For the authors, the main lesson from evolutionary biology is that all species, and in particular the human species, have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that enable them to respond adaptively to their environments. This idea allows the authors to be very optimistic about “intentional change”: Thanks to our symbolic and learning capacity, people can be reprogrammed and old problems will be solved with the right cultural tools.
However, this faith in cultural selection might be misplaced. Is cultural selection really responsible for innovative policies? Consider, for instance, people's ability to solve common pool resource (CPR) problems. Wilson et al. attribute people's successes to their cultural ability to discover new ways to cooperate and to successfully transmit these solutions to others. But this overlooks the fact that, in Ostrom's survey, many societies fail miserably and are unable to produce working institutions. In these cases, cultural evolution does not seem to be “selection by consequences”: The same humans, with the same abilities, faced with the same problems, are unable to find a working solution to their CPR.
Why is this so? Ostrom is very clear here: the conditions for solving the CPR are not met. The CPR either has shallow boundaries, or it involves too many people, with too different backgrounds, and so on (Ostrom Reference Ostrom1990). In this perspective, psychology, rather than culture, seems to be the crucial factor: People find a solution only in very specific conditions, where the problems (tracking resources, detecting cheating, identifying members, etc.) fit their psychological abilities.
What about the solution now? Does it display the kind of plasticity that Wilson et al. attribute to humans? Not that much. For instance, we could imagine that culture might have reshaped humans so that they become more altruistic and more group-oriented when they need to solve a CPR problem (a solution much favored by group selection theorists; Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson2003; Gintis et al. Reference Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr2003). But nothing of this sort is visible in the field. On the contrary, in a CPR, just like in any other social interaction, people cooperate only insofar as the interaction benefits each person equally (Baumard et al. Reference Baumard, André and Sperber2013; Trivers Reference Trivers1971). People restrict the benefit of cooperation to the contributors of the interactions (Ostrom's rule 1), they proportionate costs and benefits so that people equally benefit from the cooperation (rule 2), they proportionate sanctions so that even cheaters are treated fairly (rule 5), they make decisions based on consensus so that the rule is equally respectful of individuals' interests (rule 3), and so on.
It has often been claimed that cultural evolution can make people more cooperative and transform them into “strong cooperators” who altruistically cooperate and punish cheaters. What Ostrom's work shows is quite the opposite. People abide to the norm because their behavior is monitored, and they punish others because they are rewarded to do so (Baumard Reference Baumard2010; Guala Reference Guala2012). Hence, institutions do not transform people, they rather reorganize social interactions so that the same old psychology can produce something new. Consider, for instance, the way CPR institutions supply the cost of monitoring:
The cost of monitoring is low in most CPRs as a result of the rule in use. Irrigation rotating systems, for instance, usually place the two actors most concerned with cheating in direct contact with one another. The irrigator who nears the end of a rotation turn would like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the amount of water obtained). The next irrigator in the rotation system waits nearby for him, and would even like to start early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the second from an early start, the presence of the second irrigator deters the first from a late ending. Neither has to invest in additional resources monitoring activities. Monitoring is a by-product of their own strong motivations to use their water turns to the fullest extent. (Ostrom Reference Ostrom1990, p. 95, emphasis mine)
In others words, CPRs work only when they are compatible with humans' evolved psychology (e.g., when the interaction is perceived as fair by individuals). When these psychological constraints are not respected (which, again, happens quite often in Ostrom's database), the CPRs are simply not produced.
In their paper, Wilson et al. celebrate Ostrom's rules as evidence of the formidable plasticity of humans, but they fail to notice that these rules work only because they fit the not-so-plastic human psychology. The same conclusion holds for therapies that work at the individual level first. Simply noting that people can “reconceptualize” their problems does not explain why some therapies work and why some totally fail. Why is it that Alcoholics Anonymous has been so successful? Like other (less successful) therapies, it insists on the danger of alcoholism and tries to reconceptualize people's views on alcoholism. But on top of that, it taps into very intuitive aspects of human psychology, such as morality, reputation, or social motivation. Four of the famous 12 steps are about how alcoholism makes people harm others (e.g., step 8, “Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all”). More generally, by joining an AA group, people bind themselves to others; by feeling accountable to this social group they put themselves in a situation where drinking would amount to losing face.
Turning to large populations, we can make the same observation. How does the intervention against selling tobacco to minors work? Is it by changing people or simply warning them of the dangers of smoking? Not really. It works by tapping into some powerful instinct such as fairness (“How many shifts will you work to help me [if I get caught because you wanted to buy tobacco]?”), reputation management (praise in local newspaper), or resource acquisition (coupons). That is, it works precisely by tapping into the fixed genetic dispositions that the authors view as hindering any progress in social change. Indeed, as more and more behavioral studies show, our evolved psychology is not only a constraint that policy designers need to take into account, it is also a powerful lever to solve social problems (for reviews, see Baumard, in preparation; Griskevicius et al. Reference Griskevicius, Cantu and Van Vugt2012; Thaler & Sunstein Reference Thaler and Sunstein2008). Hence, for public policies, our evolved psychology is both the problem and the solution.
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For the authors, the main lesson from evolutionary biology is that all species, and in particular the human species, have evolved mechanisms of phenotypic plasticity that enable them to respond adaptively to their environments. This idea allows the authors to be very optimistic about “intentional change”: Thanks to our symbolic and learning capacity, people can be reprogrammed and old problems will be solved with the right cultural tools.
However, this faith in cultural selection might be misplaced. Is cultural selection really responsible for innovative policies? Consider, for instance, people's ability to solve common pool resource (CPR) problems. Wilson et al. attribute people's successes to their cultural ability to discover new ways to cooperate and to successfully transmit these solutions to others. But this overlooks the fact that, in Ostrom's survey, many societies fail miserably and are unable to produce working institutions. In these cases, cultural evolution does not seem to be “selection by consequences”: The same humans, with the same abilities, faced with the same problems, are unable to find a working solution to their CPR.
Why is this so? Ostrom is very clear here: the conditions for solving the CPR are not met. The CPR either has shallow boundaries, or it involves too many people, with too different backgrounds, and so on (Ostrom Reference Ostrom1990). In this perspective, psychology, rather than culture, seems to be the crucial factor: People find a solution only in very specific conditions, where the problems (tracking resources, detecting cheating, identifying members, etc.) fit their psychological abilities.
What about the solution now? Does it display the kind of plasticity that Wilson et al. attribute to humans? Not that much. For instance, we could imagine that culture might have reshaped humans so that they become more altruistic and more group-oriented when they need to solve a CPR problem (a solution much favored by group selection theorists; Boyd et al. Reference Boyd, Gintis, Bowles and Richerson2003; Gintis et al. Reference Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr2003). But nothing of this sort is visible in the field. On the contrary, in a CPR, just like in any other social interaction, people cooperate only insofar as the interaction benefits each person equally (Baumard et al. Reference Baumard, André and Sperber2013; Trivers Reference Trivers1971). People restrict the benefit of cooperation to the contributors of the interactions (Ostrom's rule 1), they proportionate costs and benefits so that people equally benefit from the cooperation (rule 2), they proportionate sanctions so that even cheaters are treated fairly (rule 5), they make decisions based on consensus so that the rule is equally respectful of individuals' interests (rule 3), and so on.
It has often been claimed that cultural evolution can make people more cooperative and transform them into “strong cooperators” who altruistically cooperate and punish cheaters. What Ostrom's work shows is quite the opposite. People abide to the norm because their behavior is monitored, and they punish others because they are rewarded to do so (Baumard Reference Baumard2010; Guala Reference Guala2012). Hence, institutions do not transform people, they rather reorganize social interactions so that the same old psychology can produce something new. Consider, for instance, the way CPR institutions supply the cost of monitoring:
The cost of monitoring is low in most CPRs as a result of the rule in use. Irrigation rotating systems, for instance, usually place the two actors most concerned with cheating in direct contact with one another. The irrigator who nears the end of a rotation turn would like to extend the time of his turn (and thus the amount of water obtained). The next irrigator in the rotation system waits nearby for him, and would even like to start early. The presence of the first irrigator deters the second from an early start, the presence of the second irrigator deters the first from a late ending. Neither has to invest in additional resources monitoring activities. Monitoring is a by-product of their own strong motivations to use their water turns to the fullest extent. (Ostrom Reference Ostrom1990, p. 95, emphasis mine)
In others words, CPRs work only when they are compatible with humans' evolved psychology (e.g., when the interaction is perceived as fair by individuals). When these psychological constraints are not respected (which, again, happens quite often in Ostrom's database), the CPRs are simply not produced.
In their paper, Wilson et al. celebrate Ostrom's rules as evidence of the formidable plasticity of humans, but they fail to notice that these rules work only because they fit the not-so-plastic human psychology. The same conclusion holds for therapies that work at the individual level first. Simply noting that people can “reconceptualize” their problems does not explain why some therapies work and why some totally fail. Why is it that Alcoholics Anonymous has been so successful? Like other (less successful) therapies, it insists on the danger of alcoholism and tries to reconceptualize people's views on alcoholism. But on top of that, it taps into very intuitive aspects of human psychology, such as morality, reputation, or social motivation. Four of the famous 12 steps are about how alcoholism makes people harm others (e.g., step 8, “Made a list of all persons we had harmed, and became willing to make amends to them all”). More generally, by joining an AA group, people bind themselves to others; by feeling accountable to this social group they put themselves in a situation where drinking would amount to losing face.
Turning to large populations, we can make the same observation. How does the intervention against selling tobacco to minors work? Is it by changing people or simply warning them of the dangers of smoking? Not really. It works by tapping into some powerful instinct such as fairness (“How many shifts will you work to help me [if I get caught because you wanted to buy tobacco]?”), reputation management (praise in local newspaper), or resource acquisition (coupons). That is, it works precisely by tapping into the fixed genetic dispositions that the authors view as hindering any progress in social change. Indeed, as more and more behavioral studies show, our evolved psychology is not only a constraint that policy designers need to take into account, it is also a powerful lever to solve social problems (for reviews, see Baumard, in preparation; Griskevicius et al. Reference Griskevicius, Cantu and Van Vugt2012; Thaler & Sunstein Reference Thaler and Sunstein2008). Hence, for public policies, our evolved psychology is both the problem and the solution.