This book may be read from two complementary and enlightening perspectives: as a history of political thought centered on the role played by fear in group formation, and as a theoretical treatise on “negative association,” that is, collective action based on a principle of identification in opposition to others. Both perspectives sustain each other. The first draws attention to a rich and insightful reinterpretation of classical and lesser-known texts. The peculiarity of this history of political thought is that it records not inflection points but continuity and resilience. The second perspective is intended to bring about positive knowledge. This conflation of genres is an appealing facet of the book. In tracing a continuity of thought, Ioannis Evrigenis purports to demonstrate the validity of a theoretical claim about the centrality of negative association. By the same token, the historical exposé lays bare the set of premises that sustains the claim.
The first contribution of this insightful inquiry is to document a common thread running from Thucydides, Aristotle, and Sallust to Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau, with Machiavelli and Hobbes as major moments. Through the lens of a rich, careful, and original analysis, Evrigenis shows that the perception of external threats as crucial to group and state preservation is not the exclusive domain of modern political thought (i.e., starting with Machiavelli and Hobbes). This theme underlies Thucydides's analysis of the rise of Athens in response to the Persian threat. Aristotle acknowledges that the fear of external enemies preserves and reinvigorates the state. Sallust draws the negative implication of this point when he concludes that the destruction of Carthage was the beginning of Rome's decay.
Aristotle and Sallust at times do adopt a moral standpoint and, in this regard, they distinguish themselves from their modern counterparts (p. 43). The important point is that authors writing in different epochal times, in different settings, and under various circumstances acknowledge the element of fear in the constitution of groups. This fact alone testifies to the validity of the claim. Thus, the truth of the metus hostilis (fear of enemy) argument is atemporal. It is independent of time and space. Its content is “universal” (pp. xix, 18, 45). From this perspective, the history of political thought has the value of a theoretical claim. Even critics contribute to the credentials of the claim since in laying out their refutations, they borrow from the arguments that they seek to undermine. Evrigenis's textual exegesis here is illuminating. For instance, he persuasively demonstrates that Gentillet, Bodin, and Botero indirectly confirm the relevance of Machiavelli's insights. Similarly, the “range of reactions to Hobbes's political theory, from Rousseau's vociferous disagreement, through Kant's respectful departure, to Hegel's acceptance” underscores the “potency” of claims regarding the force of negative association (p. 162).
Correlatively, Evrigenis casts his reading of metus hostilis as an argument about the essence of politics. The defining feature of the political lies in an “antagonistic relationship to other entities” (p. 3). Groups “become” political when they develop this relationship (p. 3). It is through the experience of antagonism that individuals identify with others and develop their political identity (p. 2). Hence, the processes at play with regard to negative association are foundational. We are bound to encounter metus hostilis from the moment we enter the realm of politics.
How different is this from Schmitt? Evrigenis takes pains to suggest that Schmitt refers only to extreme cases (p. 4, fn. 4). For Schmitt, according to Evrigenis, the underlying dimension of a conflict becomes political when it involves the notion of an “existential threat.” Yet the parallels are striking. For one thing, both are concerned with a foundational approach aiming at the essence of the phenomenon. Second, the constellations of terms and referents that they set forth have overlapping cardinal points: “enemies,” “threats,” and “fears.” Third—and related to the previous observation—in endorsing the metus hostilis argument, Evrigenis also lends credence to the premises that form the core of Schmitt's anthropology.
This last point deserves close attention. Evrigenis clearly underscores that the metus hostilis argument rests on a conception of human nature marked by the ever-present possibility of conflict and the pervasiveness of fear. Conflict is the regulative horizon of human relations. It is inscribed in the limits of the human condition. It is because others always represent a threat that fear is pervasive (p. 5). Hence, regarding human nature, the theorists of negative association bring us “bad news.” They see human beings in terms best summarized by Schmitt, whom Evrigenis quotes several times to this effect: “All genuine political theories presuppose man to be evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being” (pp. viii, 11, and 165).
A salient characteristic of this anthropology is that it has no place and time: It is atemporal. In laying bare this close connection between negative association and a substantialist conception of human nature, Fear of Enemies indirectly sheds light on the structural logic of the argument. An essentialist approach to politics implies truth claims that elude the vagaries of time and space. The referent needs to be irrevocable. For this purpose, the reference to a human nature defined in terms of inalterable propensities (“dangerous and dynamic being”) is not only apt but required.
Clearly, this book captures a powerful motivation underlying rallying effects, various processes of group emergence in the realm of domestic politics, and alliance formation in the realm of international relations. Precisely because it reveals the significance of this theme with considerable vigor and insight, the book is also an invitation to question further the anthropological premises underpinning the apparent universality of the claim. What grounds the postulate that analyzing the power of negative association implies a conception of human nature defined by reference to definite and irrevocable traits?
Groups vary in their response to external threats. In some cases, they stand firm and restate their collective capacity. In other cases, they yield, collapse, or even legitimize their own subversion. The challenge is to account for this variation. Contra substantialist representations, I would argue that the anthropological conception that best fits the record displayed by such variation is one that hypothesizes malleability within relational and historical contexts. If so, the thrust of the matter is to figure out, and explore, how this malleability gets shaped. Recall Robert Musil who, witnessing the cataclysms of the twentieth century, conceived human beings as fundamentally lacking any “shape” (Gestalt) in the form of essential attributes, and who proposed to view this absence of shape as the only theorem of the human condition (das Theorem der Gestaltlosigkeit).
