In Israel, Jordan, and Palestine: The Two-State Imperative, Asher Susser bundles the debate over a one-state versus a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict into a neat package that expertly and conveniently covers the topic within one volume. His project is a response to both the failure of the Oslo peace process to produce two coexisting independent states, Israel and Palestine, and the resultant popularity among some Palestinian advocates of a one-state solution. With his use of the word “imperative,” Susser signals his conviction that the two-state solution is still viable and, indeed, essential. The reader is well served with a detailed index, lengthy bibliography, discursive endnotes, and clear maps. The work's many strengths include Susser's frequent return to a rich collection of Arabic, Hebrew, and English language primary sources, as well as his engaging prose and occasional dry wit.
The book is logically organized, both by chapter and by subdivisions within chapters. Susser carefully defines terms and establishes historical context and the narratives of the main protagonists at the outset. Successive chapters then trace Israeli, Jordanian, and Palestinian discourse about the two-state solution and the emergence of the one-state alternative. Here Susser takes issue with arguments favoring the latter in published works by Ali Abunimah, Tony Judt, and Virginia Tilley. The heart of the volume is the final chapter and conclusion, in which the author makes a resounding case for the resurrection of the two-state solution, or at least for interim unilateral steps that will preserve it as the best eventual, if distant, end to the conflict.
Ironically, after years of vigorous lobbying by Palestinians, the governments and popular majorities of the United States and Israel were finally won over to the wisdom of the two-state solution, just as some Palestinians were giving up on it in favor of a single, binational state. The one-state solution posits that Arabs and Jews should live as equal individuals, with one vote for one person, in a single state west of the Jordan river. Susser perceives in this solution either a utopian vision of a “post-nationalist era” that does not actually exist anywhere on the globe or a gilded approach to the unmaking of Israel as a Jewish state. In the first case, he argues that ethnocultural nationalism is still thriving around the world and that it is naive to believe that Palestinians and Israelis would be the first to forgo an ethnocultural-based statehood when that is still the yardstick by which most peoples measure self-determination. Susser marvels that the same scholars who are quick to explain why Palestinians and Jordanians cannot coalesce in a Jordan-is-Palestine state earnestly insist that Israeli Jews and Palestinians can do just that in Palestine/Israel. But Susser is more concerned with the second rationale, which he sees as driven by anti-Israel activists who know that the overwhelmingly Arab demography of any binational state would precipitate the collapse of the Jewish nation-state and the rapid reduction of the Jewish population to minority status. If one-state proponents truly aspire to peace in Palestine, he asks, why do they express only Palestinian interests, when Jewish Israelis are the much harder sell? Susser finds that the one-state agenda “does not seek Israeli acquiescence but collective submission to be brought about by the coercion of the international community” (p. 144).
Susser lays out his opponents’ positions and his own with clarity and scholarly sobriety. He acknowledges that both sides have been unreasonable in what they expect the other to give up and have promulgated pointless demands which only serve to invalidate the narrative of the other (p. 219). He finds fault with the obstructionism and “culture of illegalism” of Israeli settlers, as well as with the consecutive governments that have acquiesced in or promoted their actions (p. 85), and criticizes Palestinian “absolutist positions” (p. 113); all of these have frustrated peacemaking efforts.
The achievement of a two-state solution rests upon the resolution of what the author aptly identifies as the “files” of 1948 and 1967. The latter concerns borders, West Bank settlements, and Jerusalem—difficult but not existential issues for Israel. The former, however, is existential in nature, relating as it does to the Palestinian right of return to Israel proper (p. 41). Israelis seek to close the 1948 file and resolve the 1967 file in a practical manner; Palestinians seek validation and restitution for their 1948 claims and the reversal of the Israeli occupation that began in 1967. In this framework, Israelis are seeking a pragmatic end to the conflict while Palestinians are seeking justice.
Precisely because the two parties are pursuing different ends, Susser argues on behalf of an interim arrangement. He references Ralph Bunche's negotiation of the four armistices that ended the 1948 war and held for twenty years. Had Bunche aimed for a comprehensive peace at the time, Susser writes, he would have failed and warfare would have resumed promptly. Susser posits that the prevailing situation is no more inviting for a comprehensive agreement and suggests instead a new armistice, or hudna (p. 68), between Israel and the Palestinians, which even Hamas has periodically endorsed. This arrangement would preserve the viability of two states until implementation is possible. Moving beyond a 21st-century armistice would require the conduct of domestic negotiations by the three critical parties, namely Israel (which must forge consensus on a West Bank withdrawal), the Palestinians (who must push Hamas and Fatah to reunite Gaza and the West Bank), and Jordan (whose Jordanian and Jordanian-of-Palestinian-descent citizens must determine their own relations as well as that of the kingdom with the emergent state of Palestine).
Susser has no illusions that this tripartite reckoning will be easy or speedy, which leads him to the interesting notion of unilateral parallelism. This formula sees Israel and the Palestinians taking uncoordinated unilateral steps in their own best interests, without having to commit to soul-searing compromises, while nonetheless advancing the likelihood of a two-state solution. Israel might “withdraw unilaterally from certain areas, without concessions on other issues of principle like refugees, for example, and the Palestinians would develop their institutions of self-rule and statehood, without the shackles of Israeli preconditions” or the renunciation of refugees’ rights (p. 217). Mahmud ʿAbbas has already moved unilaterally in securing the 29 November 2012 UN vote to upgrade the status of Palestine to that of non-member observer state. It is difficult to imagine, however, that subsequent Israeli (and Palestinian) unilateral responses will be primarily positive and complementary.
Susser argues that perpetuation of the status quo can only end poorly, with either Jordan's remaking as an alternative Palestinian homeland (a perennial Jordanian fear), Israel's continued absorption of the West Bank, or the default emergence of a conflict-ridden unitary state. But since a negotiated peace between them is impossible at this time, Susser makes the persuasive case that Israelis and Palestinians should strive for interim and even unilateral steps that might facilitate an eventual two-state solution. It is, he writes, the best achievable end, as opposed to a perfect but unattainable one.
