nienass pick up on themes from both On Revolution and The Origins of Totalitarianism. If, as Arendt claims in On Revolution, the Founders realized both the fragility of the old “absolutes” (Nature, God, Tradition) and the irreducible need for a “new absolute” to lend their constitutional creation an authority it otherwise lacked, it would seem to follow that every modern republic would have to take a similar, neo-Roman tack, endowing their respective “founding moments” with the authority of a “new absolute.” Yet, as the authors argue, the case of postwar Germany both problematizes and confirms Arendt's argument. After World War II, no one could pretend that the new fundamental law of the Federal Republic was anything other than the product of defeat, a legal-technocratic intervention from above. This “founding moment” could hardly gain the near-mythic status required by a new absolute, nor could it claim the authority requisite to produce lasting political stability. Yet the Federal Republic achieved a remarkable level of stability in less than four decades, ultimately facilitating the return of a unified Germany. How, Hoye and Nienass ask, was this possible?
The answer, the authors suggest, lies in the curious “negative absolute” of the Holocaust. It was this event, this caesura in German history, which paradoxically provided a ground, a “new absolute” for a postnationalist, postmilitarist Germany. The collective memory of the Holocaust, and the German guilt surrounding this event, paved the way for a new form of constitutional patriotism, one which provided the Grundgesetz the sort of authority productive of lasting political stability. The collective memory of the “negative absolute,” combined with public debates about the “unmasterable past,” served to preserve and augment the new constitution in a country notably lacking in viable liberal constitutionalist precedents.
Taken together, these three essays demonstrate the continuing productivity of critical scholarly engagement with Arendt. None of the authors treat her texts as sacred. However, it is precisely this lack of genuflection which enables the extension of her thought to new and unpredictable problems.
