“Tabloid” was once an untainted word, referring to newspapers that were printed in a smaller size and presented news in a more condensed way than broadsheet newspapers did. At some point, condensed news gave way to sensational news, and tabloids became known for their lurid subject matter and screaming headlines such as “Headless Body in Topless Bar.”

François Debrix, a professor of international relations at Florida International University, takes the idea of “tabloid” to a new level, applying it to various aspects of geopolitics and political culture. He writes, “Labeling a culture tabloid or trash is not a pejorative dismissal,” but rather “a descriptive and expository notion” related to “the postmodern condition” (6). He describes “tabloid realism” as being designed to “stir popular emotions” and explain “geopolitical realities in a manner that was meant to be gripping and entertaining” (48). Sometimes, he adds, this realism becomes a problem. He diagnoses journalist Robert Kaplan, for instance, as suffering from “tabloid realist self-induced paranoia” (53).

There is a lot of tabloid whateverism in Tabloid Terror. In this short but ambitious volume, Debrix integrates cultural and media studies with international relations, which is an interesting approach to contemporary global politics. His effort is marred, however, by the density of his writing. If an idea can be expressed in a ten-word sentence, why not make it twenty or thirty words? If one adjective is helpful, why not string together three or four of them?

Some important issues can be found within the interminable sentences. Debrix alleges that after the 9/11 attacks, America's “quest for meaning” has become “to always remain one with terror and war” (89). He argues that the United States is widely perceived as a warrior state and that its people are increasingly quick to embrace warrior mentality. Debrix reaches this conclusion, which will certainly find favor with a substantial audience, but he discusses the idea on an emotional level without providing substantive proof. Assertions stand up better when they are supported by evidence as well as rhetoric. It is also unclear exactly what Debrix wants the United States to do in order to progress beyond this dangerous belligerence.

This is a time, writes Debrix, “when the practice and idea of international relations, particularly in the United States, are increasingly seduced by the tabloid geopolitics and aesthetics of violence” that are compatible with “the American war machine's terror” (142). That is nicely polemical and is a fashionable sentiment in some circles today. Much of Tabloid Terror reflects passionate conviction, but does not reach the level of being convincing.