Gregory Bruce Smith's new book seeks to rescue both republicanism and political philosophy. Republicanism is threatened by moral relativism, the bureaucratization of life, and technology that operates free from moral and political constraints, while the threat to political philosophy comes from “‘constructivist’ political theory—which either starts in midair or constructs its own foundations ex nihilo,” which began with Descartes and culminated in Nietzsche and Heidegger (40). The threats are related, Smith claims, in that constructivism proceeds from a “self-legislating ego” that wills abstractly and finds no need for political participation (41). Smith admires both ancient and modern republicanism: he champions the civic dedication and striving for excellence of the former, and the foundation for the dignity of all and the individual rights of the latter. He exaggerates the homogeneity of ancient Greek republics, ignoring disagreements about justice between rich and poor. But he cogently notes the danger that modern technological science poses for republicanism, as well as the hedonism and cosmopolitanism that tend to result from that science. We live without senses of honor and solidarity that can flourish when our activity is focused on a particular res publica.
According to Smith, “the phenomena of life itself must always be our philosophical point of departure” (43). Those phenomena present themselves to us in a particular res publica. But we need a fixed point—what is often called “nature” or “being”—in order to make sense of the ever-changing phenomena. How do we arrive at that point? He poses two alternatives: either intuition allows us to escape the present and engage in atemporal, theoretical contemplation; or we always begin with a particular relation to past, present, and future, and reach the goal “in some mediated or dialectical fashion” that never completely leaves the res publica behind (46). The former is the misguided approach of Aristotle, which Smith calls “staring”; the latter is the approach of Plato and Cicero, which Smith calls “caring” because all action always aims at the good and “we can never simply emancipate ourselves from the hierarchy of goods of our res publica” (48, 61). But why should Smith thus oppose dialectic (caring) to contemplation (staring)? In Plato's Republic, doesn't dialectic serve as the ultimate subject for philosophers to master before they can contemplate the forms? Smith's best reply is, “Linking the two realms [of phenomena and atemporal realities] becomes problematic” (331n15). He oddly interprets Plato's cave not as a place where falsity prevails, but as a home where we must strive to remain if we hope for true transcendence in search of wisdom. “All speech is always public speech that presents itself before the fact in a publicly shared space” (54). But if Smith does not reject the distinction between public and private, he at least mistakes the starting point for the result. He takes the difficult-to-deny premise that language is social in origin and draws the unfounded conclusion that private speech should be philosophically insignificant. This reasoning leads him to the claim, “The truth of architectonic political philosophy is its … ultimately public persuasiveness” (63). How could Plato or Cicero agree that truth is what most or all people can be persuaded of?
Smith devotes seven chapters to Cicero, philosopher and practitioner of republicanism, because Cicero shows us how to understand the relation between philosophy and public discourse. Most scholars regard Cicero as belonging to the New Academy, a development from Plato's school that took a skeptical approach and saw probability as the highest achievable degree of truth. Smith questions the internal consistency of the New Academy: How can one have knowledge of probabilities if one cannot have certain knowledge of anything? Moreover, skepticism does not allow the establishment of a cosmology, which is necessary for psychology, which in turn is necessary for ethics and political science. Smith sees Cicero as “a Platonist, if we understand Plato as a phenomenologist and dialectician, not as an idealist or metaphysician” (91). Smith exaggerates when he says that Cicero “almost never says anything in his own name” in his philosophical works, but he rightly emphasizes Cicero's desire to teach by regularly hiding his own thoughts and making his readers think for themselves (84).
In cosmology, according to Smith, Cicero is primarily concerned to oppose materialism. In natural theology, he argues that Cicero attempts to form a rational faith with a providential divinity but sees the limits of reason in solving the mysteries of life; thus Cicero begins not from proof of the existence of a divinity but from the necessity of piety, the need for humans to understand and revere something greater than themselves. But does Cicero believe in the existence of a divinity, and, if so, does he believe on the ground that we need for one to exist? Smith is at his most speculative here. He calls Christianity “a rational religion” because it solves problems such as the relation between mind and matter (172).
In ethics, Smith properly observes that Cicero is not a Stoic because he does not base virtue primarily on intention. But Smith is so concerned not to separate theoretical from practical wisdom that he errantly claims that Cicero, when speaking of wisdom, almost always uses prudentia, “prudence.” In fact Cicero often uses sapientia, which can mean theoretical wisdom. He is not so dismissive of contemplation as Smith thinks. Smith is more convincing when he characterizes Cicero's ethics as combining duty and honor with liberty, equality, and even individual rights. On the matter of rights, he could have bolstered his case by consulting chapter 4 of Jed W. Atkins's Cicero on Politics and the Limits of Reason: The “Republic” and “Laws” (Cambridge University Press, 2013). In oratory, if Cicero considers philosophy to be as inseparable from a res publica as Smith claims, why does Cicero choose a private instead of a public setting for the dialogue On the Orator, his primary work on oratory? To his credit, however, Smith is regularly attentive to the dramatic details of Cicero's dialogues. In politics, Smith shows that for Cicero institutional reform is no substitute for education and the formation of character. In explaining the dream of Scipio in On the Republic, however, Smith overlooks Cicero's point that contemplation will hasten the process by which the soul comes to enjoy the rewards of the afterlife.
A brief chapter on Nietzsche follows, with Smith blaming him for encouraging his philosophers to use deception and withdraw from public life to rule indirectly. And Nietzsche would destroy a rational religion. In his conclusion, Smith argues that individual rights must be defended with a view to self-development, not as ends in themselves. Yet he would have the self-control that he promotes occur by public persuasion rather than by legal constraint. Such public persuasion should recognize a hierarchy of ends worth pursuing—“followed by social contempt for those who pursue the vulgar” (316).
In sum, in Political Philosophy and the Republican Future Smith offers an admirable concern for republicanism and a challenging—if not always convincing—interpretation of Cicero.
