Geoff Cockfield, Ann Firth, and John Laurent are the editors of “New Perspective on Adam Smith's The Theory of Moral Sentiments.” The volume consists of the introduction by the three editors and eight essays. Lisa Hill claims that Smith is deeply indebted to Plato's idea of thumos—our spiritedness, our drive to satisfy social needs, our desire to be noted and approved. Richard Temple Smith diminishes the influence of Aristotle, especially of the Aristotelian idea of reason, showing that, according to Smith, our moral judgment is based more on natural feelings than on reason. Pete Clarke contextualizes Smith's criticisms of religion, noting that Smith attacks specific religious institutions rather than religion itself. James E. Alvey claims that, while there is an evolution of Smith's religious ideas across the different editions of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith always maintains the belief in a divine design. Jack Barbaket presents Thomas Wright's The Passions of the Minde in Generall as a seventeen-century precursor of Smith, while Ann Firth shows how Kant was influenced by Smith. And while David Thorpe shows the reciprocal influences of Smith and sciences (engineering in particular), John Laurent and Goeff Cockfield look at the relationship between Theory of Moral Sentiments and Darwinan evolutionary theories, claiming that, in Smith, human cooperation should not be attributed to rational calculation based on the hope of future reciprocation, but to our innate sentiments.
The image of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments arising from this volume is consistent, convincing, and innovative. By presenting such a contextualized analysis of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith is described as presenting an image of a complex human being living in a complex system. But despite the variety of points of view under which The Theory of Moral Sentiments is scrutinized, the volume avoids a risk that may sometimes be associated to a volume collecting analyses coming from a variety of perspectives: the volume does not sound like a cacophony of voices, The volume sounds instead like a well-tuned chorus. The harmonious presentation of Smith seems linked, in part, to the common focus on two Smithian ideas, which in one form or another are present across all of the essays: for Smith, we are driven by passions, and we are providentially designed so. Across the essays, the two most quoted sentences from Theory of Moral Sentiments are indeed: “Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren. … She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake, and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.” (Smith [1759] 1976, pp. 116-117), and “The immense machine of the universe” and “the care of the universal happiness … is the business of God and not of man” (TMS, p. 236). And so, while our emotional components are consistently center-stage, the role of reason is downplayed to the point that its discussion is often absent and, when present, it is merely to point out its absence. According to the contributors of the volume, for Smith, we are designed with the emotional drives to become moral, even if our moral rules are not innate. Our moral system therefore evolves, and it evolves spontaneously; yet, its evolution is not purposeless and blind. The constant thread among all the essays is indeed the emphasis on the fact that, for Smith, we are designed. This implies both that there is a designer and that our design, as the design of machines, has an end, as emphasized in particular, but not only, by David Thorpe. The end of our design is identified as universal happiness. The image offered is that one should therefore beware of taking Smith out of context and attributing to him some rationalistic, evolutionary, and atheistic themes as we understand them today.
The Smith that emerges from this book is therefore a somewhat religious Smith who describes emotions-driven individuals—quite a different image from the caricatures of homo economicus to which one is accustomed. The volume is therefore challenging throughout, especially for those who may be trained in economics. Its rich scholarship enriches our knowledge of Smith, and opens the door for a new line of possible scholarship and for additional developments in the existing one. In the introduction, we are told that The Theory of Moral Sentiments used to be the forgotten book of Smith. In this collection of essays, though, it is The Wealth of Nations that seems to be forgotten. The Wealth of Nations is seldom mentioned, basically never analyzed. Once at the end of this volume, a reader may ask how to re-read The Wealth of Nations, given the new perspectives offered. Should one read it in a different light? Would it make any difference? Is the old Adam Smith Problem reopened? Or, how can the book that gave birth to economics be reconciled with this new reading of Smith's “other book”?
Additionally, given the interpretation of Smith offered here, how should one read Smith's essay History of Astronomy? There, Smith claims that, with our imagination, we build systems, or imaginary machines, to calm the anxiety generated by what we do not understand and to arrive at a much-sought “tranquility of the imagination.” But if our universe is a machine and we are part of its design, who is its creator? The divine or our imagination? Should our reading of Smith be affected by whether the universe is a machine or whether people simply believe the universe is a machine?
I believe that this volume is a valuable contribution to Smithian scholarship. All of the essays are engaging and stimulating. They demonstrate the value of exploring and analyzing the context in which Adam Smith wrote. And they will inspire further research to develop the views put forward, as well as to challenge them.
