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Congress and Foreign Policy: Congressional Action on the Darfur Genocide

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 June 2009

Joseph Uscinski,
Michael S. Rocca,
Gabriel R. Sanchez and
Marina Brenden
Joseph Uscinski
Affiliation:
University of Miami
Michael S. Rocca
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
Gabriel R. Sanchez
Affiliation:
University of New Mexico
Marina Brenden
Affiliation:
University of Southern California
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Abstract

As of January 2008, more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in the regions of Darfur and Chad. This event has not gone unnoticed in the United States, as the 109th United States Congress (2005–2006) considered several measures in the House of Representatives to provide funding and peacekeeping forces to quell the violence in Darfur. The goal of this article is to explain individual members' of Congress (MCs') support for Darfur legislation by examining the influence of their individual, district, and institutional characteristics. The Darfur case provides the opportunity to analyze factors critical to congressional behavior in a context where there is reason to expect an MC's usual set of incentives—e.g., reelection and adherence to party—to be less prominent. In all, we contribute to congressional and foreign policy research by parceling out the determinants of congressional support for foreign policy in comparison to domestic policy.

Information

Type
Features
Information
PS: Political Science & Politics , Volume 42 , Issue 3 , July 2009, pp. 489 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © The American Political Science Association 2009

As of the writing of this article, more than 400,000 people have been killed and more than 2.5 million people have been displaced in the regions of Darfur and Chad (DarfurScores.org n.d.). The crisis in Darfur has sparked a great deal of attention internationally as well as here in the United States as it represents the first time in history that a mass destruction of people has been labeled genocide while it is still occurring (Crook Reference Crook2005). The conflict began in 2003 when groups of mostly Christian subsistence farmers in Darfur united against the Sudanese government in an effort to address neglect and small-scale violence. In response, Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, funded local Islamic militias known as the Janjaweed (loosely translated as “devils on horseback”) to enter villages murdering, pillaging, torturing, and raping families (Kristof Reference Kristof2006). The Janjaweed have successfully cut off food and water supplies making villages uninhabitable, thus forcing people to either move to refugee camps or accept certain death (Montesquiou Reference Montesquiou2006). It is estimated that without international aid, including that from the United States, more than 100,000 people will die per month (Braun Reference Braun2007).

Facing international and domestic political pressures, the 109th Congress (2005–2006) proposed several measures in the House of Representatives to provide funding and peacekeeping forces to quell the violence in Darfur. One measure, the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (DPAA), reasserted the U.S. stance that the Darfur situation is genocide and passed the House overwhelmingly in October of 2006. However, other measures such as House Amendment 980 to H.R. 5522, which sought to increase funding and troop presence in Darfur, faced considerable opposition on the House floor. Indeed, support for these measures came from both parties and created some unlikely alliances.

Not only is Darfur an important subject of study in its own right, it also presents a fascinating case in congressional behavior. Students of Congress have long argued that reelection is one of—if not the—primary motivation for members of Congress (MCs) (Fenno Reference Fenno1973; Mayhew Reference Mayhew1974). Thus electoral factors such as party affiliation and constituency interests remain important determinants of their position-taking behavior. This election-centered perspective, however, may not adequately explain MCs' behavior on Darfur because most voters neither know nor care all that much about the issue (e.g., Ripley and Lindsay Reference Ripley and Lindsay1992; Uslaner Reference Uslaner1999, 46). For instance, polls taken immediately before the 2006 midterm elections suggest that voters did not place Darfur on their list of either important issues or issues that would determine their vote choice.Footnote 1 Even if the efforts of religious groups, human rights organizations, political coalitions, and celebrities have increased media and elite awareness (e.g., Baum Reference Baum2002), there is little reason to expect the typical pocketbook voter to hold representatives accountable for Darfur policy.

And so we face an interesting puzzle. On the one hand, party and district influences may be weak on the issue of Darfur. This may lead to congressional inattentiveness toward Darfur. On the other hand, the fact that Darfur has been declared genocide presents MCs with a moral imperative. This should lead MCs to support aid for Darfur and bring an end to the genocide. We examine behavior on Darfur during the 109th Congress and find that while individual, district, and institutional characteristics matter to MCs' positions, party has a muted effect compared to voting on other issues. This suggests that those wishing to influence congressional behavior on Darfur might find party a weaker obstacle than for domestic or more contentious foreign policy issues.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY

According to Fenno (Reference Fenno1973) members of Congress have three goals: getting reelected, making good public policy, and attaining influence within Congress (e.g., institutional promotion). Arguably the most important goal is getting reelected because that “must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be entertained” (Mayhew Reference Mayhew1974, 16). Thus most congressional behavior, from roll-call voting to non-roll-call position taking, is thought to be primarily electorally oriented. Research is mixed on whether Mayhew's (Reference Mayhew1974) simple electoral explanation can be applied to issues of foreign policy. While some scholars have found evidence of a link between constituency opinion and congressional behavior on foreign policy (e.g., Bartels Reference Bartels1991; Miller and Stokes Reference Miller and Stokes1963; Overby Reference Overby1991), others remain skeptical. The challenge is that most voters neither know nor care all that much about specific foreign policy issues because few of these issues have a direct impact on their lives (that is, aside from war, defense spending, or trade policy) (Almond Reference Almond1950; Delli Carpini and Keeter Reference Delli Carpini and Keeter1996; Lippman Reference Lippman1922).Footnote 2

One implication of voters' inattentiveness in foreign policy is that it effectively frees MCs from the constraints of constituency opinion, giving them “great freedom in taking substantive positions” (Ripley and Lindsay Reference Ripley and Lindsay1992, 422). Of course, this is not to suggest that MCs disregard their voters' preferences entirely; the electoral constraint still looms large because the media, interest groups, and campaign challengers have sufficient resources to inform constituents of wayward representatives (Arnold Reference Arnold1990; Fiorina Reference Fiorina1974, 124; Miller and Stokes Reference Miller and Stokes1963, 47). Thus representatives are likely to act within an acceptable range of behavior.

Most foreign policy issues are not sufficiently salient for them to serve parties' electoral goals.Footnote 3 Incentives for parties to care about and expend resources to influence behavior depends on its relationship to electoral outcomes (Arnold Reference Arnold1990; Bawn and Koger Reference Bawn and Koger2008; Miller and Stokes Reference Miller and Stokes1963). Therefore, to the extent that parties are able to influence legislative behavior, it is reasonable to expect that party differences will be larger in the domestic policy arena. When the normal electoral constraints—that is, constituency opinion and political party—dissipate, congressional goals beyond reelection should take on added importance (Kingdon Reference Kingdon1973; Reference Kingdon1977). For instance, foreign policy may be an opportunity for MCs to “make good public policy” without the usual constraints of party and electoral environment (Fenno Reference Fenno1973). MCs' foreign policy decisions may be guided more by what they believe is right or moral rather than what is salient or preferred by constituents or party leaders.

Unlike many foreign policy matters that either fall completely under the public radar (such as most foreign-aid packages) or attract contentious ideological debate (such as war), Darfur legislation falls into an interesting “sweet spot” for scholars of Congress and foreign policy for two reasons. First, while Darfur remains very low on the public's list of issue priorities, the tragedy has attracted considerable media attention due to the efforts of a variety of groups and organizations. Two of the most active organizations are the Save Darfur Coalition, which consists of over 100 faith-based, humanitarian, and human rights organizations and the Genocide Intervention Network, which publishes the Darfur scorecard. Church and religious groups also work hard to increase awareness. Among the most active are Jewish organizations such as American World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Committee, and Jews Against Genocide Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism. And celebrities such as George Clooney, Angelina Jolie, and Matt Damon have done their part to increase attentiveness as well (Dyer Reference Dyer2006). These efforts should signal to Congress that at least elites are aware of the tragedy (see Baum Reference Baum2002). Second, Congress may be facing a moral imperative. Not only has the international community deemed the tragedy in Darfur genocide, sent peacekeeping forces, enforced economic sanctions, issued warrants, and involved the International Criminal Court, thousands of deaths may occur due to the withholding of foreign aid (Braun Reference Braun2007). The question, then, is not only “why would a MC support Darfur legislation?” but also “why wouldn't a MC support Darfur legislation?”

DATA AND METHODS

To explain an individual congressperson's support for Darfur legislation, we tested the influence of individual, district, and institutional characteristics. Our dependent variable was taken from an interest group: the Genocide Intervention Network's Darfur scorecard.Footnote 4 This rating accounts for roll-call votes and cosponsorships on six pieces of legislation considered in the 109th Congress. This numerical score has a theoretical range of 0 to 8. One point each was awarded for voting for the following bills, simple resolutions, or amendments: DPAA (H.R. 3127), H.Res. 723, H.Res. 992, amendment 709 to H.R. 4939, and amendment 980 to H.R. 5522 (see the appendix for details of these legislations). One point each was also awarded for cosponsoring any of the following legislations: the Darfur Genocide Accountability Act (DGAA) (H.R. 1424), DPAA, H.Res. 723, and H.Res. 992. Given that cosponsoring and voting are qualitatively different actions and that the pieces of legislation range from purely symbolic to providing money and troops, we investigated each of these separately as well as in the combined Darfur score. The results indicate that the combined score provides a robust indicator of support for Darfur legislation.Footnote 5

In determining the factors that explain congressional support for Darfur, it would be useful to see how these factors differ from those associated with foreign policy in general and policy overall. Therefore, in addition to the model utilizing the Darfur scorecard, we include models utilizing National Journal's (NJ) foreign policy score as well as Poole and Rosenthal's well-known DW-NOMINATE ideology score.Footnote 6 The three dependent variables have been recoded to allow for cleaner comparisons across models (each now ranges from 0 to 100).Footnote 7 For the NJ and DW-NOMINATE scores, higher values indicate more liberal voting records.Footnote 8 Higher values on the Darfur scorecard indicate greater support for Darfur legislation.

Independent Variables

Our explanatory variables included measures of district, personal, and institutional characteristics. First, district characteristics such as the racial, economic, and military background of the constituents have been found to affect congressional decision making due to MCs' desires to get reelected (e.g., Bartels Reference Bartels1991; Bishin and Hayes Reference Bishin and Hayes2008; Broz Reference Broz2005; Herrick, Moore, and Hibbing Reference Herrick, Moore and Hibbing1994; Miller and Stokes Reference Miller and Stokes1963; Overby Reference Overby1991). We included three measures of district characteristics: a measure of the median income, the percentage of African Americans in the district, and the percentage of military veterans.Footnote 9 We included these measures because they speak directly to the district's informational environment and constituent interest (e.g., Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien Reference Tichenor, Donohue and Olien1970), the interest in African affairs (e.g., Dawson Reference Dawson1995), and interest in military affairs (e.g., Bishin and Hayes Reference Bishin and Hayes2008).

Second, individual characteristics including race, gender, generational cohort, and religion have all been found by recent literature to affect the policy stances of MCs because they help determine an MC's ideology and view of “good” policy (e.g., Burden Reference Burden2007; Rocca and Sanchez Reference Rocca and Sanchez2008; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski Reference Rocca, Sanchez and Uscinski2008; Swers Reference Swers1998; Reference Swers2001; Reference Swers2002; Whitby Reference Whitby1998). Thus we control for an MC's race (coded 1 for black, 0 for white), which we expected to be positive because of black MCs' shared continental and racial heritage with those affected by the Darfur conflict (Dawson Reference Dawson1995). We also expected female MCs to have greater support for Darfur legislation than males because of the conflict's profound effect on women in the region.Footnote 10

Representatives should also be influenced by MCs' generational experience: the different political, social, and cultural conditions characterizing each generation's coming-of-age period leads members of each generation to display an “imprinting” that makes them different from generations preceding it (Abramson Reference Abramson1976; Reference Abramson1979; Craig and Bennett Reference Craig and Bennett1997; Jennings and Niemi Reference Jennings and Niemi1981; Miller Reference Miller1992). While we expected that in most issues newer generations would act more conservatively (e.g., Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski Reference Rocca, Sanchez and Uscinski2008), in this instance we expected newer generations of MCs to show more support for Darfur. This is because the groups working to garner support for Darfur in this country have appealed to younger generations with Internet campaigns and Gen X celebrities. We employed dummy variables representing membership in the silent generation, baby-boomer generation, and Generation X.Footnote 11 The omitted variable is the cohort born before 1925.

Finally, we controlled for religion, which we expected to be an important factor for several reasons. These include past sectarian violence in the Darfur region, a genocide that may speak to groups who have been affected by genocide in the past, and because many of the interest groups involved in lobbying for and bringing attention to the Darfur cause are religiously oriented.Footnote 12 Nine standard religious classifications are included in our models with Protestant as the omitted category.Footnote 13 Because we could not effectively measure conviction or integration within the church, our measure does not speak to strength of conviction, only to self-reported affiliation.

The third set of variables is institutional in nature. Institutional characteristics such as party (e.g., Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman Reference Binder, Lawrence and Maltzman1999), committee membership (Adler and Lapinski Reference Adler and Lapinski1997; Hall and Grofman Reference Hall and Grofman1990; Hurwitz, Moiles, and Rohde Reference Hurwitz, Moiles and Rohde2001; Londregan and Snyder Reference Londregan and Snyder1994; Weingast and Marshall Reference Weingast and Marshall1988), and tenure (Hibbing Reference Hibbing1991; Payne Reference Payne1991) have been found to influence congressional decision making as MCs seek reelection, make policy, and gain status within the institution. Thus we controlled for Democrat (coded 1 for Democrat, 0 for Republican), which we expected to be small because of voters' lack of interest in the issue and positive because of the Democratic Party's tendency to support U.S. involvement in international human rights efforts (e.g., Guth and Green Reference Guth and Green1991). We also expected members of relevant committees—International Relations Committee and the Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and International Relations in particular—to support Darfur legislation more often than non-members because of their knowledge of and expertise in the subject. Our final institutional variable is tenure (measured as the number of years served), which we included to determine whether an MC's seniority is correlated with level of support for Darfur legislation.

RESULTS

Table 1 depicts results for our three dependent variables: the Darfur scorecard, the NJ foreign policy score, and the DW-NOMINATE score. These three sets of results allow for some comparisons to be made across the three congressional policy areas.Footnote 14 In examining the three models, the Darfur and NJ models provide robust r-square statistics of 0.57 and 0.63 respectively, while the DW-NOMINATE model provides an exceedingly large r-square of 0.90.Footnote 15 This indicates that while our models perform rather well, explaining congressional action in Darfur and foreign policy in general is more difficult than explaining overall policy. Simply put, actions on Darfur by MCs are not as easily predicted as other areas.

Table 1.

Regression Results (109th Congress)

Note: Higher Darfur scores correspond to greater support for the Genocide Intervention Network's platform. Though they remain in the models, the following statistically insignificant religion variables are excluded from the table in order to conserve space: Black Protestant, Orthodox, Christian Scientist, and Seventh Day Adventist.

* p < 0.1;

** p < 0.05,

*** p < 0.01 (one-tailed)

As expected, race matters to congressional support for Darfur. Black MCs are approximately 8 points more supportive of congressional efforts in Darfur than MCs of other racial backgrounds. We believe this is due to black MCs perceiving a sense of commonality or linked fate with those negatively impacted in the African region.Footnote 16 Indeed, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has been active on the issue. Among other tactics adopted in the 109th Congress, the CBC sponsored and cosponsored legislation, organized floor speeches, issued press releases, and held press conferences to bring attention to Darfur. The CBC's involvement even extended beyond the halls of Congress. In May of 2006, seven of its members were among those arrested protesting outside the Sudanese Embassy in Washington while trying to draw attention to the conflict (Frommer Reference Frommer2006).Footnote 17 Interestingly, the role of race is not unique to this policy area, as our results suggest black MCs vote more liberally than non-black MCs in foreign policy measured more generally, as well as the most comprehensive DW-NOMINATE measure. This is important because it shows that black MCs' liberal behavior is not limited to domestic policy (Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran Reference Cameron, Epstein and O'Halloran1996; Canon Reference Canon1999; Lublin Reference Lublin1997; Mansbridge Reference Mansbridge1999; Swain Reference Swain1993), but extends to foreign policy as well.

However, we find gender to have little influence over support for Darfur legislation as Female MC is statistically insignificant in the model. This is surprising given the violence against women and children taking place in Darfur. However, while a gender gap existed between male and female MCs for many years, it has been a longstanding prediction that the gap would dissipate over time as women became more numerous and institutionalized (Welch Reference Welch1985). Indeed, while the variable Female MC is significant in the DW-NOMINATE model (p < 0.05), female MCs are only 3 points more liberal than men.

In all three models, generational status shows no significant effects while some religious affiliations do appear to influence MC behavior. For instance, as expected, Jewish MCs (who have an average adjusted Darfur score of 87) are nearly 10 points more supportive of Darfur efforts than Protestant MCs. We believe that Jewish MCs may be more supportive of increased efforts in Darfur due to their shared cultural experience with ethnic genocide. Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY)—who is Catholic—noted as much in a remark on May 26, 2006:

I have received letters from children in Jewish schools asking me to help the people of Darfur. Jewish people have a special understanding about genocide. The parents of these children who write to me may have lost grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins. But they also know they can write to their congressman and their children can write and ask for help for these people so far away who are in desperate trouble as their relatives once were.

(Rangel Reference Rangel2006, E975)

One year earlier Representative Mike Thompson (D-CA)—also a Catholic—read from a letter sent to him by Jewish children at Congregation Shir Shalom in Sonoma, California:

As Jewish children, we know about the Holocaust, when Jews were killed just for being Jews. We know that there are people in Darfur who are now being killed just for being who they are. Knowing this, we know we cannot stand by and let it happen … We ask our government to make it safe for families living in Darfur …

(Thompson Reference Thompson2006, E1006)

It is worth noting that the late Rep. Tom Lantos (D-CA), a Holocaust survivor, was among only six MCs in the 109th Congress to receive a perfect A+ from the Genocide Intervention Network.

Among the other religious variables, only Mormon MC reaches statistical significance. The results show that Mormon MCs (who have an average adjusted Darfur score of 42.7) are nearly 10 points less supportive of Darfur legislation than Protestant MCs. We had no a priori reason to expect this. But it is consistent with the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints's (LDS) long-held practice of not getting involved in political matters. According to the LDS Web site (http://www.lds.org), the church does not “endorse political parties or candidates” or “participate in politics unless there is a moral question at issue” (see also Ruby Reference Ruby2007). Accordingly, Elder Russell Nelson, a member of the LDS's Quorum of the Twelve Apostles, told the Pew Research Center that the church does not “wade into the political debate on such controversial issues as Darfur and the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Ruby Reference Ruby2007).

While we find party to have a significant and robust impact on voting behavior across all three measures, our results suggest that this impact is significantly less pronounced for the Darfur issue. Specifically, there is about a 42-point difference between partisans on DW-NOMINATE scores and 40 points on the NJ foreign policy scale. This gap is only 28 points for Darfur legislation. This is consistent with our theoretical expectations. As we discuss above, it is doubtful that typical pocketbook voters either rewards or punishes their representatives for their positions on Darfur. Because of this, the Darfur conflict cuts beyond traditional support coalitions—ardent support for the Darfur cause comes from members of opposing political ideologies. For instance, Representative Thomas Tancredo (R-CO) and Representative Donald Payne (D-NJ) have both been cited by the Genocide Intervention Network as “Champions of Darfur” for their efforts to end the genocide.Footnote 18 Tancredo is an ardent conservative Republican best known for his anti-immigration policy stances; he has a DW-NOMINATE score of 0.815. Payne is a liberal democrat known for his support of education funding and health care reform; he has a DW-NOMINATE score of −0.679.

There is, of course, a difference between “less partisan” and nonpartisan. Though its effect is muted compared to other issues, party does in fact matter to congressional behavior on Darfur. The source of this partisanship appears to depend on the difference between symbolic and substantive action on Darfur. Of the six pieces of legislation dealing with Darfur in the 109th Congress, only three called for the meaningful use of U.S. resources: the DGAA, amendment 709 to H.R. 4939, and amendment 980 to H.R. 5522. And the partisan differences on each of these actions are telling. Of the 135 MCs who cosponsored the DGAA (which did not reach the floor of the House), 111 were Democrats. And the votes on both amendments were just as partisan, with an average of 85% of MCs voting with their party while voting against the other.Footnote 19

Floor debates regarding these amendments show that opponents were concerned about the potentially harmful signals the additional money would send to the international community. For example, Representative Jim Kolbe (R-AZ and chair of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs) argued that amendment 709 would slow the transition from the African Union force to the United Nations force. He opposed amendment 980 from the floor as well, primarily because it would divert important foreign aid from Egypt as they “strive toward greater democracy and greater freedoms” (Kolbe Reference Kolbe2007, H3538). Since almost every MC voted in favor of the three mostly symbolic pieces of legislation, behavior on the three substantive bills and amendments drive the party effect noted in Table 1. Thus Democrats appear more willing to send U.S. resources to Darfur than Republicans, all else being equal.

It is worth noting that the effect of party affiliation on the NJ foreign policy scores is much larger than previous literature would have led us to expect. Again, Democrats are 40 points more liberal than Republicans on foreign policy issues, which is comparable to the difference across all votes. We believe this has to do with the nature of the “key votes” included in NJ's foreign policy score. By definition these key votes are likely salient, particularly those that dealt with the Iraq war. Given the media attention these decisions attracted, as well their subsequent importance to the 2006 elections, it is not surprising that the partisan effect on the NJ foreign policy score is higher than expected. It is likely that the electoral pressure surrounding these foreign policy votes led to exceptionally high party voting.

In addition to party, the results for committee assignments are consistent with our expectations as well. For example, members of the International Relations Committee are nearly 7 points more supportive of congressional involvement in Darfur, and members of the African subcommittee are nearly 13 points more supportive than non-members. This suggests two plausible conclusions: that members of these committees are predisposed to support Darfur legislation, or the unique information and expertise gained from serving on these committees leads them to show more support for Darfur legislation than members of other committees.

Among district-related factors, both the median income and the percentage of military veterans in one's district impact support for Darfur. The socioeconomic status of an MC's constituency influences voting behavior not only on Darfur-specific issues, but foreign policy more generally. In both cases higher income levels among the electorate leads to more liberal foreign policy votes. Finally, the percentage of military veterans in a district yields more conservative DW-NOMINATE scores, as well as less support for Darfur. Veterans may be an attentive public who are more concerned with potential military involvement in Darfur.

CONCLUSION

At the time this article was completed, the United Nations estimates that the more than 400,000 people in the Darfur region have been killed and at least 2.5 million more have been displaced. This genocide has showed little signs of slowing, as attacks to humanitarian convoys are forcing the UN to reduce food rations by approximately 50%. With up to three million people depending on this food supply for survival it is likely that this sobering casualty rate will continue to climb well into summer 2009. It is therefore vital to the Darfur effort that international support not only continues, but is increased. Accordingly, our analysis attempts to shed some light on factors contributing to congressional support from the U.S.

As stated in the opening of this article, Darfur is an interesting case because there is reason to expect an MC's usual set of incentives—the reelection motivation in particular—to be less prominent. Thus other goals—particularly the goal of making good public policy—may take on added importance. Consistent with our theory, we find institutional (e.g., committee membership) and personal characteristics (e.g., religious affiliation) to matter to Darfur voting. We do not want to suggest, however, that electoral considerations do not exist for issues such as Darfur. As we discuss above, even if one assumes a totally uninformed electorate the electoral constraint still looms quite large. Thus we find that two district characteristics—median income and percent military veterans—remain significant determinants of voting on Darfur.

Perhaps the most important finding of this study surrounds party influences. In the absence of direct electoral consequences, Darfur may be a winning issue for every member of Congress regardless of party affiliation. Fittingly, the Genocide Intervention Network highlights a “bipartisan group of ‘Darfur Champions’” on its Darfur Score Web site. In a time when even foreign policy—where politics was once said to “stop at the water's edge”—is often defined by partisan polarization, Darfur may be among the few issues where real bipartisanship actually occurs. Still, our results indicate that while partisanship certainly has a muted effect compared to other issues, its influence on Darfur voting is still meaningful. Overall, Democrats were more supportive of Darfur legislation than Republicans. The Darfur Genocide Accountability Act and two amendments in 2006 drove this difference. They were more partisan than the others because they dealt with the distribution of U.S. resources. In all cases, Democrats were much more likely than Republicans to support sending money, and in the case of the DGAA, troops to Darfur. Simply, bipartisanship was most likely to occur when the debate did not involve spending U.S. resources. Only when MCs sought to divert funding to the region by $100 million did partisanship again rear its head.

APPENDIX

The Darfur Genocide Accountability Act (H.R. 1424)

As its name suggests, this bill was meant to bring accountability to those who have allowed or perpetrated the genocide in Darfur, namely the Sudanese government. It called for economic sanctions against Sudanese government officials, denied privileges to the Sudanese embassies in the United States, refused port entrance to ships conducting business with Sudan, and gave the president power to use force to end the genocide. It was introduced by Donald Payne (D-NJ) and had 138 cosponsors. Although this bill never reached the House floor, it did assist in bringing about the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act.

The Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (H.R. 3127)

Signed into law in October of 2006 (PL 109-344), this bill reinforced the U.S. stance that the situation taking place in the Sudan is constituted as genocide and will not be tolerated. It also petitions the United States government to support and expand the African Union peacekeeping forces as well as to assist in the prosecution of those who have committed gross human rights violations and war crimes. The bill was sponsored by the late Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), had 162 cosponsors and was passed by the House 416 to 3 on April 5, 2006.

NATO Bridging Force (H.Res. 723)

This nonbinding simple resolution requested the president take immediate steps to help improve the security situation in Darfur. One of its provisions called for President Bush to send out a NATO Bridging Force to begin peacekeeping efforts until the United Nations could deploy its own peacekeepers. It was introduced by the late Representative Tom Lantos (D-CA), had 121 cosponsors and passed the House 412 to 7 on September 26, 2006.

Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan (H.Res. 992)

The specific purpose of this nonbinding simple resolution was to support the appointment of a Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan. More generally, it was to ensure that the genocide in Sudan remains a top concern for the presidential administration. The resolution was sponsored by Representative Frank R. Wolf (R-VA), had 108 cosponsors and passed the House on September 26, 2006, by a 414 to 3 vote.

Amendment 709 to H.R. 4939

The purpose of this amendment, offered by Representative Michael Capuano (D-MA), was to assist the African Union in their peacekeeping efforts in Darfur. Offered during debate regarding emergency funds for the 2006 fiscal year, amendment 709 proposed 50 million additional dollars be sent to support the African Union. It passed by a vote of 213 to 208 on March 16, 2006.

Amendment 980 to H.R. 5522

Offered by Representative David Obey (D-VI) during debate over appropriations for foreign operations for the 2007 fiscal year, this amendment proposed increasing funding for humanitarian operations by $50 million. The amendment was voted down 198 to 225 on June 8, 2006.

Footnotes

1 http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/special/issues.

2 For a comprehensive review of research on Congress and foreign policy pre-1992 see Ripley and Lindsay (Reference Ripley and Lindsay1992). For recent on research on congressional behavior and foreign policy see, for example, Lindsay (Reference Lindsay1994), Hill (Reference Hill1993), Burgin (Reference Burgin1994), Taylor and Rourke (Reference Taylor and Rourke1995), Meernik (Reference Meernik1995), Cronin and Fordham (Reference Cronin and Fordham1999), and Meernik and Oldmixon (Reference Meernik and Oldmixon2004).

3 This is not to say that parties' reputations and electoral success have not at times turned on foreign policy issues (e.g., policy towards communism during the cold war and national security following 9/11). However, instances of foreign policy on the congressional agenda are far outnumbered than instances of domestic policy on the agenda.

4 The Genocide Intervention Network designed the score to award MCs for cosponsoring or voting for legislation that seeks to “protect human rights and stop Darfur genocide.” Members of Congress are each given a personal profile, a numerical score, and a corresponding letter grade based on their voting patterns and participation. This can be found at http://www.darfurscores.org.

5 Of the six bills and amendments, three are mostly symbolic because they do not involve the distribution of U.S. resources: the DPAA (H.R. 3127); H.Res. 723, which called for President Bush to authorize a NATO peacekeeping force to Darfur; and H.Res. 992, which called for President Bush to send a special envoy to the region. The remaining three, in contrast, involve significant U.S. resources: the DGAA (H.R. 1424), which, among other things, authorized President Bush to use force to end the genocide; amendment 709 to H.R. 4939, which authorized an additional $50 million to be allocated to the region; and amendment 980 to H.R. 5522, which authorized an additional $50 million. As we discuss later, the three symbolic bills passed overwhelmingly while the three substantive bills were more contentious.

6 The NJ scores are determined by a computer-assisted calculation that ranks members from one end of the ideological spectrum to the other, based on key foreign policy votes on the floor. The DW-NOMINATE scores take all roll-call votes into consideration, resulting in a broad measure of voting that allows comparison of our findings with those of previous research.

7 The Darfur Score, which has a range of 0–8, was multiplied by 12.5, providing a new range of 0–100, a mean of 60, and a standard deviation of 23. The NJ foreign policy score is coded 0 to 100 with 100 indicating the most liberal positions. This score has a mean of 48 and standard deviation of 29. The DW-NOMINATE scores, which fall generally within a range of −1 to 1, with higher scores indicating more conservative voting records, was multiplied by −1; we then added 1 and multiplied by 50. This provided a new range of 0 to 100, with 100 being the most liberal. This provided a mean of 45.8 and a standard deviation of 24.

8 It is unclear what National Journal defines as liberal on foreign policy. Adding to the confusion, Cronin and Fordham (Reference Cronin and Fordham1999) show that the meanings of liberal and conservative are not stable over time. We do not wish to contribute to this discussion as it goes beyond the purposes of this paper. Thus we cautiously adopt National Journal's language when interpreting its scores.

9 We do not include direct measures of district ideology or partisanship—accurate measures of these are generally difficult to ascertain at the district level and substitutions of these, such as presidential vote margins, are rife with methodological problems (Jackson and Kingdon Reference Jackson and Kingdon1992).

10 This includes the systematic raping of young women and mothers, the destruction and kidnapping of families, and the decapitation of female breasts so that mothers cannot feed their young.

11 There are no universally agreed upon generational boundaries. We use these years based upon those used by previous research. In the data there are 99 silent generation, 257 baby boomers, and 50 Generation Xers. The birth years of these generations are 1925–1945, 1946–1959, and 1961–1980 respectively (Craig and Bennett Reference Craig and Bennett1997).

12 We identified 29 different religions among the 435 members of the 109th Congress. Following the advice a religion and politics expert, we were able to combine many of the 29 categories into nine religious affiliations.

13 We controlled for nine classifications, but only present the statistically significant variables in our tables to conserve space. We footnote the other findings in the results section.

14 There are a total of 433 MCs in the Darfur data set, as Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and Representative Robert Portman (R-OH) were dropped because they lacked a sufficient number of votes to calculate the score. Five additional MCs are excluded from the National Journal model for the same reason. We excluded Representatives Hastert and Portman from the DW-NOMINATE model to maintain consistency across models.

15 While our analysis focuses on the House of Representatives, an investigation of the Senate provides similar results, with our models explaining more variance across the broader DW-NOMINATE and NJ foreign policy scores than the more narrowly focused Darfur score. Furthermore, senators of Jewish origin are more supportive of Darfur efforts, as are Democrats and those serving on the IR Committee. Results from these models are available at joeuscinski.com.

16 The group identity literature suggests that African American political behavior is influenced by not only individual based attitudes, but also proxies for how that political decision may impact the larger African American community. See Tate (Reference Tate1994) and Dawson (Reference Dawson1995) for a discussion of the linked fate argument.

17 The seven CBC members were Representatives Al Green (D-TX), Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX), Gwen Moore (D-WI), Barbara Lee (D-CA), Mel Watt (D-NC), and Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC).

18 This is evidenced in the Senate as well. The Genocide Intervention Network identifies Senators Sam Brownback (R-KS) and Richard Durbin (D-IL) as Champions of Darfur in the Senate.

19 The breakdown of each vote is as follows (R = Republicans, D = Democrats):

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Figure 0

Table 1.Regression Results (109th Congress)