Misinformation and hate speech are increasingly visible features of the contemporary democratic landscape, and this disconcerting fact forces us to confront basic questions about why and how much we value freedom of expression. How fortunate, then, to have a book like Ioanna Tourkochoriti's, which provides an informative and philosophically rich account of the differences separating the French and American approaches to free speech. Describing these differences is a fairly straightforward enterprise—the American system prioritizes free speech considerably more than does France, which energetically regulates hate speech, contributions to political campaigns, the dissemination of misinformation, and other dignity-diminishing expressive practices—but explaining their emergence is not. Tourkochoriti seeks to do so by recurring to the history of ideas: she views the two nations’ differential willingness to regulate speech as a product of more fundamental contrasts in the conceptions of liberty and the state's role in society that were operative during the French and American Revolutions. French revolutionaries, she argues, were concerned not only with the possession but also with the effective exercise of rights, and this “positive” view of liberty led them to use state power to regulate all practices they believed to be autonomy inhibiting. The American founders, on the other hand, inherited from Locke (among others) a “negative” view of liberty which sought to make citizens free by minimizing the state's ability to aggress upon them.
These differences, explicable “by reference to the philosophical presuppositions underlying the two legal orders,” generate correspondingly different understandings of why freedom of expression deserves protection and the extent to which it can be regulated (6). Tourkochoriti puts particular emphasis on the French bans on the niqab—a facial covering worn by many Muslim women—and the practice of “dwarf throwing” (which is exactly what it sounds like). On her accounting, such bans are products of a specifically French “historical imaginary” which posits “a strong government that has a positive impact on society” and a paternalistic view of liberty which allows the government to intercede in patterns of voluntary choice when they have been unduly influenced by “false consciousness.” This imaginary finds expression both during and prior to the revolution, and forms the context in which all expressive acts are interpreted. Through its lens, the niqab ban supports emancipation by “liberat[ing] women from the oppression of their families in the cases when the burka is not self-imposed,” and prohibitions on dwarf throwing serve a similar end by protecting the dignity of those who might otherwise feel compelled to participate in a spectacle that severely demeans their dignity (119–20). Tourkochoriti worries that any view of liberty requiring the state to substitute its judgments for those of its citizens is inherently dangerous and makes a strong argument indeed against the bans to which she refers: “it is possible to accept that it is legitimate for the state to intervene to limit freedom of expression when there is harm to others, while it is not legitimate for the state to intervene in cases of self-expression, such as dwarf-throwing and the burka ban” (241).
Tourkochoriti's book is informed, however, by an awareness of the limits of the American as well as the French approach to free speech. Though the American legal system's reticence to regulate expression is on her accounting commendable because of the freedom it gives each individual citizen to “reflect and judge by themselves,” its comprehensive pessimism about the state is problematic because it “leads to the impasse of underprotecting important values like privacy” and “overlooks the performative dimensions of speech” (241). This latter limitation is especially significant for Tourkochoriti, who claims that First Amendment jurisprudence—based as it is on a rigid distinction between speaking and acting—systematically neglects the possibility that some forms of speech qualify as action and thus fails to reckon with the full harm done by hate speech. So too is Tourkochoriti critical of the Citizens United decision, which interprets expressive rights in a way that allows powerful social actors disproportionate influence in setting the terms of public debate. Ultimately her concerns about both legal systems are sensible, rooted in a deep understanding of their respective logics, and articulated in an even-handed and scholarly way. In these ways, Freedom of Expression is exemplary and may serve as a model for a field which too often devolves into crude polemic and ideological crusading.
Though Tourkochoriti's account of the differences between the French and American legal systems is undeniably rich, so too does it have its limitations. Its attempt, for instance, to explain the emergence of free speech restrictions in France by recurring to the specifically French revolutionary and legal context is questionable in light of the fact that similar regulations on expression exist in most other European countries. Indeed, what distinguishes France from America as well as other European countries is not its generic willingness to regulate speech but rather its constitutional commitment to the principle of laïcité, which governs what forms of religious expression are permissible in public spaces. Though this principle is of central importance to the revolutionary context Tourkochoriti emphasizes and bears directly on many of the contemporary controversies she refers to, its role in structuring the legal discourse around freedom of expression is strangely neglected. One might say the same of religion more generally: though Tourkochoriti's focus on “revolutionary moments” is revelatory in many respects, it abstracts from the primarily religious context in which debates about freedom of expression first emerged and, in so doing, perhaps underestimates Christianity's influence on historical imaginaries on both sides of the Atlantic.
Yet, these shortcomings are hardly a reason not to engage with Tourkochoriti's excellent study, which deserves the careful attention of historians, legal scholars, and political theorists alike. It places divergent approaches to freedom of expression in a meaningful philosophical context, bears directly and helpfully on a contemporary political problem of tremendous importance, and illuminates the causal force of ideas-in-time.
