The progressive movement of the early twentieth century reached its political peak in the election of 1912. That was the year Theodore Roosevelt ran for president as the candidate of the new Progressive Party, after losing the nomination from his own Republicans. Roosevelt's leadership gave progressivism the sense of legitimacy for which it had been waiting: As the former president and larger-than-life political celebrity made the movement his own, it ceased to be a loose affiliation of grassroots social reformers or an abstract school of thought among Darwinian intellectuals. As a party, Progressives offered an appealing third way between socialist revolution and uncontrolled capitalism. The new party would end the default privileges of elite business interests and give the American people a truly democratic form of government by elevating the spirit of reform to a national level. Roosevelt lost the election, of course; despite his intense campaigning efforts, the presidency went to Woodrow Wilson. The Progressives went the way of all third parties, as the movement retreated back into local reforms and social philosophies—but not without leaving a deep and enduring mark on the way Americans understand and experience politics in modern times.
Sidney Milkis's new book is a study of that momentous election, which, he argues, witnessed a radical transformation of American politics. It remade the modern understanding of elections and set the framework for all subsequent American political thought. It began the American search for “a more direct relationship between government action and public opinion throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries” (14). This was, perhaps, an inevitable change in light of the new conditions of industrial life, which seemed to alter even the most basic understanding of justice and good government. As the social classes grew further apart, laborers found themselves degraded and desperate, finding no remedy against massive economic injustices. The only solution—or the best alternative to violent revolution, as Roosevelt frequently reminded everyone—was to unite local and national concerns and make the power of national government correspond with the energy and vision of activists and charity workers, merging it all together into a single “Nationalism.”
The greatest obstacle, though, was the Constitution, which kept local activism within the state sphere on one hand and restricted the power of the federal government on the other. The two could only meet with the breakdown of the Constitution's central features, which were meant to contain democracy, namely, the system of representation, the independent judiciary, and checks and balances in the legislative process. In practice, this meant the direct election of senators, the recall of judicial decisions, and a turn to administrative lawmaking; in the states, it meant experiments in popular referendums, initiatives, and other methods of direct democracy.
Ultimately such reforms would prove the answer to a simple proposition which the existing constitutional order had rejected: The people themselves have an absolute right to rule. This was no “natural” right, as the Founding generation believed; “the ‘Forward Movement’ intended to sanctify a new civic faith that rested not in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution but, in the emancipation of popular rule from natural rights, political parties, and the law” (72). It was an asserted right, as asserted as all other values and practices in modern times. Under the Progressive Party's plan, a nationwide direct democracy could emerge, unified by its reforming spirit, and empowered by an efficient and responsive national government.
Such a social transformation could not occur spontaneously, though, nor could it happen by the people's efforts alone. It required a single visionary or a lone representative who could sympathize and personally connect with the people; he could become one with the multitude, and at the same time, shape them into a unified body, and lead them forward into a full realization of democratic freedom. “Most social reformers viewed a powerful, charismatic leader as indispensible to the task of remaking American democracy,” Milkis writes. There was a “critical link between heroic leadership and social reform” or a “magnetic candidate who could give expression and effective leadership to their causes” (129). Who but Theodore Roosevelt could accept such a duty?
Many could see the danger in this and identified it as classic demagoguery. Roosevelt's rival, the incumbent president William Howard Taft, called it nothing short of tyranny. Progressive supporters like Jane Addams and Lyman Abbott could grant this. “Yet given the disdain reformers felt for conventional party politics, Roosevelt's extraordinary leadership was no less necessary than it was dangerous” (155). Government control by corporate interests was already tyranny as far as they were concerned. However, was it possible that future Roosevelt-style leaders could become just as bad? Was ideological ambition any better than economic greed? It was a risk Roosevelt's supporters felt the nation would have to take.
Milkis details Roosevelt's electrifying campaign, as the candidate accepted his calling wholeheartedly. He used many of the electioneering techniques taken for granted today. Roosevelt introduced the first “candidate centered” campaign, where voters deliberate about personality more than party platform and establish a direct relationship between the candidate and voters. He sought celebrity endorsements from famous entertainers and scientists; and he used early recording equipment to distribute his speeches via phonograph. Most striking of all, Roosevelt called the election nothing less than the battle of Armageddon and filled the campaign with intense religious fervor by suggesting himself as a kind of spiritual leader.
These were all the features of Roosevelt's “stewardship” theory of the presidency—the ability to deliver the nation from the social and economic crises of the times and move history forward by his own magnanimity. It was a perception of leadership that would leave the Constitution—the “rule of law rather than the rule of men,” with all of its enduring checks on power and guarantees of basic rights and liberties—quite cold and irrelevant by comparison.
Milkis's book makes it easy to believe that the Progressive legacy influences all aspects of American government and politics today. This claim to continuity of a single movement is a bit dubious, given the major twists and turns experienced since 1912: the New Deal was certainly the sort of project many progressives hoped for, yet it was more of an attempt to regulate than nationalize private industry to end the Great Depression. The 1960s brought an open revolt against the older progressive vision of state-manufactured democracy for the sake of radicalism and power. Then came the new conservative movement, which did much to recover the Founders' constitutionalism and classical liberal thought as a viable basis for public policy. However, these were primarily economic, social and intellectual trends, not political ones, and if the evidence is considered carefully, it is not clear that any of them entirely escaped the framework of progressive thought. How deeply did progressivism transform American politics? Did Theodore Roosevelt's campaign truly set the tone for the following century? Milkis's work offers an excellent starting point for answering these questions.
