In this paper, I argue that the literature on victims’ duties to resist their own oppression has not paid enough attention to the heterogeneity of victims and how this affects their duties. The main aim of the paper is to introduce considerations and complications—informed by an intersectional analysis, and particularly the concept of privilege—that must be taken into account when determining how to assign duties to resist. I argue that failure to recognize these nuances results in an overcautiousness when it comes to assigning duties of resistance, and that a blanket reluctance to assign such duties is of most detriment to the most marginalized.

In “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,” Donald Davidson argues against the view that conventions fix the meanings of our words and for the position that a speaker’s intentions play a fundamental role in fixing what she means by her words. However, he is clear that he still holds to the externalism, holism, and literalism argued for earlier in his career. Lepore and Stone (Philosophical Perspectives, 31, 245–265, 2017) and Camp (Inquiry, 59, 113–138, 2016) suggest that the resulting picture is contradictory. In this article, I take up Lepore, Stone, and Camp’s arguments to clarify Davidson’s position and motivate an anti-conventional literalism about meaning.

Collective agents can be praiseworthy without any of their members being praiseworthy. To support this “discontinuity thesis,” we consider the role that motivation plays in the attribution of moral responsibility. An agent who is praiseworthy must have had the appropriate moral motivation. We argue that it is possible that the collective agent was appropriately motivated, while its members were not. Subsequently, we develop an account of corporate moral concern, which gives substance to this second discontinuity thesis, about the moral motivation of collective agents.

Cases of identity confusion raise a challenge for convention-based meta-semantics. David Lewis’s influential account of convention, as it applies to language use, fails to distinguish, among two candidate languages, the one used by the population in question. The problem extends to Paul Grice’s influential account of sentence meaning.

In this review essay, I begin by considering Adler’s commitments, in defending his favored form of welfarism, regarding how we should conceive of well-being across human lives and account for this well-being in the social evaluation of outcomes and policies. Then I turn to Adler’s strategy for comparing his welfarist model(s) with traditional cost–benefit analysis in practical contexts of fatality risk regulation.

Proponents of modal knowledge accounts (safety and sensitivity) concur that one crucial advantage of their accounts is that they solve the so-called lottery problem—the problem of explaining why “lottery beliefs” based merely on statistical evidence do not constitute knowledge. Contra this claim, I argue that epistemic judgments about lottery beliefs do not consistently track what occurs in a specified set of nonactual possibilities. Thus, modal knowledge accounts cannot properly explain beliefs based merely on statistical evidence. Finally, I argue that these beliefs can be better accommodated by a rival theory of modal accounts—namely, explanationism.