Chinese officials have long been sceptical of using the tools of the United Nations to pressure those accused of human rights violations. Sanctions and military interventions weaken the norm of sovereignty, a strong version of which Beijing relies on to reject foreign interference in its own affairs. As a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council, why then has China sometimes acquiesced to, or even supported, such pressure? In China and Intervention at the UN Security Council, Hong Kong University professor Courtney Fung argues that anxieties about the loss of status can help explain the puzzle. In doing so, she not only draws attention to an underappreciated motive of Chinese foreign policy, but also develops a sophisticated, and largely persuasive, theory of how and when status concerns encourage leaders to do the unexpected.

In a nutshell, the book theorizes that a state will act on status concerns under two conditions: when leaders perceive that a failure to act will have a strong, immediate effect on their standing within a peer group (called a “status trigger”), and when the other members of the group have coalesced around a specific course of action, and are thus in a strong position to punish the would-be spoiler. Seeking to avoid the social costs of opposition, a state will bandwagon even if doing so requires a cost to its material interests or normative preferences. Conversely, in the absence of a specific trigger or a consensus among its peers, a state is likely to act in ways more consistent with those other interests. This argument builds on, and advances in a thoughtful way, the literature on the micro-processes of social influence in international relations.

The empirical heart of the book weighs this theory against Chinese decision-making at the Security Council in three recent cases involving mass atrocities: Darfur (2004–2008), Libya (2011–2012) and Syria (2011–2015). Marshalling over 200 interviews and a vast collection of UN documents and Chinese-language sources, the cases demonstrate how, at critical moments, Beijing considered the social costs of obfuscation and adjusted its positions accordingly. In the Darfur and Libya cases, a consensus among China's two peer groups – the great powers (represented by the United States, Great Britain and France), and regional groups representing the developing world – made intervention hard to resist, while in the Syria case, divisions in the Arab world greatly reduced the costs of China using its veto to shield the Assad regime.

While the book is clearly valuable to international relations theorists and students of Chinese foreign policy, there are also useful insights for practitioners. In the conclusion, Fung argues that Security Council resolutions are most likely to succeed when they are not seen as stoking regime change. Dealing with “rogue regimes” with a lighter touch would address sensitivities piqued by the view in many quarters that NATO far exceeded its mandate in the 2011 air campaign against Libya that led to Gaddafi's demise, concerns reflected in the Security Council's failure to act decisively on Syria. Less ambitious proposals, though unsatisfying in Western capitals, could be more useful in galvanizing broad regional support, which Beijing will take into account when forming its own position.

Readers of this volume will leave with the impression that status has weighed on the minds of past Chinese leaders, especially when they feared isolation on the world stage, but may also question how relevant this consideration will be in an era of Chinese confidence. The threat of a Western boycott of the 2008 Beijing Olympics led China to shift its position on Darfur, but given Chinese appraisals of a US in relative decline after the global financial crisis and a growing willingness to stand up to Europe on human rights, it is unclear that China's decisions would be as easily influenced today. It is also doubtful that Xi Jinping – a bolder leader in his own right – would be as willing to appear to bend to Western pressure as his predecessors.

China's ability to influence the distribution of social rewards and sanctions also deserves greater attention. With greater economic and diplomatic power, Beijing is less likely to accept whatever the consensus of the major players and regional blocs happens to be. China, for instance, has leveraged its largesse among a few Southeast Asian partners to prevent ASEAN from adopting a stronger critique of China's territorial claims in the South China Sea, thus avoiding social opprobrium. In a future debate on intervention, Beijing could also use various carrots and sticks to prevent other groups from unifying against its preferred position or dissuade them from imposing costs, such as boycotting the Olympics. Understanding the means through which China is both adapting to and actively manipulating the ability of others to grant it status will thus be a key consideration as world leaders try to enlist Beijing in a future coalition.