Etel Solingen's Nuclear Logics is a welcome addition to the nuclear proliferation literature's growing consensus on the central importance of domestic factors for decision making in this issue area. Solingen argues in favor of a “political survival” model of proliferation that focuses on how well “nuclearization” suits the economic interests of the ruling coalitions inside states. Her core argument is that after the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) established a clear international non-proliferation norm—and thus also generated credible threats of economic sanctions and other material punishments for violating the norm (p. 8)—the value of going nuclear has come to be seen in very different ways by different domestic interest groups. Internationalizing domestic political coalitions—that is, coalitions anchored by economic groups that advocate openness to the international economy—are prone to promote “denuclearization” as a means of reassuring foreign investors and trade partners. By contrast, inward-oriented coalitions—coalitions anchored by economic groups, including the “military-industrial complex,” that resist openness to the international economy—do not fear foreigners' negative reaction to their state's nuclearization, and indeed might welcome it as an opportunity to increase their relative power over domestic internationalizers. Finally, compromise coalitions try to straddle the issue, often leading to “schizoid” policies (pp. 42–44).
Solingen's theoretical framework is both clear and plausible. She is also admirably careful not to claim too much for it. She clearly signals that the logic connecting internationalizing coalitions and denuclearization is much stronger than the logic connecting inward-oriented coalitions and nuclearization; indeed the very title of her theory chapter (ch. 2) is “Alternative Logics on Denuclearization.” Along these same lines, she properly asserts that her framework on its own cannot explain major, qualitative shifts in nuclear status—the construction or destruction of an operational nuclear weapons arsenal (pp. 18–19). She also notes that regional events or trends can constrain ruling coalitions from choosing the political path they would ideally most prefer. Apart from being sensible, Solingen's theoretical modesty is quite winning and allows the book to largely transcend stale inter-paradigm warfare.
Having developed her theory, Solingen then probes its value through case studies of the nuclear histories of nine countries from East Asia (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and North Korea) and the Middle East (Iraq, Iran, Israel, Libya, and Egypt). These amply researched case studies lay waste to the traditional assumption that proliferation (or non-proliferation) is the product of unitary, rational states pursuing objective national security interests. In its place, they provide considerable evidence that in both East Asia and the Middle East, internationalizing and inward-oriented domestic factions have indeed tended to hold very different opinions on the costs and benefits of nuclearization.
Solingen's application of her theory, however, is less than fully convincing because of the ill-defined and therefore slippery dependent variables of “nuclearization” and “denuclearization.” In a footnote, Solingen defines “denuclearization” simply as “renunciation,” and she defines “nuclearization” as “movement toward nuclear weapons acquisition, even if it does not result in actual acquisition,” without further elaboration (p. 301, n. 1). Such terseness leaves untouched many knotty issues of operationalization and even conceptualization. For instance, what constitutes denuclearization in practice? The usual shorthand in the literature is to equate it with Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) membership, but Solingen strongly rejects that notion without clearly explicating what we should put in its place. She therefore ends up dealing in debatable interpretations of leaders' ultimate nuclear weapons intent. For instance, the nuclear trajectories of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Park Chung Hee's South Korea might seem rather similar: both long-resisted the NPT and indeed launched dedicated nuclear weapons drives but later downshifted those efforts in the face of severe diplomatic pressures. However, Solingen rejects the parallel, choosing instead to depict the inward-oriented Saddam as a dedicated nuclearizer who was counting the days until he could restart his bomb drive (p. 160), while depicting the internationalizing Park actually as a closet denuclearizer whose bomb drive was a mere “bargaining chip” that he was happy to cash in when his price was met (pp. 91–93). The point here is not that Solingen's interpretation of either case is necessarily wrong, but rather that the lack of clear coding rules weakens all of her interpretive claims. Similar problems dog Solingen's discussions of nuclearization. What, exactly, does it mean to move “toward” nuclear weapons? The usual approach is to equate it with growing mastery over the nuclear fuel cycle, but Solingen again rejects that standard without offering any clear alternative. Thus, for instance, Solingen describes Japan as a paradigmatic case of denuclearization despite its large and growing plutonium stockpile and, in Solingen's view, reversible commitment to remaining non-nuclear (pp. 80–81), while she portrays Gamel Abdul Nasser's Egypt as a paradigmatic case of nuclearization even though its nuclear program consisted mainly of hot air (pp. 239–240). Further confusing matters, in the Iran chapter, Solingen approvingly quotes one expert's view that Iran's nuclearizers may be following a “Japan model” of acquiring “all weapons-related technologies under legal cover” (p. 175). But was not the “Japan model” supposed to be one of denuclearization?
These problems notwithstanding, Nuclear Logics makes a strong theoretical contribution and deals extensively with numerous cases that are of burning contemporary policy relevance. The book will be valuable not only to scholars interested in the proliferation issue, but also to policymakers seeking more effective means of reining in upstart nuclear weapons programs.
