There has been a revival of interest in the life and career of Richard Crossman, whom the political commentator Tony Howard (Reference Howard1979) described as one ‘of that select group of politicians . . . who fleetingly bring a glow to the normally grey and dingy skies of British politics’ (p. 9). Victoria Honeyman's (Reference Honeyman2007) cogent review of Crossman's contribution to socialist thought, foreign affairs and the constitution has now been complemented by Stephen Thornton's highly readable and informative account of Crossman's ultimately unsuccessful attempt to ‘break the UK welfare system free from the restriction of [Beveridgean] flat-rate provision’ (p. 22) by means of a more generous earnings-related national superannuation scheme, which aimed to provide the average worker with half pay on retirement.

Utilising Seldon's (Reference Seldon, Marquand and Seldon1996) influential approach to the policy-making process based on the inter-relationship between ideas, individuals, circumstances and interests, Thornton recounts how Crossman devoted himself to the development of a state scheme that would improve the financial circumstances of pensioners. Crossman's initial interest in this area can be traced to a short speech he made, as a member of the National Executive Committee to the Labour Party Conference in 1955, in response to a series of resolutions calling for a sizeable increase in the basic state pension. Drawing on the pioneering work of Abel-Smith and Townsend, Crossman rejected these resolutions, suggesting instead that a new earnings-related scheme would prove to be a better remedy for the shortcomings of Beveridge's flat-rate scheme. Thornton highlights how the unexpectedly warm and enthusiastic response to this speech led to the establishment of an NEC Study Group on Security and Old Age, which subsequently published a pamphlet, entitled National Superannuation: Labour's Policy for Security in Old Age in time for the Party conference in 1957. Although Thornton acknowledges that it was Heclo's (Reference Heclo1974) so-called ‘middle men’ Titmuss, Abel-Smith and Townsend who proved to be ‘the driving force behind the entire document’ (p. 58), he argues that the pivotal role played by Crossman in persuading trade union sceptics and left-wing critics of the advantages of a moderately ‘egalitarian’ earnings-related scheme should not be overlooked.

Although the Labour Party maintained its commitment to national superannuation following their third consecutive post-war General Election defeat in 1959, Thornton notes how the implementation of this plan was becoming increasingly complicated in the period up to the General Election of 1964. Conservative legislation in 1959 had, for example, encouraged a growing number of employees (11.1 million workers by 1963) to join private occupational schemes, thereby increasing the need to devise ever-more elaborate contracting out arrangements from the prospective state scheme. Moreover, there was growing interest within Labour circles regarding Douglas Houghton's ‘rival’ proposal for remedying pensioner poverty, namely, an Inland Revenue administered guaranteed income scheme, which was to feature prominently in the party's 1964 manifesto.

In the latter part of the volume, Thornton explores the reasons why the 1964–70 Labour government failed to introduce a Crossman-style national superannuation scheme or, even make good its manifesto commitment to introduce a guaranteed income for pensioners. These include the adverse economic conditions of the period, the decision to focus on the needs of existing rather than prospective pensioners by increasing flat-rate benefits and the lack of a robust blueprint for the income guarantee scheme. In addition, Thornton draws attention to the negative consequences of Wilson's decision to make Houghton a non-departmental Cabinet ‘overlord’, which made for testy and largely unworkable relationships with Departmental Ministers such as Peggy Herbison, who served as Minister for Pensions (1964–66) and Social Security (1966–67).

National superannuation returned to the top of the policy agenda when Crossman finally succeeded Patrick Gordon Walker (Houghton's successor) as social security supreme in April 1968. (He eventually became Secretary of State of a merged Department of Health and Social Security in late 1968). Importantly, though, the White Paper National Superannuation and Social Insurance published in January 1969 bore the clear imprint of civil service thinking. As Thornton notes, this resulted in a greater willingness to accept, not least by the introduction of less onerous contracting-out rules, that the private insurance sector should continue to play a significant role in pension provision. In consequence, Crossman's initial goal of a generous earnings-related state pension scheme to cover all social classes ran into the buffers.

Thornton reminds us that that Crossman deserves to be recognised as an influential post-war Labour thinker, not least because of his promotion of ‘Marks and Spencer’ socialism, which involves a commitment to the ‘solidaritstic goal of enabling a privilege for a few to become the right of the many’ (p. 171) as opposed to redistribution per se. He also makes a persuasive case for Crossman to be viewed as a welfare pioneer largely on the grounds of his advocacy of mutually supportive forms of private and public pension provision. However, given that private and public welfare ‘accords’ of this kind are contentious and inherently problematic, it would be misleading to conclude that this was necessarily a ‘progressive’ step forward.

Thornton has provided us with a wonderfully erudite and thought-provoking account of Crossman's role in the rise and fall of National Superannuation. It serves to confirm that we are in something of a golden age in terms of contemporary political and historical writing on the post-war welfare state.