WOMEN'S AGENCY IN DEMOCRATIZATION

In the past three decades, a vast number of studies has been produced on democratization. In analyzing the process of democratization, the majority of scholars have relied upon the two-dimensional definition of democracy developed by Dahl (Reference Dahl1971): (1) public contestation (i.e., competitive elections) and (2) inclusive political participation. In democratic regimes, competitive elections are conducted freely and fairly at regular intervals, and all adult citizens participate in political processes by relying upon their political rights and civil liberties such as the freedom to form and join associations and the freedom of assembly and expression (Dahl Reference Dahl1971, 3). Drawing upon the Dahlian approach, democratization scholars have analyzed how and why democratization occurs and why some democracies consolidate while others do not. To answer these questions, they suggested a multitude of explanatory factors varying from institutional and structural conditions of the political regimes to the role of political actors and regional and international influences (Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996; Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela Reference Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela1992; O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead Reference O'Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead1986). Despite the variety of explanations and disagreements in the democratization literature, one thing is clear: the process of democratization, or democratic consolidation, is complex and multilayered. While many scholars have paid particular attention to structural conditions (institutional and socioeconomic factors), others have examined the agency of political and social actors in bringing about political change (Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996; Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Valenzuela Reference Mainwaring, O'Donnell and Samuel Valenzuela1992). These actor-based approaches to democratization have either focused on the role of political elites or social movements and civil society.

Nevertheless, the mainstream democratization literature has paid less attention to women as political subjects who comprise nearly half of national populations (Jaquette Reference Jaquette1994; Paxton Reference Paxton2000; Waylen Reference Waylen2007). Although the Dahlian definition of democracy includes women by referring to the participation of “all” adult citizens in competitive politics, the majority of democratization measurements take only the introduction of male suffrage into account. For instance, the mainstream democratization literature usually labels Switzerland democratic since the mid-nineteenth century despite the fact that female citizens in this country obtained the right to vote first in 1971. A further reason for neglecting women as political subjects is that the mainstream democratization literature focuses mostly on the upper echelons of politics that are mainly occupied by men (Waylen Reference Waylen1994, Reference Waylen2007). Since women were not considered a part of political elites, they were ignored or excluded from the analysis of democratization. Hence, to examine the relationship between women and politics in general—women and democratization in particular—women's participation and representation should be at the center of any theoretical analysis.

Women as political subjects were first mentioned when democratization studies began to question what role social movements and civil society play in the process of democratization. Especially in the aftermath of the transitions in Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, scholars have argued that a vibrant civil societyFootnote ³ is one, if not the, crucial factor for both the transition to and the consolidation of democracy (Diamond Reference Diamond1994; Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996; Schmitter Reference Schmitter1993; Waylen Reference Waylen2007). They claimed that a vital civil society can generate political alternatives, supplement political parties in stimulating political participation, and increase political efficacy by monitoring the government (Linz and Stepan Reference Linz and Stepan1996, 9). However, none of these studies have explicitly discussed the role women played in democratization processes, although women formed the majority in many popular movements (Waylen Reference Waylen1994, 334). From the 1990s on, gender and politics scholars began to raise the question on the agency of women and integrated the gender perspective into the analysis of democratization processes (Alvarez Reference Alvarez1990; Jaquette Reference Jaquette1994; Waylen Reference Waylen1994). By integrating gender as a category of analysis, gender scholars have emphasized women's roles as political subjects and examined not only the ways women participate in politics, but also revealed how political norms, values, attitudes, and behaviors excluded women categorically (Waylen Reference Waylen1994, Reference Waylen2007). They stressed the need to employ a gendered perspective in analyzing women's agency in democratization.

Accordingly, the gender and democratization literature demonstrated that women participate with their gender identity in the struggle for the transition to democracy (Alvarez Reference Alvarez1990; Jaquette Reference Jaquette1994; Waylen Reference Waylen1994, Reference Waylen2007).Footnote ⁴ In analyzing the relation between women's agency and the transition process, gender scholars analyze women's participation and representation in the democratization process. To this end, they examine political, economic, social, and cultural circumstances under which women organize as women and how they make their claims visible (Waylen Reference Waylen2007, 65). They contend that the increased popular participation of women empowers women in putting their gendered interests on the political agenda (Jaquette Reference Jaquette1994; Waylen Reference Waylen2007).

Many gender and democratization scholars claim that in the consolidation phase, the visibility of women's movements declines, oppositional protests vanish, and the formal political arena (electoral arena, parliament, government, bureaucracy, and political parties) becomes the source of political activity (Franceschet Reference Franceschet2001; Jaquette Reference Jaquette2000; Waylen Reference Waylen2007). Women who have been active in women's movements enter governmental institutions that are formed to contend with gender issues (Franceschet Reference Franceschet2001; Waylen Reference Waylen2007). Accordingly, scholars pay more attention to the role of women in formal politics (i.e., women's legislative representation) and question if and how women in formal politics put gender issues on the political agenda and shape policies beneficial to women in the posttransitional period. However, organized women outside of formal politics can still be active and visible. Women's movements, for instance, begin to organize in a more structured and professionalized way around specific issues, namely in advocacy-oriented nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and their relationship with the state becomes an important theme in the posttransitional period (Waylen Reference Waylen2007, 79). Although female politicians can be influential in shaping gender policies beneficial to female citizens, the latest studies have showed that the vitality and strength of women's movements have a substantial impact on the making progressive policies for women (Htun and Weldon Reference Htun and Laurel Weldon2012; Waylen Reference Waylen2007).

In consolidating or consolidated democracies, organized women, as any other part of civil society, gain more opportunities to articulate and communicate their gender-specific needs and demands to public and state institutions and to access political decision-making processes. This enables them to push the government to produce more gender-friendly policies and to monitor the implementation of those policies. In analyzing the relationship between women and democratic consolidation, the focus is hence not only on how women participate and put their interests on the political agenda, but also whether laws and regulations reflect organized women's demands and interest (Franceschet Reference Franceschet2001; Waylen Reference Waylen2007). In other words, researchers look for “positive gender outcomes” in specific policy areas and investigate if these policies substantially reflect the demands of women (Jaquette Reference Jaquette2000; Waylen Reference Waylen2007).

ORGANIZED WOMEN'S AGENCY IN TURKEY'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

Civil society in Turkey began to develop and expand its boundaries within the restricted political arena in the 1990s. As Arat (Reference Arat1994, Reference Arat1998) argues, feminist women who were politicized in the leftist movements in the 1970s were among the first to organize in newly developing Turkish civil society. They organized mass protests addressing domestic violence and have successfully directed public attention to inequalities between women and men in all spheres of life (Arat Reference Arat1998; Diner and Toktaş Reference Diner and Toktaş2010). The visibility of feminist women and their success in bringing gender-specific issues to the public's attention encouraged women from other political movements to mobilize. Especially women from the Islamist and Kurdish movements, both of which contested the founding principles of the Turkish Republic (secularism and Turkish nationalism), began to organize independently from their respective movements and established their own women's organizations (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Çoşar and Onbaşi 2008; Diner and Toktaş Reference Diner and Toktaş2010). From the mid-1990s on, the women's movement in Turkey was divided along these ideological lines, and the number of independent women's CSOs increased remarkably (Coşar and Onbaşi Reference Coşar and Gençoğlu Onbaşi2008, 325). These organized women have questioned and challenged the prevalent gender relations in Turkish society and politics and pushed the Turkish governments to make more gender-friendly policies. Several scholars even claimed that these autonomous women's CSOs have strengthened Turkey's nascent civil society (Arat Reference Arat2000, Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Bodur Reference Bodur2005; Ertürk Reference Ertürk, Marx Ferree and Mari Tripp2006).

Studies that specifically analyze different women's groups in Turkey—feminist, Kurdish, Islamist, or Kemalist—present their demands and activities and then discuss how they challenge patriarchal structures in Turkey (Arat Reference Arat1998, Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Çoşar and Onbaşi 2008; Diner and Toktaş Reference Diner and Toktaş2010; Ertürk Reference Ertürk, Marx Ferree and Mari Tripp2006; Göle Reference Göle1996). Islamist women are one of the well-studied women's groups in Turkey. The research on organized Islamist women identifies the characteristics and boundaries of their activism and points to hindrances they face within the civil society and political arena (Akboğa Reference Akboğa2013; Arat Reference Arat1998; Göle Reference Göle1996; Kadıoğlu Reference Kadıoğlu2005; Marshall Reference Marshall2005; Ozcetin Reference Ozcetin2009; Turam Reference Turam2008). Scholars argued that the Islamist women's activism has contested the notions of secularism, religiosity, national identity, and feminism and brought about a variety of discursive and cultural debates in Turkey (Arat Reference Arat1998; Marshall Reference Marshall2005; Ozcetin Reference Ozcetin2009; Saktanber Reference Saktanber, Bacchetta and Power2002). While several studies on organized Islamist women stated that they are not open to different opinions and issues and that they are allies of the Islamist movement (Kadıoğlu Reference Kadıoğlu2005; Marshall Reference Marshall2005; Turam Reference Turam2008), others have argued that Islamist women have challenged the male domination in the Islamist movement and cooperated with other women's groups to strengthen women's rights in Turkey (Ozcetin Reference Ozcetin2009; Saktanber Reference Saktanber, Bacchetta and Power2002).Footnote ⁵ I attach to the latter group and argue that organized Islamist women make efforts to strengthen women's human rights and cooperate with other women's groups by looking at the debates on the headscarf ban, LGBT rights (lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender), and abortion. I specifically ask how the Islamist women's CSOs reacted to these debates and how their choices of acceptance or rejection contribute to the process of democratic consolidation in Turkey.

CASE SELECTION AND METHOD

In the present article, I analyze three Islamist women's CSOs—BKP, GIKAP, and AKDER—that are highly visible and influential in public opinion and independent from all Islamist political parties. To delineate the relationship between these CSOs and the AKP, I look at their activities and strategies to influence the political debate on the headscarf ban and their public statements on LGBT rights and abortion. The common point of these debates is that these Islamist women's CSOs have challenged the AKP's approach to these issues. Moreover, these debates are closely related with the deficiencies in the civil rights regime that are one of the main obstacles in the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

Two of the Islamist women's CSOs under consideration, BKP and AKDER, are formed by students, lawyers, academics, teachers, and public officials who were expelled from public institutions and universities because of their headscarves. GIKAP's member profile differs from others and is comprised of both professional nonprofessional women. AKDER and BKP are associations and have more than 150 members but total around 500 with volunteers. GIKAP is an umbrella organization, in which 54 Islamist women's groups and associations are represented, including AKDER. The three CSOs under consideration are funded by dues and donations as well as by projects and incomes from their diverse activities. These CSOs are selected because of the following reasons: First, they deal exclusively with women's issues and consider themselves women's rights organizations, which differentiates them from other Islamist women's CSOs working as charities. Second, they are highly institutionalized. Third, these three CSOs praise diversity and pluralism within CSOs and work with CSOs from different political backgrounds. Therefore, they can be labeled “non-orthodox” compared to other Islamist organizations. Finally, these CSOs have influence on policy makers by counselling and lobbying them.Footnote ⁶ Both GIKAP and AKDER are Istanbul-based, whereas BKP is based in Ankara, and they all have connections to other Islamist women's organizations operating in other parts of Turkey.

The empirical material is obtained both from the primary and secondary sources. As mentioned before, I conducted semistructured and in-depth interviews with the executive and founding members from BKP and AKDER. Moreover, I interviewed several feminist and Kemalist womenFootnote ⁷ activists to display different positions in the debates under consideration. To supplement the data, I reviewed websites, documents and pamphlets of these three CSOs. The empirical data on GIKAP has been mainly collected from its web site as well as from other academic studies. The data on the abortion debate has been acquired from the mainstream newspapers such as Akşam, Hürriyet, Radikal, Yeni Şafak, Vatan, Today's Zaman, and internet-based Bianet (an independent web-based newspaper) especially during June 2012 when the debate was at its peak. This article also used the secondary literature on the agency of the Islamist women's movement as well as on political Islam in Turkey to give an account on the contextual background.

CHALLENGING SECULARISM AND ISLAMISM: THE EMERGENCE OF ISLAMIST WOMEN'S ACTIVISM

The Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP), the predecessor of the AKP, has largely benefited from women's agency for its party organization nationwide (Ayata and Tütüncü Reference Ayata and Tütüncü2008; Saktanber Reference Saktanber, Bacchetta and Power2002). Active women were organized at the grassroots level, mostly in the shanty towns of the big cities, and worked for the election campaigns of the RP. The leadership of the RP believed that women could more easily reach potential voters in the neighborhoods. In 1994, Sibel Erarslan, the head of the women's branch of the RP, worked with 18,000 women for the local election campaigns in Istanbul and Ankara, and the RP won the local elections in both cities, but Erarslan was not given any political position within the party organization afterward (Arat Reference Arat1998, 124). As scholars also argue, a group of Islamist women activists thus began questioning and criticizing male dominance in the Islamist movement (Arat Reference Arat1998, Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Marshall Reference Marshall2005). They realized that the RP instrumentalized the dynamism of women activists for its electoral purposes but then denied any higher political position to women (Arat Reference Arat1998, Reference Arat and Kasaba2008).

Active Islamist women began to form their own CSOs in order to promote their demands for political participation and inclusion, without being pushed back by their Islamist male fellows. In 1995, a group of active Islamist women in Istanbul established GIKAP, and in the same year in Ankara, another group founded BKP.Footnote ⁸ These Islamist women have attached great importance to educational activities that targeted women's self-development. Arat argues that Islamist women formed platforms to discuss their right to wear headscarves in public institutions as a matter of “freedom of religion” (2008, 412). These women argued that the headscarf ban was a direct intervention into fundamental rights of the individual, as it hindered women's right to education and work. Students from BKP and GIKAP have organized sit-in protests in front of the universities in Istanbul and Ankara and voiced their demands for entering universities with their headscarves (Diner and Toktaş Reference Diner and Toktaş2010, 51). Their protests in the 1990s attracted the public's attention, and the headscarf issue became a focal point in Turkish public opinion (Ayata and Tütüncü Reference Ayata and Tütüncü2008, 368).

In 1996, the RP, as the coalition partner, pronounced that female employees could cover their heads in the ministries the RP controlled and proposed a bill to lift the headscarf ban in universities (Akboğa Reference Akboğa2013, 3). This caused a serious political crisis in Turkey. At the National Security Council (NSC)Footnote ⁹ meeting on February 28, 1997, the secularist military leadership forced the government to extend and strictly implement the law concerning the headscarf ban in public institutions. Owing to the “28 February intervention”Footnote ¹⁰, Islamist actors—especially veiled women—were pushed out of the public sphere and deprived of their individual rights in employment and education (Kadıoğlu Reference Kadıoğlu2005; Turam Reference Turam2008). Turam rightly argues that Islamist women became “the scapegoat” of the tension between Islamist movement and the Kemalist state, as their headscarves were seen as a symbol of the Islamist threat (2008, 479).

In the aftermath of the February 28 intervention, AKDER, the third CSO analyzed here, was formed in 1997 in Istanbul. AKDER was formed by veiled students and professionals (mainly lawyers and teachers) in Istanbul, who were expelled from their universities and jobs. Similar to BKP, AKDER contested the headscarf ban and demanded expansion of the public space for religious identity. AKDER has collected donations to support veiled students banned from universities and sent them abroad to study.Footnote ¹¹ Furthermore, the organization has worked on human rights abuses and struggled for making women's problems visible.Footnote ¹² At the end of the 1990s, the headscarf became a symbol of “mobility and independence” for active Islamist women (European Stability Initiative 2007, 11) and a way of protesting strict secularism of the Kemalist state (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Kadıoğlu Reference Kadıoğlu2005).

In the 1990s, Islamist women activists were considered as “Islamist feminists” by the Turkish media, although only few have described themselves as feminists (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Bodur Reference Bodur2005; Marshall Reference Marshall2005). They argued that women should reconcile their family and everyday life (work or university) with the Islamic duties (Marshall Reference Marshall2005; Saktanber Reference Saktanber, Bacchetta and Power2002). Organized Islamist women pursued their struggle on two tracks: First, they have contested the Kemalist regime's assumption that a “modern” Turkish woman should participate in public life by leaving religion behind (Cindoglu and Zencirci Reference Cindoglu and Zencirci2008, 798). Second, they have criticized the male domination in the Islamist movement that ascribed women traditional gender roles (i.e., staying at home and being a “good mother and wife”) (Arat Reference Arat1998; Ozcetin Reference Ozcetin2009). As Arat (Reference Arat1998) and Göle (Reference Göle1996) argued in their research on Islamist women's activism, these Islamist women had nothing in common with the traditional image of “religious women” as uneducated, passive, and devoted to the family; on the contrary, they were publicly visible, politically active, and educated women who wanted to participate in public life.

Interestingly, the efforts of organized Islamist women pushed secular feminist groups to realize that Islamist women were prevented from receiving university education or participating in professional life only because of their gender identity, whereas Islamist men could enjoy public life without being confronted with any kind of discrimination. As Marshall (Reference Marshall2005) contends, feminists were in general against the suppression of women's sexuality, as is the case in covering one's own body, but they began to defend the “right to wear headscarves.” Some feminist women have acknowledged that religious women can participate in public life only by wearing headscarves (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008, 412). Conversely, secularist Kemalist women, who base their political activism and worldview on Turkish laicism, disliked the visibility of Islamist women in the public sphere and perceived them as “a threat” to Turkish secularism, which was seen as the guarantor of women's equal rights.

Over the years, Islamist women managed to establish themselves as an important group within the broader scope of the women's rights movement in Turkey, but they have not found a common ground on which to work on women's issues together with other women's groups (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Marshall Reference Marshall2005). However, the liberalized political atmosphere following Turkey's acceptance for EU membership candidacy (1999) provided organized Islamist women with opportunities to interact with the broader women's rights movement in Turkey.

A NEW ERA? THE RISE OF THE AKP TO POWER

When the Islamist AKP came to power in 2002, the AKP leadership argued that developing democracy was the only way to become ready for EU membership (Insel Reference Insel2003; Keyman Reference Keyman2010). To this end, the first AKP government furthered the ongoing reform process and passed seven democratization packages. Between 2002 and 2005, the AKP revised the laws on the freedom of expression (allowance of the Kurdish broadcasting and private Kurdish language schools) and the freedom of associations (the revision of the Law of Associations), revised the Penal Code and limited the competences of the NSC (Müftüler-Baç Reference Müftüler-Baç2005, 22f.). Meanwhile, the AKP engaged leading CSOs from diverse interest areas into policy-making processes. Prominent CSOs such as Turkish Industry and Businessmen Association (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği, TÜSIAD), Helsinki Citizen Assembly (Helsinki Yurttaşlar Derneği, HYD) and Human Rights Organization (Insan Hakları Derneği, IHD) initiated projects with European partners and assisted the AKP government to implement democratic practices such as strengthening the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of minorities (Kubicek Reference Kubicek2005, 368). Moreover, the AKP government revised the penal code by receiving assistance from the Women's Platform for the Turkish penal code consisting of around twenty-five women's CSOs from different women's groups.Footnote ¹³ Subsequently, the amended penal code criminalized and increased the sentences regarding violence against women and improved the protection of women's human rights.

During the AKP's first term (2002–2007), Turkey has taken crucial steps in the consolidation of democracy by integrating CSOs in policy making (Keyman Reference Keyman2010; Kubicek Reference Kubicek2005). In the AKP's second term (2007–2011), Turkish politics witnessed a bitter power struggle between the secularist Kemalist elite and the Islamist AKP that extensively hampered the democratic reform process. In recent years, the AKP government passes constitutional changes without regarding the interests and demands of democratic CSOs and the oppositional parties in the parliament. Especially after the September 2010 constitutional referendum, the AKP consolidated its power within the state structure and began to show authoritarian reflexes in politics. The party leadership promotes a conservative agenda on women's rights and turns a blind eye to the concerns and demands of organized women, including that of Islamist women's CSOs (Arat Reference Arat2010; Ayata and Tütüncü Reference Ayata and Tütüncü2008; Coşar and Yeğenoglu Reference Coşar and Yeğenoğlu2011).

AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP: ORGANIZED ISLAMIST WOMEN AND THE AKP

During the reform process for Turkey's EU membership, the Islamist women's CSOs discussed here have actively engaged in improving women's rights in the legal framework. AKDER has participated in the aforementioned Women's Platform for the Turkish penal code and worked with feminist and Kemalist women activist for the implementation of gender-sensitive amendments. Fatma Benli, the general secretary of AKDER (1997–2004) and a well-known women's rights lawyer, stated that she prepared proposals for new regulations related to discrimination and violence against women. After the ratification of the revised penal code in September 2004, BKP joined the “Ankara Women's Platform on the Penal Code,” which had closely monitored the amendment process and the implementation of laws.Footnote ¹⁴ All three CSOs—BKP, AKDER and GIKAP—have promoted the new laws in the civil and penal code by preparing pamphlets and brochures and organizing panels. Furthermore, both AKDER and BKP have begun to work specifically on violence against women by giving seminars to women with lower educational levels and to promote joint campaigns to increase public awareness on the issue. BKP, as the member of the Turkey Committee of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) of the United Nations, actively engaged in the struggle for the elimination of the discriminatory laws in the legal framework.Footnote ¹⁵ The participation in campaigns on women's rights together with other women's CSOs enabled the Islamist women's CSOs to push the AKP government to improve laws regarding women's rights.Footnote ¹⁶

Meanwhile, Islamist women were using lobbying activities on the international level. Both AKDER and BKP were engaged in the EU accession process by informing European officials about the problems of veiled women in public institutions and by cooperating with some women's rights organizations in Europe (Kancı et al. Reference Kancı, Bayraktar, Rumelili and Keyman2010). In 2002, Fatma Benli from AKDER, as a lawyer, brought the case of the veiled student Leyla Şahin to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Benli claimed that the law on the headscarf ban was a form of discrimination against women and referred thereby to the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) concerning the freedom of religion and conscience and the right to education, work and progress (Benli Reference Benli2010, 10). However, in 2004, the ECtHR ruled against this case and concluded that the ban is indeed violating the right of education and the freedom of religion, but was justified considering the Turkish political context (Kancı et al. Reference Kancı, Bayraktar, Rumelili and Keyman2010, 25). Organized Islamist women regarded this decision as being guided by the political concerns of Europe and inconsistent with the European ideals of freedom (Kancı et al. Reference Kancı, Bayraktar, Rumelili and Keyman2010, 26). Meanwhile, the AKP government has not attempted to lift the headscarf ban.

From 2007 onward, the AKP has slowed down the political reform process and instrumentalized reforms for its own political interests. As the general secretary of AKDER Neslihan Akbulut (2008–2012) argued, In recent years, the AKP began to build its own NGOs, mostly run by the female relatives of the AKP leadership. These organizations conduct charity work to reach the poor and needy people, elderly or youngsters. They try to dominate the civil society realm with their gender-blind political discourse and inhibit other CSOs or groups like us, which work on civil rights and freedoms.

The interviewed Islamist women pointed at the unwillingness of the AKP government in strengthening civil rights in general, women's rights in particular. Accordingly, they stated that their contention is not limited to challenging the discriminatory laws toward women with headscarves, but it is also directed against the patriarchal and exclusionary attitude of the AKP. These critical Islamist women's CSOs opposed the AKP's political stance and rhetoric in the debates on the headscarf ban, abortion, and LGBT rights.

FIGHTING FOR INCLUSION: THE HEADSCARF DEBATE

During the AKP governance, the first political contention relating to the headscarf issue was the presidential elections in April 2007. The AKP's candidate was the former foreign minister Abdullah Gül, whose wife was wearing a headscarf. Secularist political parties and civil society groups reacted with mass demonstrations, and on April 27, 2007, the Turkish Armed Forces “warned” the AKP in its choice for the presidential post on its official web site.Footnote ¹⁷ Similar to the reactions in the 1990s, secularist military elites feared that the AKP, with the backing of an Islamist president, could undermine the secularist legacy of the Turkish state. Accordingly, the parliament decided to prepone the general elections to July 2007 to overcome this political crisis. In the 2007 general election, the AKP enjoyed a landslide victory by raising its votes from 34% up to 47%. Following the elections, Gül has been elected as the president of the Turkish Republic by the newly elected parliament. BKP, GIKAP, and AKDER denounced the military's discriminatory attitude towards Gül's wife through their web sites and public statements.

The more important incident was in January 2008, when the AKP government proposed a law to abolish the ban on headscarf wearing at universities. The AKP has thereby avoided using religious references and put the issue as a matter of civil liberties. Despite the objections from the secularist parliamentarians, the Turkish Parliament passed the proposal for the constitutional change that allowed headscarf wearing at universities (Akboğa Reference Akboğa2013; Arat Reference Arat2010; Turam Reference Turam2008). Secularist segments of CS were in an uproar over this law and demonstrated to demand the resignation of the AKP government. In March 2008, a public prosecutor took the AKP to the Constitutional Court accusing the party of “undermining secularism” of the Turkish state. The Court judged the AKP guilty but surprisingly decided not to ban the party (Akboğa Reference Akboğa2013; Turam Reference Turam2008). On June 5, 2008, the Constitutional Court annulled the new law and reinstated the headscarf ban in universities. GIKAP, BKP, and AKDER condemned the decision of the Constitutional Court publicly. Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER remarked that during the law proposal, the AKP leadership did not ask for the consultancy of the Islamist women's CSOs, who are considered to be the experts for the issue.

While Kemalist civil society groups, especially Kemalist women, organized massive demonstrations to protest the attempt to legalize headscarves in public institutions, organized Islamist women were not visible in mass demonstrations (Turam Reference Turam2008). As Hidayet Tuksal from BKP stated, “The reason for the silence and invisibility of organized Islamist women is that veiled women strongly believe that the AKP would, at some point, solve the headscarf problem.”Footnote ¹⁸ They preferred other strategies to deal with the headscarf issue such as providing judicial counseling for women who were expelled from their jobs or universities because of their veils. At the beginning of 2010, AKDER organized a petition in a blog for lifting the ban on wearing headscarves in public institutions.Footnote ¹⁹ In this campaign, AKDER criticized the strict secularism of the state and claimed that the headscarf ban is an offense against religious identity and individual freedom as well as against personal choices. Both GIKAP and BKP supported this initiative and asserted that the Turkish state limits bodily rights of women by defining their appearance in public life.Footnote ²⁰ Islamist women also received support from several feminist organizations, academics, writers, and journalists. Although Islamist women were successful in keeping their topic alive in public opinion and created a public consensus that headscarf wearing should not hinder women from receiving education or work, they were not influential on the AKP government.

Both interviewees from AKDER and BKP claimed that the AKP and its predecessors have instrumentalized the headscarf issue for gaining electoral support from their conservative, traditionalist base, but in reality they consider Islamist women's presence in public as a way of empowering the symbolic presence of Islam in society, rather than empowering women's individual autonomy or freedom. Therefore, as the interviewees further remarked, the AKP does not take gender-based needs and interests of veiled women into account while making policies.

On July 12, 2013, the parliament accepted an amnesty law that allows veiled women who were banned from their works at public institutions between February 28, 1997, and February 14, 2005, to return their jobs, and veiled students to their educational institutions.Footnote ²¹ This law came into effect in “law package No 6495” (torba yasa), in which banned officials gain the opportunity to return. But the ban continues for the posts in security forces and the judiciary. Although organized Islamist women welcomed this development, they insist on removing the ban completely.Footnote ²² Besides the headscarf debate, Islamist women were also critical on the AKP's conservative agenda, reflected in the issue of women's reproductive rights and rights of homosexual individuals.

ISLAMIST WOMEN BETWEEN TRADITION AND FREEDOM: THE HOMOSEXUALITY DEBATE

In Turkey, homosexuality is not criminalized, but the state neither includes homosexual identity in laws pertaining to civil rights nor recognizes same-sex marriages.Footnote ²³ Although the gay rights movement is well organized and their NGOs demand equal rights for LGBT individuals, the Turkish state ignores their demands entirely. The Islamist AKP uses a derogatory and discriminatory language on homosexuality and condemns it as morally wrong. In 2010, some of the AKP politicians called homosexuality “a disease” (Aliye Kavaf, the former Minister for Women and Family Affairs) or as “an example of dishonor” (Idris Naim Şahin, the former Minister of Interior) in their public speeches. In recent years, homophobic incidents, which resulted in physical and sexual violence, and the number of murdered LGBT individuals have increased dramatically. But the AKP government resists the guarantee of freedom and security for LGBT individuals.

The interviews I conducted with feminist and Islamist activists reveal that the debate on homosexuality is a highly sensitive issue. Both Akbulut and Benli from AKDER were asked if they would support the rights of LGBT individuals. They acknowledged that these individuals are discriminated against, but they added that homosexuality is not religiously permissible. One incident shows the controversies on the homosexuality debate. In March 2010, a number of Islamist CSOs initiated a petition called “Homosexuality is an illness and deviancy.”Footnote ²⁴ Islamist women from these groups supported the discourse of the AKP politicians and called the government to duty to fight against homosexuality. Accordingly, the Lambda, a LGBT organization based in Istanbul, filed a lawsuit by claiming that these Islamist organizations willingly intimidate and offend LGBT individuals. This caused a huge debate in the platform called “We protect each other” (Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz), which was initiated for the denunciation of the headscarf ban in public institutions.Footnote ²⁵ This platform was one of the rare occasions in which Kemalist, feminist, and Islamist women came together for a common purpose (Turam Reference Turam2008, 477). LGBT activists wanted to withdraw their signature from the petition on lifting the headscarf ban.Footnote ²⁶ Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER explained, “I work with women from LBGT groups and appreciate their support for us. But not all of my fellow activists are comfortable with LGBT individuals.” Likewise, Fatma Benli stated in the interview, “I sometimes work with the activists from LGBT organizations, and I think homosexual individuals are discriminated against in Turkey. But not everyone has the same opinion.” However, secular feminists from women's and LGBT groups were quickly irritated by the reactions of orthodox Islamist women and reproached the whole Islamist women's movement to be “intolerant, backwards and discriminating” and argued that “the democraticness and openness of organized Islamist women end in the homosexuality debate.”Footnote ²⁷

Hidayet Tuksal from BKP, as a prominent Islamist activist and known for her liberal ideals, stressed that “Homosexuality is a hard topic. It is clear that homosexual individuals in Turkey are discriminated against, and it is not a democratic attitude to ignore the demands of homosexuals. But people have to learn and discuss why homosexuality is not a disease.”Footnote ²⁸ Indeed, Islamist women's CSOs under consideration do not deal with the issue of LGBT rights. However, some Islamist women activists from AKDER and BKP criticized the AKP's discriminatory language toward LGBT individuals and emphasized the need to strengthen human and civil rights regime in Turkey to eliminate discrimination against LGBT individuals and any other discriminated groups (The Economist, February 4, 2004).

THE ABORTION DEBATE

In Turkey, abortions became legal in 1983. Since then, women may have abortions until the tenth week of their pregnancy. On May 26, 2012, Prime Minister Erdoğan held a speech at the third congress of the AKP's women's branch and equated abortion with murder. He stated that “every abortion is like Uludure,” referring to a Kurdish village close to the Turkey-Iraq border where 34 Kurdish civilians were killed by the Turkish military forces in December 2011. This speech provoked a furious public response. Through his speech, Erdoğan not only exposed his religious-conservative opinion on the bodily rights of women, but also his exclusionary attitude toward Kurdish citizens. Feminist organizations, the Turkish Doctors Union, and prominent journalists immediately reacted and criticized Erdoğan's discourse on women. In February 2013, the AKP government drafted a bill to make the legal abortion almost impossible. Also, prominent AKP politicians publicly equated abortion with murder.Footnote ²⁹ In response, women's rights activist initiated a campaign called “Abortion is a Right”, which reached international an audience. They organized protest demonstrations and sit-ins in big cities and opposed the newly planned policies on birth control and abortion.Footnote ³⁰ The AKP government appeared to retreat from its initial position when challenged by women's CSOs, the national and international press, and international organizations such as the UN.Footnote ³¹ Despite the right to have abortion until the tenth week of pregnancy, feminists claim that many doctors in state hospitals in conservative cities reject to perform abortions by saying that it is prohibited.

Organized Islamist women were critical on the AKP's approach to the abortion debate. An Islamist activist and journalist criticized Prime Minister Erdoğan by saying that “he is trying to impose specific beliefs and views on citizens and uses an essentialist discourse by ignoring the opinions of women.”Footnote ³² Similarly, Hidayet Tuksal from BKP criticized the AKP: “The government failed to manage the abortion debate. It has been raised without discussing it with NGOs, experts or medical doctors. It is absurd that rather than building a participative democracy, we move towards a one-man presidency system.”Footnote ³³ Similarly, Neslihan Akbulut from AKDER stressed, “We (Islamist women) are morally against abortion, if it is used as birth control. But women do not undergo abortions on a whim. One has to look first at the reasons behind the abortion; it can be a result of a rape or incest. Hence, the government representatives should avoid making such harsh statements.”Footnote ³⁴ Both Tuksal and Akbulut argued that the state may not interfere in women's bodily rights. These women were disturbed by the patronizing language of the AKP government and believed that the party was using the abortion issue as a political maneuver to conceal the truth behind the Uludere incident.

In contrast, GIKAP was silent on the abortion debate. The organization works primarily on the well-being of families and encourages women to have children. However, in 2004, GIKAP was involved in meetings in Eastern Turkey, where women in the Kurdish region have been informed by several women's CSOs from Istanbul about “women and legal development,” “right to live abortion,” and “women's reproductive health.”Footnote ³⁵ This partly shows that they are open about the abortion issue but do not publicly discuss it. Organized Islamist women in general consider abortion as an issue concerning the female body and suggest that it should be discussed with regard to women's experiences. They contend that the state may not curtail women's bodily rights, as they suffered under the state's intervention in their bodily appearances because of their headscarves. Islamist women activists took part in petitions initiated by feminist groups and supported their cause publicly in their interviews with Turkish newspapers. Organized Islamist women criticized the AKP leadership for using the abortion issue politically, rather than dealing with women's health and birth control seriously.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Islamist women's CSOs under consideration have claimed that the debates on the headscarf ban, LGBT rights and abortion are the consequences of the deficits in civil freedoms and democracy in Turkey. Therefore, they address the need to strengthen civil rights and freedoms to achieve a consolidated democracy in Turkey. They cooperate with other women's groups to create a women-friendly public opinion in Turkey. However, the AKP under Prime Minister Erdoğan pushed its own conservative agenda and disregarded the concerns of women's CSOs in general, Islamist women in particular. Hidayet Tuksal from BKP claimed that, “The only way to impart the information on women's concerns is to influence the female deputies of the AKP, who in turn can convince Prime Minister Erdoğan.” The only female minister in Erdoğan's cabinets, who was responsive to the demands of women's CSOs was Fatma Şahin. She served as the Minister for Social and Family Affairs from July 2011 to December 2013 and tried to convince Erdoğan for progressive gender policies promoted by organized women's groups.

The Islamist women's CSOs continue their struggle against the patriarchal attitude of the party and cooperate with other women's CSOs to influence and monitor policy making in women's rights issues. Islamist women's critical stance towards the AKP, especially in the homosexuality and abortion debates, increased the opportunities of cooperation among different women's groups. Although GIKAP and some conservative members of BKP and AKDER were not vocal on these issues, they did not oppose the views of their critical members like Hidayet Tuksal or Neslihan Akbulut. As these non-orthodox Islamist women participate in political debates and take part in women's civil society platforms working in policy-making processes, they contribute to the consolidation process as democratic agents. Some scholars claim that organized Islamist women exhibit an exclusionary attitude toward other identities and issues, which are not their priority concerns (Gençoğluist Coşar and Onbaşi 2008; Kadıoğlu Reference Kadıoğlu2005; Marshall Reference Marshall2005). It is, of course, not surprising that they act according to the Islamist discourse, since they were first politicized within the Islamist movement. However, as the recent literature on Islamist women also claims, Islamist women do not only fight for freedom from headscarves, even though it has been their priority, but they also conduct projects for improving women's rights and status in Turkey (Ozcetin Reference Ozcetin2009; Seckinelgin Reference Seckinelgin2006). As Fatma Benli from AKDER remarked, “a real change in Turkey is only possible by a civil society that overcomes its internal boundaries for achieving democracy.” When the interviewed Islamist women were asked if the headscarf ban would be lifted and what their organizations would do, they responded that they would continue to work on improving women's human's rights and to fight against discrimination of women. Conclusively, independent Islamist women CSOs vitalize democratic civil society that in turn contributes to the consolidation of democracy in Turkey.

Nevertheless, the CSOs analyzed here constitute only one part of the organized Islamist women. Within the broader scope of organized Islamist women, there are orthodox groups that may cooperate with different segments of civil society on the headscarf issue, but not in the cases of homosexuality, abortion, or any other issue, which may contradict Islamist values and norms. For the present, it can be stated that the Islamist women's CSOs that are open to different voices in civil society played a role in the democratic consolidation process in Turkey. Yet, as scholars also argue, it is still a problem that organized women are, at times, divided along the ideological divisions pertinent in Turkish society (Arat Reference Arat and Kasaba2008; Turam Reference Turam2008). Arat argues that the only way to oppose conservative gender policies of the AKP is an “active and vigilant women's CS” within which diverse segments of the women's movement are represented (2010, 870). Also, organized women should be committed to engendering pluralistic democracy in Turkey. As it was declared in the petition “We Protect Each Other,” organized women in Turkey should have a public sphere where they can walk together.