Remarks by Deputy USTR Sapiro, July 2, 201Footnote 1
Ambassador Miriam Sapiro gave the following remarks in Rome, Italy
Ambassador Sapiro. It is a pleasure to be here today to open the Third Workshop on Small and Medium Enterprises organized under the U.S.-EU Transatlantic Economic Council. I want to thank Undersecretary Dassù, European Commission Vice President Tajani, and Confindustria President Squinzi, for hosting this important event, and everyone here for playing a key role in helping small business compete more effectively in the transatlantic marketplace.
I am particularly grateful to the executives and entrepreneurs from our small business community, hailing from California, the Midwest, and the East Coast, for making this trip so they could share their insights and expertise. I know first-hand about the risks, challenges, and opportunities you face in launching and running a small business, which I did for eight years before President Obama and Ambassador Kirk offered me the opportunity to serve in Government again.
We are here today because the EU and the United States share the goal of promoting increased participation in trade by our small businesses. We want to discuss EU and U.S. best practices and to develop additional concrete ways that the United States and EU can collaborate to address these types of barriers and help our SMEs participate more actively in transatlantic trade.
We know that strengthened trade and business partnerships across the Atlantic by companies both small and large will mean more jobs and growth at a time when our economies need it most.
Indeed this is the focus of the EU-U.S. High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth, whose efforts hold considerable promise for smaller U.S. and EU firms. Based on its work thus far, the Working Group indicated last month that a comprehensive transatlantic trade and investment agreement, if achievable, would generate substantial benefits for the U.S. and EU economies. I am confident we will be able to take concrete steps to help smaller U.S. and EU firms sell their products and services across the Atlantic and to third countries.
Let me take a brief moment to put our work here in Rome in that context.
U.S.-EU goods and services trade totaled nearly $1 trillion in 2011. But both sides know we have the potential to build this into an even greater partnership, to benefit our small businesses and companies of all sizes. We know that small companies that export grow faster, add jobs faster, and pay higher wages than those that do not. Small and medium sized enterprises collectively not only employ a majority of workers in the United States and the EU, but are also a critical source of innovative processes, products, and services that are key engines of economic growth, job creation, and competitiveness.
We know also that the issue of trade barriers affects businesses of all sizes, but SMEs face particular challenges. We are ready to focus on measures that disproportionately affect SMEs, especially those that impose additional costs, and thereby hamper SME export performance. For example, in the manufacturing sector, SMEs with limited resources often find it difficult to meet foreign standards, testing and certification requirements. In the services sector, insufficient intellectual property protection poses a relatively larger risk to firms with limited resources. Similarly, services SMEs have more difficulty establishing affiliates in foreign markets and preferences for local providers can be more burdensome.
The United States wants to ensure that our SMEs have the tools they need to compete in the transatlantic marketplace and around the world. That's why President Obama is strongly committed to taking several concrete actions that can make a difference.
Since taking office, the Administration has secured 18 tax cuts for small business. Just yesterday, President Obama announced additional initiatives to reduce paperwork and streamline processes to help more small businesses access the credit they need to invest, hire, and grow. The President's National Export Initiative (NEI) also puts a special emphasis on finding new ways to enhance SME participation in trade, including by making government programs and resources more accessible through one-stop online platforms such as Export.Gov.
In the United States, small businesses account for nearly 98 percent of all U.S. exporters. The value of exports by U.S. small businesses in 2010 was over $380 billion, an increase of more than 24 percent from 2009, and an estimated 34 percent of the total value of known U.S. goods and services exports. These trends are positive, but I believe we can do better. Which is what brings us here today.
The EU and the United States launched these SME workshops under the auspices of the Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC) in 2011 with clear goals in mind: What can we do together to help small companies trying to overcome the challenges to selling abroad? What can we learn from each other as we each seek to strengthen our programs and policies in this area?
Remarks by USTR Kirk, July 24, 2012Footnote 2
Ambassador Ron Kirk gave the following remarks in Washington, DC
Ambassador Kirk. Thanks to the U.S.-Russia Business Council staff and all of the member companies. You provided vital support to USTR during the WTO accession negotiations with Russia. And you continue to play a critical role as we work together to obtain Congressional action on a bill that will ensure the WTO Agreement applies between the United States and Russia.
I'm pleased to be with you all at an important moment for the United States, for Russia, and for businesses in both countries. Yesterday, Russia notified the WTO that it has accepted its terms of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). I don't need to tell this crowd that this is, without a doubt, a historic event. Fewer than thirty days from now Russia will become the 156th Member of the WTO. In some ways, this is the end of a long road that started almost 20 years ago. Russia has amended and adopted laws, regulations, and other measures to create the legal framework needed to implement the WTO rules.
Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress is getting closer to completing important steps that will ensure the WTO Agreement applies between the United States and Russia. Last Wednesday, the United States Senate Finance Committee reported out of committee legislation that will terminate application of the Jackson-Vanik amendment and authorize the President to extend permanent normal trade relations to Russia.
We congratulated Chairman Baucus and Ranking Member Hatch, and applauded the Finance Committee's unanimous vote to authorize PNTR extension to Russia and Moldova.
Similarly, we are pleased that House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Camp and Ranking Member Levin have come together to schedule a full committee markup this Thursday of a bill that is based on what the Finance Committee approved. As we continue to work with Congress, our priority is to put legislation on the President's desk for signature as soon as possible.
Today, we'll talk about what's at stake with the legislation Congress is currently considering. I look forward to hearing directly from you how passage of this important trade measure will help support American jobs by boosting your exports of U.S. goods and services to Russia. You all know the benefits of extending PNTR for your businesses, so I'll just briefly summarize some of the highlights before we begin the discussion.
This bill will help protect U.S. intellectual property, which supports well-paying jobs for innovators and creators across America. This bill will help ensure that U.S. exporters of agricultural products—such as soybeans, corn, pork, poultry, and dairy—benefit from Russia's WTO commitment to base its sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on international standards. Similarly, this bill will help support U.S. manufacturers who need the benefits of Russia's WTO commitments to enhance transparency of mandatory and voluntary standards (TBT), and to reduce other non-tariff barriers to trade. This bill will help bring U.S. service providers the benefits of Russia's WTO commitment to open its services markets in sectors such as audio-visual services, telecommunications, computer services, and financial services. Similarly, this bill will help keep America's IT exporters competitive in Russia as it joins the Information Technology Agreement. And finally, of course, this bill will provide the United States with more trade enforcement tools to hold Russia accountable for its WTO commitments. These tools will include the WTO's function as a multilateral forum, where we will be able to air, address, and resolve trade disputes more efficiently and effectively.
All of these benefits are on the table right now. Recent actions by the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees have moved us closer to securing them. But they won't be in your hands until the WTO agreement applies between the United States and Russia. And failure to pass a Jackson-Vanik/PNTR bill could jeopardize well-paying jobs here at home.
As we mark the significant progress made so far, it's important for everyone to stay focused on the positive impact that Russia PNTR will have on U.S. trade and jobs, so that we can pursue a legislative path forward. Thank you.
Remarks by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations DiCarlo, August 21, 2012Footnote 3
Ambassador Rosemary DiCarlo gave the following remarks at a Security Council meeting at UN headquarters in New York, New York
Ambassador DiCarlo. Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you, Special Representative Zarif for your briefing. I'd like to welcome Prime Minister Da?i? of Serbia and Prime Minister Thaçi of Kosovo to the Council today, and I thank them both for their comments. Mr. President, I'd like to make five points.
First, the United States commends the Republic of Kosovo for several positive developments during the reporting period. We especially welcome the OSCE's facilitation of peaceful Serbian parliamentary and presidential elections for dual nationals in Kosovo. The OSCE enabled dual nationals to exercise their right to vote without infringing upon Kosovo's sovereignty. Kosovo and Serbia worked effectively with each other and with the international community to promote the development of strong, democratic institutions. It is unfortunate that two Serb municipalities in the north flagrantly ignored Kosovo and Serbian law by improvising a parallel voting process. We welcome Belgrade's rejection of these actions. Parallel structures have no legitimate role in Kosovo. They should have been dismantled long ago in accordance with resolution 1244.
Mr. President, now that the new Serbian government is in place in Belgrade, we hope to see resumption of the EU-facilitated dialogue. This includes implementing agreements previously reached, including on integrated border management. We welcome the commitments today of both prime ministers to pursue constructive engagement through this mechanism. The United States continues to support the EU's efforts to foster dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia with the goal of normalizing relations between the two states in order to enable both countries to fulfill their European aspirations. As we have stated previously, the European Union is uniquely placed to lead this dialogue.
Second, the United States congratulates Kosovo on the upcoming end of supervised independence. We join our colleagues in the International Steering Group in recognizing the enormous progress Kosovo has achieved, including upholding its commitment to implement provisions embodied in Special Envoy Ahtisaari's proposal and in enshrining these into law. The United States commends the International Civilian Office, which has worked with the Kosovo Government, to achieve these gains. The decision to end supervised independence in September is a vote of confidence in Kosovo's dedication and ability to build a multiethnic, democratic nation.
Third, the United States remains concerned over threats to security and freedom of movement in northern Kosovo. The Secretary General's report touches on this; however, more focus should have been given in the report to the lack of cooperation, and attacks and threats to international personnel from hardliners in the north. Blockades continue to be erected; troop movements continue to be restricted; and, EULEX officials and KFOR troops continue to be threatened. The principal threats to peace in Kosovo come from the nexus of hardline, criminal elements in the north. We look to Belgrade to set a positive tone, cooperate fully with KFOR and EULEX, and encourage Kosovo Serbs in the north to cooperate. KFOR's efforts, in support of EULEX, to close illegal border crossings and remove road blocks, are most definitely part of its mandate. The Council expects all parties to support these efforts.
We commend the Government of Kosovo for opening the Administrative Office for Mitrovica North. The international community should not impede the Kosovo government's natural prerogative and capacity to provide services to its citizens in the north. We hope to see cooperation from UNMIK with the Kosovo government on this issue. A significant number of northern Kosovo Serbs applied for, and were granted, positions at the administrative office. We condemn all violence against Kosovo Serbs working in the office and using its services. We hope to see these acts covered in the Secretary-General's next report.
We commend the Kosovo Police and EULEX for their efforts to protect the local population and remain confident of their investigative capacity and professionalism. We note the collaboration between EULEX and the Kosovo police in investigating the recent double murder of a Kosovo Serb couple. We share the Special Representative's concern that, as in previous years, hardliners used Vidovdan to incite inter-ethnic tensions. We condemn attacks both on the Kosovo police and on pilgrims.
Fourth, regarding the allegations raised in the March 8th report, the United States takes seriously all allegations of serious crimes committed in the region. We underline a full support for EULEX's work in this regard. We also commend the strong progress made by the Special Investigative Task Force. We again underscore our staunch support for Ambassador Williamson, the task force, and the countries cooperating with the task force in its crucial work on all of its cases currently under investigation, especially cases related to allegations of organ trafficking in connection with the 1999 conflict.
Finally, Mr. President, we are concerned about the violence returnees continue to experience. Managing the returnee process is difficult, but the looting of returnee houses, stoning of vehicles, and acts of physical violence are unacceptable and stymie reintegration. We commend the Kosovo government for its commitment to supporting returning populations through its Municipal Offices for Communities and Returns. As elsewhere in the region, more needs to be done to create conditions for voluntary returns.
Mr. President, the United States remains committed to advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the entire Balkans region. We look forward to continued cooperation with both Serbia and Kosovo toward realizing their aspirations for European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Thank you.
Statement issued by NSC Spokesman Vietor, August 31, 2012Footnote 4
Tommy Vietor issued the following statement on Azerbaijan
President Obama is deeply concerned by today's announcement that the President of Azerbaijan has pardoned Ramil Safarov following his return from Hungary. Safarov confessed to the murder of Armenian Army officer Gurgen Margaryan in Budapest in 2004, and was serving a life sentence in Hungary for this brutal crime. We are communicating to Azerbaijani authorities our disappointment about the decision to pardon Safarov. This action is contrary to ongoing efforts to reduce regional tensions and promote reconciliation. The United States is also requesting an explanation from Hungary regarding its decision to transfer Safarov to Azerbaijan.
Remarks by Acting Undersecretary Gottemoeller, September 4, 2012Footnote 5
Acting Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller gave the following remarks in Stockholm
Undersecretary Gottemoeller. Thank you so much for having me here to speak today. I am always glad to be back in Stockholm and I am very happy to be here at SIPRI. The work of this organization is widely-respected and world-renowned. I was proud to be a part of the SIPRI Board before I joined the Obama Administration. Today, I am here to talk to you about the importance of revitalizing conventional arms control in Europe.
Little known fact: my first trip to Stockholm was in 1986, to speak with participants in the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe. Pulled up the document last night, here is an excerpt from the first page:
The representatives of the participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)…met in Stockholm in from 17 January 1984 to 19 September 1986, in accordance with the provisions relating to the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe contained in the Concluding Document of the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE.
The participants were addressed by the Prime Minister of Sweden, the late Olof Palme, on 17 January 1984.
I want to convey my great respect of Olof Palme, and Swedish diplomacy, for sowing the seeds for conventional arms control in Europe.
So I am glad to back here in Stockholm talking about this issue. Sweden has frequently and productively worked together with the United States and NATO on many shared international security objectives. We in the United States are very appreciative of Sweden's support of NATO security objectives.
Strengthening European security through reevaluation and revision of European conventional force structures is essential to the future of security on the continent and around the globe. Before going into our thinking about the conventional arms control regime, I would like to briefly discuss an issue that tends to draw more attention than conventional arms control and that is the possible negotiations between NATO and Russia to reduce nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Both the President and the Senate—in the New START Resolution of Ratification—have placed a priority on seeking to initiate new negotiations with the Russians on nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNW).
Over the past few years, the Administration has taken a number of steps towards this goal. We have been conducting our own internal reviews, while also reviewing this matter with our Allies through the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR). We have been consulting with our allies, and we've been engaging with the Russians in a strategic stability dialogue.
In approving the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review at Chicago this past May, the Allies determined that NATO's current posture meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. NATO has already dramatically reduced its holdings of and reliance on nuclear weapons, but has indicated that it is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for nonstrategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of nonstrategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.
The Allies have supported and encouraged the United States and Russia to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons in every category.
NATO Allies look forward to developing and exchanging transparency and confidence-building ideas with Russia with the goal of enhancing European security and stability by increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's nonstrategic nuclear force postures in Europe.
Conventional Arms Control in Europe While we continue to work on nonstrategic nuclear force issues, we are keeping in mind the importance of European security overall. Secretary Clinton stated in 2010, “[a] strong Europe is critical to our security and our prosperity. Much of what we hope to accomplish globally depends on working together with Europe.” In this context, we have all seen that predictable conventional force structures in Europe will contribute to enhancing European security and strengthening trust, including between NATO Allies and Russia.
The three pillars of our conventional arms control agreements in Europe—the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document confidence and security-building measures—provide a foundation for stability in our strategic relationships. Each regime is important and contributes to security and stability in a unique way and when they are working in harmony, the result is greater confidence for all of Europe.
Open Skies
First, I want to touch on the very successful Open Skies Treaty. This Treaty establishes a regime of unarmed aerial observation flights over the territories of its 34 signatories, including Sweden. Open Skies is one of the most wide-ranging international arms control efforts to date to promote openness and transparency in military forces and activities.
This year, we are celebrating the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty and the tenth anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force. The Treaty itself remains a solid regime. The observation flights—more than 800 to date—serve to enhance military transparency. They also provide an opportunity for our governments—in most cases, military personnel—to regularly and effectively work together.
The biggest single challenge we face for the continued success of the Treaty is the future availability of resources. The Treaty will only be as good as the States Parties make it, and we cannot make it as effective with old aircraft and sensors. For its part, the United States has recently completed an internal review of future implementation plans. The key development involves a U.S. commitment to transition from the film-based cameras we use today to digital sensors. We urge all parties to also redouble their efforts to modernize the Treaty to allow for the use of these sensors and ensure sufficient assets for future operations.
The United States has proposed a number of ways to improve Treaty implementation, while bearing in mind the budgetary constraints that are a reality in the U.S. and across Europe. One thing we believe has been underutilized is the possibility of sharing Open Skies assets among States Parties. This is the type of creative thinking we need to do to continue to advance European security in the current fiscal environment.
Vienna Document
The Vienna Document is another important part of the European security architecture. This set of politically-binding confidence and security building measures, which applies to all 56 member nations of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, has contributed immeasurably to Europe-wide military transparency and reassurance. It is also a useful template for other regions, as they look to build confidence in the military intentions of their neighbors.
Since 2010, we have been working to modernize the Vienna Document to make it more relevant for twenty-first century military capabilities and security realities. In December of last year, an updated Vienna Document was issued—and one of the key changes was to make it a living document to be updated on a regular basis. We are actively engaged with our partners to further modernize the Vienna Document paying particular attention to enhancing military transparency and expanding the content of information exchanges, while increasing efficiency in the conduct of verification activities. Again, mindful of budgetary realities, we are working with our partners to ensure that these enhancements do not impose unreasonable expenses on participating States. Going forward we have two goals in mind: we want to strengthen existing provisions at the same time that we ensure the Document remains relevant to today's security challenges.
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Now, let me turn briefly to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, or CFE. Since its entry into force, more than 72,000 pieces of Cold War military equipment—tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft, and attack helicopters—have been eliminated. Under CFE, thousands of inspections have taken place at military sites all over Europe, dramatically increasing confidence and military transparency on the continent by providing a means to verify the information provided in data exchanges.
The CFE regime remains important to the United States, and for European security as a whole. Unfortunately, Russia ceased implementation of its CFE obligations in December 2007. Since then, Russia has refused to accept inspections and ceased to provide information to other CFE Treaty parties on its military forces as required by the Treaty.
After trying for several years to encourage Russia to resume implementation, in November 2011, the United States ceased carrying out certain obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia. We were joined by our NATO Allies that are party to the Treaty, as well as Georgia and Moldova, in taking this important step—in all, 24 of the 30 countries that are party to the Treaty.
This decision came after the United States and NATO Allies made two major—but ultimately unsuccessful—efforts since 2007 to find a way to overcome the impasse on CFE. We stand ready to return to the negotiating table whenever we have a signal that real progress can be made on the remaining issues, including the right of states to choose whether to allow foreign forces to be stationed on their territories and transparency among all parties essential for preserving confidence during the negotiations.
In the meantime, we have also embarked upon a ground-up reexamination of the entire conventional arms control enterprise.
Moving Conventional Arms Control Forward
We know that a conventional arms control regime in Europe is worth preserving. NATO confirmed the importance of conventional arms control at the 2012 Chicago Summit:
Allies are determined to preserve, strengthen and modernize the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments, and continue to explore ideas to this end.
Modernization is the key word here. We have made a serious investment in building the current security architecture in Europe. We must adapt and improve our efforts to meet our current and future security needs, and do it in a way that is efficient and effective for all countries involved. We need some new thinking, and we have been devoting a lot of time and energy to this task.
We're asking fundamental questions: What are the security concerns in Europe in 2012 that a conventional arms control agreement should address? And, taking into account the lessons learned from the implementation of CFE and other existing agreements, what kinds of arms control measures could best address those concerns and uphold core principles of European security?
The fact is, the basic problem that the original CFE Treaty was meant to resolve—the destabilizing surplus of conventional arms on the continent—has been resolved, in no small part through implementation of this important treaty.
Today, for the most part, quantities of conventional armaments across the continent are far below the negotiated ceilings, and are likely to continue to drop.
While the problems of 1989 no longer exist, it is my view that conventional arms control, done right, can significantly improve security on the continent by helping to address today's concerns. It can provide confidence regarding the military activities and intentions of neighbors, especially in sensitive areas. We also need to spend our stretched defense budgets wisely. Arms control can help us do that, for the more predictable our relationships, the better we can plan our defense spending.
Final Thoughts
With that, I would like to stop and take some questions, but I will leave you with a final thought. The conventional arms control regime that has been in place in Europe since the end of the Cold War contributes to the security of the continent. In order to maintain security and stability, this regime requires constant tending. Now is the time for action. If conventional arms control is allowed to falter, then we all will be the worse for it—this includes Russia, too.
Thank you and I am happy to take some questions.
Remarks by Assistant Secretary Gordon September 12, 2012Footnote 6
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Philip H. Gordon gave the following remarks in Washington, DC
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Assistant Secretary Gordon. As you know, and I've said here before, we constantly from the start invested in this relationship. Secretary Clinton as of today has made 35 separate trips to Europe during the course of her tenure, many of them to coordinate with Europeans on global issues—whether it's Afghanistan, Libya, Iran, Syria. She's visited 28 countries across Europe—and many multiple times—and I think that some of what you see in the belief in the relationship is a result of that deliberate, sustained and focused engagement. The President himself has been to Europe ten times. He makes multiple calls to European leaders to coordinate, again, on these same issues and on the financial questions, video conferences—and again, we'd like to believe that these numbers reflect a very deliberate investment on behalf of this administration in what we believe to be an absolutely essential partnership.
I think it's also relevant to put this in the context of some of the talk that is around about a so-called pivot to Asia and some of the questions that have been raised about whether this means the United States is distracted or looking elsewhere. It was interesting to note, as Ivan flagged, that the numbers this year are back to underscoring that Americans think Europe is more important than Asia, and Europeans, the majority think the United States is more important than Asia. This is not a competition and I don't think it's a zero sum game, but I do think without reading too much into those numbers that underscores what we believe, which is that people on both sides of the Atlantic recognize that the other side of the Atlantic is absolutely critical to their national interests and security.
We certainly believe that about Europeans, and that's one of the things I've tried to say, and we've tried to convey to them—that their partnership with us on global issues, that their security, and their economy, as our biggest trade and investment partner is absolutely essential to us, and I think our importance to Europeans goes without saying, but it's also manifested in the degree to which we are critical to their economy and to their security, and by our enduring security partnership and military presence, even after the completion of the changes to our global strategic defense posture, we'll still have more troops in Europe than we will in Asia or anywhere else and that's because we're committed to European security and because we're committed to partnership with Europeans. Indeed, a significant justification of the troops in Europe is not just to protect Europe, but to perform that training and that partnership function because of how much we do together.
I'll just briefly underscore the degree to which I think Europeans are fulfilling that function as our key global partner—I don't need to go into a huge amount of details, but it's worth flagging because it is also a reflection of the numbers that you see and the reason why we think this partnership is so important, and I've said before and I can say now even three and a half years into this administration, I think our strategic alignment with Europeans on these questions is greater than ever.
I'll just take some of the big questions that are out there. On Iran, we really do have the same policy—we're pursuing it together—what Europeans have done in aligning their approach with ours over the past couple of years has been very impressive. Europeans now, the European Union having a full and total embargo on petroleum products imported from Iran was, I think, beyond what many would have believed possible a couple of years ago, but they, like we, are convinced that the only way to get Iran to be serious about the talks—and we're also serious about that piece of our approach to Iran, we're ready to negotiate on the nuclear issue—the only way to get them seriously back to the table is to put pressure on, and Europeans are doing that, very much in conjunction with us—we're on the same page.
On Syria, it's a current big challenge of the day. We're also coordinating absolutely closely and effectively—that's one of the reasons for some of the Secretary's most recent trips to Europe. We know it's a tremendous challenge but we're on the same page—we all believe that Syria can never be stable under this current regime under Assad. We want to support a political transition; we're working together on the sanctions, financial and diplomatic pressures to bring that about; we're working together to coordinate our efforts with the opposition so there's something that can come in place when Assad does go; we're pooling our assets in terms of humanitarian assistance to the neighboring states; and while we acknowledge that it's a challenging issue, the challenge is not transatlantic coordination, we very much are on the same page, and working very closely together.
Afghanistan. There have been nearly 40,000 troops, European troops fighting alongside American troops in Afghanistan for a decade now. I know people always look for differences and want to focus on timetables of withdrawal and what the differences are. To me the overwhelming message at the NATO Summit was not differences among allies, but rather the absolute commitment—“in together out together”—that was demonstrated by those allies. At the Lisbon Summit we all agreed on what that timetable was for the 2014 transition to full Afghan authority, that was reiterated in Chicago by all the Allies, and what's much more impressive than any withdrawals or precipitated withdrawals is the fact that pretty much—to an ally—all of the NATO members have committed to that; are keeping their troops; agreed on the 2013 milestone, agreed on very significant financing of Afghan National Security Forces after 2014 which is the way we're going to make this work, so that there can be security in Afghanistan after we leave, so I think that's the story when it comes to Afghanistan. And other aspects of that NATO Summit that the President hosted in Chicago, also underscored the depth of transatlantic cooperation commitments that were made on what we call smart defense—with Baltic Air Policing, so that we're working together to provide security for some allies without them having to spend money that they can put to use in other areas,—Alliance Ground Surveillance, pooling our assets so that we have greater capabilities for intelligence—these are also critically important positive steps that came out of the Chicago Summit.
And while I'm on the subject of NATO, Libya itself we think was yet another example of how we can count on each other when it comes to security challenges that we face. There was great discussion of a particular approach to Libya, and what role the United States would play—we discussed that here and elsewhere, and I don't need to go into all the details here, but suffice it to say once we collectively agreed that action was necessary, the United States put forward the unique capabilities that it had; made clear it wanted to see the Europeans play a major role in the operation because they were among the strongest proponents of action; they did so; and we found that Europeans, even with their limited military capabilities that we're constantly focused on bolstering, were able to make absolutely essential contributions to a successful operation to uphold UN Security Council resolutions; get rid of a dictator; and give that country hope for the future, so I think all of that reflects what I'm gratified to see our publics seem to understand, which is that both sides appreciate the role of the other.
Transatlantic Trends this year added a Russian dimension, which I think is worth highlighting. I think that's an excellent idea, because Russia is such an important piece of this overall puzzle—there too, especially without previous numbers to compare it to, I wouldn't want to infer too much or draw too many conclusions, but I think there are a couple of things that struck me. It is notable that more than 50 percent of Russians, or 50 percent of Russians surveyed, have a favorable opinion of the United States—that's not bad under the circumstances—I think if you compare it to previous polling, not by Transatlantic Trends, but other polls, just before this administration took office, I think the number of negative Russian opinion of the United States was in the upper 60s, once again, I'd like to assert that I don't think that's a coincidence—it's part of the deliberate effort that we have undertaken to increase trust and cooperation with Russia.
It's been absolutely clear from the start that we have significant and enduring differences, people know what those are. They include our real differences on Georgia; include our differences on the principle of NATO enlargement; include our differences on missile defense. We've been very clear about our disagreement with some recent domestic developments in Russia where human rights and democracy are concerned, and obviously on Syria we have differences, as well—we've never hidden that—we've been clear about all of those from the start. But we've also believed and the President has also believed and made very clear that we have common interests with Russia. We believe it's in both countries' interests to pursue them, and we have a pretty good track record of getting real things done, whether it's in the field of strategic arms control, cooperation on Afghanistan, tough UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, Russian membership in the WTO which is maybe the most recent accomplishment—and the two aren't inconsistent and we'll continue to pursue both at the same time, but I'd like to believe that the approach on focusing on what we can do together in our mutual interests has had some effect on those numbers that you showed, and that the tone of our relationship and the effort to have a pragmatic relationship that works has been understood by the Russian people, and that fifty percent of them have a favorable opinion of the United States may indeed result in part from our investment in that relationship.
Maybe I'll just end with a brief word about the eurozone and economic issues, which again, I think were highlighted in your report, and it would be negligent not to bring up an issue that has been so dominant in the relationship and in Europe. We have made clear, the President has said many times how invested we are in Europe's economy—I mean that in a literal sense, because it is our biggest mutual investment partner, our biggest trade partner, and we have a fundamental national interest in seeing Europe's economy succeed. But it goes beyond just our own economic interest, it is the continent, these are the countries we partner with when it comes to overseas development assistance; these are the countries we partner with, as I already stressed quite clearly, that we partner with in terms of global security. That doesn't work unless Europeans have the resources to do it, and there too I would say the story—and people are looking for consequences of the eurozone and this partnership—I think it's actually more impressive how much we've continued to do together in the security field given the economic crisis than any notion that it has somehow interfered with our ability to do so. That in the face of these genuine economic troubles we've been able to sustain our work together in Afghanistan, that we were able to conduct the operation in Libya, that we're taking very tough and even yes, costly decisions on Iran sanctions, that hurt the bottom line in some export sectors because of our commitment to strategic cooperation—that actually says a lot about that commitment. So yes, we have a huge interest in getting the economy back on track which will facilitate this cooperation but it's worth underscoring that it has gone ahead, even in the face of these enormous economic challenges.
We're encouraged by some of the progress that Europeans have made in recent months including some significant steps even in the past couple of weeks that might have seemed out of reach just a couple of years ago.
So how do we put this all together? Obviously a lot of issues, and I did want to leave some time for discussion, so I would just end by going back to where I began: I think—it is our belief that the United States and Europe are more strategically aligned, arguably than they have ever been. It's our belief that that is in part a function of our deliberate investment in that relationship because of how much we count on Europeans. I think that now that I'm doing this for the fourth time and we've got some numbers to look at over a period of time, it's safe to say that it's not a blip, it wasn't driven by any one factor or speech or incident that happened before the 2009 survey, but rather it's a sustained reflection of the fundamental mutual interest that the two sides, and the fundamental commitment that we in the United States and the Obama administration have made in this essential partnership.
Excerpts of Remarks by Assistant Secretary Gordon September 20, 2012Footnote 7
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Philip H. Gordon gave the following remarks in Washington, DC
Introductory Remarks Omitted
Assistant Secretary Gordon. Amidst the current headlines from Libya to Syria, it is all too easy to forget that it wasn't so long ago that the revolutionary pictures filling our television screens were not from the Middle East but from Europe. From the freedom fighters in Hungary who laid down their lives in 1956 to the brave civil society activists who launched the Prague Spring twelve years later. From the workers who shut down the shipyards of Gdansk in 1980 to the citizens of Romania who overthrew a ruthless dictatorship a decade after that. People across Central Europe have struggled for governments that respond to the needs of their people; for more tolerant societies, built on respect and dignity; for the freedom to think, to believe, and to pursue their dreams. Those dreams—and for many years they were only dreams—have now been realized within a strong Euro-Atlantic alliance, firmly anchored within NATO and the European Union. Central Europe's experience can serve as a reminder to those struggling for freedom across the Middle East today that while the process of democratization is never quick or easy—or for that matter complete—it can advance and succeed even in the face of repeated setbacks.
The United States is proud to have supported the aspirations and struggles of Central Europeans. Over the last two decades, we have assisted their transition from communist regimes to modern democracies—investing over $4.8 billion in assistance to ten countries across the region. And even after they “graduated” from U.S. development assistance upon their accession to the EU, we have continued to support defense modernization through our security assistance—enabling these countries to have advanced and inter-operable capabilities so they can partner with the U.S. in responding to our shared security concerns.
As President Obama said on the eve of the NATO Summit in Strasbourg-Kehl, “This shared history gives us hope—but it must not give us rest. This generation cannot stand still.” Just consider the immense challenges we are confronting: an economic crisis that has hurt people on both sides of the Atlantic, the drawdown of troops in Afghanistan, and a new wave of democratic reform and unrest across the Middle East and North Africa.
Some in Central Europe may look at these problems and conclude that the U.S. is no longer focused on their part of the world. But that conclusion misses an essential point. The unique relationship we had with Central Europe in the immediate post-Cold War period has evolved into a 21st century partnership that is based not only on the shared values and interests that have long joined us together, but also on the shared responsibilities that we now face together as allies. It is precisely because of these global challenges and the growing willingness and capacity of Central Europe to meet them with us that we need and value our partnership more than ever. And so in America, we no longer think in terms of what we can do for Central Europe but rather of what we can do with Central Europe.
Let me address several areas in which we are building this relationship.
First and foremost, the United States and Central Europe are bound together by shared values and a common commitment to protect those values—whenever and wherever they are challenged. NATO remains the bedrock of that commitment. As President Obama has said, there are no old members, there are no new members, there are just members. We remain inextricably linked by our unwavering commitment to Article 5, according to which an attack on one is an attack on all.
That political truth is reflected in practical terms. Although fiscal and strategic realities compel the United States to alter our global force posture, our commitment to European security and stability remains rock solid. While this does not equate as directly to large numbers of U.S. troops as in the past, we remain committed to maintaining a robust force presence in Europe. After global reposturing is complete, there will still be more American forces permanently stationed in Europe than anywhere else in the world other than the continental United States.
Furthermore, the restructuring does not signal a change in our perception of NATO's value or its Article 5 guarantee. We remain committed to enhancing Allied interoperability and partner capacity in order to ensure that NATO remains ready to deter and address threats to our common security. That is why we have committed to identifying a U.S.-based brigade to participate in the NATO Response Force and to regularly rotate a battalionsized task force to Germany for exercises and training. We are taking other steps to modernize Article 5, such as the establishment of a U.S. aviation detachment in Poland, missile defense deployments, and updated NATO planning efforts for all Alliance members.
This Administration's approach to missile defense further demonstrates our commitment to European security. In the 20th century, NATO successfully prepared to defend Allied territory against what was then a very real Soviet challenge. Today, the proliferation of ballistic missiles outside of Europe poses a real and growing threat to the Alliance. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is designed to meet this threat with a proven technology that will cover more of Europe—including Central Europe—and cover it more effectively than the previously proposed system. We welcome the willingness of many of our allies to host components of this system, including Romania and Poland.
Another example of our commitment to the collective security is Baltic Air Policing, a NATO mission that enables the continuous presence of Allied fighter jets to patrol Baltic airspace. This example of 'smart defense', which was highlighted at the NATO Summit in Chicago last spring, allows allies to allocate their resources more effectively. Since 2004, Poland, Romania, and the Czech Republic—as well as numerous other NATO allies—have contributed aircraft and personnel in support of this mission.
In addition to preparing for possible threats, we are together bearing heavy responsibilities for ongoing conflicts. Our sons and daughters are serving side by side across the globe, with Central Europeans living up to their commitments as allies by becoming providers rather than consumers of security. Central Europeans are making robust contributions to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, with all ten countries currently deploying a combined total of over 6500 troops. They are contributing nearly 800 troops to KFOR in Kosovo. In addition, Bulgaria and Romania deployed naval assets to help enforce the NATO-led arms embargo against Libya.
Central Europe has also stepped up in support of our efforts in the Middle East and North Africa. Last year, the Hungarian government served as our protecting power in Libya. From February to July of this year, Poland served as our protecting power in Syria. The Polish Embassy was instrumental in helping to retrieve and repatriate the remains of American journalist Marie Colvin from a besieged neighborhood in Homs. Since August, the Czech Republic has taken over this role. We are grateful to all these allies for that important work.
Just as we and Central Europe are linked militarily, so too are we connected economically. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the U.S. has supported efforts to stimulate Central Europe's economy. In the early 1990s, we provided over $560 million to establish enterprise funds to promote sustained economic growth in countries that were transitioning from centrally-planned to market-based economies. The funds encouraged institutional reforms, produced results in banking and financial markets, and stimulated direct investment. The funds have also generated substantial income; they will provide over $200 million to the U.S. Treasury and an additional $865 million to establish legacy foundations that continue supporting ongoing reforms.
Given our sustained commitment to strong Central European economies, the U.S. worked with the IMF and World Bank to ensure countries received international support when they needed it most. While some countries have borne the brunt of the crisis, we have been heartened to see how others have successfully weathered the global recession and put their economies on the road to recovery. We have also seen slow returns to modest growth, particularly in Poland with one of the fastest-growing economies in Europe in recent years. By working together, we can all learn lessons from this crisis that will help us lay the foundation for renewed growth and prosperity.
Another issue we must continue to address together is energy security. The countries of Central Europe are—by history, geography and necessity—well placed to lead Europe in this effort. Cooperation will enable us to increase our mutual security and prosperity; underpin stable, reliable and transparent global energy markets; and coordinate our regulatory regimes and research programs to advance our climate change goals and speed the deployment of clean and efficient energy technologies. In support of these goals, the Administration launched the U.S.-EU Energy Council at the ministerial level. We have also engaged with Central Europe through the former Special Envoy for European Energy and the newly established Energy Bureau at the State Department. Our dialogue has been significantly deepened through consultation in these bilateral and multilateral channels.
A further component of our bilateral economic relationship is the strength of our people-to-people ties. In addition to robust exchange programs with Central Europe, a majority of these countries enjoy visa-free travel to the United States. This Administration has prioritized efforts to bring the rest of Central Europe into the Visa Waiver Program, starting with Poland. President Obama has strongly endorsed proposed bipartisan legislation aimed at accomplishing this goal. Through this effort we hope to broaden the basis of the Visa Waiver Program and remove barriers to the full enjoyment of new economic opportunities, while at the same time enhancing secure travel.
Let me now take a moment to discuss our efforts to support democracy, which we are doing in partnership with Central European allies who share our democratic values. The example these countries set 20 years ago inspired the world. The leadership they exert over the next 20 years can change that world, as they help to strengthen fledgling democracies in their own backyard while also supporting those further afield who are struggling to realize and consolidate democratic gains.
The countries of Central Europe have been eager to collaborate with us in expanding the zone of democracy, prosperity and stability to the former Soviet Union. Since 1990 the U.S. has provided approximately $6.2 billion in assistance to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus to promote democratic and economic reform, health, education, and regional security. Each of these countries presents unique challenges. As I said last night in my remarks to the Center for U.S.-Ukrainian Relations, Ukraine has enormous potential but its economic development has been hampered by barriers to trade and investment. Furthermore, its European integration efforts are on hold because of politically motivated prosecutions of opposition leaders. Moldova continues to have the lowest per capita GDP in Europe, but it is making progress on political and economic reforms needed for closer ties with the EU. Belarus remains an outlier in the region due to the government's brutal suppression of human rights. But we continue our efforts to support to Belarusian civil society even while we have imposed sanctions on regime leaders.
In addition to our bilateral assistance, we coordinate closely with the European Union in support of its Eastern Partnership program. Central Europe has taken a leading role in the EU's efforts to promote political and economic development in Eurasia.
About a year ago, the U.S. decided to expand our partnership with emerging donor governments in Central Europe with the creation of the “Emerging Donors Challenge Fund.” This fund serves as an incentive to identify and then co-fund assistance projects. To date, the U.S. is co-financing 23 projects (valued at $6 million with a one-to-one cost share) with Central European partners in the areas of rule of law, democracy, free media, civil society and economic growth in key countries in Eurasia and the Western Balkans.
We have also supported individual initiatives, such as the LEND Network launched in July by Secretary Clinton and Estonian Foreign Minister Paet, that facilitates real-time voice, video, and text communication between leaders who have guided successful democratic transitions and their counterparts in new democracies.
In addition, Central European countries are seeking to share their experiences and expertise beyond Europe's borders. For example, Slovakia is co-chairing with the Netherlands the Community of Democracies Task Force on Tunisia. Poland invited members of Tunisia's civil society to observe its October 2011 parliamentary elections, while Estonia and USAID are collaborating to bring e-governance to Tunisia. And Bulgaria hosted 40 representatives of Syrian opposition groups last May to help facilitate their coordination efforts.
Our ability to work together with Central Europe to promote democratic transitions abroad is rooted in our shared commitment to democratic values at home. Because our alliance is based on these shared values, we have not shied away from reminding our partners of their own obligation to promote and protect democratic principles.
In Hungary, we have engaged in vigorous discussions about troubling efforts to weaken institutional checks-and-balances within the government, the cumbersome and politicized registration process for recognizing religions, and the importance of preserving the integrity and independence of the judiciary and free press. We are encouraged that Hungary continues to consult on these issues with the Council of Europe's Venice Commission, a process that has already led to some positive changes. We also urge the Hungarian government to have a dialogue on these matters with civil society, as we believe that a strong democracy depends on a transparent and inclusive political process.
In Romania, we have expressed our concerns about threats to democratic institutions and the independence of the judiciary. We were particularly concerned about the conduct of the referendum on impeaching the President, as the government appeared to change the rules during the process and there were credible allegations of voter fraud and attempts to coerce the Constitutional Court. We were pleased to see the government uphold its commitment to respect the Court's rulings. We are hopeful that Romania will emerge from this crisis with a renewed dedication to preserving the strength and independence of its democratic institutions.
In conclusion, these are clearly challenging times. The events of last week demonstrate and underscore our need for strong, capable and democratic partners who can help us address these challenges. The countries of Central Europe have demonstrated repeatedly that they are ready, willing and able to play that role. They are contributing militarily, economically and politically to demands at home and abroad. And the U.S. consults regularly with our Central European allies in bilateral and multilateral fora about our collective vision for joint action. The strength of our relationship is testament to bipartisan policy over the last several decades that has invested in these countries' development and nurtured the ties that bind us. Together, we can continue the hard work of completing the 'unfinished business' in Europe's east and responding to unfolding challenges in the wider world.
Q. I just wanted to follow up, Assistant Secretary, about USAID and Russia. You mentioned that the United States is not going to back away from supporting civil organizations in Russia, but what kind of symbol do you think this sends that Russia has booted USAID out of the country? What does it mean for the country and the government?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. I think a lot of those who support democracy and human rights around the world see this as Russia backing away from commitments for a democratic society that allows for free expression and it's not just the ending of the USAID mission. There's a pattern going on over recent months in terms of treatment of NGOs, and deeming them foreign agents, and raising fines on protestors and other interventions in the media that lead people to the conclusion that Russia is somehow resisting the trend towards democracy, free expression and human rights. The United States has been consistent, will continue to support democracy, free expression and human rights. So it sends a negative signal, but not in isolation—combined with other measures that the Russian government has taken.
Q. Did the U.S. see this coming?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. There's been talk for some time about the Russian government desire to end the USAID mission specifically and more generally to end this sort of activity which again, as I say, is consistent with their other measures on NGOs.
Q. Do you see that in any way this may affect the reset in the Russian-American relations?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. We've been clear about the reset from the start. It was never naively assuming that we wouldn't have our differences, and we've had differences over democracy and human rights from the start. We've been clear about those. The President and Secretary Clinton have raised it consistently in their meetings with Russian government officials. So it doesn't mean that we're not going to continue to try to work together in areas where we have common interests like non-proliferation, security, global challenges, nuclear issues, economic relations, we still welcome Russia's joining of the WTO and want to boost U.S. investment in Russia. So it doesn't change anything about the approach that we have taken to Russia.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in Poland there is growing fear that Poland would be left over; Poland and the region during transformation of American foreign policy when the stress is more on Asia than on the European effort. Are these fears justified?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. I think we've been very clear about what the renewed focus on Asia and the greater Middle East means, and means for Europe. It's in no way walking away from the longstanding commitments we have to our partnership with Europe. In some ways, as I've made clear, the partnership for Europe is even more important to us because we face these great challenges in Asia and the Middle East—that's why we're increasing our partnering with European countries. Nor is it in any way a diminishment of our rock solid support for all NATO allies, and I've described here and elsewhere how we've continued to maintain the viability of Article 5, by taking steps to enhance deterrence in Europe and Poland in particular—we have the aviation detachment that we have established at a Polish air base; we're moving forward with plans for missile defense that will involve the deployment of land-based interceptors in Poland with American military personnel involved with that.
We will continue even after the restructuring of our global forces to have more troops in Europe deployed permanently than anywhere else in the world. We're going to rotate in American personnel so that we continue to partner with European forces. I think objectively there's no way to see this evolution as, in any way, a diminishment of our strong and continued commitment to Poland and other allies in the region.
I wanted to come back to one more thing on the USAID point. You asked whether we saw it coming and what it means.
The Russian government—and what it means for democracy and human rights—the Russian government has described this as a reflection of its new degree of economic development, and it's not, they have said, a walking away from their support for these activities, but that Russia doesn't need this anymore. We hope that they will follow up and provide support for the types of things that USAID has been supporting over the years. If they want to act on the basis of being a G8 country and an advanced economy and believe that they can support these goals without the United States, given that we support those goals, that's what we'd like to see them do.
Q. How would you describe the chances of their doing that?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. That remains to be seen.
Q. Two very quick questions on the Caucasus, if I may. You mentioned in the discussion the Safarov case with Azerbaijan and Hungary. I know that the U.S. has reached out to both to follow up. I wanted to ask you, what have their responses been? And has the U.S. been satisfied with those responses?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. I think you've seen the public remarks of both in explaining what they did, and we continue to express our dismay and disappointment. We're not satisfied with what has happened here. In our view this is someone who should have continued to serve out his sentence and certainly we were appalled by the glorification that we heard in some corridors of somebody who was convicted of murder, and so no, we're not satisfied with the responses.
Q. A second quick question from the Caucasus. In Georgia there was this huge scandal that erupted in the past few days about the prison abuse videos. I'm wondering what the State Department's, what has been the extent of the State Department's contact with Georgia on this issue, and the reaction to it?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. As you know it's evolving as we speak, especially yesterday more news came out so we are following it closely. We're in touch with the Georgians, but we're gathering information.
Q. Mr. Secretary, talking about unfinished business in this part of Europe, especially Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova. How do you evaluate the role which was played by the new NATO members towards let's say exporting democracy to this region? And how would you see the role of those countries in bringing democracy to, for example, Belarus?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. These countries are new partners in supporting democracy throughout Europe. They are no longer the objects of efforts to support democracy because they are democracies themselves, and in many ways they've been leaders in this effort. As I say, the Eastern Partnership was in some ways a Central European idea, and that's not surprising because they have an even greater stake than we do—they live next to the Ukraines and Belaruses of Europe—so we're partners in this common effort and we value what they're doing.
Q. Yesterday the Senate Foreign Relations Committee I believe supported a resolution to institute perhaps visa bans on people involved in the alleged mistreatment of Yulia Tymoshenko in Ukraine. Would that be possible, do you think? And do you think it would be an effective way to get some movement on the issue?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. We share the concerns expressed by both Houses of Congress about the upcoming elections in Ukraine and about selective prosecutions. I think we've been very clear ourselves, directly and privately with Ukrainian leaders and in public about our concerns about selective prosecutions, and the need for free and fair elections.
It is already the policy of the United States to deny visas to people who commit serious violations of human rights. It is not our policy at present to cut off ties with the Ukrainian government as part of an effort to get them to do the right thing on elections or prosecutions—we don't believe that that would be effective. We want to continue to engage and make clear that there are other consequences to failure to act in these areas and I think they know what those consequences are, they're already in effect. Our bilateral relationship can't be what we would like it to be so long as they're doing this. I think they're going to struggle to get support from IMF members for the economic assistance they need, so long as they haven't dealt with this. The European Union has made clear that the Association Agreement, a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, won't move forward. So there are other pressures the Ukrainians are feeling—and that's what we're going to continue to pursue.
Q. On the Magnitsky list, do you see any situation in which the administration might support the efforts in the Congress to adopt the Magnitsky list?
Assistant Secretary Gordon. Well, it depends on what you mean by the Magnitsky list. As you know, we strongly support Permanent Normal Trade Relations with Russia because now that Russia's going to join the WTO it's in American firms' interest to have PNTR extended to Russia—we've just been very clear that that should happen as a core American economic interest.
Congress in both houses has attached legislation to the PNTR measure that would have implications for democracy and human rights in Russia, including what you're referring to in the case of those responsible for the imprisonment and death of Sergei Magnitsky.
We completely share Congress' intent in making sure that those who were responsible for this crime are punished. But as I noted before, it's already our policy to deny visas to anyone who would be implicated in such a crime, and we've already done so. We've been clear that there are people who will not get a visa to the United States because of this.
So in that sense, there are still some differences between the two Houses on what exactly—that's why it's impossible to say do we support that legislation because there are still different versions that they have to work out. We certainly share Congress' view that there should be consequences for those involved in suppression of democracy, grave human rights violations—but we're also absolutely clear that PNTR should move ahead—it's in America's interest to do so; it's not a gift to Russia; it's something that's in our own interest to do.
Q. Thank you so much.
