One of the most important problems in the study of international relations concerns the understanding of the ways in which states and leaders assess the actions, capabilities, and intentions of potential adversaries. The general assumption is that better understanding between adversaries tends to make conflict less likely. The effectiveness of deterrence, for example, depends largely on whether each side is fully aware of the threats from the other and perceives those threats as credible. And many scholars argue that wars are more likely when the parties involved lack complete information and have misperceptions about the other’s interests and capabilities. Recent American intelligence failures, such as the inability to understand the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction in 2003, suggest that even states with the most sophisticated intelligence systems often fall short in assessing enemy threats.
In Knowing the Adversary, Keren Yarhi-Milo has made an important contribution to our understanding of this problem. The book focuses on two critical but narrow questions: How do leaders assess the intentions of their adversaries? And how are their assessments different from those of the intelligence agencies and officials whose job it is to conduct just such analysis?
To explain how these two groups make their assessments differently, Yarhi-Milo proposes a model she calls the selective attention thesis. According to her thesis, decision makers tend to make decisions based on information that is particularly vivid, especially from personal impressions they gather from private interactions with the adversary’s leaders; and leaders’ interpretation of signals and information they receive will be strongly influenced by their own preconceptions. Intelligence organizations, on the other hand, tend to have considerable expertise in analyzing the military capabilities and inventories of the enemy; and when estimating adversary intentions, they will tend to default to what they know, and estimate intentions based on enemy capabilities.
This thesis challenges two common assumptions in the international relations literature. The first assumption is that only those actions that are “costly” to the state undertaking them will be taken seriously by other states. Behavior that costs nothing—cheap talk, including, presumably, statements given privately by one leader to another—will be ignored, because it offers no significant insight into a state’s interests or intentions. The second assumption is that states will behave as unitary actors when making assessments about enemy intentions. In a unitary state, decision makers and intelligence agencies would not be expected to use different kinds of information in making judgments.
Yarhi-Milo tests her selective attention thesis against three existing theses that have been used to explain how states perceive intentions: based on the enemy’s capabilities, on their strategic military doctrine, or on their current and past actions. The four theses are tested using three historical cases: British assessments of the intentions of Nazi Germany in the 1930s, U.S. assessments of Soviet intentions during the Carter administration, and U.S. assessments of the Soviets during the second Reagan administration as the Cold War neared its end.
She finds that in each of these cases, the analytic lenses used by decision makers and intelligence agencies were very different. Decision makers, in estimating their adversaries’ intentions, relied heavily on costless information—not the costly signals that traditional theories would expect—and in particular on insights they gained from personal interactions with the adversary’s leaders. Intelligence communities, on the other hand, relied on the adversary’s military capabilities as the strongest indicator of intentions. As a result, in most cases, intelligence assessments about intentions had little effect on the perceptions of civilian decision makers.
Yarhi-Milo’s findings are unlikely to come as a surprise to specialists in intelligence or foreign policy analysis. It has often been noted that national leaders tend to make assessments about other states based more on their personal interactions with their counterparts than on the reports they receive from intelligence agencies. Before Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for example, the American intelligence community warned that an attack was imminent, but President George H. W. Bush preferred to listen to the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, who all assured him that the crisis could be resolved short of war (see Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., Dealing With Dictators, 2006, p. 199). But the value of this book is in its well-developed case studies, based on extensive archival research as well as interviews.
For international relations theory, Knowing the Adversary shows the limits of the literature on costly signaling and emphasizes the importance of the individual level and Kenneth Waltz’s first image of analysis. In particular, the case studies highlight the importance of diplomacy, emotions, and personal interactions between leaders—factors that tend to be overlooked in IR scholarship today.
The book offers a counterpoint to the “why hawks win” argument, which holds that leaders tend to exaggerate the evil intentions of their adversaries and to be overly confident about their own capabilities, all of which serves to make wars more likely to begin and more difficult to end (see Daniel Kahneman and Jonathan Renshon, “Why Hawks Win,” Foreign Policy [January/February 2007]: 34–38). Instead, Yarhi-Milo demonstrates that as a result of personal interactions with their counterparts, national leaders may develop assessments that are significantly more benign than the assessments they receive from their intelligence staffs.
The author does not address the question concerning who is more often correct in assessing intentions, but her study suggests that personal diplomacy and personal impressions can sometimes help reduce hostility and encourage cooperation. At times, of course, as in Britain in the 1930s, those more benign assessments of leaders may turn out to be wrong. But at other times, such as during Ronald Reagan’s second term as president, the views of leaders such as Reagan and his secretary of state, George Shultz, may be closer to the mark than those of the intelligence community. Yarhi-Milo convincingly demonstrates that American intelligence agencies’ focus on Soviet capabilities during the 1980s, and their tendency to overestimate those capabilities, made their assessments of Soviet intentions excessively pessimistic (p. 227); as a result, the intelligence community was slow to recognize the often costly signals being sent by Mikhail Gorbachev and to realize the significance of the changes under way in the Soviet Union.
Intelligence officials have long complained that policymakers fail to pay enough attention to them, and this book will only reinforce those concerns. Yarhi-Milo notes, for example, that neither Jimmy Carter nor Reagan heeded the National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) or other assessments they received (p. 246). But the book helps us understand why decision makers often fail to listen to intelligence, and it suggests that intelligence agencies should put additional effort into understanding the information needs of the leaders they support. Yarhi-Milo suggests that “personal intelligence briefings or intelligence reports that contain anecdotes or vivid information may catch the attention of decision makers more than the often-dull NIEs” (p. 253).
Intelligence is an increasingly important subject for discussion in public affairs and foreign policy today, but it remains an understudied aspect of international relations. Knowing the Adversary is a much-needed contribution toward filling that gap.
