The vast literature on the welfare states in the rich capitalist world has begun to grow stale in the more than two decades since the appearance of Gøsta Esping-Andersen's landmark Three Worlds of Welfare in 1990. The conventional narrative has long held that the social democratic welfare states of Northern Europe are the most generous and universal, and have the biggest impact in reducing poverty and inequality, followed closely by the continental European welfare states (the “Christian democratic” states, in Esping-Andersen's terminology), with the liberal democratic welfare states bringing up the rear (both in terms of overall generosity, universality, and in poverty reduction), and the United States at the bottom. This is the conventional wisdom. The mechanisms that produce these comparative differences—left party strength, political-institutional factors, cultural differences, and so forth—remain debated, but those debates have taken place within increasingly narrow boundaries.
In their fresh and compelling new book, Wealth and Welfare States, Irwin Garfinkel, Lee Rainwater, and Timothy Smeeding offer the most original and challenging assessment to date of the framework of Esping-Andersen and his colleagues. The book confirms some of the wisdom of the conventional narrative with new evidence, but challenges it in many interesting and important ways. The authors throw down the gauntlet in insisting on a fundamental reconceptualization of the welfare state itself, which leads to a number of genuinely new interpretations about both the American welfare state specifically and cross-national differences in welfare state effort. The book draws extensively upon household-level data from the Luxembourg Income Study (the remarkable data set that the authors have played key roles in developing) to provide new estimates of the redistributive effects of welfare state programs.
At the center of the authors' rethinking of existing theories of the welfare state is a careful and thoughtful argument that both public education and publicly subsidized private benefits (most notably pensions and health) should be included in our understandings of the welfare state. The typical exclusion of public education in the way the welfare state is conceptualized is, upon reflection, something of a puzzle. Early social reformers and welfare state institution builders included ignorance (alongside poverty, crime, poor public health, and social dislocation) as one of the central ills of modern industrial societies, requiring redress through the public sector. Public education is both redistributive and universal, and prepares individuals to enter the labor market in ways that are entirely analogous to more conventional welfare state programs, such as job training programs. For all of these reasons, treating it as part of the welfare state ensemble is entirely appropriate.
The inclusion of subsidized private benefits is somewhat more controversial, but here again the blurriness between public and private, and the entirely comparable impacts, renders problematic the typical sharp distinction between the two. When governments (most notably, of course, the United States) turn to private insurance schemes to solve social problems, and they subsidize those schemes, they are engaged in one kind of policymaking that can be contrasted to schemes that rely entirely on public benefits to address the same issue.
Having proposed this reconceptualization of the welfare state, the authors then raise four questions: 1) How and in what ways should we rethink the timing, sequencing, and generosity of the American welfare state in comparative perspective? 2) How do welfare states differ in terms of scale and design of their welfare states? 3) How much do the different welfare states in 14 rich countries redistribute income at the household level? And, 4) what is the impact of welfare states on growth? On each issue, they offer new and exciting observations and analyses and the empirical work they present is careful, thorough, and a model of first-rate social science. Of particular note, the authors generally provide estimates that are based on traditional or conventional ways of understanding the welfare state, alongside their newer model. This allows readers to see clearly how their model compares and the differences are often illuminating.
Starting with the question about the “exceptional” American welfare state, the authors propose that America's early commitment to public education raises doubts about the “laggard” image that dominates the existing literature on the history of the welfare state. The idea that public schools can serve as the tool to solve difficult social problems has been a long-standing and popular view in American political culture. For much of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the United States was indeed a world leader in education, although that advantage has disappeared in recent decades. Another valuable insight the authors provide about the history of the American welfare state and its exceptional character is that both in terms of effort and outcomes on most dimensions, the United States was much closer to its competitors until the contemporary era of rising inequality began. This account does not deny US exceptionalism, but puts it in a very different light than previous scholarship has provided.
Another point about the American welfare state that becomes crystal clear in the book is that even though total spending (public and private, plus education) places the United States somewhere near the mean of the 14 countries examined, the redistributive impact of this spending is far less. Private social insurance turns out to be far less redistributive than public programs and, particularly in the case of health care, much less efficient. The problem of American health care, the authors are at pains to emphasize, is not an overall lack of spending effort but a grossly inefficient overall system, combined with an unequal distribution of care that produces subpar results.
Having provided a thorough reexamination of the welfare state from top to bottom, the authors seemingly cannot resist turning to a political sociology of the welfare state to try to understand how and why the American welfare state is different from its European competitors. Here, I am less persuaded about the success of the project. No breakthoroughs will be found in this section. A large number of factors, widely discussed in previous studies (the absence of a feudal past, immigration, the importance of the “American creed,” and Protestantism), are rolled out to account for the historic patterns. The role of race and ethnic divisions is mentioned, but treated with relatively little care or insight. The recent period of conservative ascendance is described in some detail, but here, too, no new ground is broken. The policy recommendations are solid, persuasive, but unexceptional (and, somewhat unfortunately, the book was completed right before the 2010 health-care legislation, and so this critical piece of the future of the American welfare state was not subjected to scrutiny here).
Despite the lack of a compelling political analysis, Wealth and Welfare States is a wonderful book. The authors have produced the most important comparative study of the welfare state in quite some time. It is a book that should be read, examined, and debated by all students of the welfare state. It is a very American work, in that it both views and answers important questions from the standpoint of contemporary debates where the welfare state is under attack and in highlighting the role of education (which has always had a unique and broader mission in the United States than most other places). At the same time, by putting education at the center of the analysis, Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding provide welfare state defenders new tools to engage public debates. Whatever the future of the welfare state might be, the analyses and interpretations of this study deserve wide and sustained attention.
