Russia's and Iran's experiences of revolutionary change and efforts to reform revolutionary and ideological systems over the last two decades have received a fair amount of attention. Most notable among the books dealing with these subjects is Timothy McDaniel's Autocracy, Modernization and Revolution in Russia and Iran (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991).
The temptation to compare the Russian and Iranian experiences with regard to their respective revolutions in 1917 and 1979, as well as their later experiments with reform, is strong for several reasons. Both countries are what development experts call “late modernizing states,” wherein early modernization efforts were propelled by the state and largely limited to physical modernization, leaving political institutions and cultures largely untouched. The reactions of significant parts of the first and second postmodernization generations in Iran (i.e., post Pahlavi) and Russia (i.e., after the reforms of Peter the Great) to modernization also bear some similarities, notably, a trend toward returning to indigenous cultural traditions in the form of Slavophilism in Russia and political Islam in Iran.
Reformist camps surrounding Mikhail Gorbachev and Iran's president Muhammad Khatami also faced similar internal differences, notably, the question of the extent to which reform was necessary. In the case of the Soviet Union, these differences finally led to the Yeltsin phenomenon and the eventual collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet collapse reflected the fragility of a system based on a strict political and social ideology.
In the case of Iran, too, the more extensive challenges of Khatami's left-leaning supporters, most notably, to the concept and institution of vilāyat-i faqīh (rule of the jurisprudent), undermined Khatami's more moderate and gradual reform agenda. But in Iran it was the conservatives who managed to reassert their authority, at least for the time being. Ironically, the Soviet experience of reform, coupled with frequent references by some in the West that Iran would go the way of the Soviet Union, performed a cautionary function for Iran's conservatives, who succeeded in frustrating Khatami's reform efforts.
The author of Khatami and Gorbachev does a credible job in demonstrating the similarities between the monarchical phases of modern Iranian and modern Russian history, as well as in explaining the processes of reform in both countries. However, Shakibi does not pay enough attention to major differences between Iran and Russia. It is not warranted, for example, to equate Iran under the Pahlavis with the Tsarist empire. Iran was not an empire at the time and is not an empire now. Certainly Iran has an ethnically diverse population, albeit not more than a country such as Spain or the United Kingdom. However, Iran was never a colonial empire as Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union were, and as one might even say the Russian Federation is. The USSR was, according to its constitution, a commonwealth of countries that had come together voluntarily and could leave the commonwealth if they so desired. In reality, however, the USSR had many features of a traditional colonial empire. This point was the main reason for the failure of Gorbachev's reforms; the reforms unleashed ethnic conflict and movements for national independence in the USSR, which Yeltsin then manipulated for his own purposes. (In this sense, it was ironic that Yeltsin asked for the independence of the Russian Federation from the Soviet Union because from the USSR's beginnings Russia was its main power center that dominated the Union. In fact, the USSR was the empire of the tsars under a new guise.) Such unraveling did not occur in Iran under the Khatami presidency because Iran is not a colonial empire. Nevertheless, even in Iran some reformists played the ethnic card, especially during the 2005 elections, which caused fear among a portion of Iranians that centrifugal trends in the country could intensify.
The author rightly and competently discusses the similarities between the efforts of some Russian intellectuals and a number of Iran's Muslim reformers to develop a synthesis between modernity and tradition. However, here too he ignores major differences between Islam, a divinely inspired religion, and communism, a secular ideology. Communism is much more compatible than Islam (or any other divinely based system of belief for that matter) with some fundamental aspects of modernity, namely, secularism. Consequently, comparing Islamic reformism with reforming a socialist system is like comparing apples with oranges. After all, going against God is more dangerous than going against Lenin or Marx. More seriously, the author does not address the fundamental issue that the very basis of modernity consists of the negation of dogma and an emphasis on rationalism. Yet religions, like communism, are dogmatic creeds. Shakibi also does not mention the Achilles heel of synthesizers, which is their lack of recognition of the fact that modernity, as put by Wayne Allensworth, “comes in a single package” (The Russian Question: Nationalism, Modernization and Post-Soviet Russia [Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998], 35). Picking and choosing aspects of it always lead either to the victory of authenticist conservatives, as has happened in Iran, or the unraveling of the entire system, as happened in the USSR.
There are other minor points the author has missed. For example, Shakibi refers to the similarities between the worldviews of political elites in the USSR and the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, he fails to point out that this similarity was a function of the impact of socialist ideas on certain Muslim groups at least as far back as the 1940s and the inclination of some key members of Iran's Islamic power elites, including a good number of reformists, toward socialism and the USSR. By contrast, the worldviews of the political elites in the USSR were shaped by historical determinism of Marxist ideology.
The above does not exhaust the list of important differences between the experiences of Iran and Russia, most notable among them being Iran's extreme vulnerability to external factors, especially the actions of major international actors both before and after the revolution. Nevertheless, and not withstanding the above remarks, Khatami and Gorbachev is a valiant effort at a comparative analysis of developments in Iran and Russia and helps readers understand the perils and promises of reform in ideologically based systems as well as the difficulties inherent in developing local modernities.
