Despite the general aim of broad comprehension of the past, historiography concentrates on some issues and aspects related to the theories and the historical context. This book takes distance from this approach and explores innovative paths. On the one hand, it studies Epictetus, an author outside the mainstream lists, often relegated to a secondary position in a late and poorly preserved school. On the other hand, it looks into his work with a novel spirit, exploring his philosophy with a socio-historical glance concerning his opinions about non-philosophers, those idiotai, apaideutoi or hoi polloi, called by expressions that describe people without valuable instruction. This indirect route also reveals new perspectives about philosophy and its peculiar dynamic: the opinion about non-philosophers calls attention to the features of philosophers, offering information that goes unnoticed by those who run after traditional views.
The introduction provides a clear summary of the main topics. It justifies Epictetus’ pre-eminence in this study, beginning with his origin as a slave, his relation with well-known figures of the period and his curious iteration of Socrates’ rejection of writing, with Arrian as a witness of his teachings. As a former member of hoi polloi, Epictetus took distance and reflected on their status, and MacG. examines this process in due detail. The first chapter deals with philosophical identity and the condition of authenticity when adopting a school, which implies theory and practice. The second chapter analyses the limits of moral progress, focusing on vice and its relation with ignorance of the philosophical exercises. This inquiry examines Epictetus’ embrace of Stoic ideas to illustrate the link between reason and bodily issues as well as the conditions for education. Indeed, instruction is often provided by teachers without philosophical vocation or formation. As a result, they produce training in vice, without the required combination of theory and practice that would demand due disposition and time.
All these circumstances conspire against the relation between laypeople and philosophy. However, MacG. shows innovative features in Epictetus’ view that leave behind the paradoxical traits of the Stoic sage in previous versions to opt for a model of moral enhancement based on philosophy. Indeed, to indicate the obstacles is a way to deny pure impossibility. In the same line, the third chapter reviews the expectations about the impact and dissemination of philosophical ideas among laypeople, underlining the turn from Epictetus’ initial optimism towards the belief that these tasks were a waste of time. As a result, he dissuaded his followers from them. Arrian's commentary at the beginning of the Dissertations shows a caustic picture of the audience's potential reactions to Epictetus’ lessons and is compatible with these views.
Thus, although these studies emphasise the difference between philosophers and non-philosophers, MacG. balances the scene and offers cases where this distance decreases. Thus, the fourth chapter explores a curious and puzzling aspect of the Stoic doctrine related to the conditions to become a philosopher. Given the difficulties to attain coherence in the hegemonikon, the part that governs our soul, humanity seems to be condemned to ignorance. Notwithstanding, Posidonius and Seneca provide very different beliefs about its primitive status. Primitive people could attain moral virtue without the need for theoretical devices with the help of an austere context and the lack of persistent vices. This perspective revives the discussions about primitive communities found in Plato and Antisthenes and underlines the continuity between these original attitudes and Epictetus’ teachings. It is worth noting that these traits are also present in other realms, as in the case of language: etymology is justified because it is connected to the lost moment when there was a perfect correlation between word and world.
A central epistemological issue in the Stoic doctrine is the main topic of the fifth chapter, revised from the perspective of the link between philosophers and non-philosophers. The preconceptions (prolepseis) explain the innate presence of some notions in all human beings and allow certain basic access to moral virtue without theoretical studies. The approach emphasises the contradiction between some mistaken ideas and preconceptions, calling attention to the limits of these original tendencies, especially in the social and political sphere. This point stands out as a peculiar difference within the practical realm, given that cognitive shortcomings seem to affect political comprehension more than ethical abilities. This hint would account for the wretched circumstances of most communities even if the inhabitants do not have that level of corruption, which constitutes an interesting distancing from the structural parallelism between the individual and society that dates back to Plato's Republic at least.
Based on this issue, MacG. explores the problem of the law, although it was not a matter of particular concern to Epictetus, and it is necessary to read between the lines. However, this examination provides relevant information about what is inside or outside philosophy because Epictetus balances contrasting ideas: a good legal order cannot substitute philosophical exploration, but not having good laws and good administrators of justice and agents of the law could be tragic. This positive aspect of civic law is paralleled with Epictetus’ view about religion. It is often criticised because of its simplicity and idolatry. Still, he does not forget that it is connected to the inner self, and its civic manifestations can lead people to virtuous actions.
The examination of these positive features of non-philosophical activities is completed with an innovative study of Epictetus’ use of exempla. The approach reveals that beyond the attention to the figures of Socrates and Diogenes of Sinope, we should pay attention to the striking absence of mentions and appreciation of other main characters of his school. Above all, this behaviour contrasts with frequent allusions to laypeople, some of them very far from philosophy. Thus, MacG. offers a significant sample of Epictetus’ positive assessment of laypeople that balances the negative judgements. The general outline is illustrative of Epictetus’ critical reception and original reshaping of a complex tradition of authors that dealt with the universal goals of philosophy in the middle of a community that considers it just as the practice of a small part of its members. In the end, institutions prove to attain what philosophy cannot and show the significant link between philosophy and non-philosophical activities.
The conclusion resumes the overall research achievements and calls attention to its impact on studies about Stoicism. The relevance of the relation between philosophy and everyday life is well founded, even if it is unnecessary to stress the secondary place of logic to maintain the central claims. The study on the exempla suggests that Stoicism's descriptive and explanatory force allows avoiding the appeal to the authority of famous figures. Thus, MacG. indicates the possibility to explore the source of Epictetus’ attitude in previous Stoic ideas as well as the link between philosophy and artistic disciplines, both also concerned with human enhancement.
The bibliography is varied and comprehensive, although it includes few pieces from outside the anglophone tradition. Because of the omission, the approach loses the opportunity to reinforce its central tenets by juxtaposition with complementary views, but it offers a good guide to current discussions for those interested in the area. In sum, this book provides a lively presentation of Epictetus’ philosophy, avoiding the commonplaces of traditional historiography. He is not just an epigone or a late recipient of Stoicism. MacG. notes Origen's opinion in Contra Celsum 6.2, where he says that Epictetus was the only philosopher read by many. Accordingly, he finds interesting evidence of the reciprocal basis of this relation. Epictetus also included them in his reflections, within his considerations about human beings in the world.
