The prominence of Seneca in Foucault's work on the care of self stimulated vigorous discussion of selfhood in Seneca, and this book is an invigorating continuation of that discussion. It derives from a conference held in Chicago in 2003 (four of the papers — Inwood, Long, Schiesaro, and part of Gill — have also appeared elsewhere in the meantime). As the editors say in their introduction (3–19), they brought together philosophers, cultural historians and literary critics, who regularly engage with each other's ideas as well as Foucault's.
A central question is what, if anything, was new about Seneca's treatment of the self. A. A. Long, ‘Seneca on the self: why now?’ (20–36), thinks Seneca's psychology is orthodox Stoic, but he shows how Seneca, in the Letters in particular, is concerned with closing the gap between the occurrent self — the actual self of the present moment — and the normative self — the self that one aspires to be. Long suggests that the lack of reference to Roman social and political components of the normative self in the Letters helps to make them particularly accessible to modern readers. Brad Inwood, ‘Seneca and self assertion’ (39–64), argues for a minimalist view, that there is nothing ontologically innovative in Seneca's thinking about the self, and nothing particularly new in his practices of self-fashioning; but there is something distinctive about Seneca's writing about the self, with his emphasis on his own intellectual independence, and his use of himself as an exemplum. Several other contributors, while accepting that there is no ontological innovation, argue that Seneca's imagery must be given greater weight than Inwood allows. Elizabeth Asmis, ‘Seneca on fortune and the kingdom of god’ (115–38), shows how, whereas in earlier Stoicism fortune is what the ignorant invoke to explain the vicissitudes of life, in Seneca fortune is often assimilated to fate, and the wise man must fight against it like a Roman military hero. Catharine Edwards, ‘Free yourself! Slavery, freedom and the self in Seneca's Letters’ (139–59), explores the many, complex ways in which Seneca uses images of freedom and enslavement in his philosophy, and how they can carry a political message for the imperial era. James Ker, ‘Seneca on self-examination: rereading On Anger 3.36’ (160–87), analyses this passage in which Seneca describes how he follows Sextius' example of daily self-examination. Ker argues that for Seneca the use of imagery, much of it anchored in the contemporary socio-political world, is necessary to persuade his Roman readers of the value of the practices that he advocates. In a similar vein Shadi Bartsch, ‘Senecan metaphor and Stoic self-instruction’ (188–217), argues that Seneca's metaphors serve his philosophical purpose, first by redescribing the world and enabling the aspiring Stoic to alter his assent patterns, and secondly by spurring action as well as intellectual reorientation; metaphor, by ‘backing abstract ideas with the force of social and legal necessity’ (216), can encourage the proficiens towards virtue.
Another theme running through the book is the relationship of the tragedies to the philosophy. Christopher Gill, ‘Seneca and selfhood: integration and disintegration’ (65–83), argues that the awareness of inner conflict and self-division found in Seneca's tragic heroines Medea and Phaedra are compatible with, and are probably meant to be examples of, the orthodox Stoic doctrines of the unitary person, the integration of the sage, and the vacillation of the passionate person. Gill suggests that the tensions between Stoic ethics and political pragmatism in Seneca's own experience gave an extra edge to his explorations of psychological unity and disunity. Alessandro Schiesaro, ‘Seneca and the denial of the self’ (221–35), argues that in Thyestes and Medea Seneca gives Atreus and Medea a sense of the multi-layered complexity of their own selves, and that this gives them greater psychological insight and intellectual power than Thyestes or Jason possesses. David Wray, ‘Seneca and tragedy's reason’ (236–54), challenges the view that the tragedies reveal the dark, passionate underside of the human psyche which the philosophical works try to repress. After tracing changing critiques of Seneca's philosophy from the late seventeenth century onwards, Wray argues that in his philosophy (particularly Ep. 48) Seneca maintains that passion must be allowed to present its case with full rhetorical force, in order for philosophy's response to be adequate. Austin Busch, ‘Dissolution of the self in the Senecan corpus’ (255–82), continues Wray's approach to the tragedies, taking the theme of what happens to us after death and the contrasting views that are dramatized in Thyestes and Trojan Women, showing how they vigorously question some of the convictions of the philosophical works. The Apocolocyntosis is another work whose relationship to the philosophical corpus seems rather distant: Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Stoic laughter: a reading of Seneca's Apocolocyntosis’ (84–112), in a paper only loosely linked to the theme of selfhood, asks what kind of laughter is found in Seneca's satire, and how it relates to Stoicism. She argues that the laughter of the Apocolocyntosis is not Stoic, because the work is politically engaged, and expresses unStoic anger and disgust at Claudius. But the disgust also contains within it the seeds of a Stoic devaluation of all political life.
All the papers in this volume offer valuable new insights, and together they should provoke continued discussion of the many facets of selfhood in Seneca.
