On April 13, 2018, Massachusetts Governor Charlie Baker signed “An Act Relative to Criminal Justice Reform” into law. The goliath legislation package included a much anticipated provision allowing for parole for two categories of prisoners: those who are terminally ill and those who are permanently incapacitated. In Buckman v. Commissioner of Correction, two incarcerated persons, Joseph Buckman and Peter Cruz (“appellants”), filed petitions for medical parole under the new statute.Footnote 1 The correctional facility superintendents (“superintendents”) who received appellants' medical parole petitions rejected and returned the petitions because they did not contain “medical parole plans.”Footnote 2 Treating the superintendents' refusal to review either petition as a final agency action, appellants sought certiorari with the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County (“SJC”) “asserting claims for mandamus, injunctive, and declaratory relief.”Footnote 3
The Commissioner of the Department of Correction (“Commissioner”), Carol Micci, argued that the superintendents in receipt of “incomplete” petitions have statutory authority to return them because “incomplete petitions cannot be properly evaluated.” The Commissioner further argued petitions are incomplete unless they contain a medical parole plan and a physician's written diagnosis. The Commissioner's position is a reiteration of non-promulgated Department of Correction's (“DOC” or “Department”) policies which were later converted into “emergency regulations” during the course of this litigation.Footnote 4 Appellant's contested Executive Office of Public Safety and Security (“EOPSS”) and the Department's faulty reading of the statute, claiming the Department improperly placed the burden of medical parole plan preparation and procurement of a physician's diagnosis on the petitioner in direct contravention of the medical parole statue.Footnote 5 Appellants Buckman and Cruz asserted that the statute places the burden of preparing medical parole plans on the superintendent, not the prisoner seeking parole.Footnote 6 Furthermore, appellants asserted that the statute does not give the superintendent authority to reject a petition for filing.Footnote 7 The statute's clear language proclaiming the superintendent “shall consider a prisoner for medical parole upon [receipt of] a written petition” supports this assertion.Footnote 8 Finally, appellants contested the validity of an EOPSS regulation denying petitioners access to the superintendent's recommendation that is transmitted to the commissioner after the initial petition reviewFootnote 9
Ultimately, the SJC found that no matter what the perceived deficiency in the petition, the superintendent has no right to reject a medical parole petition for inadequacy or incompleteness.Footnote 10 According to the SJC, the power to reject a medical parole petition is squarely placed in the hands of the Department under the statute. The SJC also found the EOPSS regulations improperly placed the burden of producing a medical parole plan and physician diagnosis on the petitioner.Footnote 11 Finally, the Court rejected the claim that medical parole petitioners are entitled to see the superintendent's recommendation, but held that it would be fundamentally unfair, and thus “arbitrary and capricious,” to deny petitioners access to supporting documents in the possession of the superintendent like the medical parole plan or the physician's diagnosis.Footnote 12
I. MEDICAL PAROLE IN MASSACHUSETTS
Compassionate release, or medical parole, is a program that permits early release of “terminally ill” or “permanently incapacitated” prisoners.Footnote 13 Medical parolees, like all other parolees, must abide by terms of release or else face arrest and potential reimprisonment.Footnote 14 On April 13, 2018, Governor Charlie Baker signed a 121-page criminal justice reform bill containing policy changes designed to make the Massachusetts incarceration system more “humane.”Footnote 15 The bill contained a long-awaited medical parole statute—making Massachusetts the forty-ninth state to enact such a program.Footnote 16 Attorney General Maura Healy praised the criminal justice overhaul as “putting justice in our criminal justice system and getting it right.”Footnote 17 Unfortunately, that promise rang empty for hundreds of terminally ill and permanently incapacitated Massachusetts prisoners counting on a sensible regulatory scheme around the new medical parole law.
The impetus for a Compassionate Release program is clear—Massachusetts is experiencing an aging prison population crisis, and the cost of caring for elderly prisoners is three times more expensive than the provision of health care to prisoners under the age of fifty.Footnote 18 However, for legislators promoting the program, cost was not the chief consideration. For instance, Massachusetts State Representative Mary S. Keefe believes that letting aging prisoners, specifically those who do not present a risk to public safety due to their infirmed or permanently incapacitated state, receiving parole is simply “the compassionate thing to do.”Footnote 19
Not all Massachusetts politicians greeted the law with enthusiasm. Governor Charlie Baker expressed reservations regarding the inclusion of prisoners with first-degree murder or sex offender convictions—persons more likely to age in prison due to longer sentences.Footnote 20 The Governor's reluctance likely underlies the EOPSS slow rollout of the program.Footnote 21 The bill named EOPSS as the agency in charge of promulgating regulations for the medical parole program, and EOPSS failed to promulgate any regulations until a full year and three months after the law's passage.Footnote 22 Those flawed regulations are the subject of the SJC's opinion in Buckman.
II. UNLAWFUL REJECTION OF PETITIONS AND IMPROPER BURDEN SHIFTING
The medical parole evaluation process, according to G.L. c. 127, § 119A, contains three phases: (1) filing of the petition; (2) review of the petition; and (3) rendering of a decision.Footnote 23 The chief procedural issues presented in Buckman, and the focus of this case comment, fall within the first phase.Footnote 24 In the filing phase, a “terminally ill” or “permanently incapacitated” prisoner (or the prisoner's lawyer, next of kin, prison medical provider, or Department staff) submits a written medical parole petition.Footnote 25 The statute defines “permanent incapacitation” as “a physical or cognitive incapacitation that appears irreversible, as determined by a licensed physician, and that is so debilitating that the prisoner does not pose a public safety risk.”Footnote 26 Upon receipt of the written petition the superintendent of the correctional institution in which the incarcerated person resides “shall” evaluate the petition within twenty-one days and transmit a recommendation to the Department Commissioner for review. The statute requires transmission regardless of the substance of the superintendent's report. In other words, even if the superintendent does not believe the prisoner is a candidate for medical parole, he or she must transmit his or her evaluation to the commissioner. Appellants in this case both filed for release under this statute due to their status as “permanently incapacitated” prisoners.Footnote 27
Along with the recommendation, the superintendent must send the Commissioner: (1) an individualized medical parole plan for the petitioner; (2) a physician's written diagnosis; and (3) a risk assessment of the petitioner. A “medical parole plan” is a “written medical and psychosocial care plan specific to a prisoner” detailing: “(i) the [prisoner's] proposed course of treatment; (ii) the proposed site for treatment and post-treatment care; (iii) documentation that medical providers qualified to provide the medical services identified in the medical parole plan are prepared to provide such services; and (iv) the financial program in place to cover the cost of the plan for the duration of the medical parole[.]”Footnote 28
Appellants in this case complied with the statutory filing requirements in G.L. c. 127, § 119A. In January of 2019, Attorney Ruth Greenberg filed two separate petitioners on behalf of Mr. Buckman and Mr. Cruz. Mr. Buckman is incarcerated in the Assisted Daily Living unit at MCI Norfolk. He only has one lung, suffers from lung cancer, Crohn's disease, nearly uncontrollable diarrhea, and cataracts. Mr. Buckman cannot walk without using a walker.Footnote 29 Unfortunately, Mr. Cruz died during the course of litigation on September 9, 2019.Footnote 30 Before his passing, Mr. Cruz was incarcerated at MCI Shirley and suffered from end-stage renal disease for which he underwent dialysis treatment three times a week.Footnote 31 Mr. Cruz also suffered from diabetes, advanced cardiac disease, degenerative joint-disease, and was a stroke victim with right-sided weakness, impaired verbal communication, and decreased motor functioning–before his death he was “barely able to grasp a pencil or spoon.”Footnote 32
Citing non-promulgated Department of Corrections Medical Parole Policy, superintendents Steven Silva of MCI Norfolk and Colette Goguen of MCI Shirley refused to accept Mr. Buckman's and Mr. Cruz's petitions.Footnote 33 In so doing, the superintendent Silva explained that it was Mr. Buckman's responsibility to submit a medical parole plan with “documentation that medical providers qualified to provide the medical services identified in the medical parole plan are prepared to provide such services.”Footnote 34 Superintendent Goguen demanded the same of Mr. Cruz in addition to a physician's written diagnosis.Footnote 35 Mr. Cruz noted in his petition that all of his medical records were under the control of the Department and Boston Medical Center—but superintendent Goguen refused to accept that in lieu of the physician's written diagnosis.Footnote 36 Recognizing the policy's inconsistency with the enabling statute, Mr. Buckman and Mr. Cruz filed for relief from compliance under G. L. c. 249, § 4.Footnote 37
During the course of litigation, EOPSS promulgated “emergency” regulations which largely mirrored the Department's violative internal policy.Footnote 38 According to EOPSS regulations, if a petition for medical parole does not contain a medical parole plan and a physician's written diagnosis, the superintendent is permitted to reject the medical parole petition and return the petition to the prisoner to request the “missing” documents.Footnote 39 The Buckman case hinged on two main issues: (1) does the statute allow for the superintendent to reject a petition for “incompleteness;” and (2) does the petitioner bear the burden of preparing a medical parole plan and securing a physician's written diagnosis?Footnote 40 The Court answered both questions in the negative, thereby invalidating all EOPSS regulations improperly burdening medical parole petitioners with the responsibility of preparing a medical parole plan or including a physician's written diagnosis and any regulations giving power to the superintendent to refuse “incomplete” petitions.Footnote 41
The Court easily dismissed the notion that the superintendent may use his or her discretion to hold back a medical parole petition. Relying on the plain language of the statute, “the superintendent shall consider a prisoner for medical parole” upon receipt of a “written petition” and “shall” transmit his or her recommendation for release no more than twenty-one days after receipt,” the Court noted that the statute did not afford the superintendent discretion to dispose of a petition at any point of the medical parole application process.Footnote 42 In actuality, so long as a petition is in written form and signed by an authorized entity the superintendent must review said petition and transmit his recommendation to the Commissioner.Footnote 43
The Court determined that the written petition is the only document the prisoner is responsible for preparing, and that the word “petition” cannot be read to include the medical parole plan or the written diagnosis.Footnote 44 Prisoners covered by this statute have limited access to the outside world making it virtually impossible for them to prepare a medical parole plan and secure a written diagnosis within a twenty-one day period.Footnote 45 The Court remarked that preparing a medical parole plan is a “ formidable task for even a young and healthy prisoner” and that the “legislature did not intend to place this burden on those so poorly able to bear it.”Footnote 46 By process of elimination, the court deduced that the only entity left to prepare the medical parole plan and secure the written diagnosis is the superintendent.Footnote 47 The Department already curates medical care plans for “regular” parolees on a daily basis, thereby boosting the Court's confidence that the legislature intended for the Department to bear this burden.
While twenty-one days is a tight timeline to arrange a comprehensive medical care plan, the reason for doing so is obvious. The legislature wrote the statute for persons living on their own tight timeline. Therefore, any meaningful effect in the realm of cost-savings or compassion depends on the Department following a swift schedule. The Buckman court did more than just clarify the invalidity of regulations, it revived the statute giving the Commonwealth a fighting chance to, in Attorney General Healey words, inject “justice” into the “criminal justice system.”Footnote 48
III. THE FUTURE OF COMPASSIONATE RELEASE IN THE COMMONWEALTH
The Department is reviewing the decision and has not yet substantively commented about the invalidated regulations.Footnote 49 Advocates expect the number of petitions processed and medical parole eligible prisoners released to increase, but the size and scope of the increase will be unclear until next year when EOPSS files their statutorily-required status report to the legislature. At a glance, one of the most vulnerable points is the risk of biased medical opinions negatively affecting the success of prisoners' petitions. The Department's health care services provider is a private company called WellPath, formerly Correct Care Solutions.Footnote 50 While WellPath is an independent company, the Department wields a lot of power over their day to day activities.Footnote 51 Furthermore, WellPath has a financial incentive to abide by the explicit and subtle pressures of the Department as they subsist on a termed contract. Additionally, WellPath has a reputation for substandard care indicating the likelihood of inadequate diagnosis procedures even without hypothetical pressure from the Department.Footnote 52 Prison health care advocates must continue to monitor the petitions for bias in diagnosis. The potential for skewed diagnoses presents a challenge to both the medical parol law and medical ethics.Footnote 53
The Buckman jurisprudence has already taken hold in a recent lower court decision. In Mahdi v. Department of Correction, citing and heavily relying on the SJC's findings in Buckman, the Massachusetts's Superior Court found that Commissioner Micci abused her discretion in denying petitioner Mahdi's request for medical parole and ordered the petitioner released.Footnote 54 The Department filed a motion for reconsideration. More litigation is surely to follow.
