Julia Lynch makes an important contribution to the crowded field of welfare state studies. A popular and apparently simplistic approach to explain why Europe has larger welfare states than North America—and why northern Europe has bigger social safety nets than the south—is related to the ability of labor to mobilize more resources than capital. Lynch challenges this view that has been the staple of comparative welfare state studies for nearly 30 years. Breaking down expenditures and labor market policies by age, Lynch overturns the traditional typology. She categorizes countries into three groups: countries whose polices favor the elderly (Japan, the United States, and Italy); countries that favor young adults and children (Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden) and a middle group (Germany, France, the Netherlands) that have a mixed system.
Lynch's explanation of this outcome takes two parts. In the first half of the book, she assembles the raw data for a sample of OECD countries, reviews previous explanations of the rise and extension of welfare states, and introduces an alternative framework. The model she proposes is a mix of history and politics, although the latter seems to trump the former in the final analysis. In the beginning, welfare states were either citizenship- (or universal-) or occupational-based, although Lynch does recognize that this distinction is less clear for the period before 1914. Occupational-based social expenditures were popular in continental Europe and tended to favor older workers and retirees. These types of welfare states created divisions between insiders and outsiders. Relatively fewer elderly oriented, universal-based programs were found in Scandinavia, and the United Kingdom and its settler economies. Sometime around mid century and in the aftermath of World War II, certain countries with occupational-based systems turned toward universal- or youth-oriented programs. Lynch constructs a measure of the ratio of elderly to nonelderly spending for a sample of rich countries and finds no obvious relation with either an index of labor or grey power. The tests are rudimentary, however, with Lynch preferring scatter plots to multivariate analysis.
The second part of the book uses the experiences of Italy and Netherlands in the provision of family allowances, unemployment benefits, and old-age pensions, to explain the conditions under which the evolution to universal systems has taken place. Politicians in the Netherlands competed for votes by promising to enact policies that they held would benefit society at large. Programmatic evolution of this type, according Lynch, was feasible in polities where cleavages between regions, industries, and classes are minor. The dynamic was different in Italy where particularistic policies or clientelism dominated and reinforced the earlier tradition of occupational-based expenditure. When in Rome do as the Romans do, and this meant that politicians traded targeted benefits for the support of selective groups of voters. Deviating from popular wisdom slightly, Lynch concurs that all politicians are local. She finds little support in her case studies, as in her wider sample, for the role of group interests, such as grey power, as is commonly evoked in the political economy school. Demographics do not explain the dispersion of social expenditure by age. The actions of politicians do.
Is the argument convincing? Despite her intention to distance herself from certain comparative studies of welfare states, Lynch's approach is less radical than she makes it out to be. Like authors of traditional studies, she restricts herself to OECD countries. Are differences between the countries in the sample so large as to warrant an explanation? Is there a problem with selection bias here? Surely, Latin American and other regions deserve to be included in the sample, let alone to understand the relation between ideology, political institutions, electoral systems, and types of expenditures. And like the traditional literature on the welfare state, Lynch's work treats each country as a separate entity. Broader forces of emulation seem not to matter. Nor does exposure to international trade. One would have thought that countries that could not alter the terms of trade would be less willing to extend social entitlements and expose themselves to higher labor costs if their major trading partners did not have comparable welfares sates. To be fair, Lynch does argue that universal systems would be favored by employers where levels of openness and international competition were greater, because employers could pass on the costs to all taxpayers. But, even in universal systems it is difficult to pass on fully the additional labor costs associated with social entitlements, and employers and workers in export competing industries would be wary of out-pricing themselves in foreign markets.
In a brief concluding chapter, Lynch conjectures on future prospects for the welfare state in the OECD. As life expectancy increases, will the bias towards the elderly in certain countries deepen? Lynch is not so certain. The age orientation of welfare states was an outgrowth of earlier choices that had little to do with the lobbying power of the elderly. Because of policy drift, there is no reason to expect large shifts in programs toward one age group over another.
This is an engaging, well researched, and written book that will be read with significant interest by students of the welfare state as well as by policy makers.
