I. Introduction
This paper will consider the question whether Dworkin’s effort to extend his general theory of municipal law to the realm of international law was successful. One must not only look at the important assumptions he made in his posthumous essay “A New Philosophy for International Law” Footnote 1 but also at his final book Justice for Hedgehogs. Footnote 2 While there have been a number of important criticisms made again Dworkin’s philosophy of international law, this paper will focus specifically on those critics who argue, as Eric Scarffe did, Footnote 3 that Dworkin’s new account of the legitimacy of international law is inconsistent with the moral ambition found in his previous philosophy or who dismiss Dworkin, as Thomas Christiano did, Footnote 4 in failing to see the connection between the assumptions present in his interpretive theory of municipal law and those of his new theory of international law.
I argue that Dworkin’s theory of international law is premised on at least three important assumptions at the heart of his “one-system picture” of law and morality: i) a non-metaphysical conception of moral facts; ii) an optimistic view about the objectivity of moral judgments; and, iii) an anti-naturalistic account of the truth of moral propositions. If these assumptions are sound, then the only way to justify the authority of law for Dworkin is by a holistic interpretation leading to the same principles that he advocates in his philosophy of international law. These two are—as will be explained—the states’ duty to mitigate the risks of their own sovereignty and the principle of salience. I will conclude that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law resists its critics as without the principles of mitigation and salience Dworkin will not be able to provide a moral foundation for international institutions. Indeed, without them his account of international law would collapse into a metaphysical theory of natural law. Before we can find a ground for this conclusion, however, we must revisit the general features of Dworkin’s theory of international law.
II. On Dworkin’s Philosophy of International Law
Dworkin’s philosophy of international law originated from his dissatisfaction with the doctrinal account of international law available to the advocates of legal positivism. When considering a doctrinal concept of international law we are concerned not with the identification of international law as a sociological category, but with the “interpretive” question of “what international law holds on particular issues.” Footnote 5 One of Dworkin’s central claims is that the resolution of any legal case depends both on a jurisprudential argument about the point of the practice of law and on the “best justification of that practice” such point is able to provide. According to Dworkin, “any practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limited, assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers.” Footnote 6
In order to explain legal practice, a plausible theory of international law faces two tasks. It must account for the sources of international law, while also expounding the abstract principles that provide the foundations for these sources. When it comes to the first task, there is little doubt that legal positivism can provide an explanation for the norms and institutions of international law. It might be said, for instance, that participants in the practice of international law accept as a matter of convention a rule of recognition according to which treaties, custom and the other materials listed at Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice serve as sources of international law. Footnote 7
A more difficult matter arises when we try to answer the question about the foundations of the criteria of validity positivism provides. According to Dworkin, the standard positivistic argument for the authority of international law is based on the idea of consent. The reason for an international legal obligation is the assumption that states have “consented to be bound by that law.” Footnote 8 This answer is unsatisfactory for several reasons. First, the general idea of consent does not provide any priority order among the “different sources it recognizes”; second, it fails to explain the existence of some international rules, such as those of jus cogens, that are binding even to states that have not consented to these norms; and third, the principle of consent is underdetermined and fails to offer a standard “for deciding how many states must accept a practice as legally required” before we can call it a custom. Footnote 9
The toughest challenge, however, is a philosophical worry about the foundation of consent itself. Dworkin makes, here, the same point that he made in other writings about the foundation of our obligation to fulfill our promises. He thinks that Hume is likely the only moral philosopher who has offered a non-question-begging account of the obligations that promises seem to generate for a reasonable moral agent. If a promise is capable of creating duties for the one who makes it, this is not because it is considered an “independent source of a distinct kind of moral duty”, but only because it plays “an important but not exclusive role in fixing the scope of a more general responsibility”, which is the duty “not to harm other people first by encouraging them to expect that we will act in a certain way and then not acting in that way.” Footnote 10 Promising is not a “self-contained practice that generates obligations automatically, but is instead parasitic on the much more general duty not to harm others.” Footnote 11
For Dworkin, the problem of consent is not that it cannot be accepted as an institutionally-regulated process for creating new norms in the realm of international law, but is instead that it is “neither a necessary nor a sufficient ground for the legitimacy” of international law. Footnote 12 To justify the authority of international law we need a theory of legitimacy, and Dworkin believes this theory is located in the terrain of the so-called “associative obligations”, which he used in his earlier writings to ground his theory of legitimacy for municipal law. To construct this theory of the legitimacy of international law, Dworkin restates the assumption on which he relied to develop the legitimacy of municipal law, which is asserted thus: “we identify the law of a community by asking which rules its citizens or officials have a right they can demand be enforced by its coercive institutions without any further collective political decision.” Footnote 13
One of Dworkin’s important claims is that courts play, at least in contemporary democracies, a major role in identifying the law. This is because the law is constitutive of their activities that they “have the responsibility and power to enforce rights and obligations on demand.” We should “frame our basic political question”, therefore, in the following way: what are the rights and duties courts have the responsibility and right to enforce? Footnote 14 According to Dworkin, once we can answer this question we have found the content of the legitimate laws in a particular community. Nonetheless, when we shift the focus to international law this test is no longer available because there is no authority with worldwide jurisdiction to enforce the rights and duties that have towards each other in international law. Dworkin appeals, therefore, to a regulative ideal and invites us to imagine a court with universal jurisdiction in order to identify the rights that it would be appropriate for such a court to coercively enforce. If we can identify the rights that this hypothetical court could legitimately enforce, then we have found a principle for the legitimacy of international law.
The core intuition of Dworkin’s answer is that the legitimacy question about what justifies coercive political power arises not just “within each of sovereign states”, but also “about the system [of international law] itself.” Footnote 15 The problem of legitimacy arises, thus, also when each state decides to respect the principles of international law. Footnote 16 In Dworkin’s words, “those principles are not independent of but are actually part of the coercive system each of those states imposes on its citizens.” Footnote 17 It follows from this a duty of each state to mitigate the effects of the notion of sovereignty by imposing “constraints on its own power” and abandoning the Westphalian model of sovereignty that still prevails in international law. Footnote 18 The first step to develop a new philosophy of international law would be to accept that the states’ duty to improve their own political legitimacy includes “an obligation of each state to improve the overall system” of international institutions. This requirement, which Dworkin calls the principle of “mitigation”, provides the “true moral basis of international law.” Footnote 19 Once this principle is established, Dworkin proposes a second principle, salience, which functions as a “fundamental structuring principle” to facilitate the practical application of the duty to mitigate. Dworkin defines the principle of salience in the following way:
If a significant number of states, encompassing a significant population, has developed an agreed code of practice, either by treaty or by other form of coordination, then other states have at least a prima facie duty to subscribe to that practice as well, with the important proviso that this duty holds only if a more general practice to that effect, expanded in that way, would improve the legitimacy of the subscribing state and the international order as a whole. Footnote 20
The core of Dworkin’s philosophy of international law, therefore, is that these two principles—the duty to mitigate and the principle of salience—provide the grounds for the legitimacy of international law. Let us call this strategy to establish the moral foundations of international law the “State Legitimacy Enhancement Thesis.” Footnote 21 Even though I think these principles are coherent with the general justification of interpretivism, understood as a non-foundational theory of law that maintains that legal propositions are given sense “only by and within the practice” of law, Footnote 22 this theory of the legitimacy of international law has faced some important criticism not only from the scholars who have opposed Dworkin’s general interpretive theory of law, but also from legal philosophers who can be sympathetic to “law as integrity.” It is with the “internal critique” that I will be concerned with in the remaining sections of this paper.
III. Mitigation and Salience under Attack
Before Dworkin published his essay on international law, some of his sympathizers raised doubts as to whether interpretivism could be extended to the territory of international law. Başak Çali called one these internal objections the “lack of community objection.” Footnote 23 According to this objection, “interpretivism as a theory of law relies on the very existence of community and more importantly a community which is aimed at … equal concern and respect for individual lives.” Footnote 24
The core of Dworkin’s “law as integrity”, as we know, is the claim that consistency in principle is a necessary requirement for success in legal interpretation. Footnote 25 But the value of integrity holds only for a “specific type of community”, in which equal concern and respect for individuals is the fundamental point of the political association. Footnote 26 I believe this is an important objection to the application of interpretivism in the realm of international law, and I am glad that Dworkin—at least indirectly—tried to counter it or to at least minimize some of its practical implications in his philosophy of international law. In effect, if Dworkin’s principle of mitigation is sound, then states have a duty not only to strangers, but also to their own citizens, to create international institutions and to enhance the legitimacy of international law. No municipal legal system can be legitimate if it fails to contribute to build a legitimate association of states in the global level.
Nonetheless, the internal criticisms that Dworkin received for his actual theory of international law followed a very different track. They tend to share an idea that is also very important for Dworkin: that a philosophy of political morality and human rights implies a cosmopolitan conception of dignity and that this conception should be at the foundation of international law. Nonetheless, they criticize Dworkin because they think that the legitimacy of international law should be regarded as binding independently of any duties states have to their own citizens. Let us discuss, in the following headings, two different versions of this objection.
a) The Charge of Political Realism
Perhaps the most radical criticism raised against Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is Eric Scarffe’s contention that Dworkin’s moralized account of legality “seems to be conspicuously missing” in his theory of international law. Footnote 27 Scarffe considers Dworkin’s principle of mitigation “not an argument of political morality, but rather an uncharacteristic concession” to political realism. Footnote 28 When speaking of political realism, Scarffe means to describe a theory largely defended by skeptical lawyers and political scientists who tend to be ruthless pragmatists, rather than supporters of a moral reading of the sources of law. A fashionable account of political realism in international law is provided by Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, who think that international law “emerges from the state’s pursuit of self-interested policies on the international stage.” Footnote 29 The best explanation for state compliance or reluctance to comply with international law, for them, “is not that states have internalized international law, or have a habit of complying with it, or are drawn by its moral pull, but simply that states act out of self-interest.” Footnote 30 When Dworkin sustains that states should comply with international law only to the extent that it enhances their own legitimacy, the reason for international obligation would not be a moral argument “all the way down.” Instead, it would be an alignment “with a state’s self-interest.” Footnote 31
The value of dignity, in Scarffe’s reading, is widely downplayed in Dworkin’s philosophy of international law: “instead of speaking of dignity as an ‘indivisible’, or ‘inviolable’ value, as was the case in earlier works, here Dworkin considers it as one value among many.” Footnote 32 It is no longer a “trump” which “supervenes upon all other state interests, but is subjugated to the values of furthering world order and the state’s own political legitimacy.” Footnote 33 Once the basis of the obligation of international law is entirely derived from the state’s duty to improve “its own legitimacy”, any other values (including “justice”, “human dignity” and “political morality”) “do not extend into the relations between international bodies and states.” Footnote 34 State interests, as Scarffe says, “reign supreme, and the standing duty for states to improve their own legitimacy is the core value upon which all other derive and are interpreted against.” Footnote 35
After attributing these fatal consequences to Dworkin’s philosophy of international law, Scarffe asks why this theory has taken such an unexpected route, and comes to three possible explanations. First, it might have been the case that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is simply a deviation from his earlier works and lacks consistency with Dworkin’s general jurisprudence. Footnote 36 Second, Dworkin could have failed to understand international legal obligation because there is an asymmetry between state law and international law, which he failed to capture when purporting to extend his theory of law to the international arena. Footnote 37 Finally, Dworkin’s theory of international law might indeed be a possible application of his previous writings to the field of international law, so that Dworkin’s political realism is in fact a consequence of an important problem of consistency in Dworkin’ s philosophy of law.
This paper focuses on the final explanation, viz., that Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is a correct application of his previous works. Accordingly, it may be possible to argue that the principle of mitigation is established in the same way as Dworkin derived our duty to be moral from the ethical duties that we have towards ourselves. The idea of dignity, for Dworkin, comprises the principles of “self-respect”—which is seen as an ethical principle according to which each person must take his own life seriously— Footnote 38 and “authenticity”—which holds that “each person has a special, personal responsibility for identifying what counts as success in his own life.” Footnote 39 Given these principles, Dworkin grounds his argument to derive our moral responsibilities in a constructive interpretation of Kant’s assertion that we should treat humanity as an end in itself. This assertion, which Dworkin describes as the “principle of humanity”, is understood as follows:
If the value you find in your life is to be truly objective, it must be the value of humanity itself. You must find the same objective value in the lives of all other persons. You must treat yourself as an end in yourself, and therefore, out of self-respect, you must treat all other people as ends in themselves as well. Footnote 40
Once we understand the sources of our moral obligations in this way, it would be a small step to think that we can extend this reasoning into the territory of international law. As international actors, states “share the same source of their obligations as well: namely, their interests in furthering their own legitimacy.” Footnote 41 It would make sense, therefore, to say that because the legitimacy of a state “depends solely on how it treats its own citizens, it follows that a state’s obligation to furthering international order exists only when its citizens are directly affected.” Footnote 42
According to Scarffe this interpretation fails to provide a solid foundation for Dworkin’s philosophy of international law and reveals important consistency issues in Dworkin’s philosophy of law. On the one hand, it would not be clear “what grounds Dworkin has for claiming that a state’s moral obligations to its owns citizens differ from its obligations to those who are not under its dominion.” Footnote 43 On the other hand, Scarffe is not persuaded by Dworkin’s account of dignity in the first place. Dworkin would have failed to establish, with a solid philosophical argument, why citizens have the kind of dignity that he is proposing, thereby failing to “ground his understanding of dignity.” Footnote 44 In short: “although Dworkin devotes countless pages to explaining what it means to respect [someone’s dignity], he does not provide an argument for why we have it in the first place.” Footnote 45
b) Christiano’s Argument for the Insufficiency of State Legitimacy as a Basis for International Law
Thomas Christiano provides a “fair association model” of the legitimacy of international institutions. The fair association model, which predates Dworkin’s theory of international law, is an attempt to ground the legitimacy of international law in democratic values such as the principles of “equal advancement of interests” and “public equality.” Footnote 46 In the context of the modern state, Christiano argues that “democratic institutions are legitimate to the extent that and because they publicly realize the equal advancement of interests of the members of the society.” Footnote 47 His proposal, roughly, is to extend these two abstract democratic values to international law. If this is possible, then the legitimacy of international law “derives from the fact that the system of international law and institutions is a system of voluntary association among states.” Footnote 48
One should notice, however, that Christiano is much more optimistic than Dworkin about the importance of consent in this associative model for the legitimacy of international law. He thinks the voluntary association model “seems to animate the traditional view that state consent is the main source of international law”, although he is aware that there are some propositions of international law that are valid despite a lack of consent because “they support a system of free association among states.” Footnote 49
In spite of this emphasis on consent, there are interesting points of convergence between Christiano’s “fair association model” and Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. An important connection is that Christiano believes that the “moral foundation” of his model “consists in the importance of states to the advancement of the interests of persons.” Footnote 50 When, for instance, he speaks of the norms of jus cogens—which includes norms against genocide, slavery, torture, racial discrimination and so on—he thinks that they do not require consent because “states that engage in these practices cannot be said to be representing the interests of their members, and so the point of voluntary association seems to be clearly defeated in the cases of states violating these jus cogens norms.” Footnote 51 I find this model for the legitimacy of international institutions compatible with the theory of state legitimacy that Dworkin supported in his original philosophy of law. When Dworkin considers state law, he purports to ground political legitimacy in “associative” or “communal” obligations, i.e., in the special responsibilities that social practice attaches to membership in a political community. According to Dworkin, “political association, like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and intimate, is in itself pregnant of obligation.” Footnote 52
As we can see, Dworkin grounds state legitimacy in an associative model that is based in democratic values very similar to those of Christiano, and his duty to mitigate the effects of sovereignty seems to pursue an association of equal and cooperative communities very similar to Christiano’s “fair association model.” The “fair association model” seems more like a formidable reply to the “lack of community of objection” discussed by Çali Footnote 53 than a plausible argument against Dworkin’s principles of mitigation and salience in international law. Nonetheless, in spite of these important similarities in their conceptions of political legitimacy, Christiano has raised some concerns about Dworkin’s conception of international law. The central objections are due to four worries about the principles of salience and mitigation. The first worry is that it is unclear why “salience and mitigation must go with essentially universal treaties.” Footnote 54 According to this objection, Dworkin did not explain why international rules at the global level are better positioned than regional treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights or the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) to enhance the legitimacy of the signatory states.
The second and more damaging problem is that the states’ duty to enhance their own legitimacy would not be a satisfactory ground for the international obligation to prevent human rights violations that take place beyond their borders. Christiano believes that Dworkin’s concept of legitimacy concerns only how states treat their own citizens, regardless of what happens to the people who are not under the rule of their political authority. As a consequence, Dworkin’s claim that the principle of mitigation can ground the principles of jus cogens only fits imperfectly. To specify this second objection, Christiano draws on a distinction between a “narrow” and a “broad” version of the principles of mitigation and salience. The former would connect these principles only to the “enhancement of state legitimacy”, whereas the latter would be more ambitious because it seeks “to overcome the dangers of sovereign states to any important moral values.” Footnote 55 A problem of Dworkin’s view, for Christiano, is that it is concentrated only in the narrow view, which is insufficient to ground the independent moral aims of international society “that all societies have common reasons to pursue.” Footnote 56 Though the principle of state legitimacy provides a solid basis for assessing whether a state is justified in imposing coercive obligations upon its citizens, “it does not seem to imply anything about how these people treat others outside the society.” Footnote 57 It fails to explain, for instance, the duty of European states to subscribe human rights treaties outside Europe, “since that adherence does not increase the legitimacy of those states.” Footnote 58 The true moral basis for international law, therefore, could not be captured by the principles of salience and mitigation. It should include, instead, “moral concerns beyond state legitimacy”, which should pull us into a type of different political association: “a cosmopolitan community of people who are divided into states.” Footnote 59
The third worry, which in reality seems to be a special case of the second worry, rather than an independent concern, is that Dworkin excludes from the scope of international obligations some problems that are genuine concerns for the international community under the fair association model, such as the duties to increase wealth and alleviate global poverty. Although these matters are the object of important international regulations, such as the United Nations Millennium Declaration, they receive little attention in Dworkin’s paper and are not grounded by the concept of state legitimacy that Dworkin adopted to support the two basic principles of international law. Footnote 60
Finally, the fourth worry is that the legitimacy of international law seems to extend “significantly past the domestic legitimacy enhancement thesis.” Footnote 61 We cannot justify the legitimacy of international law without the idea that people should participate in the making of international law. But this idea, for Christiano, “does not seem to involve enhancing the legitimacy of domestic institutions at all.” Footnote 62 We should be able to build, instead, a “cosmopolitan political community.” Footnote 63
As it is probably evident, the source of Christiano’s worries—with an exception for the first one—seems similar to the objection that Scarffe pressed against Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. Footnote 64 Even though Christiano does not share the view that Dworkin ends up adopting a form of political realism, he seems to agree with Scarffe about ascribing to Dworkin a thesis that we might call the “indifference thesis”, which is the claim that political authority is a purely domestic business, so that a state can be legitimate even if it has no concern for the people who are not subject to its political authority. It is this assumption that is at the root of the most important difficulties that both critics find in Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. I intend to assess, in the following section, whether critics are correct when they say that Dworkin needs to uphold the indifference thesis in order to say that states seek to enhance their own legitimacy when they commit themselves with international law.
IV. A Dworkinian Response: Towards a Hedgehog Conception of Political Legitimacy
In this section, I will argue that the “indifference thesis” is based on a misunderstanding of the deep philosophical assumptions of Dworkin’s conception of political legitimacy, and that if we consistently follow Dworkin’s theory of moral values we will arrive at something analogous to the principles of salience and mitigation to provide a moral foundation for international law. If this contention is correct, you may still disagree with Dworkin’s conception of the moral foundations of international law, but you will have to challenge not the derivation of the principle of mitigation from the duty states have to enhance their own political legitimacy. Instead, you must demonstrate that these philosophical assumptions—that stand at the core of the argument of the “unity of value”—are not defensible and that the integrated epistemology that Dworkin establishes to understand political concepts is not a plausible moral philosophy.
a) The Hedgehog’s Philosophical Ambition
Before we move on, we should outline the basic philosophical assumptions underlying Dworkin’s account of law and morality. One of its distinctively interpretivist claims is that the debate between positivists and natural lawyers remains unresolved because both sides assume that a relevant question for legal theory is whether there exist necessary connections between law and morality. A crucial assumption of this debate is that “law and morals are different systems of norms and the crucial question is how they interact.” Footnote 65 While legal positivists hold that social facts are the exclusive determinants of the content of law, or, as “inclusive positivists do”, that it is at least possible to imagine a legal system rooted exclusively in social facts, natural lawyers sustain that there are necessary connections between law and morality, either because some moral values are necessarily incorporated by any legal system or because the authority of law must be justified by some metaphysically basic principles of natural law.
According to Dworkin, when we ask whether there are relations or connections between law and morality we already have the wrong picture of the nature of legality since “there is no neutral standpoint from which these connections between these supposedly separate systems can be adjudicated.” Footnote 66 We should avoid, therefore, the underlying premise that law and morality are “two different intellectual domains.” Contrary to this idea, Dworkin believes that it is better to treat law as a department of morality, i.e., as a “part of morality more generally understood” whose crucial distinctive feature is that it is concerned with the action of institutions. Footnote 67
He understands the realm of value—that includes law, politics and morality—as a single domain. Morality in general would have a sort of “tree structure”, which goes as follows: “law is a branch of political morality, which is itself a branch of a more general personal morality, which is in turn a branch of a yet more general theory of what is to live well.” Footnote 68 In his earlier writings about legal theory, he already seems to anticipate this point in a less explicit way, by distinguishing the “grounds” and the “force” of law. The grounds of law are the determinants of the truth of a legal proposition. They are the “more general” propositions that make any particular proposition of law true or false. The force of law, in turn, is its ability to obligate, i.e., to create duties and rights that should be regarded as morally binding by the members of the community that it purports to regulate. Once this distinction is assimilated, we can see the novelty of interpretivism. The point of interpretivism is that it assumes “no non-moral prior account of grounds and leaves no residual question about whether legal obligations have moral force.” Footnote 69 Unlike the mainstream approaches to political philosophy, Dworkin thinks that we should avoid a theory to account for the grounds of law that is not also a theory of political obligations. A theory of law should not adopt a test to establish the truth of a legal proposition that is entirely independent of its moral justification. Such a theory, for Dworkin, could not fit legal practice because “legal argument takes place on a plateau of rough consensus that if law exists it provides a justification for the use of collective power against individual citizens or groups.” Footnote 70
Dworkin believes that the view of the ordinary citizen and the legal practitioner—or, more generally, the view of anyone who participates in a debate about what our rights are and what duties we have against each other in a political community—is very different from the mainstream philosophical tradition which adopts a positivistic definition of law while also assuming that such law is not necessarily obligatory from the moral point of view. However, he thinks reason is in the side of the ordinary view, not the philosophical tradition. The classic question of political philosophy—whether there is a political obligation or a “moral obligation to obey the law”—is not regarded as independent from the question of what the law is in the first place. Footnote 71
There is a strong practical aspect in Dworkin’s conception of law. His view is that we generally use the concept of law in a justificatory way. It is this justificatory purpose that distinguishes the doctrinal concept of law—the one with which we should be concerned in a jurisprudential project—from the “criterial” concepts that sociologists and historians might deploy. We use a doctrinal concept of law when we stake a claim “about what the law requires or prohibits or permits or creates, and we share a great many assumptions about the kinds of argument that are relevant in defending such claims and also about the consequences that follow when such claims are true.” Footnote 72 As a consequence, Dworkin believes that the law is “effectively integrated with morality”, and that “lawyers and judges are working political philosophers of a democratic state.” Footnote 73 Nonetheless, even if the law is conceived as a branch of morality, two questions of significant importance remain. First, what is the distinctive aspect of law, which makes it a special department of morality broadly conceived? Second, how exactly do we establish the connection between the different branches of value?
To answer the first question, Dworkin believes that the distinctiveness of law involves its institutionalization. The actions of institutions such as parliaments, agencies, and officials, can change the overall moral obligations that we have in a political community. Under the direct influence of Dworkin, Mark Greenberg has called the set of “all of the moral obligations, powers, permissions, privileges, and so on that obtain in [a] society” the “moral profile” of that particular community. Footnote 74 By taking morally significant actions such as enacting legislation, applying sanctions, or adjudicating on constitutional cases institutions alter the moral profile of the communities in which they exist. Footnote 75 Our commitment to democracy and to the values that underlie the rule of law can generate obligations for us.
As Dworkin explained when considering the moral significance of conventions, our performative and associative obligations—i.e., the obligations that arise from our acts or from the special bonds that we have as members of a distinctive group—are “dramatically affected by social facts.” Footnote 76 When an institution such as a parliament enacts a statute, for instance, this enactment is a social fact that is constitutive of a legal obligation. But the significance of this social fact, despite what legal positivists say about that, must be determined by something else. In fact, it is partly the product of a moral judgment. This is, for Dworkin, the main difference between legal positivism and interpretivism: “Legal positivism argues that such historical acts or conduct is exclusively decisive in deciding what legal rights people have”, whereas interpretivism provides a different answer, “in which principles of political morality also have a part to play.” Footnote 77
The answer to the second question, in turn, is Dworkin’s deepest philosophical assumption. And it is also the philosophical argument that provides the connection between state legitimacy and the legitimacy of international law. The core of Dworkin’s argument is stated in the first page of Justice for Hedgehogs, where he makes reference to the traditional tale of the hedgehog and the fox in order to claim, contrary to Isaiah Berlin, that moral philosophy should seek for the “unity of value.”
The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing. Value is one big thing. The truth about living well and being good and what is wonderful is not only coherent but mutually supporting: what we think about any one of these must stand up, eventually, to any argument we find compelling about the rest. Footnote 78
He takes this claim—of mutual dependence between ethical and moral values—a step further and holds that if we want to retain our ordinary conviction that our judgments about values are true we must give up the meta-ethical assumption that we can have “external, non-moral reasons for believing that our moral opinions can be true.” Footnote 79 We should hold, instead, that there is no neutral standpoint to provide a test for the value judgments we make. There is nothing analogous to scientific method to determine what counts as a moral truth.
Dworkin dismisses, thus, the common philosophical distinction between first-order moral judgments and second-order meta-ethical questions. This is why, for him, moral realism and external skepticism are both implausible philosophical positions. They are wrong because they are the product of our wrong expectations about the independence of meta-ethics. Footnote 80 Yet, there is an even stronger claim that Dworkin is making about the nature of values, which he thinks is the “most radical view” that he defends: “the metaphysical independence of value.” Footnote 81 If we believe in the objectivity of values while admitting that meta-ethics is an illusion, then our theories about moral truth are a matter of moral argument. Our theories are “drawn from within morality”, for “they are themselves moral judgments.” Footnote 82
Once we give up looking for a non-moral test to validate our moral propositions, which is the core assumption of meta-ethics, we need a new moral epistemology. It must be “an integrated rather than Archimedean epistemology, and it must therefore be itself a substantive, first order moral theory.” Footnote 83 Instead of an external process of verification for our moral intuitions, we need an interpretive epistemology based on the value of “integrity”, which is the “nerve” of our moral responsibility. Footnote 84 Our only accesses to the truth of a moral proposition are our conviction that it is true and the links that such proposition may have to other moral truths that we already know. Whenever we need to provide a ground for the moral propositions we sustain, we must reexamine the “unstudied moral convictions” that we have since nearly the beginning of our lives. We must interpret the propositions we advocate in the light of other values—normally more abstract ones—in a responsible way. Our interpretation aims to knit these values together. We must be morally responsible, and we do that “to the degree that our various concrete interpretations achieve an overall integrity so that each supports the others in a network of value we embrace authentically.” Footnote 85
As Jeremy Waldron puts it, Dworkin’s claim is that “all areas of value depend on one another.” Footnote 86 According to Waldron, this is a respectful holistic ambition, which is based on a “refusal to repeat the lazy pluralism of, say Isaiah Berlin—the fox par excellence.” Footnote 87 We should praise Dworkin’s philosophical attitude and reject such value-pluralism “whose sententious expression is not matched by any intellectual curiosity about possible connections between various ideals.” Footnote 88
We can observe, from this reconstruction of Dworkin’s integrated moral epistemology, that his moral and legal philosophy is based on three important assumptions that, if correct, leave him no alternative except a somehow “circular” form of interpretivism. First, Dworkin upholds a non-foundationist conception of value. He believes we should seek truth for the propositions we hold about value not in the arid ground of metaphysics, but in the mundane field of the arguments that we are able to offer to justify these propositions. Second, he upholds an anti-naturalist conception of morality. We may leave the question whether he is a moral realist open. Yet, we must observe that he is an intransigent supporter of Hume’s distinction between “is” and “ought” and repeats several times his assumption that there is nothing in the natural world that can establish the truth of any proposition about values. Third, he is a committed advocate of moral objectivism. There are, for him, true answers about values, and it would be silly to deny this evident fact. He offers an indirect argument for this claim. Although he does not use this vocabulary, we can say that a supporter of external skepticism—the abstract thesis that there is no right answer about values—will necessarily commit a performative contradiction each time he argues for any proposition about morality or ethics or political values. Footnote 89 If I am an external skeptic, I can no longer assert any proposition about justice. I cannot, for instance, participate in any political debate on whether progressive taxation or abortion or gay marriage or hate speech is morally right or wrong. According to Dworkin, no-one can consistently live as a moral person while accepting this implausible philosophical argument, so all of us end up implicitly admitting the objectivity of value as a hidden presupposition of our political arguments.
The thesis of the “unity of value” appears, therefore, as the only reasonable alternative for moral philosophy. Footnote 90 If Dworkin is correct about this thesis and his integrative epistemology, he has given us the route to test his own claim about the legitimacy of international law. It is a route that seems to me similar to the one that he took to ground our personal morality in our ethical values, and then our political values in our personal morality, and finally our legal institutions in our political rights.
b) The Indifference Thesis and Political Legitimacy
Earlier in this essay I mentioned one of the possibilities that Scarffe thinks is available to explain why Dworkin was led to adopt the State Enhancement Legitimacy Thesis, which is to read this thesis as deriving from the two principles of dignity—“self-respect” and “authenticity”—that Dworkin supported in his late moral and legal philosophy. Footnote 91 If this possibility is attractive, Dworkin will be able to ground international obligations in the same way as he grounded our personal morality, which is comprised of our duties towards other human beings, in the principles of humanity and self-respect. The obligations our community assumes in the international society would be directly linked to the duty such community has to improve the dignity of its members.
This is how Dworkin defines “legitimacy” in his mature political philosophy:
[Governments] can be legitimate if their laws and policies can … reasonably be interpreted as recognizing that the fate of each citizen is of equal importance and that each has a responsibility to create his own life. A government can be legitimate, that is, if it strives for its citizen’s full dignity even if it follows a defective conception of what that requires. Footnote 92
This conception does not entail that a person can expect that her officials “will always act out of principles that she herself thinks right.” Footnote 93 But it implies that she can expect her officials “to act out of the principles that they themselves endorse.” Footnote 94 Whenever an authority fails to adopt this political attitude we should feel cheated, since political authorities have a special responsibility to protect their dignity and to show equal respect for each of their fellow citizens. Footnote 95
Nevertheless, there is something more in the requirement that a government must “strive for its citizens’ full dignity.” Dworkin extracts from the principle of self-respect a duty not only to treat ourselves as ends in ourselves, but also a more general duty to “treat all other people as ends in themselves as well.” Footnote 96 Something similar can be said about the obligations of political communities in the realm of international law. As Dworkin stated with regards to the duty to mitigate the concept of sovereignty, a state is “defective in its legitimacy when it cannot protect those over whom it claims a monopoly of force from the invasions and pillage of other peoples.” Footnote 97 Any state must help to construct an international order which is able to assist states in protecting their people from such kind of violence, wherever it is said to come from. But there is something even more important in Dworkin’s reasoning to explain the source of international law, which is the duty of states to help their own citizens comply with their responsibility to protect the human rights of other people that may not be part of their political community. I do not believe Dworkin could have been clearer about this obligation, as we can read in the following excerpt:
People around the world believe they have—and they do have—a moral responsibility to help to protect people in other nations from war crimes, genocide, and other violations to human rights. Their government falls short of its duty to help them acquit their moral responsibilities when it accedes to definitions of sovereignty that prevent it from intervening to prevent such crimes or to ameliorate their disastrous effects. Footnote 98
The key to international obligations resides in the duty our government has to help us acquit our own moral responsibilities towards people who may suffer harm from our actions or who we might have a duty to aid under appropriate circumstances. If, for instance, we, as ordinary persons, can be said to have a duty to do what we can to help alleviate extreme poverty wherever it may occur, then our state cannot be indifferent to this moral duty. Our community cannot claim our allegiance if it fails to contribute to develop an international order that helps us fulfill the moral responsibilities that our adherence to the principle of humanity entails. If we cannot be indifferent to global warming or extreme poverty, neither can our government while it acts as a community that is made by us and purports to be authoritative upon ourselves.
I believe that this argument provides the definitive Dworkinian answer to the objections that we analyzed in this essay. Given Dworkin’s interpretivist methodology, it is the only answer available to Dworkin for establishing the moral foundations of international law. The hedgehog approach that he suggested in his mature political philosophy, which invites us to seek unity in our value assumptions, leads no other way. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that both Scarffe and Christiano anticipated this reply, although they failed, for different reasons, to appreciate its force.
Scarffe, on the one hand, thinks this interpretive integration between dignity and international legitimacy fails for two reasons. First, it does not offer a solid foundation for states’ international obligations because it is unclear why Dworkin believes that a state would have obligations to their own citizens that are not extensible to people out of their jurisdictions. Second, Dworkin’s account of dignity is incomplete because it lacks a solid philosophical foundation: although Dworkin provides an extended explanation of what dignity entails, he fails to give us a plausible argument for why we have that kind of dignity in the first place. Footnote 99
Christiano, on the other hand, thinks the state’s requirement to treat people under its authority with equal concern is not a sufficient ground for the obligation the political community may have to “those outside the community.” The “quality” of the association within the community would not depend on anything such community does to the strangers who are not their members. Footnote 100 Furthermore, Christiano also thinks that if people in general have obligations to the persons living outside their own political community, this duty should be based on independent moral goals that are regarded as sufficient for establishing international obligations. To put it straightforwardly, the question is: “why not see the normative underpinning of international law as directly grounded in these duties?” Footnote 101
These objections, however, disregard Dworkin’s integrative moral epistemology and implicitly assume interpretivism is a failed methodological process. They are typical expression of the methodology of “foxes”, instead of hedgehogs, and presuppose the possibility of independent moral aims that need not be related to any obligation states may have to their own citizens. Scarffe seems to demand, for instance, an “independent” ground for human dignity, whereas Christiano is searching for “independent aims” of the international society. But how could these independent moral values be grounded if there is not such a thing as a metaphysical test that we can apply to determine the correctness of moral norms? Where would these moral aims come from if Dworkin is right about his philosophical claim that our meta-ethical intuitions rest on a mistake about the nature of our moral arguments?
If Dworkin’s ethical, moral, political and legal philosophy has any merit it lies in its insightful holism, which allows us to abandon the labyrinth of arbitrary metaphysical formulae while rejecting the contradictory assumptions of external skepticism. Dworkin’s interpretivist methodology is at the same time anti-metaphysic and objectivist, making sense of our moral intuitions about the objectivity of value while also protecting us from the dangers of metaphysical moral realism. Dworkin’s most general claim about political morality is that there are no independent moral aims, and this seems to imply that there is no department of value that should be regarded as independent from the others. If we cannot make sense of our law without our political morality, and if we cannot make sense of our moral obligations (both political and personal) without our ethical values, why should we regard the legitimacy of international law as independent from the legitimacy of municipal law? Wouldn’t it be preferable to construct an account of international legitimacy that coheres with our convictions about the legitimacy of the state?
It is probably the case that Scarffe and Christiano have different answers to this question. Scarffe, on the one hand, will probably think it is natural to look for some metaphysical test to provide the foundation for our moral values, since he is not satisfied even with Dworkin’s exhaustive description of the concept of dignity throughout several pages of Justice for Hedgehogs. To recap, Scarffe thinks Dworkin’s moral philosophy is unsatisfactory because he assumes that it lacks a proper explanation for why people are entitled to their dignity in the first place. I believe this is a worry about the capacity of Dworkin’s circular interpretive methodology to establish the truth of the two principles of dignity that he proposes. On Dworkin’s view, since we lack an external Archimedean standpoint from which we could apply a non-moral meta-ethical principle to adjudicate on any particular moral judgment, we must start our moral arguments from our moral convictions and test them in the light of all other moral values with which they must cohere. Scarffe’s dissatisfaction with this conception of dignity seems to derive from a more general dissatisfaction with Dworkin’s interpretivism. This is the only explanation, as far as I can see, for the fact that Scarffe wants an explanation of the foundation of our dignity that is not also an account of what dignity entails.
If I am correct about Scarffe, it comes as no surprise that he fails to see the connection between state legitimacy and the legitimacy of international institutions. Domestic and international institutions, for him, have conflicting interests and the issue of legitimacy is considered to be nothing but their own business. State and international legitimacy are entirely independent matters.
Christiano, on the other hand, seems to be much more sympathetic to Dworkin’s interpretive ambition, as we can apprehend from the most fundamental aspects of his political philosophy. In Christiano’s discussion of the authority of democracy, for instance, we can see many points that could be considered common to Dworkin in the approach to controversial moral principles. Footnote 102 Instead of looking for a metaphysical explanation for the moral concepts he deploys in his democratic theory—publicity and equal advancement of interests—Christiano seems to be arguing, most of the time, from the internal point of view, in a way that seems similar to Dworkin’s methodological approach to moral, political and legal philosophy. He tries to integrate these values with other very abstract values we consider morally fundamental, such as autonomy, justice and political equality. By the same token, his ambition to ground the legitimacy of international institutions in a “fair associative model” seems to be just as interpretive as Dworkin’s contention that our moral duties stem from the ethical principles that we adopt and the responsibilities we assume when we reflect about how to live our own lives. The fair association model for the legitimacy of international institutions follows the same path as Dworkin’s doctrine of associative obligations in municipal law. The “indifference thesis”, therefore, seems to be much more problematic for Christiano than it is for Scarffe. A supporter of Christiano’s fair association model may ask why we should construct an account of state legitimacy that is indifferent about how the state acts upon other persons in the international stage.
I think Christiano made a wrong move when he took the concept of legitimacy at face value and held that such concept is merely a communal requirement of treating subjects with equal consideration. A problem with this view is that it is unilateral and regards the state as the single source of our legal obligations in a political community. On Dworkin’s model of “associative obligations”, however, the source of our political obligations stems from the people’s own attitudes towards their fellow citizens in the polity. It derives, in other words, from our own recognition of our reciprocal importance as moral persons, which lie at the core of Dworkin’s concept of dignity.
There is little reason to suppose that Christiano’s “morally mandatory aims of international law” should be regarded as independent from the legitimacy of the states that take part in the political association of international law. Footnote 103 According to Christiano, two of these morally mandatory aims have already been recognized in Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations: the aims of “preservation of international security” and “protection of persons against serious and widespread violations of human rights.” Footnote 104 The others, in turn, are of “equally great moral importance” and “must be pursued by the international system.” Footnote 105 They consist, according to Christiano, in three basic moral duties: (i) the duty to avoid global environmental catastrophe; (ii) the duty to alleviate severe global poverty; and (iii) the duty to establish a fair and decent system of international trade. Footnote 106
Christiano is convinced that these morally mandatory aims are among the basic principles underlying international law, and that they can be the source of international obligations even when a particular state fails to acknowledge their importance or to give its consent to a treaty that purports to enforce them. This explanation seems to assume, indeed, the same kind of moral objectivity that stands is at the core of Dworkin’s account of values in law and political morality. It need not assume, in a similar way, that there is any metaphysical test to ground our moral obligations, and seems to cohere with the view that under the circumstances of moral disagreement we should appeal to our arguments to make a case for our moral views and rely on our democratic processes to resolve these disagreements. One of the virtues of Christiano’s fair association model is that it does not resort to obscure principles of natural law, and is instead much closer to Dworkin’s interpretive methodology for reasoning about political values. It is a model that fits very well with the hedgehog’s idea of unity of value. It seems to be inconsistent, therefore, to assume that state legitimacy has nothing to do with the values underpinning international law. Dworkin’s reasoning, in this matter, seems to elucidate some important moral duties that we should assign to each state that recognizes itself as equal with others in the international realm. But if it is to succeed it must be interpreted in the same way that Dworkin interpreted our individual responsibility to strangers in his account of our personal morality. The position of states in international law is analogous to the position of a moral agent in relation to other people who are not under her authority and do not have the special associative obligations that are internal to a special community to which she belongs. We should consider, therefore, what these duties seem to hold for any given individual, regardless of the state or the political association to which she is taken to belong. If we can show that the indifference assumption is unacceptable in our personal morality, then we are very close to demonstrating that it is also unacceptable for the political association whose basic duty is to protect our dignity.
c) Aid and Harm in Dworkin’s Account of Personal Morality and in International Law
If the State Legitimacy Enhancement Thesis is correct, then international legal obligations derive from the states’ duty to improve the dignity of their citizens. To improve their citizen’s dignity is not, for Dworkin, merely to protect them against international aggression and to guarantee their own human rights. It is also, importantly, to facilitate their compliance with the moral responsibilities owed to all moral persons, including those outside of their own political community. We must, therefore, integrate personal morality with the international obligations of the states.
I intend to argue, in this sub-section, that the integration just described can be achieved by exploring Dworkin’s consideration of the importance or aid and harm in our personal morality. Footnote 107 Let us consider, first, the case of aid. Our duty to help strangers has nothing to do with communal or associative obligations, since we do not have any special relationship with these people. It must derive, then, from Kant’s principle of humanity, which requires us to treat all human lives as “of equal objective importance to our own.” Footnote 108 Dworkin believes, however, that Kant’s understanding of this duty is based on an “ultra-demanding interpretation” of the principle of humanity, which forbids us to have any preferences between persons and requires an absolute indifference between who to rescue or aid. To use a familiar example, if I am to decide between saving my daughter and saving two strangers, Kant’s interpretation disallows any preference for saving my daughter.
According to Kant, in order to decide how to act towards other people we should reason impersonally “with no special attention” to our own position. Footnote 109 Dworkin would argue that Kant is wrong because his is a “morality of abnegation”, which should be replaced by a “morality of self-affirmation, not anonymity”, that is, “a morality drawn from and flowing back into our sovereign ambition to live well with dignity.” Footnote 110 Dworkin sustains, therefore, that Kant’s claims about the principle of humanity “are most persuasive when understood as an interpretive account of linking ethics and morality.” Footnote 111 An adequate interpretation of our duty to “treat all persons as ends in themselves” should take into consideration also the other principle of dignity (the principle of self-respect), which establishes “our own responsibility to make something valuable of our life.” Footnote 112
To harmonize these apparently conflicting ideas we must construct a conception of these values that reads them together as both feasible requirements of a moral life. Even though we must “treat other people consistently with accepting that their lives are of equal objective importance to our own”, it is not always the case that failing to help someone else is inconsistent with that attitude. Footnote 113 According to Dworkin, “I can legitimately recognize the importance of the lives of others without supposing that I must subordinate my life and interests to some collective or aggregate interest of them all.” Footnote 114 To take up one of Dworkin’s examples, I do not violate this principle of the equal importance of human life just because I “dedicate my life to helping my children while I ignore yours.” Footnote 115 I may acknowledge the equal importance of human rights even if I refuse to make admirable sacrifices.
There is, however, a limit to “how far I can consistently ignore something that I claim has objective value.” Footnote 116 If I am escaping from a fire in an art gallery and I can easily carry with me a unique masterpiece without bringing any risk to myself or to other people, I cannot leave it to burn while insisting that I recognize an objective value in art. By the same token, if I walk by a child who is drowning in shallow waters and I can save her without putting myself in great danger, I can no longer claim to respect the principle of humanity if I leave her to her own devices. When, therefore, do I have a duty to act? Dworkin suggests a general test based on three factors to provide an answer to such rescue cases: (i) the harm threatened to a victim; (ii) the cost a rescuer would incur; and, (iii) the degree of confrontation between victim and potential rescuer. Footnote 117
Although these principles were conceived for individual actions, they may be read as plausible guidelines for interpreting the state’s duty of aid in international law. If a state finds its neighbor in great danger and is in a comfortable position to help, even if it is not responsible for causing the danger, it would be difficult for such state to be indifferent under reasonable circumstances. The test would establish that the greater the danger facing our neighbor citizens, the stronger our duty to help. Similarly, the smaller the risk that the state assumes in order to help, the greater the probability that it is under an obligation to help. Furthermore, if we can individualize the victims and if they are within our reach, it is even more likely the case that we have an obligation to aid.
There are even stronger obligations, however, when it comes to harm. In order to understand our duty not to harm other persons, Dworkin distinguishes between “bare competition harm” and “deliberate harm”. Only the latter, Dworkin argues, constitutes a breach of our duty not to harm other people. According to Dworkin, “no one could even begin to lead a life if bare competition harm were forbidden.” Footnote 118 If you compete with me and win, for a job or a lover or a house, I cannot claim compensation from the bare fact of my loss. We should live our lives, therefore, “mostly like swimmers in separate demarcated lanes.” Footnote 119 I must cross the line, sometimes, to help you if you are in trouble, but I can never deliberately hurt you or slow you down in order to succeed: “If our responsibility for our lives is to be effective, we each need a moral immunity from deliberate harm by others.” Footnote 120
A similar duty can be established, if Dworkin is right, for states and institutions participating in international law. Although states might compete for political influence or markets, for instance, they cannot deliberately harm other states in order to achieve their goals—not even if the harm is a mere collateral effect of economic, military or environmental policy. If a state provides its citizens a comfortable life by raising gas emissions that will later cause major natural disasters in other states, it is in breach of one of the mandatory aims of international law. If, in the same vein, a state provides wonderful public services, generous wages, and social benefits for its citizens with the profits from an unregulated financial system that provides a safe haven for illegal activities such as international terrorism beyond their borders, it cannot be said to be acting legitimately, for it is not helping its citizens fulfill the moral responsibilities their dignity entails to the victims of the policy they as a nation adopt.
The correct interpretation of the concept of legitimacy, to conclude, must be established in light of the basic value of dignity, the principles that provide the right conception for its application, and its relation to other values and moral obligations we have in the public sphere. If the unity of value is sound, then the idea of state legitimacy implies the recognition of moral aims and values that hold beyond the border of territorial sovereignty. States are now regarded as communities of persons, rather than impersonal institutions. They can be legitimate to the extent that they enhance the dignity of their own citizens, but they fail to do it if they fail to comply with the obligations that stem from the mandatory aims of international law. The principles of mitigation and salience, which Dworkin placed at the core of his philosophy of international law, provide an important foundation for these moral aims and a valuable interpretive principle for all the norms and institutions of international legal practice.
V. An Interpretive Understanding of State Consent
Suppose Dworkin is right about his interpretive moral epistemology and the moral foundation of international law. Suppose we adopt a broad understanding of the concept of legitimacy and we manage to connect state legitimacy and the legitimacy of international institutions, as Dworkin intends to do. What place should we leave to state consent? I think this is an important question for any attempt to extend interpretivism to the ambit of international law. Consent is, nowadays, the process through which the vast majority of legal obligations are assumed, extended, modified or extinguished in international law. It plays a role that might be described as analogous to the democratic legislative process in municipal law. In the circumstances of reasonable disagreement, which is wide currency in international politics, the existence of such a process is a moral requirement for the legitimacy of institutions. In this matter, Dworkin’s philosophy of international law is unfortunately silent, but this does not mean we cannot construct a plausible interpretive account of the role of consent in international legal practice. To be sure, I think that this is one of the areas were Christiano did an excellent job and constructed a conception of consent that is consistent, at least in part, with Dworkin’s integrative methodology for interpreting political concepts.
Christiano agrees with Dworkin both in the argument that state consent is an indeterminate concept, so that international law stands in need of “other institutions to fill in the gaps that are left open by agreement-making processes”, and in the Humean argument that the moral significance of consent derives from other abstract principles that make it a valuable process. This does not mean, however, that state consent does not have a role to play in international process: “The role for consent consists in making it possible to experiment with different ways of solving the difficult problems of international society and doing so by means of a process that is accountable to the people subjected to it.” Footnote 121 Furthermore, Christiano is correct to argue that the opposition between mitigation and salience, on the one hand, and consent, on the other hand, is misconceived. Footnote 122 This conclusion seems to be not only correct, but also profoundly coherent with the pull of interpretivism as an intellectual construction. If we are to interpret international law as a fair association of states that regards the lives of the citizens of each state as of equal importance, then we need a process that serves this egalitarian ideal. Interstate negotiation and consent can be “parts of a process that respects persons as equals in the process of making decisions for the international community”, which is the “analog of democracy in the process of making collective decisions for domestic societies.” Footnote 123
On the basis of the morally mandatory aims of international law, Christiano correctly thinks that international law “involves the creation of a new and distinct cosmopolitan society that is to be evaluated on its own distinct norms.” In other words, “we create international law ideally because we see ourselves as part of a larger community that is very incompletely structured.” Footnote 124 It is our duty, therefore, to bind our peoples to norms we all regard as valuable and fair. The question is: how can we do it in a legitimate way? Or, to put it in Christiano’s words: “who gets to shape it? Who gets to determine the rules of international trade, migration, human rights, the distribution of benefits and burdens of environmental law, and the structure of the collective society?” Footnote 125
It would be very difficult to answer these questions here. It would also be hard to answer, for instance, whether Christiano is right when he says that states should look not only for universal treaties that claim global allegiance, but also look, with particular emphasis, for regional laws that could commit them with their neighbors when global consent is still an unachievable goal. Nonetheless, Christiano makes a very important point when he stresses that international politics is struck by indeterminacy of its aims and widespread disagreement among its members. The only possibility of coordination is through a process that is fair and respectful of these constitutional aims.
It seems to be possible, as Christiano argues, to say that norms of jus cogens and pacta sunt servanda—perhaps complemented by other principles such as mitigation and salience, if Dworkin is right—can be assimilated as “something like constitutional norms of the international system as a whole”, i.e., to something like the British constitution that is not announced in written terms. Footnote 126 If this interpretation is right, then state-consent can be understood as “the basic model of ordinary lawmaking for an international system that is bound by certain constitutional norms.” Footnote 127 If this construction is sound, then we can think, “from a moral standpoint”, that “state-consent” can be part of an account of legitimacy that is a “morally bounded system of voluntary association among peoples.” Footnote 128 This reading seems to be, for me, a plausible interpretive conception of the role of consent in international law, one that seems to fit well with Dworkin’s theory of the legitimacy of international institutions.
Mitigation and salience, therefore, would be interpreted as part of the “international constitutional norms”, which might be appropriate to establish the limits of consent and the appropriate conditions for its moral worth, whereas consent can be read as the ordinary process by means of which we can negotiate norms and rules when such negotiation is morally admissible. In other words, we cannot make the morally mandatory aims and norms of international law depend always on state consent. Neither can we, consequently, say that consent itself is the moral basis of international law. State consent’s role in international law is a procedural one. Yet, if we take consent to be a process analogous to democratic lawmaking in municipal law, the moral significance of this process must be based on principles, and it may well be the case that the principles that Dworkin proposed in his philosophy of international law can accomplish this theoretical task.
VI. Conclusion
My conclusion is more optimistic than that of most commentators of Dworkin’s philosophy of international law. Footnote 129 Dworkin’s intent to connect state legitimacy with the legitimacy of international institutions is the only route that is available for his account of political legitimacy and the foundations of law, given that his interpretivism rejects any metaphysical foundation for the morally mandatory aims of international law. If these aims are important and can help us understand the legitimacy of international institutions, they must be established interpretively.
Scarffe’s worry that Dworkin’s State Legitimacy Enhancement Thesis is a concession to political realism is ungrounded as he fails to give enough weight to Dworkin’s interpretivism. Scarffe is regarding state legitimacy as a purely domestic business because he does not consider all the implications of Dworkin’s conception of dignity. The state, for Dworkin, is an association of people who purport to act as a community in which each member recognizes the importance of the dignity of all others, thereby constituting a special form of association in which participants have associative obligations of equal concern and respect. Given that the point of the state is to protect the dignity of its citizens, it must enable them—even when collectively acting as a state in the international society—to acquit their personal responsibilities to the people who live out of the boundaries of their territory. Footnote 130 Scarffe’s failure to read Dworkin with the interpretive method that provides the groundwork for his philosophical project caused him to expect something that from the beginning we knew Dworkin’s philosophy could not offer: a metaphysical foundation for human dignity and for the value of international legitimacy.
Christiano’s objection, in turn, is based on a misunderstanding of Dworkin’s concept of legitimacy, which led him to think that state legitimacy also can be independent from international legitimacy. Christiano’s distinction between a “narrow” and a “broad” version of the principles of mitigation and salience seems to be flawed, since no state can enhance the legitimacy of its laws without also “overcoming the dangers” of a Westphalian concept of sovereignty. The legitimacy of a state depends, in part, on its capacity to allow its citizens fulfill their responsibilities to humanity, and the morally mandatory aims of international law are also morally mandatory aims that the state or any other form of political association, whether actual or hypothetical, has a duty to pursue. The legitimacy of international law is not something that lies beyond state legitimacy, for it is always a duty of each state to improve the legitimacy of international law.
Once we take the unity of value seriously, we should struggle to find the connections between our moral values, including the values that define our personal morality, and the basic principles of our political morality. When interpreted in that way, political morality is able to explain Christiano’s attempt to ground the legitimacy of international institutions on a fair associative model and to provide an interpretive understanding of the value of state consent in international law. If we get rid of the unattractive criticisms that Christiano made against Dworkin’s philosophy of international law and if we read his own theory of international law in an interpretive way, we can realize that it is a wonderful contribution to build a new philosophy of international law, which follows the same road as Dworkin did when he took us apart from the misguided assumption that state consent is itself the basic moral ground for the legitimacy of international law.
