Robert Dodaro's Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Saint Augustine is more than the most important book-length study of the City of God since Robert Markus' Saeculum several decades ago now, though it is that. It is also important precisely because it eschews contemporary theological argumentation and lets Augustine speak for himself. The fact that crusaders (ancient and contemporary), pacifists (mostly contemporary) and just-war advocates have all found solace for their political theology in Augustine's pages suggests that the stakes are high even before we open the book. Dodaro's best service may be that he lets the City of God be about what it purports to be about – Christ, and the just society that is founded only in him.
Dodaro's first chapter feels most like the dissertation this once was, under Rowan Williams at Oxford. Here he argues that the importance of Cicero's De Re Publica has been understated in the scholarship. That work provides a philosophical foundation that allows Augustine to argue with critics of the political impact of Christianity on Rome both in the City of God and in his voluminous correspondence. Augustine also argues with Cicero, especially on the nature and aim of civic virtues and on the role of the statesman. For Augustine, the ancient pagan virtues are all transformed radically in Christ. He agrees with Cicero that the orator-statesman should have practical erudition, the ability to seek ascetic wisdom and to tell of the fruits of his learning to the people, in order to pacify their fears and weave them into a harmonious civic whole. The crucial difference for Augustine is that Rome not only is not now, but never has been, a republic, as he famously argues in book 2 of the City of God. For the ideal statesman and orator is Christ, whose oratory and justice alone can heal the effects of original sin upon humanity so that people can know and love God. Without Christ there can be no justice.
Dodaro's second chapter feels like a mini-commentary on the first half of the City of God. He suggests Augustine writes there not about political structures on a large scale, but rather about the soul, writ-large. That is, the ignorance and weakness that are the result in humanity of original sin make it impossible for us to know God, ourselves or others with any clarity (Dodaro insists against the scholarly grain on the noetic damage of original sin for Augustine, not just its effect on the will.) God's grace remedies our ills by its appearance in the form of mystery in the scriptures and humility in Christ, puncturing our proud self-reliance. In a particularly strong section, Dodaro details Augustine's distinction between Roman praise of optimi viri, ‘most excellent men’, with their love of praise and glory, and Christian martyrs, whose love is for truth and justice, who seek not immortality through heroism in war but look forward by faith to a reward they cannot see as they die anonymously and in ignominy in imitation of Christ.
Dodaro's third chapter describes Augustine's effort to ‘create a new religious myth’ over against Cicero's Roman one (p. 112). Here Dodaro details how Augustine's polemical combat with the Pelagians pushes him to clarify the manner in which Christ differs from the saints, with important effects on the City of God. For the Pelagians are confident that Christ's holiness can be imitated by the believer, as the saints in scripture and church history testify. For Augustine, in contrast, Christ's two natures are utterly unique, as the divine nature mediates grace through the human to the rest of his body, the church. Augustine elevates Christ with his insistence that virtue comes only from his grace and demotes the saints from a position akin to heroism for Pelagius to one in which it is their humility and forgiveness of others that distinguishes them as most fully Christian. Over against proud Pelagians and pagans alike, Augustine holds that true virtue comes only from God, who can be known only imperfectly. Therefore the forgiveness of which believers are in constant need should be shared with others. For Dodaro's Augustine, ‘the just society is penitential’ (p. 112).
If Christ is Augustine's statesman, scripture is Augustine's oratory. The scriptures convey grace to the soul of hearers so they can move towards a divine wisdom, or ‘sapiential eloquence’, about a mystery that can never be fully understood (p. 140). This fourth chapter could serve on its own as a fine introduction to Augustine's biblical hermeneutics, for we see here both Augustine's characteristic exegetical moves and bounteous examples of particular readings. For Augustine, God never speaks directly, lest people think they can apprehend God directly or easily. Rather, God speaks in figures. Learning to reconcile the conflicting literal meanings of scripture is itself part and parcel of the sweat of Adam's brow required of humanity in the fall. Through this struggle to harmonise the disparity in scripture, knowledge is begrudgingly gained until the reader learns to glimpse the divine nature just beyond our apprehension, in light of which all of scripture's particulars ought to be interpreted.
Dodaro next returns to the Pelagian polemical subtext of Augustine's hermeneutics and view of the just society. He draws a distinction against his opponents between an example and a sacrament. The cry of dereliction is an example for us to follow, of confessing our sin and receiving God's justice. But Jesus’ refusal of Mary's attempted embrace is a sacrament. It confounds literal sense (what does it mean?) and shows our need not only for an example, but for God to instill in us the grace to overcome pride and grow in virtue. Yet this distinction between example and sacrament is only as sharp as that between the humanity and divinity of Christ – they are distinguished only to be united in one person. This complex view of biblical interpretation is far richer than the Pelagian insistence that scripture gives information on how to behave. Dodaro's Augustine counters: even to do the law of the Decalogue requires that we know and love God – and that's hard, or even impossible. Yet this very difficulty is key to the Christian community that is Augustine's primary subject in City of God. Christian judges must see in their adjudged a fellow sinner for whom proper knowledge of God is not more difficult, who is no more in need of pardon than he. On this account clemency is justice – and Roman notions of justice are in for serious challenge.
Yet neither Christian judges nor any other person can imitate Christ perfectly – as only Christ is perfect, and cannot actually repent, as sinners must. In contrast to Cicero's optimates, Christian exemplars are confessors of their sins, and those who know their grasp of divine knowledge remains ever partial. Dodaro reads Augustine's rather infamous praise of Emperor Theodosius in book 5 of City of God in this light: the ideal ruler must be suspicious of praise of him, willing to do public penance, slow to punish and inclined to pardon only to reform (not for licence). Augustine names Paul as his only optimus vir, since he insists that his weakness is genuine strength, as he confesses past sin in intimate detail and insists on humility as the outgrowth of piety, rather than glory. In Augustine's correspondence he fires back at the polemical claim that Christian non-violence and praise for mercy will weaken the empire against its enemies. On the contrary: employ Christian politics and the empire will only grow stronger. For only mercy can change sinners into lovers of virtue; only Christ can grant suspension of humanity's natural fear of death. A good ruler will, like Theodosius, repress pagan cults – for only with Christianity is forgiveness possible, without which social cohesion is unthinkable. With these sorts of comments we can all see medieval Christendom anticipated. Yet Dodaro adds Augustine's more puzzling political pronouncements: only Christ could rightly apply the death penalty, as one without sin himself who could throw the first stone (but, alas, did not). Clemency is no dereliction of a judge's duty, but its highest instantiation. A good ruler should indeed assist his subjects in loving God truly. He must also remember that to offer God thanks and praise is the most political of acts – for it shows humanity's ultimate dependence on Christ for all goodness. The best steps towards ruling well would be to pray and do penance, for only so can the faith, hope and love necessary to rule well or do anything virtuous increase.
To read Dodaro is to remember that Augustine offers precious little for those of us desperate for direct advice on how to survive in liberal democracies. No worry – for he offers a wealth about the church and the soul's reformation in Christ for the instantiation of true justice.
