This volume addresses two distinct but closely related propositions, both highly relevant to understanding the contemporary world order—a subject on which there is much ongoing speculation but little clarity. The first, as the title suggests, is that the world is witnessing a “New Cold War,” distinct from the first, to be sure, but displaying some parallel characteristics. The second is that this new Cold War, and the great power competition it entails, has directly contributed to the “remaking” of world regions, notably in enhancing their influence and ability to impact larger patterns of war and peace. In this regard, the book confirms a trend that scholars of regions and regionalism have pointed to for a while: that regions constitute the central building blocks of any new world order. This idea is captured on the penultimate page: “regions are more than just backyards or battlegrounds of great powers. Region making is not exclusively reserved for great powers because weaker and smaller states can often play a leading role” (p. 247). It ranges widely theoretically and empirically, both in terms of looking at the features of this new Cold War, and its expressions across different regional orders. Bookmarked by a strong introduction and conclusion setting out the main premises and findings, the volume’s early chapters (Chapters 2–7) offer a twenty-first-century perspective on some familiar, and some less familiar, International Relations themes, like great power rivalry, grand strategy, status competition, and the role of norms and ideologies among major powers. A chapter on economic statecraft (Chapter 7) embraces the role of new technologies and “beyond the border” strategies in an interdependent world. Later chapters (Chapters 8–10) consider the roles of the United States, China, and Russia respectively in their different spheres of influence.

Though the volume was published in 2025, its core themes and general orientation evolved from discussions at a 2017 workshop on peaceful change, and the prospects of peaceful change constitute a common thread running through the chapters. Subsequent roundtable discussions over the content of individual chapters followed in 2023 and early 2024 (see Preface ix-x), but the findings are mostly based on the period up to 2023. This means that the Hamas attacks on Israel in October 2023 and the onset of the Gaza War get only a brief mention. The second Trump presidency, the longer-term effects of the Gaza War, developments in the Ukraine War, the Iran War, and US intervention in Venezuela are perforce not included. Given the fast pace of change and unpredictability of recent events, it is reasonable to ask if the central propositions still hold. One chapter (Chapter 8) presciently warns of the possible dangers of Trumpian revisionism to the prevailing security order in Europe and Asia (p. 177)—a warning borne out in Europe by the splintering of the Atlantic alliance. Another (Chapter 6) wonders whether we should indeed characterize the current phase of great power politics as a Cold War (p. 123).

It certainly can be argued that, for all the talk of US-China rivalry, the elements of any Cold War are much less obvious than before. The new Cold War cannot simply be conflated with the old. In their introduction, however, the editors are careful to caveat its distinctive conditions, making clear that great power competition is ever present, yet more diffuse. And this diffusion has contributed to processes of regional remaking. There are simply more great powers and “rising” powers (though some of these have arguably already risen, suggesting the term may already be passé) and more so-called “pivot” states (e.g., India, Indonesia, Brazil, and Saudi Arabia) than was the case in the Cold War (pp. 4–5). Ideological dividing lines are less sharp than under bipolarity, but still apparent. Chapter 4 shows how ideas still inform the strategies of major powers, which, in turn, are crucial to the “wiring” of different regional orders (p. 76). Dominant patterns in the global economy may have shifted—there are far higher levels of economic connectedness than in the old Cold War years, but Chapter 7 shows how China and the United States clash over contrasting visions of desired regional order in the Indo-Pacific theatre (p. 142).

If there is still ambiguity over the nature of this new Cold War, and the authors remain divided on this point, the same can hardly be said for the resurgence of regions. Here the volume comes into its own in capturing this burgeoning trend towards regionalization. As core building blocks in today’s “multiplex world”—the term derives from the work of Amitav Acharya, who is also co-author of Chapter 2, but is threaded throughout the volume—regions and their actors have helped to hasten the demise of the “American World Order” (p. 28). Ongoing geopolitical competition is not the only reason for their remaking. The changing international balance of power has brought regions to the fore, but increased regional assertiveness also comes from within—from those states once categorized as “weak,” “developing,” or part of the old “Third World.” Regions and their actors simply have far greater capacity and feel emboldened, not least because of the visible failures of post-war institutions to deliver an effective and more representative global governance: the veil has finally been lifted on the so-called “Liberal International Order.” Regional states have more choice of alliance partners and greater bargaining power: they may simply “hedge” or refuse to align with major powers and former allies when it suits them—as positioning on the Ukraine War has shown. Recognizing these changes, the United Nations Secretary General, António Guterres, in different statements and high-level policy documents, has repeatedly called for reform of the organization to keep pace with the changing realities of power. This is a far cry from a world of regions in the US “imperium” that Peter Katzenstein once described.

On the question of what such regionalization means in terms of peaceful change, authors are divided. Some appear nostalgic for familiar elements of the old “rules-based” order and see its revival as providing a fresh pathway to peace, though the evidence from the past few years hardly supports such a view. Others, including the volume’s editors, are hopeful that peaceful change is possible within the “polycentric” emerging order (p. 19). The conclusion strikes a positive note in describing how today’s challenges are also opportunities. It points out that the growth of multiplexity opens up “new windows for transformational change,” while more decentralized forms of governance may “establish the solidarity and cohesion needed to address global problems” (p. 247).

Time will tell. Meanwhile, International Relations scholars and policy makers will find much of interest in the fresh take offered by this volume on the question of global order. It’s a shame there isn’t a little more discussion of regions like Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, which are all part of the ongoing remaking of regions. The focus is principally on the main spheres of interest of major powers—East Asia, Eurasia, and Europe. Setting that point aside, the book succeeds in issuing a compelling invitation to readers to engage critically with old and new paradigms and embrace the changing realities of the new world order.