2.1. Defining Party Ideology

It is important to distinguish between political parties and political ideologies because even though they do similar things—organize coalitions of individuals—they do so in different ways.Footnote ¹⁰ A political party is a “team of individuals,”Footnote ¹¹ but a political ideology is a “configuration of ideas and attitudes.”Footnote ¹² These ideas and attitudes are bound together by a “verbal image of the good society.”Footnote ¹³ In this conceptualization, ideology is “a shared body of reference—a configuration of more or less abstract ideas” that constrains the behavior of individuals.Footnote ¹⁴

Thus, a party ideology is a system of ideas shared by party members that shapes the way they think, talk, and act. As political structures, party ideologies are belief systems that shape and constrain the thinking, attitudes, decision making, and behavior of party members. Like party organizations,Footnote ¹⁵ party ideologies are created and transformed by political actors, and it is often elites who play a decisive role in determining the meaning and content of a party's ideology at any given time. As Philip Converse explained, “the shaping of belief systems of any range into apparently logical wholes that are credible to large numbers of people is an act of creative synthesis characteristic of only a miniscule proportion of any population.”Footnote ¹⁶

Political actors create, modify, and use party ideologies for the same reason that they create, modify, and use party organizations: They are useful. They are “economizing device[s]” that simplify decision making for individuals who identify with, or subscribe, to the ideology.Footnote ¹⁷ They provide “norms of cultural appropriateness” that help party members “cope with the cognitive constraints on their information-processing.”Footnote ¹⁸ They “provide the language in which groups debate and disagree.”Footnote ¹⁹ In this way, ideologies have both a limiting function and a rationalizing function.Footnote ²⁰ They both shape, and are shaped by, the actions of individuals.

We should keep in mind that just because political actors can participate in the creation and transformation of political ideologies does not mean that they can do so exogenously or at-will. These political actors are embedded in a language community that limits the way that they even think about the activity of party ideology change. As Elkins and McKitrick explain, new “ascriptions of meaning, then, must in the most basic sense be fashioned out of what is already there. The clusters of ideas, the values attached to them, and the modes whereby they are put into words must be drawn from some common reservoir; otherwise, there can be no echoes, no recognition, no meaning.”Footnote ²¹

This linguistic character of ideology means that transformations of ideology are limited. Any radical changes in some part of an ideology must be paired with consistency in other parts of the ideology for it to make sense and remain relevant. For example, when Democratic Party ideology changed in the early twentieth century from advocating limited national power and limited economic intervention to advocating expansive national power and expansive economic intervention, other aspects of the party's ideology remained consistent, and familiar terms were put to new uses. Notably, Democrats refashioned the term “liberal” to no longer refer to laissez-faire, free-market policies, but to refer to expansive government power and intervention.Footnote ²²

This article's treatment of the dependent variable (party ideology development) is based on the conceptualization of ideologies as composed of “idea-elements” in a hierarchy, with some parts more stable than others. The most stable idea-elements that anchor a party's ideology are “foundational ideas”Footnote ²³ that explain the party's “fundamental principles,”Footnote ²⁴ “fundamental beliefs,”Footnote ²⁵ or “theory of ends.” These aspects of a party's ideology—like the current Democratic Party's rhetoric about social equality or the current Republican Party's rhetoric about economic liberty—are not immutable, but they rarely change. Another type of idea that helps constitute a party's ideology, less stable than the party's foundational ideas, are “theories of intervention” that “designate the areas and extent to which government should intervene” in society and the world.Footnote ²⁶ A third type of idea within a party ideology, also more subject to change than the party's foundational ideas, are “theories of governance” that outline how governing powers should be distributed among various institutions.Footnote ²⁷ Many observers of politics have noticed how Democrats and Republicans have frequently changed their attitudes toward, for example, executive power or judicial power over the years. Finally, a fourth type of idea in this hierarchy are specific issue positions. Thus, ideologies not only bundle issue positions together,Footnote ²⁸ but they also bind issue positions to “more abstract or fundamental” idea-elements within the ideology.Footnote ²⁹ While this article necessarily engages with all of these different parts of a party's ideology, it focuses specifically on the development of the two major parties’ theories of governance and theories of economic intervention.

2.2. Hypothesis

This article hypothesizes that a party in long-term control of unified government tends to develop its ideology in a way that advocates for, and justifies, relatively more national government power and economic intervention (changing its theory of governance and its theory of intervention). A more interventionist economic policy includes advocacy for more government spending, more economic regulation, more infrastructure projects, more redistribution of wealth and income, and more government social programs.Footnote ³⁰ This position has taken on many different names and appeared in many different ideological forms over the past 230 years, including mercantilism, Federalism, National Republicanism, whiggery, the “American system,” conservatism, social democracy, progressivism, liberalism, and social justice. Similarly, this article hypothesizes that a party in opposition to unified government tends to develop its ideology in a way that advocates for, and supports, relatively less national government power and economic intervention. This includes advocacy for less government spending, lower taxes, less economic regulation, fewer infrastructure projects, less redistribution of wealth and income, and fewer government social programs. This position has also assumed many different names and forms, including whiggery, liberalism, Jeffersonian Republicanism, the “Principles of ’98,” constitutionalism, Democratic Republicanism, democracy, laissez-faire, stand-patism, conservatism, and libertarianism. It is important to note here that, in measuring party ideology development, I am not looking at absolute changes in party ideology as much as relative change in party ideology between the two major parties.

2.3. Theoretical Premises

There are two important premises underlying this article's theory. The first premise is that politicians usually want to expand and exercise the powers at their disposal, and directing the economy is one of the most important powers that government officials can exercise.Footnote ³¹ The desire to respond to events, exercise the powers at their disposal, and expand the powers at their disposal is a general disposition that characterizes most politicians—including presidents and members of Congress.Footnote ³² When parties with relatively noninterventionist theories of economic policy take control of unified government, their preexisting ideology will act as a constraint in making decisions to intervene in the economy. However, controlling the levers of power will prove tempting because of all the ways that they could intervene on behalf of other, more foundational, aspects of their ideology, and on behalf of themselves and the interests of their party members. Thus, as circumstances arise and as party entrepreneurs act over time, the party will tend to intervene in the economy despite their previous rhetoric.

This premise alone, however, is not sufficient to make us think that changing party control of government will lead to parties changing their ideologies. After all, politicians could simply act on their incentives to expand and exercise power without parties changing their ideologies. The second premise underlying this theory, however, is that partisans want to change their party ideology in ways that justify the actions of their co-partisans and vilify the actions of their opponents.Footnote ³³ To justify and criticize the use of these powers, parties often change their theories of governance and theories of economic intervention accordingly.

2.4. Ideology versus Behavior

Although they are related, it is important here to distinguish between party ideology and the behavior of party members. Party ideology exists in language: in the rhetoric, discourses, mental frameworks, and narratives used among those who identify with the party. Ideology exists in “thinking, speech, and writing.”Footnote ³⁴ The behavior of party members, on the other hand, exists in action. It is true, of course, that party ideology constrains the behavior of individual party members, but the nature and extent of this constraint depends on a variety of factors, including how embedded a given individual is in the mental frameworks and linguistic patterns of the party ideology; how committed the individual is, personally, to the party ideology; and what other circumstances are involved in their decision-making process. Thus, ideology and action may be aligned, but they also may be at odds. As a result, in measuring party ideology (the dependent variable of this article), it is more useful to examine language than action.

According to the political institutional theory of party ideology development tested here, members of a party exercising the powers of government institutions will often act in ways contrary to their party's ideology. Notably, when a new party takes control of unified government, the members of the party in government will often exercise the powers at their disposal by enacting interventionist economic policies—even if their party's ideology during the campaign and in the early years of their control of government calls for limited national government power and limited economic intervention.

Following up on the historical example cited above, this is what happened to the Democrats in the 1930s. With the national crisis of the Great Depression in full force—despite their previous critiques of Republican big government—the Democratic Party spent, regulated, and intervened beyond what their predecessors had attempted. President Franklin Roosevelt quickly used his party's control of unified government to pass New Deal legislation despite the party's preexisting theory of governance and theory of economic intervention.Footnote ³⁵ The Democratic Party used the powers at its disposal to pursue other aspects of party ideology like equality, support for agriculture, and support for the urban poor, and to benefit the various groups that made up the burgeoning New Deal coalition.Footnote ³⁶ To justify these interventions, the party rapidly changed its ideology during the 1930s to emphasize and promote progressive ideas while discarding their previous limited-government ideas.

2.5. Ripple Effects of Changes in Party Theories of Governance and Intervention

Despite these changes in party theories of economic intervention, differences in other, perhaps more fundamental, aspects of party ideology may cause the party to intervene in ways different from the ways the previous party intervened. Arguably, the Democratic Party's New Deal administration was directed at different ends, and undergirded by different ideological foundations, than the Republican Party's Square Deal administration. Nonetheless, these changes in party theories of economic intervention often have ripple effects on other aspects of party ideology. For example, when Democrats became increasingly interventionist on economic policy during the 1910s and the 1930s, this helped transform other aspects of the Democratic Party's ideology. As Gerring points out, the party shifted from a “populist” era to a “universalist” era in the mid-twentieth century.Footnote ³⁷ The party's increasing emphasis on economic equality—articulated by Wilson and FDR—helped the party to become more concerned with humanitarianism. As Democrats evolved from being relatively laissez-faire to relatively interventionist on economic policy, they also evolved from being relatively nationalist to relatively internationalist on foreign policy.

2.6. Ingredients for Party Ideology Change

Why does this article hypothesize that long-term changes—but not short-term changes—in party control of government lead to party ideology evolution? The reason I focus on long-term changes is because the incentives that party actors face (to exercise power when in office and to justify co-partisans and criticize opponents) is not sufficient, on its own, to cause party ideology development. Ideologies, like institutions, are political structures that are not easily changed. First, party leaders face contrary incentives to maintain existing ideological positions: If ideologies are changed too often and too cavalierly, then they lose their usefulness as reputational signaling mechanisms to voters.Footnote ³⁸ Second, because group ideologies are language discourses shared by millions of people, they typically cannot change their meaning for so many people all at once. It usually takes a long time for parties to stop using their previous rhetoric and for the new rhetoric to gain currency among politicians, interest groups, writers, activists, and party identifiers in the electorate. Finally, the longer the two parties have held divergent ideological positions, the more calcified these ideologies become and the more difficult they are to change.

Thus, several ingredients need to come together before we would expect this inertia to be overcome, and this typically takes several years. First, there must be a salient political issue (like the government's response to the Great Depression) for the parties to divide over. Second, there must be political leaders in Congress and the presidency willing to act in ways contrary to the party's previous ideological commitments. For the Democrats of the 1930s, this was President Franklin Roosevelt and his Democratic New Deal Congress. Third, once party leaders have acted contrary to party ideology and there is a new incentive to change party ideology to justify co-partisans and criticize opponents, there must be party entrepreneurs—often the leaders of a party faction—who can recognize opportunities, and assemble the necessary resources, to act on these new incentives.Footnote ³⁹ This approach appropriates Terry Moe's “logic of institutional development”: on occasion, certain actors, operating in particular institutional settings, have the necessary incentives and resources to successfully change a party's ideology.Footnote ⁴⁰ Fourth, when these party entrepreneurs are successful, different groups within the parties rise and fall in importance in accordance with the party's changing ideology. Finally, it is not enough for party elites to change a party's issue positions, talking points, and narratives in government. These new ideas, discourses, and rhetoric must be adopted by ordinary party identifiers in the electorate long enough to become durably entrenched in the public discourse and consciousness. It takes several years for all of these ingredients to come together.Footnote ⁴¹

To say that party ideologies evolve over time does not necessarily mean that the people who make up the two parties are constantly switching parties or changing their minds (although both do happen, and they are an important part of party ideology development).Footnote ⁴² It can also mean that certain strands of thought within the two parties become more vocal or muted depending on circumstances. For example, the libertarian Right has long been a part of the Republican Party: It was vocal during FDR's New Deal, subdued during Eisenhower's era of New Republicanism, received the party's presidential nomination for the first time in 1964 during the Democratic Party's Great Society, was subdued once again during the Nixon and Ford administrations, received the party's presidential nomination for only the second time in 1980 with the Reagan Revolution, gave way to “neoconservatives” and “religious conservatives” in the 1980s, became vocal again in the 1990s, gave way to “compassionate conservatives” during the Bush administration, and became vocal again with the Tea Party during the Obama administration. This shift in emphasis—some groups within the party becoming more influential in shaping party platforms, candidate selection, and party stances at some times more than others—is a key ingredient in party ideology evolution.Footnote ⁴³

Given that so many ingredients need to come together, only a long-term (but not short-term) change in party control of government provides enough time for the dissonance between a party's institutional position and ideological position to be overcome—and for the necessary ingredients to be instantiated long enough to effect a durable change in party ideology. Because party ideologies are sticky equilibria, party ideology change typically lags behind change in party control of government. Thus, if a party takes control of a government institution, but then relinquishes power shortly afterwards, party ideologies are not durably changed during that short time period. For example, when Republicans took control of unified government from 1953 to 1955, Republican Party ideology moved somewhat in the direction of more government intervention in the economy, but the incentives for party ideology change lasted only two years, and the ideology change lagged long enough that there was no substantive ideological change by the time Democrats regained control of Congress. With Democrats back in control in the House and Senate, the dissonance between the Republican Party's institutional position and ideological position was resolved by a change in institutional control rather than a change in ideology.

All parties face incentives on Day 1 of unified control of government to expand the powers of the national government and intervene in the economy. However, it takes time for them to act on these incentives in opposition to their ideology, for the ideology to change in a way to justify these actions, and for any ideological changes to be instantiated long enough to be durable. As a result, the independent variable of this study is not simply a change in party control of unified government, but a long-term change in party control.

2.7. No Change in Party Control

Just as this article hypothesizes that change in long-term party control of government institutions leads to change in party theories of economic intervention, it also hypothesizes that the absence of change in long-term party control of unified government leads to relative stasis in party theories of economic intervention. This is due to the path-dependent nature of party ideologies. Absent external forces (like socioeconomic changes) and political entrepreneurs with incentives and resources, we expect that the meaning and content of ideologies will remain relatively static. The ideologies held and espoused by parties at Time 1 are likely to be held and espoused at Time 2, and the ideologies held and espoused by parties at Time 2 are likely to be held and espoused at Time 3, and so on. It is possible that the parties’ ideologies change as a result of historical contingencies or secular developments, but without a change in long-term control of unified government, the hypothesis predicts that the relative positions of the parties will remain the same.

Thus, even though American political history has had a dozen instances of the relatively less interventionist party taking control of unified government, because these are almost always short-term changes in control, they almost never lead to durable shifts in party ideology. In 1801, 1829, 1835, 1845, 1853, 1857, 1893, 1913, 1933, 1953, 2001, and 2003, the relatively less interventionist party took control of unified government, but only the changes in 1801 and 1933 led to durable changes in the relative ideological positions of the two parties with respect to national government power and economic intervention. The difference is that, in these two instances, the new party in power held on long enough to durably change the parties’ ideologies. In every other instance, the new party's control of government was quickly reversed. In these cases, there was not a long enough period for all of the ingredients necessary for ideological change to come together before the new party's unified control of government was disrupted, and the two parties lost their institutional incentives for ideological change. Only in 1801–1825, when the Republican Party had a stranglehold on unified government, and 1933–1945, when the Democratic Party dominated the national government, did the two parties’ ideologies durably change. In those instances, the changes in party ideologies became instantiated long enough to outlast the time when they lost unified control.

2.8. Other Factors that Influence Party Ideology Development

Having outlined the causal mechanisms of the theory, I recognize that changes in party control, and the resulting changes in party ideologies, are not the only factors that influence party ideology development. The most significant driver of party ideology development is public ideology development, which is the product of innumerable historical contingencies and factors including major events (like economic depressions) and major secular developments (like industrialization, immigration, and urbanization). For example, the United States, like other countries, has oscillated “between periods of greater and lesser government intervention in the economy.”Footnote ⁴⁴ The parties change their positions and ideologies as the larger public changes its positions and ideologies. The study of American political culture and thought, which bears on public ideology change, has rightfully received a great deal of attention by historians and political scientists.

This article does not pretend to explain all of these broader movements in American public ideology over time. Instead, this article asks, more narrowly, what causes the ideologies of the two major parties to develop differently, in relation to each other, within this larger sphere of changes in public opinion and American political culture and thought.

2.9. Independent and Dependent Variables

As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable in this study is change in the relative movement of party ideology positions with regard to more or less national government power and economic intervention. For example, at the start of the Jeffersonian Era in 1801, Federalist Party ideology called for significantly more economic intervention than Republican Party ideology. Since the Republican Party took long-term control of unified government between 1801 and 1825, this article predicts that the Republican Party changed its ideological position to move farther in the direction of more economic intervention than their Federalist opponents did during that time period. The hypothesis is not necessarily that the two parties would actually switch positions in ideological space (although that is possible), but that the gap between the two parties would at least clearly narrow. Furthermore, it is possible that, due to secular shifts in American history, both parties moved in the direction of more economic intervention during this period. Within this general movement by society at large, however, this theory predicts that the Republican Party moved farther in that direction than the Federalist Party. Thus, it is the relative movement of the two parties’ ideologies that is being measured rather than their absolute positions.

Measuring ideological positions is inherently difficult because ideology exists in language, rhetoric, and ideas, which are not easily quantified. In his seminal study of political ideology, Philip Converse explained that the neglect of ideology as a subject of study by political scientists is a primary exhibit “for the doctrine that what is important to study cannot be measured and what can be measured is not important to study.”Footnote ⁴⁵ This article attempts to measure ideology even though it is difficult. The empirical sections that follow rely on a variety measures of party ideology.

To measure party ideology, as it exists in the party organization, I have read every major party platform in American history and made note of every sentence that talks about party theories of governance and party theories of economic intervention. Party platforms are useful samples of the kinds of narratives that party members tell themselves at any given time, and they are useful records of the issue positions that party members take at any given time. Unfortunately, mass party organizations and platforms only emerged in the 1830s, so we have less consistent measures of party organization ideology at the turn of the nineteenth century.Footnote ⁴⁶

To measure party ideology as it exists among the party in government, I rely on, in addition to party platforms, the writings and speeches of party leaders in government. Whether a particular presidential candidate or member of Congress truly believed what they were writing or speaking is largely irrelevant for the purposes of measuring party ideology, because we are interested in measuring not so much what any particular person believed about the role of government in society, but the kinds of things that party leaders, office seekers, and office holders told each other and their constituents about the proper role of government. This is where party ideology exists—in the narratives, mental frameworks, and discourses used by party members in discussing public policy.

I supplement these measures of ideology with an analysis of votes cast by members of Congress and the bills signed or vetoed by presidents. I do not subscribe to the assumption that roll call votes perfectly reveal ideology, but to the extent that mental frameworks and ideological narratives and belief systems constrain the behavior of a party's members of Congress, then their voting decisions can be a useful second-best proxy measurement of ideology. Using voting data, party platforms, and the speeches and writings of party leaders together can give us useful measurements of party ideology developments over the course of American history.

While it is difficult to measure party ideology, it is easy to measure party control of unified government, which is the independent variable in this model. Determining party control of Congress and the presidency is straightforward in American history, given that each of the forty-five presidencies has represented one of the two major parties, and each of the 115 Congresses has been controlled, or split between, the two major parties.Footnote ⁴⁷

As mentioned before, this article focuses on changes in long-term party control of government, which is defined here as a change lasting for at least eight years. This time-span is chosen based on Skowronek's work on reconstructive politics.Footnote ⁴⁸ In American politics, a one-term president is considered a blip or an aberration. A party that only captures the presidency for one term, and is then forced to relinquish power, is a party with only tenuous control of government, thus leaving a smaller mark on the course of American political development. “Reconstructive presidents” (and parties) are always at least two-term presidents, who then have successors from their same party continue their reconstructive work. Thus, in identifying periods of long-term party control, this article looks for control of unified government that lasts for at least eight years: two presidential terms and four sessions of Congress.Footnote ⁴⁹

In identifying periods of change in long-term party control, this article looks at moments when the new institutional configuration is in tension with the existing party ideologies for a sustained period of time. Thus, a party's institutional position may shift from a long period of control of unified government, to divided government, to a short period of opposition, back to divided government, and back to another long period of control, but this would not represent a new party taking long-term control. This is what has happened since 1933.Footnote ⁵⁰ Republicans have never taken long-term control of unified government since they lost it during the Great Depression. Thus, going back to the New Deal, the two parties have never experienced enough long-term dissonance between their ideological position and their institutional position to expect significant changes in party theories of economic intervention.

It is important to point out a potential circularity problem: It is possible that party ideology change could cause changes in long-term party control of unified government, and not vice versa. That is, it may be that the two variables coincide as predicted by the political institutional theory for a different reason: because, once in power, party ideology change toward more national government power and economic intervention causes parties to win more elections and establish long-term control of unified government. While theoretically plausible, the empirical findings in the following sections do not support this idea. For the causal relationship to work in this reverse direction, there would need to be a firm link between relative ideological position and electoral results. As it turns out, there is no substantive relationship between those two variables. All other things being equal, the party calling for relatively more government intervention in the economy has no significant electoral edge—in either the presidency or Congress—over the party calling for relatively less government intervention. While there is no significant correlation between party ideology and election outcomes—at the time of the election—there is a correlation between party ideology and party control of government in the years following a new party taking control. That is, the empirical sections of this article show that party ideologies do indeed change in the years after a new party takes control of unified government (but not before the election or at the time of the election).

2.10. Observations

This article presents data for the independent and dependent variables going back to the emergence of the two-party system in the 1790s. Narrowing the time frame to a particular era or slice of history has the added benefit of being able to do in-depth case study analysis, and broadening the time frame to all of U.S. history has the danger of treating each case too superficially. However, because there have been so few cases of change in long-term party control of unified government, in order to record enough observations to be able to draw conclusions about a trend, we must look at all of U.S. history going back to the first parties.

These twenty-three decades of U.S. history give us five eras of long-term party control of unified government to examine (see Table 1). The first time period consists of the infant years of the United States under the Constitution. The second time period is the quarter century after the Jeffersonian Republicans took control of unified government in the “Revolution of 1800.” The third time period is the antebellum period following the presidential election of 1824, which ended the one-party system as Republicans split between “national” Republicans and “democratic” Republicans. This period is distinguished as a separate era because two new parties emerged—Democrats and Whigs—and not because either party took long-term control of unified government.Footnote ⁵¹ The fourth time period contains the seven decades following the election of Abraham Lincoln in 1860 when his new Republican Party took control of unified government. The fifth time period comprises the eighty-five years that have followed the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt in 1933 when his Democratic Party took long-term control. The rest of this article will analyze the development of the two major parties’ ideologies during each of these eras.

Table 1.

Party Control of Unified Government and Party Theories of Economic Intervention (Expectations)

4.1. Historical Context of the Jeffersonian Era

In the early nineteenth century, the American people, including both major parties, moved to embrace more national government power and more intervention in the economy than was generally acceptable following the first war for independence. The second war for independence, the War of 1812, exposed many of the weaknesses of the American state, and in “the first few years following the war … the spirit of nationalism was in vogue.”Footnote ⁵⁶ This resulted in greater support by both parties for a stronger army, a national bank, and more national infrastructure. The expansion of American settlers beyond the Appalachian Mountains also resulted in a call for more national infrastructure projects to unify the expanding republic. Since the Republican Party ran the U.S. government, it was responsible for most of the nationalist legislation of this period, and its ideology changed to catch up with its institutional and policy positions. While the nation, as a whole, generally moved in a direction welcoming more national government power and more economic intervention, the two parties moved differently, in relation to each other, as predicted by the political institutional theory of party ideology development: The party in power moved farther in the direction of government intervention than the party out of power.

4.2. Party Control of Unified Government and Party Ideology Development

In his first Inaugural Address, Jefferson articulated his party's ideas about limited government, which were formulated during the campaigns and elections of the 1790s:

In the early years of the Republican regime, Jefferson's party acted in accordance with this ideology.Footnote ⁵⁸ The first Republican Congress repealed the Whiskey Tax of 1791 and the direct tax of 1798, along with the naturalization laws of 1798. In addition to signing these repeals, Jefferson pardoned prisoners who had been prosecuted under the Sedition Act. The new government reduced the size of the military, decreased the national government's debt, and decided not to renew the charter on Hamilton's Bank of the United States. However, the longer Republicans remained in control of government, the more they began to adopt the policies and ideas of their Federalist predecessors.Footnote ⁵⁹

Between 1801 and 1824, the originally antinationalist Republican Party gradually moved away from its roots in anti-Federalism toward National Republicanism. One of the first ways that Republicans acted in opposition to the party's theory of governance was by purchasing the Louisiana Territory. The acquisition was justified as a way to serve the party's theory of ends because it would make possible the ideal of an agrarian republic of egalitarian yeoman farmers spread out over the vast continent. However, territorial expansion by executive agreement would violate the party's ideology because, to act quickly on the deal, Jefferson would have to exercise more national government power, in general, and more executive power, in particular, than Republicans had previously believed was proper. Given this tension between the party's theory of ends and the party's theories of governance and intervention, the more foundational theory of ends won out, and Jefferson went ahead with the executive action.Footnote ⁶⁰

However, it is not as though the theories of governance and intervention were irrelevant in shaping Republican behavior. These parts of the party's ideology acted as a powerful constraint, and Jefferson's “strict-constructionist scruples” caused him much trepidation and anxiety about going forward with the purchase to more than double the size of the United States.Footnote ⁶¹ As Stephen Skowronek explained:

Ultimately, the more foundational aspects of Republican Party ideology held slightly more weight in shaping Jefferson's behavior than the less foundational aspects of party ideology. Thus, Jefferson decided to exercise and increase the powers at his disposal despite his party's previous rhetoric condemning the Federalist Party's expansion of national government and executive power.

After more actions like these going forward, Republicans eventually modified their theories of governance and intervention to justify these kinds of actions, but the party's more foundational ideals—like popular rule and agrarian republicanism—did not change during this time. In 1806, with a majority of Federalists and a minority of Republicans, Jefferson signed into law the bill creating the Cumberland Road: the first internal improvement of its kind. In 1807, Jefferson's concerns about foreign affairs led him to push through the Republican Congress an embargo act that restricted trade. This embargo represented an unprecedented use of government power to intervene in the economy. In 1808, Jefferson's Republican Secretary of the Treasury, Albert Gallatin, offered a report that called for $20 million in internal improvements. Commenting on this about-face, Herbert Croly explained:

Because of the dissonance between the party's preexisting ideology and the party's actions in government, Republicans faced incentives to modify their theories of governance and intervention to justify their behavior.

However, the party's ideology did not change without a fight between different factions. Jefferson's betrayal of the “Revolution of 1800” caused a split within the Republican Party between “moderate and ardent republicanism.”Footnote ⁶⁴ Ultimately, though, the “nationalists” calling for more government intervention in the economy won out over those calling for less.

As the historian Henry Adams has noted, when Republicans took control of unified government, they changed their minds on a variety of issue positions, including the national debt, the size of the navy, and the national bank.

Although Adams was correct to point out the hypocrisy, Jefferson was not entirely a man of political expediency. As a principled ideologue, the transformation of the Republican Party caused Jefferson pangs of conscience, and he blamed the Hamiltonian policies of the 1790s as the original sin responsible for the mercantilist policies of his own administration: “It mortifies me to be strengthening principles which I deem radically vicious, but the vice is entailed by the first error.”Footnote ⁶⁶

Despite the remorse he expressed, it is clear that Jefferson behaved “differently as President than his earlier utterances would have suggested,” and the Republican Party largely followed suit.Footnote ⁶⁷ During Jefferson's second term in office, a faction of Republicans, led by John Randolph, broke with the president over what they perceived as Federalist policies being promoted by the Republican administration. These Republicans became known as “Quids” to distinguish themselves from the main body of the party, and they opposed Jefferson's administration on the Yazoo land fraud compromise, the attempt to purchase West Florida from Spain, and the trade restrictions with England.Footnote ⁶⁸

Madison's succession to the presidency in 1809 moved the party in an increasingly centrist direction on the question of nationalism. In 1810, Republican “war hawks” like Henry Clay and John Calhoun from the backcountry were elected to Congress, and they called for an even stronger national government that would bind the separate states together and provide a powerful military force in international affairs. The rise of these young Republican nationalists was opposed by the previous generation of antinationalist Republicans, including the Quids, who became known as “Old Republicans.”Footnote ⁶⁹ The difference between these two factions was not only a difference in issue positions but also a difference in the bundle of ideas they articulated (a difference in ideology).

The Federalist and Republican ideological positions became closer during this period mostly because of changes in Republican, rather than Federalist, Party ideology: The Republican theory of governance became significantly more nationalist, and the Republican theory of economic intervention became significantly more interventionist. While there were some Federalists who moved in a less nationalist direction in the early 1810s, the party largely maintained its earlier principles as the country as a whole moved toward Federalist ideas about national power and economic intervention.Footnote ⁷⁰ However, Federalist opposition to the War of 1812 soon doomed the party to irrelevance.

By the early 1820s, former Federalists had joined the majority Republican Party, but they were not required to change their principles concerning the role of the national government. Although the Old Republicans blamed Jefferson for starting the party down the path of nationalism and interventionism, after his presidency, he, too, worried that the party was going too far. In 1822, Jefferson wrote to Henry Dearborn that the Federalists, discredited as a national party, now promoted “consolidated government” from within Republican ranks like foxes hiding “in the midst of the sheep.” As a result, Jefferson explained, “you see so many of these new republicans maintaining in Congress the rankest doctrines of the old federalists.”Footnote ⁷¹ Jefferson was concerned not simply with changes in Republican Party issue positions but also with changes in Republican Party doctrines (or ideology). The accession of John Quincy Adams, the son of the old Republican nemesis, to the presidency in 1825 symbolized the party's newly developed nationalist theory of governance.Footnote ⁷²

Although Republican ideology continued to embrace economic intervention as more and more Republican nationalists joined Congress, the old party ideology still worked as a partial constraint on the behavior of party members, and, of course, political actors still exercised agency in opposition to the general forces at work. For example, in two different instances, Madison the constitutionalist vetoed legislation passed by a more interventionist Republican Congress. First, in 1814, Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States, but President Madison, given his background in the ideology of the original Republican Party, worried about its constitutionality and vetoed it.Footnote ⁷³ Second, in 1817, Madison vetoed the Bonus Bill, explaining that although he supported congressional funds being spent on internal improvements, such an authorization required a constitutional amendment before he could sign it.Footnote ⁷⁴

Despite occasional vetoes by presidents from the Virginia Dynasty, Republican nationalists like Henry Clay, John Calhoun, and John Quincy Adams “dominated the party after the War of 1812.”Footnote ⁷⁵ They moved the party's ideology toward more national government power as they pursued an “American System” of economic interventions—including tariffs, subsidies, and internal improvements—that echoed the mercantilist policies of the Hamiltonian Federalists but were aimed at benefiting different constituencies and used toward different ends.Footnote ⁷⁶ These party entrepreneurs, acting with resources in Congress and the administration, took advantage of opportunities to change their party's ideology in accordance with the incentives they faced.Footnote ⁷⁷

While the Republicans changed their party's theory of economic intervention, the Federalists, such as they were, mostly maintained their old theory of government intervention in the economy. Although some New England Federalists changed their minds about the government's power to regulate international trade, in general, they continued to advocate for mercantilist policies like a national bank, tariffs, and internal improvements. As the Republican Party expanded its dominance of American politics and adopted the Federalist theory of economic intervention, the Federalist Party dissolved.

In retirement, Jefferson followed the political events unfolding in the “Jeffersonian Era,” and he criticized the new Republican Party's adoption of Federalists and Federalism:

This factional division within the Republican Party would set the stage for the revival of two-party politics in the antebellum period.

4.3. Other Factors that Explain Party Ideology Development in the Jeffersonian Era

Economic factors, of course, also help explain the relative shifts of the two parties during this time. Most of the American pioneers who moved west into and beyond Appalachia in the first quarter of the nineteenth century were Republicans.Footnote ⁷⁹ These Westerners “needed good roads and canals to communicate and conduct their business with other parts of the country and abroad,” and so they supported a change in party ideology that justified a program of internal improvements paid for by the national government.Footnote ⁸⁰ Southerners, on the other hand, were skeptical of a national system of tariffs, internal improvements, and national finance that seemed to disproportionately benefit the North and West. Thus, “Old Republicans” in the South resisted the ideological changes pushed by new Republicans in the West.

Historical contingencies, most visibly the War of 1812, also explain much of the party ideology development observed during this time. The Anglophilic Federalist Party in the North generally opposed the War of 1812, while the Republican Party in the West pressed for it. Once the war was underway, the Federalist opposition to war was seen as unpatriotic and un-American, and this opposition to war helped cause their demise.Footnote ⁸¹ Perhaps more importantly, the War of 1812 made Republicans realize the need for the development of a stronger national state.Footnote ⁸² For example, the transportation problems the American military faced during the war caused Republicans to reconsider their opposition to national infrastructure projects.Footnote ⁸³ These society-centered factors and historical contingencies, along with party control of institutions, help us understand the party ideology developments we observe during this period. While it is debatable whether or not the Republican Party became as nationalist and as interventionist as the Federalist Party during this time period, it is clear that the gap between the parties that existed in the 1790s had narrowed considerably during the first quarter of the nineteenth century.

During that period, all of the necessary ingredients came together for Republican Party ideology to dramatically change. First, a variety of salient political issues emerged, including the opportunity to purchase the Louisiana Territory, the call for more internal improvements and trade protection, a growing national debt, the call for a national bank, and war with England. Second, at certain times—and to varying degrees—Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, and Republicans in Congress were willing to act in ways contrary to previous party orthodoxy on those issues. Third, seeking to justify these actions, important party entrepreneurs like Clay and John Quincy Adams changed the party's ideology by putting familiar terms to new uses. “Republicanism” became associated with nationalism, and defenders of the original faith adopted the label “Old Republican” to distinguish themselves from the new ideology that had emerged. Fourth, these new nationalists in the party—many of them “war hawks” elected from the frontier—rose in importance within the party as the Old Republicans became less influential. Finally, ordinary Republicans in the electorate began using the new narratives, rhetoric, and ideas despite the dissenting opinions of Republicans like John Taylor and an aging Jefferson, who complained that Federalists now hid like foxes in the midst of the Republican fold. This represented a durable shift in Republican Party ideology between 1801 and 1824 that would last largely unchanged through the succeeding National Republican, Whig, and Republican Parties for over a century until the New Deal.

5.1. Historical Context of the Antebellum Party System

The circumstances of the presidential election of 1824 led to the creation of the second party system. As Monroe ended his second term, it was clear that, in a one-party regime, whichever politician the Republican Party supported would run unopposed and become the next president. Thus, the party was unable to unify behind a single candidate, and four major candidates emerged instead. John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay, ardent nationalists, were the most clearly in favor of the “American system” of tariffs, internal improvements, and a national bank. William Crawford, the least nationalist of the candidates, received the support of the “Old Republicans” and an endorsement from Jefferson.Footnote ⁸⁵ Crawford also received the support of a first-term radical Republican senator from New York, Martin Van Buren, who saw the presidential election of 1824 as “the proper moment to commence the work of a general resuscitation of the old democratic party.”Footnote ⁸⁶ Finally, Andrew Jackson was a moderate nationalist, but more popular for his military heroics, and anti-establishment symbolism, than for any ideological issue positions.Footnote ⁸⁷ Contrary to common belief,Footnote ⁸⁸ Jackson did not campaign in 1824 on a noninterventionist platform. Up until this time, Jackson had been a moderate nationalist. “Jacksonian ideology,” understood as opposition to the “American System,” did not develop until after the election of 1824.Footnote ⁸⁹

After Adams won election in the House of Representatives, the Republican Party quickly divided between, on the one hand, Adams and Clay supporters and, on the other hand, supporters of Jackson, Crawford, and Calhoun.Footnote ⁹⁰ The residue of Federalists in New England, led by Daniel Webster, joined in support of the Adams administration. Denied the presidency despite receiving the most votes in the general election, Jackson immediately began planning to oust Adams in 1828, and Van Buren once again hoped to use the election to establish a national two-party system.Footnote ⁹¹ Van Buren successfully orchestrated the support of the radical Republicans and Old Republicans, and this coalition became known as “Democratic Republicans,” or “Jackson men,” in opposition to the “National Republicans,” or “Adams men.” Combining his own supporters, who gave him a plurality of the vote in 1824, with Crawford's supporters, Calhoun's supporters, and Van Buren's political machine, Jackson easily won the election of 1828. Jackson's reelection in 1832 caused the National Republicans to join in coalition with a variety of smaller groups opposed to the Jackson administration, and this new party—after considering a return to the “Republican” label—adopted the name “Whig.”Footnote ⁹² By 1836, the Democrats and Whigs had emerged as the two major parties.

Between the 1830s and the 1850s, the American public, in general, and both parties, in particular, changed their ideas slightly concerning national government intervention in the economy. Like many public policy issues, the debate over national government intervention in the economy acted like a pendulum, and by the early 1830s, the pendulum had swung back somewhat against national government power.Footnote ⁹³ Jackson successfully campaigned against renewing the charter of the Second Bank of the United States and used his antibank campaign to secure reelection in 1832. The “Tariff of Abominations”Footnote ⁹⁴ led to the Nullification Crisis of 1832–33 and helped precipitate a backlash against nationalist economic policies during the antebellum period that were tied up with the sectional crisis regarding slavery.

5.2. Party Control of Unified Government and Party Ideology Development

Once the two-party system of Whigs and Democrats was in place, neither party took long-term control of unified government. As expected, the original ideological divisions remained largely intact through the 1850s. The Jackson coalition decided to campaign against John Quincy Adams, in 1828, on the same principles that Jefferson had articulated when he opposed the incumbent's father in 1796 and 1800. Jackson's “neo-Jeffersonian” program leaned toward “the economics of laissez-faire.”Footnote ⁹⁵ Of course, this coalition of Republicans opposed to Adams included a diverse group of ideological commitments, and the campaign of 1828 would not be all about the “Principles of ’98.” Indeed, Jackson's vague ideological commitments, but personal popularity, made him the ideal candidate to lead this new heterogeneous party.Footnote ⁹⁶ Still, Van Buren assured his political allies back in New York that “we will support no man who does not come forward on the principles & in the form in which Jefferson & Madison were brought forward & this they will in the end all assent.”Footnote ⁹⁷

The Jacksonian Democratic Party, formed in opposition to Adams and the National Republicans, generally called for less national government intervention in the economy: no federal government role in banking, lower tariffs, fewer internal improvements, and less spending. The 1840 Democratic Party platform articulated Democratic ideology by emphasizing the party's commitment to old Jeffersonian Republican theories of limited national government power and limited government intervention in the economy:

The four succeeding party platforms of 1844–1856 essentially reprinted the planks of the 1840 platform verbatim. In this way, the ideology articulated in party platforms tied together the different parts of the party's ideology: foundational ideas, theories of governance, theories of intervention, and issue positions. Throughout this period, the Democratic Party typically campaigned on limited national government power, strict construction of the Constitution, opposition to internal improvements, opposition to tariffs, limited government spending, lower taxes, opposition to a national bank, and the foundational “classical liberal” ideas of Jefferson. The period from 1825 to 1860 is part of the Democratic Party's “Jeffersonian Epoch,” which was characterized by “limited government, … antistatism, and civic republicanism.”Footnote ⁹⁹

The Whig Party, likewise, generally remained true to the economic ideology of the National Republicans that preceded them.Footnote ¹⁰⁰ Throughout the antebellum period, the Whigs called for more national government intervention in the economy: for a federal government role in banking, higher tariffs, more internal improvements, and more spending. The 1844 platform indicated that the party's “principles may be summed as comprising, a well-regulated currency; a tariff for revenue to defray the necessary expenses of the government, and discriminating with special reference to the protection of the domestic labor of the country; [and] the distribution of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands.”Footnote ¹⁰¹ The 1852 platform specifically endorsed the idea that “the Constitution vests in Congress the power to open and repair harbors, and remove obstructions from navigable rivers.”Footnote ¹⁰² The period from 1825 to 1860 is part of the National Republican and Whig Parties’ “National Epoch,” in which party members were “mercantilists” and “statists.”Footnote ¹⁰³

These party ideologies were not simply rhetoric, and they were not simply instrumental; they often actually worked to constrain the behavior of political actors. For example, in response to the Panic of 1837, even pragmatic President Van Buren “was sufficiently wedded to Jacksonian principles to resist government-sponsored solutions to the economic crisis.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴ This inaction led to Van Buren's defeat in 1840. Political actors are not free to change their party's ideology every time it might suit them. Party ideology change requires several different ingredients, and it typically take several years for all of those ingredients to emerge. The stasis in party theories of economic intervention between 1825 and 1860 is partly explained by the absence of change in long-term party control of unified government.

For example, during his first term in office, from 1829 to 1833, Jackson enjoyed unified Democratic control of government, but not all of the necessary ingredients showed up during that short time period, and the Democrats did not become durably more interventionist relative to the National Republicans. During that time, the rechartering of the Second Bank of the United States emerged as an important political issue, but Jackson followed his and Van Buren's neo-Jeffersonian Democratic Party ideology by calling for an end to the national bank. In so doing, he resisted the temptation to simply use the power of the bank to serve his own party's purposes.

However, Jackson was not entirely a principled defender of Democratic Party ideology. During his administration, infrastructure spending increased dramatically.Footnote ¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, Jackson enforced the Tariff of Abominations in the name of nationalism and in opposition to the states’ rights faction of his party. Despite these deviations from party ideology, no party entrepreneur emerged among the Democrats to change the party in a way that would justify this nationalism and economic interventionism. Although former National Republicans seized on the issue of executive power—naming their new party Whigs during “King Andrew's” second term in office—they did not significantly change their ideas about national government power or economic intervention. After just four years of unified Democratic control of government, the National Republicans won control of the Senate in the election of 1832, and the incentives for party ideology change were lost. Similarly, in 1845, 1853, and 1857, Democrats once again took control of unified government, but in each case government control was short-lived, and it was not enough time for all of the necessary ingredients to come together to expect party ideology change.

5.3. Other Factors that Explain Party Ideology Development in the Jacksonian Era

That the two parties maintained their theories of economic intervention is not, of course, entirely attributable to the path-dependent character of party ideologies—that is, the tendency of party ideologies to maintain their preexisting structure unless acted on by other forces. It is also a product of the political economy of the period. Although founded as a national party, uniting Southern antinationalists and Northern Federalists opposed to Jackson, the Whig Party became increasingly sectional and based in the Northeast over the course of the 1840s and 1850s.Footnote ¹⁰⁶ As such, the Whigs had incentives to push for a national bank, high tariffs, and internal improvements that would disproportionately benefit the manufacturing and mercantile class. In this sense, the explanation offered by previous historians—focusing on the class interests of capital as opposed to agriculture—also helps make sense of this era.

The factor that underlies the entire antebellum period, however, is the issue of slavery, which holds enormous explanatory power. The Democratic Party, based in the South, was generally more supportive of slavery and its extension into the West than was the Whig Party. The Democrats feared what the national government could do if abolitionists, or opponents of slavery, came to power. As such, Democratic ideology throughout the period emphasized limited national government power and state sovereignty. In each party platform they resolved:

The Democratic Party's strict construction of the Constitution was not only about preventing Congress from passing tariff or internal improvements legislation that disproportionately benefitted the North (as noted earlier, Democrats themselves sometimes supported such legislation), but it was also about preventing Congress from interfering with slavery. The election of a president in 1860 from a third party that was opposed to the expansion of slavery was the impetus for Southern slaveholders’ secession from the Union.

6.1. Historical Context

Party ideology in the 1850s and 1860s was dominated by the issue of slavery. The new Republican Party's theory of governance argued that the national government should have the power to outlaw slavery in its territories—as it did in the Missouri Compromise of 1820. The Democratic Party's theory of governance, in contrast, argued that the decision about slavery in the territories should be made through local referenda. In addition to its relatively nationalist theory of governance, the Republican Party's theory of economic intervention closely followed the relatively interventionist ideas articulated by the Whigs—many of whom became Republicans.Footnote ¹¹⁰

Following the Civil War, the United States experienced dramatic industrialization, immigration, and urbanization. In response to the socioeconomic inequality caused by these forces, several social democratic and progressive reform movements emerged in American politics. These insurgent reform movements represented a move by the American public, in general, and the two major parties, in particular, toward an increasing acceptance of greater national government power and intervention in the economy. The two parties’ ideologies moved in this direction at different times and in different ways, and these differences can partly be understood through the political institutional theory of American party ideology development.

6.2. Party Control of Unified Government and Party Ideology Development

With the Democratic South out of the Union, the Republican Party dominated the U.S. government starting in 1861. Republicans won six straight presidential contests between 1860 and 1880, controlled the House from 1859 to 1874, and controlled the Senate from 1861 to 1878. After Reconstruction, Democrats began winning the House in the 1870s and 1880s, but they would not gain control of unified government until 1893—and even then, it only lasted two years. During this period of Republican Party control, the GOP had incentives to develop its ideology in a way that justified relatively more economic intervention. Likewise, the postbellum Democratic Party had incentives to develop its ideology in a way that criticized Republican intervention in the economy.

6.3. Coding the Republican Era of Civil War, Reconstruction, and Progressivism

Over the course of seven decades, from the Civil War to the Great Depression, the parties largely developed their ideologies as predicted by the political institutional theory. During most of this time, Republicans in control of government argued for greater national government power and economic intervention, while Democrats in opposition argued for less. The two exceptions were associated with Democrats taking short-term control of unified government.

In 1893, the Democratic Party took control of unified government for the first time since before the Civil War, and in the 1890s Democratic ideology became as interventionist as Republican ideology. First, a salient political issue—“the absorption of wealth by the few, the consolidation of our leading railroad systems, and the formation of trusts and pools”—provided an opportunity for the two parties to debate and disagree.Footnote ¹⁴² Second, Democratic leaders in Congress (but not in the presidency) were willing to vote in ways contrary to previous party ideology. Third, the political entrepreneurship of William Jennings Bryan at the 1896 Democratic National Convention provided a new set of narratives, ideas, and discourses to be used by party members. And, fourth, the influence of the Bourbon Democrats waned as the influence of the Populists waxed. However, these new ways of speaking and thinking did not become entrenched in the party, and by the 1900s, Democrats had returned to being less nationalist and less interventionist than the Republicans as the GOP took back control of unified government after only a short period of time.

In 1913, thanks to the Progressive Party split from the GOP, Democrats once again took control of unified government, and in the 1910s Democratic ideology once again became just as interventionist—if not more so—than GOP ideology. First, the social, economic, and political causes promoted by progressive reformers provided a variety of issues over which the parties could disagree and debate. Second, after a few years in office, President Wilson and his Democratic Congress were willing to act in opposition to previous Democratic Party ideology. Third, the political entrepreneurship of President Wilson provided a new set of narratives, ideas, and discourses to be used by party members. And, fourth, the influence of traditional Democrats waned as the influence of progressive Democrats waxed. However, these new ways of speaking and thinking did not have enough time to become entrenched in the ordinary party membership, and by the late 1920s, Democrats had returned to being less nationalist and less interventionist than the Republicans as the GOP took back control of unified government.

Although the developments of the 1890s and 1910s were not durable, they were still significant. Therefore, I do not code this era's ideological changes as developing in accordance with the hypothesis. While one could argue that, overall, the parties developed as expected, I only code an era as following the logic of the political institutional theory if the ideologies clearly and consistently developed as expected. There is enough ambiguity during this era that it does not meet the exacting standards of this test.