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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 22 July 2005
Hakan Özo[gcaron]lu addresses the changing rapport between the Ottoman state and its Kurdish population from the incorporation of Kurdistan in the 16th century until the empire's demise and assesses the role of Kurdish notables—the key figures in the state–Kurdish relationship—in the more recent rise of Kurdish nationalism. Of the topics in Kurdish history hitherto examined, the relationship of the Kurds to the Ottoman state and Kurdish nationalism have received the most attention. Nevertheless, Özo[gcaron]lu's reading both expands on existing studies and revises previous accounts in a concise, nuanced fashion.
The first half of his book provides a framework for understanding the origins of Kurdish identity formation by exploring the historical relationship of the Ottoman state to the Kurds, particularly the notables. Instead of divide-and-rule, the strategy most commonly associated with state policies vis-à-vis the Kurds, Özo[gcaron]lu contends that the Ottomans pursued a policy of “unite and rule.” The state provided incentives to Kurdish leaders to establish their dominance over fragmented groups, an arrangement that worked well for both state and notables. This allowed the Ottomans to limit the parties with whom they had to cooperate, to make this interaction more manageable and, in certain cases, more profitable, while also permitting the notables to expand their own regional influence. While not explicitly confronting the notion of a “classical” arrangement between state and regional actors, the portrait Özo[gcaron]lu paints of a dynamic, ongoing interaction in constant transformation fits well with recent revisions to the paradigm of Ottoman “classical” institutions and their “decline” that has characterized the general field of Ottoman history.
How did this relationship come to the point where, in the 19th century, Kurds began to demand, through word and deed, autonomy or secession from an empire to which they had previously been loyal? They did not in fact become nationalist and secessionist, Özo[gcaron]lu argues, until the empire disintegrated in the 20th century, an argument that both dispels nationalist historiography and corroborates the recent findings of other scholars on the timeline of Kurdish nationalism. In chapter 5, Özo[gcaron]lu's most important, the author provides extensive biographical details of several Kurdish notables who form the backbone of his study. Since such information was hitherto available primarily in Turkish-language sources, this is a great service for English-language readers. More important, it is here that Özo[gcaron]lu goes beyond merely synthesizing existing biographical information and turns to tracing the careers of key early nationalists in support of two chief claims. First, he contends that it was really not until World War I, and particularly its aftermath, that Kurdish “nationalist” activities became actually nationalist and secessionist. Until the empire fell, Kurdish notables generally continued to regard themselves as Ottomans, viewing their fate as linked to that of the state, albeit while seeking to secure their own leadership privileges. Özo[gcaron]lu also draws attention to a split in this nationalist camp. Herein lies his second important suggestion: Kurdish notables who had been members of the Ottoman bureaucracy or otherwise affiliated with the state, or who had more secular backgrounds and educations, opted for the secessionist camp sooner than those whose backgrounds were connected to Sufi brotherhood networks in Anatolia, who remained attached to the caliphate until it ended. Özo[gcaron]lu further maintains that preexisting family ties and loyalties reinforced this split. While this is certainly plausible, a more complete discussion of the followings the notables enjoyed would be welcome. If Kurdish proautonomy or secessionist elites did indeed have followings, what were their bases of support beyond the Kurdish working class of Istanbul?
Another strength of this study is the author's argument that, as the boundaries of Kurdistan shifted in the minds of both Kurds and outsiders, a parallel shift occurred in the notion of who was a Kurd. Özo[gcaron]lu rightly challenges the nationalist/primordialist position that an identifiable and fixed notion of Kurds and Kurdistan has existed over time. But his attempt to link this position with his point on territoriality needs further elucidation. In chapter 2, the author traces the ascribed boundaries of Kurdistan and the corresponding shifts in Kurdish identity. Since the latter part of this argument is a key point of the study, it would be worthwhile to more clearly relate Kurdish nationalist territoriality to the disintegration of the empire. In concluding chapter 3, for example, Özo[gcaron]lu suggests that the brief existence of an official province of Kurdistan in the mid-19th century may have inspired the later Kurdish leadership's vision of an autonomous or independent political entity. While the idea is not far-fetched, Özo[gcaron]lu fails to follow through in chapters devoted explicitly to nationalism, abandons his discussion of territoriality in his most important chapter, and only briefly restates the connection in his conclusion. While he rightly argues that Kurdish notables were not passive partners in the state–Kurdish relationship and that they supported the state because it could confirm their positions of privilege and access to wealth (through property rights or privileges), he stops short of fleshing out this connection for those notables who became nationalists. Land itself, and not simply territoriality, became increasingly important for a certain segment of Kurdish society, and tribal notables in fact cared less about “Kurdistan”—until it served their purposes to frame their demands in a nationalist manner—than about securing their access to land and resources.
The author rightly draws attention to the historical interplay of forces that contributed to the shaping of Kurdish identity and to the gradual emergence of Kurdish nationalism. He challenges ahistorical, essentialist understandings, but framing this interplay as being alternately monologic and dialogic is rather confusing. His point that identity of a people and territory can be shaped at the behest of outsiders (what he calls monologic) is well taken, but isn't this still part of the larger dialogic/dialectical process of identity formation?
Despite these few criticisms, Özo[gcaron]lu's work is a welcome contribution to the ongoing debate on Kurdish nationalism and the relationship of the state (explicitly Ottoman, implicitly Turkish) to the Kurds in its boundaries (and sometimes beyond). Readers interested in comparative nationalism, identity formation, center–periphery relations, and links between nationalism and the demise of empires will certainly make good use of this study. Even though Özo[gcaron]lu does not delve deeply into the Republican period, he demonstrates that a better understanding of Kurdish history is not simply constructive but essential for comprehending Turkey. He leaves us to wonder what might have been if, rather than embarking on a nationalist/Kemalist path, Turkey had continued the (at least theoretical) multiethnic tradition of the Ottomans.