It has long been known that members of the founding generation expressed misgivings about the worth and viability of the Constitution and of the federal government that operated under it. Dennis Rasmussen's contribution is to assemble this evidence of doubt, much of it drawn from private correspondence, and put it toward showing that “disillusionment”—from the book's subtitle—represented the dominant state of mind. The “setting sun” of the title refers to Benjamin Franklin's side remark at the close the Constitutional Convention. Franklin revealed to those standing nearby that throughout the proceedings he had wondered whether the half sun carved into the crest of the president's high-back chair depicted a rising or a setting sun; but that now, with the delegates then affixing their signatures to the finished document, he was pleased to announce that in fact it was a rising sun. Franklin's remark was a testament of optimism. Most others of the period, however, would register their pessimism. Included among the pessimists were George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson. Eight other figures, briefly treated, round out Rasmussen's list of disillusioned founders. The exception was James Madison. Like Franklin, Madison was an optimist to the end, though Madison's end came forty-nine years later, Franklin's only three years later.
Washington anticipated partisan-free republicanism. His first year in office largely satisfied that expectation, his second year to an acceptable degree. After that, however, the divisions in his administration became unbridgeable, and by the time of his second term, party politics had fully taken over. Foreign affairs produced the divide, with Hamilton and the Federalists favoring Britain and Jefferson and the Republicans favoring France. Washington tried to float above the parties, but his policy of neutrality and his support for Jay's treaty with Britain aligned him more with the Federalists. He used his Farewell Address to bemoan the emergence of factionalism, which in the Adams administration rigidified to the point that Washington could say, deflecting pleas that he run again in the 1800 election, that a “broomstick” for the party's nominee would command all that party's votes (57). Party, therefore, was the source of Washington's disillusionment.
Hamilton was never a Constitution booster: “a frail and worthless fabric” (97), he once called it. His disaffection rose from the belief that the federal government, and especially the executive, was not, and would never be, sufficiently powerful—despite his stunning success in making it so (e.g., the national bank and the theory of implied powers). While Hamilton enjoyed the confidence of Washington, President Adams hated and distrusted him, and not without cause, for Hamilton maneuvered to have himself named second in command of the New Army (organized to repel an expected French attack), and he publicly opposed Adams's reelection, only to have Jefferson elected instead. Jefferson, of course, was worse: his small-government policies further weakened an already enfeebled federal government, and his persistent popularity threatened to consign Federalists to the political wilderness. Hamilton's final statement of disillusionment came the night before his duel with Aaron Burr (1804), in a letter prophesying the dissolution of the Union.
Like Washington, Adams disliked the factionalism of parties, but his special worry was civic virtue, or the lack of it. Adams moved from avowing the indispensability of civic virtue and celebrating its presence among wartime Americans (Novanglus, 1775), to questioning the possibility of civic virtue and compensating for its absence with the institutions of mixed government (A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America, 1786–87), to relying on mystery, majesty, and hereditary succession to correct perceived deficiencies in the Constitution (Discourses on Davila, 1790–91). Rasmussen downplays the change, claiming that disillusionment was Adams's primary attitude and that effusions of optimism were occasional and short-lived. In retirement Adams had ample opportunities for complaint, for besides general irritation with Republican administrations, his own Federalists were talking up secession. On the upside, Adams was relieved that Jefferson's policy initiatives fell short of the promised revolution.
Jefferson, an inveterate idealist, who found cause for cheer in the Reign of Terror, is nonetheless placed in the camp of contrarians for reasons exactly opposite those of Hamilton: namely, centralizing forces, once unleashed, could not be checked, even with Jefferson himself as president, and only the example of Washington (retirement after a second term) prevented executive reeligibility from turning into a lifetime appointment and the president into a monarch. But Jefferson defeated Adams and the Federalist legacy of Washington and Hamilton, and so Jefferson left the presidency a happy optimist, confident that with Madison and Monroe as successors, the Federalists would never rise again. Then came the Missouri Compromise and the resuscitation of the slavery issue (1819–21). Slavery was Jefferson's second cause for disillusionment. Jefferson opposed the compromise, partly on states’-rights, constitutional grounds and partly in affirmation of “diffusion theory,” the doctrine that the spread of slavery westward would weaken its hold on the South and hasten its demise (a full reversal of his view in the 1780s). Throughout the book, Rasmussen delivers pointed rebukes at most of the founders for their easy belief that slavery would somehow take care of itself, or that it was a problem best handled by future generations.
Madison, though an outlier, provides the book its moral center. Rasmussen attributes Madison's enduring optimism to temperament, longevity, and end-of-life labor. Even-tempered and pragmatic, Madison had realistic expectations and was willing to take the least imperfect for the best. Accordingly, he held out little hope for partisan-free politics or for a virtuous citizenry, and he was not dismayed when neither materialized or lasted very long. Nor was he terrified by competent government with powers equal to its responsibilities or, from the other side, enamored of expanding those responsibilities to encompass the goal of national greatness. Madison outlived his contemporaries (dying in 1836); he therefore experienced nearly a half century of life under the Constitution and witnessed its staying power amid crises, the last being the Nullification Crisis (1832–33). His optimism was earned, so to speak, and benefited from historical corroboration. The end-of-life labor was the return by Madison to his Convention notes, organizing them for posthumous publication. The effort resulted in a renewed, indeed heightened, respect for the Constitution and the delegates who wrote it.
The obvious question to ask of this book is why disillusionment is significant. It is not as though the country failed because some of the founders despaired of its success. The country did not fail, so why does it matter what the founders thought in their darker moments? While not quite posing the question, Rasmussen does venture an answer. It is that the Constitution deserves no more respect today than the founders gave it back then. If unloved by those who made it, it should not be revered by those who have received it. But after adopting this iconoclastic posture, Rasmussen shifts to a more balanced stance typical of Madison, recommending that we temper our expectations and appreciate our blessings, accept that political defects are repairable only at the margins, and admire and replicate the resolve of the founders, who despite their reservations worked tirelessly in the country's service. On this “two-cheers” note, Rasmussen concludes his thoughtful, thorough, and beautifully written book.
