Teresa Wright poses the question most frequently asked in the West about China: Why has the emergence of capitalism not led China's citizens to press for liberal democratic change? Given the popularity of modernization theory in US policy and research, we expect that the economic growth in China since 1979 should serve as a catalyst for the middle class demanding more political rights such as participation. However, while social unrest has increased in China, the regime does not appear to be in imminent danger of being overthrown by the middle class. In fact, many recent analyses of Chinese politics examine the durability of the Chinese Community Party (CCP), such as David Shambaugh's China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation (University of California Press, 2009). What explains this confounding case for modernization theory?
Wright contends that increasing social unrest in China should be understood not as a social push for democratization but rather as evidence that the Chinese brand of authoritarianism has been consolidated. By consolidated (my word, not Wright's) I mean that most citizens play by the “rules of the game,” both spoken and unspoken, to express grievances. Both Kellee Tsai and Margaret Pearson find a similar trend of the missing process of class formation and mobilization against the government by private business owners—the vital ingredient of the middle class according to modernization theory (Kellee Tsai, Capitalism without Democracy [Cornell University Press, 2007], and Margaret Pearson, China's New Business Elite [University of California Press, 2000]). For example, in 1993 only 13 percent of private entrepreneurs were members of the party, but by 2003, 34 percent belonged to the CCP. The rise in party memberships among “middle class” groups such as private entrepreneurs and college students illustrates the perceived benefits of working within the existing system to achieve social, political, and economic goals.
In Wright's analysis of critical social classes—private entrepreneurs, professionals, state-sector workers, private-sector workers, and farmers—she finds three key political factors to explain Chinese consolidation of authoritarianism in addition to the state-led model of development. First, the bifurcation of trust between central and local government hinders the attribution of blame. Problems that develop, such as exploitative taxation or corruption, may be blamed on the local government while the legitimacy of the CCP is left unchallenged at the central level. Second, commonly held ideas of upward economic mobility permeate all social classes and support the status quo. Rapid growth in China has created a perception that hardship is temporary and the future holds the promise of advancement, a sort of Chinese version of the American Dream. Third, the lack of “bridging” social trust in China hinders the creation of a unified identity among workers or other groups. This analysis of China finds that the link between economic modernization and political change depends on creating common identities, which are currently missing. Social reaction to the 2008 global economic crisis provides an excellent example of how these three factors unite to defuse potential social mobilization against the CCP.
The crisis created high unemployment primarily for two groups: migrant workers and recent college graduates. Approximately twenty million migrant workers in 67,000 factories lost jobs in the export sector, and three million recent graduates are currently unemployed and living in “ant tribes” outside Beijing and other major cities looking for jobs. Sociologist Lian Si called these underemployed or underpaid Chinese university graduates frustrated by their failure to fulfill their ambitions “ant tribes”: “Ants are smart. They are relatively weak individually but if you don't pay attention to them they can cause a big disaster. There is a Chinese saying that a 10,000 mile dam can be breached by a swarm of ants” (Peter Ford, “China's Ant Tribe: millions of unemployed college grads,” Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 2009). Despite a common cause, these groups have not joined together to demand government support or job creation. Instead of mobilizing, students and workers both feel that if they continue to work within the existing system, they will reap economic benefits when the expected rebound occurs. This lack of mobilization is partly explained by Wright's argument that the two groups do not view their cause as a common one. As one migrant worker explained, “in the city, some people basically don't consider us to be people. They treat us as a thing” (128). However, the CCP also uses political mechanisms to reify this divide. For example, when the international group Oxfam attempted to match college student volunteers with migrant workers, the Ministry of Education instructed all universities to stop collaborating with Oxfam. In this way, the party-state uses administrative controls to “guide” civil-society groups away from potentially creating a common identity.
However, Wright does find sources of fragility in Chinese authoritarianism, such as a generational shift and the sharp economic downturn. Additionally, other scholars have argued that corruption threatens CCP political consolidation (Jie Chen, Popular Political Support in Urban China [Stanford University Press, 2004]). In the absence of a common identity over these threats and a common entity to blame, it is unclear if citizens would mobilize in a way that challenges state authority rather than reaffirms it by asking for state intervention to correct the situation. For example, as one farmer engaged in tax protests argued, “The Center lets us ordinary people have good lives; all central policies are very good. But these policies are all changed when they reach lower levels. It's entirely their fault” (158).
Wright's class-based analysis explaining the economic determinants of this lack of identity is extremely valuable. However, although Wright explains the motivations behind the consolidation of authoritarianism, she neglects to provide the same depth of analysis of the political process of consolidation. Recent studies examine the political process whereby the CCP maintains varying relationships with different groups and classes, which enables these divisions in identity between central and local government, urban and rural workers, and unemployed students and migrant workers (Kang Xiaoguang and Han Heng “Graduated Controls: The State-Society Relationship in Contemporary China,” Modern China 34, no. 1 [2008]: 36–55). The CCP is actively engaged in this process of constructing, or at least maintaining the borders of, differentiated identities. As Elizabeth Perry argues, the CCP “has proven adept at the art of creating coalitions with, and cleavages among, key social elements” (“Studying Chinese Politics: Farewell to Revolution?” China Journal, no. 57 [Jan. 2007]: 1–22). This political process of consolidating authoritarianism highlights the creation of a new state-society model that allows for more pluralistic participation than we might imagine in an authoritarian regime, but the channels of participation and tools of “graduated controls” are still controlled by the state. Understanding this political process of authoritarian consolidation in China allows us to better analyze linkages between economic and political development and the proliferation of alternative state-society models.
