Until the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire's economic prosperity was comparable to that of Western Europe; by the nineteenth century, the Empire was poorer and growing more slowly. Understanding how the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe arrived at such divergent development paths remains an important question. This volume shows how Ottoman institutions’ failure contributed to the empire's decline and describes policy makers’ reform attempts to prevent its eventual collapse.
The authors, Fuat Andic and Suphan Andic, use neo-institutional economics to address the Ottoman Empire's decline. The first chapter gives a brief introduction and summarizes the volume's goals. The second chapter establishes the conceptual framework, which carries the subsequent discussion in later chapters. The third chapter describes policy solutions a number of Ottoman writers proposed but the government failed to follow. The subsequent chapters provide a narrative of Ottoman institutions’ failure and reform attempts from the eighteenth century until 1918 in a chronological order. While these chapters do not provide much new formation for scholars already familiar with Ottoman history, other readers will find the historiography useful.
The authors give a good, succinct overview of the history of Ottoman administration and governance paradigm, as well as the empire's reform and modernization efforts. This volume is particularly successful in showing how the Ottoman state apparatus comprised different actors who often had conflicting interests and that the neo-institutional economics framework is crucial in understanding the failure of reforms. In this way, the book resembles recent work by Şevket Pamuk (“Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500–1800,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 35 [2004]: 225–247). Pamuk also advocates this framework in understanding institutional changes in the Ottoman Empire.
Moreover, the section on Ottoman writers’ counsels shows that (at least some) Ottomans were acutely aware of the empire's troubles as early as the sixteenth century. Some of these writers’ policy recommendations are quite sophisticated. Since the Ottoman government did not adopt these policy recommendations, one can infer that determinants of decline might be found in political economy and institutional failure.
Despite the book's ambition, its small size is not sufficient to comprehensively address 400 years of history. First of all, the question of “decline” is not well defined. The conceptual framing in the second chapter implies the economic decline will receive attention. Instead, the book focuses mostly on territorial losses, decentralization, and decrease in the government's fiscal capacity. It is unclear how the central government's decline is bad for the general economy. This raises some confusion. For instance, the authors describe the Ottoman Empire from eighteenth century onwards as a state in decline. However, real wages in Ottoman cities were comparable to many urban centers of Europe until the mid-eighteenth century (Süleyman Özmucur and Şevket Pamuk, “Wages and Standards of Living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489–1914,” Journal of Economic History 62 (2002), pp. 293–321). This evidence suggests comparable economic well-being despite military failures.
Second, while one of the book's strengths is its analysis of the complex Ottoman state machinery, the state itself receives exclusive attention in explaining reforms (or lack thereof). There is not much discussion about the population at large as economic actors. For instance, the authors analyze the late and brief introduction of the printing press in the 1700s by the Ottoman government as a top-down reform, which failed due to antagonistic relations within the state (pp. 56–58). On the other hand, in Maarten Prak and Jean Luiten van Zenden's Technology, Skills and the Pre- Modern Economy in the East and the West (Leiden: Brill, 2013), Luiten van Zenden provides an alternative explanation by showing that the Ottoman script was not suitable for the technology at the time and thus the printing press did not offer sufficient savings over hand methods. Finally, the book might have strengthened its arguments by providing empirical evidence on the central government's tax revenues, tax farming, and state finances.
Ultimately, the authors’ analysis is not sufficient to support the book's claims. However, it provides a good introduction to the Ottoman administration's reforms and Ottoman history for the uninitiated. The book's convincing framing of the Ottoman state as a coalition of agents with conflicting incentives shows that future studies on the Ottoman Empire need to take the underlying political economy of Ottoman administration into account.
