The Derg, Ethiopia’s military government (1974–91), which adopted a socialist political ideology, embarked on sweeping agrarian reforms. The 1975 land reform was a key initiative of the reform program and marked a shift from longstanding traditional landholding systems to a socialist mode of production. It placed all land under state control and banned its transfer through sale, lease, or mortgage.Footnote 1 This reconfiguration of land and property relations between the state and the peasantry shifted the focus from individual land-use rights to collective agricultural production under centralized state control.Footnote 2
The Derg also nationalized privately owned commercial farms and converted them into state-run farms. The existing literature contends that the Derg established these state farms to increase the domestic food supply for the urban population, provide raw materials for domestic industries, and generate foreign exchange through the production of export-oriented cash crops.Footnote 3 State ideology framed these farms as a way to end Ethiopia’s reliance on international food aid. The state substantially invested in state farms with the expectation that they would become principal sources of surplus production and government revenue. Apart from this, the state utilized a centralized approach to operate the farms, with the intention of consolidating state control over the national economy. As part of a socialist mode of production, the state farms served as instruments through which the Derg legitimized its authority over the rural economy.
One of the private commercial farms converted into a state farm during this period of reform was the Humera commercial farm. Previously owned by local restland (hereditary communal landownership rights) owners, as well as domestic and foreign private agricultural firms, the Humera State Farm was established not only as a state-led economic enterprise but also as part of a securitization agenda intended to reinforce state presence in the contested frontier region. Located in the politically volatile and contested frontier claimed by Sudan and used by various rebel groups as a safe haven for cross-border operations, the Humera State Farm formed part of a broader state strategy to assert sovereignty and counter insurgent movements in the region. In this context, the Humera State Farm served as a testing ground for the Derg’s socialist agrarian policy in a borderland region, reflecting its broader ideological aim to transform rural society through centralized planning and the reconfiguration of socioeconomic relations between the center and the periphery.
The Derg’s agrarian reforms and state farms have attracted considerable scholarly interest, given that they represent a large-scale socialist experiment that had not been implemented under the earlier imperial regime. In this regard, Mesay Kebede argues that state farms were strategically designed to exert state control over agricultural production, dismantling the old imperial class hierarchy.Footnote 4 A prolific scholar of the Derg’s agrarian reforms, Dessalegn Rahmato emphasizes that the regime disproportionately allocated resources to the state farm sector, reflecting its ideological preference for large-scale, state-controlled modes of production over smallholder agriculture.Footnote 5 Christopher Clapham, for his part, argues that the Derg used agrarian reform as a tool of political control, replacing traditional authority structures with state-controlled peasant associations and state-run agricultural projects, further facilitating its ideological penetration into rural areas.Footnote 6 State farms and producer cooperatives are interpreted in these works as state-building strategies intended to expand authoritarian control over rural areas. This scholarship suggests that state farms were often analyzed through political-economy perspectives that emphasize the extraction of surplus from peasant labor. Meanwhile, state ownership of land undermined peasants’ long-term incentives to invest, thereby stagnating productivity.
State-driven agrarian reforms of the Derg regime remain the subject of scholarly debate and demand critical analysis from multiple perspectives. However, scholarly works produced by development scholars, political economists, sociologists, and anthropologists have primarily focused on policy issues such as land reform, collectivization, resettlement, villagization, and their outcomes, framing the Derg’s agrarian initiatives as socialist ideological experiments.Footnote 7 These works, which emerged during the 1980s and 1990s, sought to understand the dynamics of land reform, state farms, producer cooperatives, villagization, and resettlement programs. Works produced in the 1990s, in particular, focused on critiquing the economic outcomes and political motivations of the Derg’s collectivization and resettlement programs, portraying its agrarian strategy as a developmental failure marked by its inefficient implementation.
Situating the following analysis within this broader debate on the Derg’s agrarian reform, this paper explores the evolution of mechanized agriculture in Humera, the shift from private holdings to a socialist-oriented state farm, the trajectory of investment in contested borderlands, the impact of insurgent-driven border security threats on state farm operations, and the policy failures associated with large-scale state farming. This study also addresses key research questions related to the economic and administrative implementation of the Humera State Farm, the contradictions embedded in its governance structure, local responses to state-imposed mechanized agriculture, and the ultimate fate of the state farm after the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991.
Methodologically, the study draws on previously unused contemporary provincial and national archival sources held in Gondar, at Debre Markos University, at the National Archives and Library Agency (NALA), and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). These archival documents are confidential and have not been used in previous studies. Due to the political sensitivity of their contents, the archival documents kept in Gondar and at MFA are not accessible to most researchers or open to the general public.Footnote 8 Similarly, documents kept at MFA, which address government policy, diplomatic relations, and political crises that posed challenges to the Derg regime’s socialist transformation efforts are restricted and require special permission for access. With the authorization of MFA, I consulted these materials in 2019 and 2020 while collecting data for my PhD dissertation on the Sudan–Ethiopia border issue. I likewise accessed the Gondar archives during the same period after obtaining special permission from the Gondar City Administration. Both MFA and the Gondar City Administration granted me access on the understanding that my research would contribute insights toward addressing the long-standing Sudan–Ethiopia border dispute. Thus, the opportunity to consult these documents allowed me to consider sources that are not easily accessible to other researchers, significantly strengthening the originality and scholarly value of this research.
These previously unexamined sources provide new insights into the dynamics of state-led agrarian development projects in the contested borderlands and their ultimate outcomes. Such materials often reveal overlooked local issues, creating opportunities to critically reassess dominant narratives by incorporating perspectives that were marginalized or excluded from earlier scholarship. In this regard, these archives provide not only firsthand evidence but also empirical data that enrich the existing body of historical scholarship on state-driven agrarian development in the contested borderlands of northwestern Ethiopia. Taken together, these sources contribute to a deeper understanding of the Derg’s agrarian reforms by highlighting overlooked local dynamics and challenging state-centered interpretations of agrarian development.
The archival sources used for this study are diverse and were produced by various state and nonstate officials. Sources from local governors, the national state farm coordinating office, the Humera State Farm’s technical governing bodies, borderland community representatives, peasant laborers, rebels, and various border patrol units provide multifaceted insights that help reveal overlooked issues. Additionally, I conducted in-depth interviews and focus group discussions with purposively selected participants in Metema, Maichadra, Humera, Abderafi, Dansha, and Gondar. Participants were chosen based on their knowledge of the practices and challenges of the Humera State Farm, its successes, failures, and multifaceted impacts on society. Many of the key informants and focus group participants served in different administrative positions at the Humera State Farm during the Derg period. Some were also farmers who had cultivated land in the contested regions since the 1950s and had served as local governors in the border districts during both the Imperial and Derg periods. Because of their direct involvement in state policies and their implementation, they possess in-depth knowledge of the challenges associated with investment in the contested border areas, as well as the practices and constraints that affected the operation of the Humera State Farm during the Derg period.
This fieldwork was conducted with the intention of capturing local perspectives on the practices and challenges of the Humera State Farm. By incorporating oral testimonies, local memories, and the lived experiences of farmers and local administrators, this study moves beyond state-centered narratives and highlights the local dynamics of large-scale agrarian schemes. By integrating marginalized voices, this study broadens the historiography of agrarian development, state-society relations, development policies, and borderland transformations within the contested borderlands of northwestern Ethiopia.
The Economic Foundations of Setit Humera and Development Challenges in Contested Borderlands
Setit Humera is located at the geographical margin of northwestern Ethiopia, sharing a contested border with Sudan (see Figure 1, below). It is a river-delta-like border region situated between the two rivers, the Angereb (Bahr Selam) River in the south and the Setit (Tekeze) River in the north. Historically belonging to the administration of Begemedir and Simien Governorate General, the region is resource-rich and endowed with fertile soil known for growing sesame, cotton, and sorghum. It has also played a pivotal role in Ethio-Sudanese relations, acting as both a point of conflict and a point of cooperation. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it became a bone of contention among Egyptians, Mahdists, Anglo-Egyptians, and Ethiopians.Footnote 9 However, due to recurring malaria epidemics and a lack of road infrastructure, it remained sparsely populated and served as a buffer zone between Ethiopia and Anglo-Sudan until the 1950s.Footnote 10 The region attracted renewed attention when Ethiopia embarked on commercial agriculture in the late 1950s and Sudan achieved independence in 1956. Since the border region remains contested, state authority and territorial sovereignty continue to be resisted, negotiated, and challenged not only by Ethiopia and Sudan but also by various local rebel groups. As a result, the central governments in Khartoum and Addis Ababa have historically viewed the Setit Humera (Al-Fashaga) border region through a security lens.
Map of Setit Humera.
Figure 1 Long description
The map displays the Setit Humera region, detailing boundaries and infrastructure. It includes the countries of Eritrea and Sudan. Key locations such as Setit, Humera, Wogera and Waloait are marked. The map features a legend indicating Teklai Gizati (province), Awraja (sub-province), Woreda (district) and Woreda capital. Principal earth tracks and regional boundaries are shown. The map also highlights the proximity to Begemdir and Tsegede regions. Om Hajer is noted near the border. The map provides a detailed view of the area′s geographic and administrative layout.
Since the developments prior to 1974 laid the economic foundations of Setit Humera, it is essential to examine these earlier processes in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of the region’s economic transformation and the expansion of mechanized agriculture before the Derg converted these enterprises into state-owned farms. Driven to expand export-oriented cash-crop production, the Ethiopian government launched large-scale commercial agriculture in Setit Humera and Metema frontier regions in the 1950s. Large-scale human settlement and commercial agriculture in the Setit Humera borderland did not take place before the 1950s, when the farms began employing seasonal migrant labor, and local restland owners of the Wolkait and Armachiho regions initiated large-scale sesame, cotton, and sorghum production. They possessed extensive tracts of farmlands locally known as Mechach, Lugdi, Kurmur, Gelan Zeraf, Meiol Meda, Redam, Kafita Meda, Maikadra, Bahkar, Rawiyan, Bewal, Debelob, and Ambarkit.Footnote 11 Moreover, the government allocated extensive farmlands to foreign investors and several private farmers from Tigray, Eritrea, and the highland region of Begemidir to expand commercial agriculture in the border areas.Footnote 12 For instance, the government leased 100 gasha (4,000 hectares) of farmland to the Greek and Yugoslav nationals, Dinqu Vitanovitch, Sidris Marco, and Dimitrios Zervos. Located south of the Setit (Tekeze) River, locally called Alkadra, these Greek and Yugoslav nationals established the Agricultural Work Limited Company in March 1956.Footnote 13 Similarly, the vast Kurmur farmland was leased to two Yemeni investors named Hajj Abdella and Ibrahim, while the Rawiyan valley was leased to Hassen Atom—a Sudanese-Ethiopian man.Footnote 14 In the early 1960s, the government allocated extensive farmlands to the retired police and army members, including returnees from the Korean War and Congo peacekeeping missions. In response, they were required to provide protection to the border areas.Footnote 15 Such aggressive land allocation was undertaken not only for economic purposes but also to strengthen state control over the contested border regions.
In order to support commercial agriculture in the border areas, the government introduced the Minimum Package Program (MPP). It was designed to provide low-interest rate credit service and supply commercial farmers with tractors, improved seeds, duty-free fuel, anti-locust chemicals, and pesticides.Footnote 16 Moreover, various domestic and international financial institutions such as the Commercial Bank of Ethiopia, the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AIDB), Addis Ababa Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Bank, and Bretton Woods institutions offered credit to the commercial farmers.Footnote 17
These development initiatives transformed Setit Humera into a key center of cash-crop production. However, the beginning of commercial agriculture in the border areas prompted protests from the Sudanese government. Sudan, which gained independence from British colonial rule in 1956, accused the Ethiopian government of expanding commercial agriculture in violation of the unilaterally demarcated colonial boundary. Prior studies have indicated that the Sudan–Ethiopia border dispute arose from conflicting interpretations of the colonial treaty signed in May 1902 between Colonel Harrington (representing Anglo-Sudan), Emperor Menelik II, and the Italian representative Chicodicolla.Footnote 18 Ethiopia insisted that the British colonial government had unilaterally demarcated the border, disregarding the 1902 treaty under which Menelik and Harrington agreed to commence the physical demarcation in the presence of representatives from both sides.Footnote 19 The basis of the Ethiopian state’s argument was that, in unilaterally demarcating the boundary, the British colonial government left fertile and strategic border regions to the British colony of Sudan, extending beyond the boundary established by the 1902 treaty. Conversely, Sudan insisted that Major Gwynn, who was appointed by the British colonial government to demarcate the border, was also authorized by Emperor Menelik II. However, several accounts, including those from Gwynn himself, confirm that demarcation was carried out without the knowledge of the Ethiopian government.Footnote 20
Apart from this, the beginning of commercial agriculture dynamically transformed the demographic composition of Setit Humera and stimulated the borderland economy. In the early 1960s, Humera town alone hosted approximately 20,000–30,000 permanent residents and 60,000–200,000 seasonal laborers speaking Amharic, Tigrinya, and Arabic.Footnote 21 However, the agricultural economy of the Setit Humera borderland was destabilized after 1974 due to land reform, changes in economic policy, and political violence in the border areas. The nationalization of private farms, the restructuring of agricultural policy, the withdrawal of foreign investment, and the termination of Western financial support disrupted the commercial farming system. Moreover, the escalation of insurgent activity by Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) in the border areas destabilized the security environment, undermined markets, and severely disrupted agricultural production.
In 1975, the Derg regime nationalized all private commercial farmlands in Setit Humera, including those held by restland owners and foreign investors.Footnote 22 The Derg also dissolved the MPP and instead established the Peasant Agricultural Development Extension Programme (PADEP).Footnote 23 The new policy restricted the supply of credit to farmers and required them to sell their agricultural products to the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission at fixed prices.Footnote 24 Due to the nationalization of their private holdings, foreign investors abandoned their large-scale mechanized farms in Setit Humera and returned to their respective home countries without fulfilling their financial obligations, such as paying wages to Ethiopian laborers and taxes to the government.Footnote 25
Moreover, the intensification of Eritrean rebel movements in the border areas caused the rapid collapse of commercial agricultural markets. Receiving substantial support from Sudan and Egypt, the ELF, which established training grounds and logistic bases in Romma and Kassala, frequently attacked Ethiopian farmers in Setit Humera. Armed with various weapons and jointly trained by Sudanese and Egyptian army officers, ELF guerrilla fighters attacked the tiny Ethiopian security force in Keren, Haykuta, Tesenai, and Ligidir (Alegidir) in March 1975.Footnote 26 Similarly, the ELF fighters who were trained at Gurduf, Gilediba, and Gilot, near the River Guang, destroyed the Abderafi Police Farm Development Association in 1975.Footnote 27 Eventually, ELF fighters gained control of the northern section of the River Setit, including Umhajar, Kurhina, Qawur, Shirona, and Gildiba, and closed the Asmara–Humera route—one of the major commercial corridors connecting Begemidir and Simien with Eritrea.Footnote 28 Because Asmara was a major domestic market destination and farm-input supply route, the closure of Asmara–Humera route significantly affected commercial farmers.Footnote 29
A series of letters written by Derg officials indicate that the closure of the Asmara–Humera route significantly disrupted commercial agricultural activities. For instance, a report sent from Gondar Province to the Ministry of the Interior in 1975 describes the effects of the closure of the Asmara–Humera route on Setit Humera’s agricultural production: “With the closure of the Humera–Asmara route, the country’s main artery, frontier development has declined.”Footnote 30 A similar confidential letter, dated 2 September 1976, written by Bezabih Gebre, Governor of Gondar Province, to Brigadier General Getachew Nadew, Governor of Eritrea and Commander-in-Chief of the Second Revolutionary Army, detailed the impact of the Asmara–Humera route closure on agricultural production and the livelihoods of the people of Humera. He wrote, “Due to the fighting against Eritrean rebels, Humera and its surrounding areas, once known for development, have faced numerous challenges. I kindly request that you facilitate support for the farmers and residents of Humera through the army.”Footnote 31 Another report, written on 1 October 1976, by an official in Wogera awraja (county) and sent to the head office of Gondar Province, explained how the closure of the Asmara–Humera route impacted commercial agriculture in the border areas: “Due to the closure of the Asmara route and the lack of market access, farmers in Metema, Abderafi, and Humera have faced severe challenges.”Footnote 32
Furthermore, the security situation in the border areas deteriorated due to Sudanese involvement in proxy conflicts, the confiscation of property and restrictions imposed on Ethiopian farmers, and the escalation of the EDU’s armed movement in the border region. Taking advantage of domestic political unrest in Ethiopia, Sudan banned several Ethiopian farmers from cultivating in the disputed border regions stretching from Setit Humera to Quara in 1975.Footnote 33 The Sudanese military also confiscated their crops, farming equipment, livestock, and personal belongings. As Ethiopia was undergoing political transition and facing domestic crises, the Derg was unable to provide protection to its farmers. Disappointed by the nationalization of rural land, the loss of commercial farms, and the erosion of their local privileges, several restland owners from Begemidir and Simien migrated to Sudan and joined the EDU in an effort to militarily remove the Derg.Footnote 34 Some of them fled without repaying loans obtained from credit institutions. In response, the Derg confiscated their properties, including houses, tractors, and other personal belongings. In a letter written on 23 November 1975, the Derg enacted a law that banned private property ownership for those who had fled to Sudan: “We have learned that farmers engaged in commercial farming in Humera have left for the neighboring country, Sudan, before repaying their loans to the government. Therefore, we would like to strictly inform you that their properties should be kept under government custody and should not be handed over to anyone.”Footnote 35 The new socioeconomic reforms alienated farmers, drove them into exile, and contributed significantly to a deterioration in commercial agricultural production.
Establishing a power base in the Sudanese border area, the EDU destabilized the Setit Humera and Metema frontier regions, causing a substantial decline in agricultural production and the expansion of lawlessness. In 1977, the EDU controlled the border towns of Metema, Humera, and Abderafi after heavy fighting, causing severe damage to the town and displacing even more people from the border areas.Footnote 36 For instance, in describing the lawlessness in Abderafi and the role of the Sudanese government in hosting EDU rebels, a letter sent from the Gondar province to the Derg’s central Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) reported:
The situation in the area surrounding Abdärafi had reached an alarming level. Incidents of violence, robbery, and occasional killings of local residents had increased significantly. As a result, some inhabitants of the town and its surrounding areas, abandoning their property, are fleeing to Gondar, while others are moving toward Setit Humera. We know that our neighboring state, Sudan, was serving as a refuge for the bandits involved in these acts of robbery.Footnote 37
These combined factors led to a sharp decline in commercial agriculture in the border areas. Due to multiple challenges, farmers were unable to repay loans obtained from credit-providing financial institutions or pay wages to laborers. For example, the Wolkait–Setit Humera Multipurpose Farmers’ Cooperative Association failed to repay a loan of 3,542,034 birr to the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, while the Armachiho–Godebie–Abderafi Farmers’ Multipurpose Cooperative Association was unable to repay 715,176 birr to the same institution.Footnote 38 Instigated by EDU political propaganda, many farmers from Metema, Abderafi, Armachiho, and Setit Humera joined the movement, abandoning their agricultural activities, while others went into exile in Sudan or fled to safer areas around Gondar.Footnote 39 Consequently, commercial agriculture in these border regions declined significantly, causing severe social and economic hardships for the local population.
The security situation in the border areas showed relative improvement after the Derg’s victory over Somalia in 1978. The regime consolidated its position in Eritrea and expelled EDU fighters from the border areas by arming peasant militia forces recruited from the seven awrajas of Gondar Province, which formed the Gesit army. These forces drove EDU fighters from the borderlands of Humera, Metema, and Quara. Eventually, the Derg reorganized rural communities in the border areas through farmers’ cooperative associations. In West Armachiho, it established the Godebie-Abderafi Farm Association, and in Humera it formed the Wolkait-Setit Humera Farm Association.Footnote 40 These cooperative unions were part of the Derg’s broader socialist transformation program aimed at restructuring rural society and strengthening state control over agricultural production. The cooperatives were tasked with organizing rural communities into a socialist mode of production, promoting the political mobilization of peasants, disseminating socialist ideology in rural areas, and implementing the regime’s development policies.Footnote 41
Transition to State Farm Development: Key Challenges and Policy Dilemmas
The Derg nationalized all commercial agricultural enterprises in 1975, which were owned by various domestic and foreign companies, members of the imperial family, and high-ranking state authorities. For example, the commercial farms established along the Awash Valley, such as Metahara, Wonji, and Dubti/Tendaho, which focused on the production of sugarcane and cotton, were nationalized and placed under the Ministry of State Farms’s Coffee and Tea Development. Similarly, commercial farms located in the Rift Valley lake region, such as Chilalo, Ziway, Bilate, and Adami Tult, which focused on wheat, barley, and maize, were nationalized and turned into state farms. Meanwhile, the large-scale coffee and tea farms in southeastern Ethiopia, such as the Gumaro tea plantation in Illubabor, the Bebeka coffee plantation in Kaffa, and the coffee and tea plantations in Tepi were also nationalized.
As stated at the beginning of this discussion, the Derg brought major commercial farms across the country under state ownership and centralized bureaucratic management in 1975. In Setit Humera, however, this process was delayed until 1979, as ongoing political instability in the border regions hindered the timely implementation of agrarian restructuring. Following its victory over Somalia and the expulsion of EDU and Eritrean insurgent forces from the border areas, the Derg consolidated its control and violently restructured the socioeconomic order of the borderlands. As part of this process, it established the Humera State Farm in 1979, utilizing tractors and other farm equipment confiscated from former local elites.Footnote 42 It was a large-scale, state-owned, mechanized agricultural enterprise that primarily focused on producing sesame, cotton, and sorghum (see Figure 2).
Map of the Humera State Farm Development and location of holdings.
Figure 2 Long description
An Amharic-language map, showing the boundary and layout of the Humera State Farm within the Setit Humera district. A red diagonal line running north–south marks a boundary through the district. A green shaded and cross-hatched area in the western portion of the map indicates the land allocated to the state farm and its holdings. A legend in the lower right corner identifies map symbols for roads, boundaries, settlements, and the shaded holding areas, along with a scale reference. The map provides a spatial view of how the state farm’s land holdings were distributed relative to surrounding communities and administrative boundaries within the contested borderland region.
The map above illustrates the size of the state farm, its relative geographical location, and the specific local place names where it was established. It also provides a spatial understanding of its extent and distribution within the contested borderland region. In early 1979, the state farm project office identified 24,000 hectares of land, allocating 20,000 hectares for sesame and 4,000 hectares for sorghum.Footnote 43 Using the labor of peasant militia forces, the state farm began cultivating 21,341 hectares of land in June 1979, investing around 13,293,664 birr in the construction of shelters, the digging of wells, the establishment of fuel stations, and the construction of farm offices.Footnote 44
As previously stated, the Humera State Farm was established not only for economic objectives but also to reinforce state control in the contested border region. Since the area was a contested borderland claimed by Sudan and frequently used by rebel groups as a safe haven, the state farm was intended to promote the territorial integration of the periphery, strengthen state control, and enhance border security.Footnote 45 To this end, the Derg conscripted and relocated 4,000 peasant militia forces from drought-affected districts of Wollo Province to Humera in March 1979.Footnote 46 These peasant militias, organized into quasi-military units by the regime, were compelled to provide labor for the Humera State Farm and protect the borderland from rebel incursions and Sudanese threats. Before their deployment, the peasant militias received six months of basic military training at Tateq (Siga Meda) in West Shewa. This training prepared them for both labor on the state farm and combat roles in the border areas. After completing the training program, they were transported to Humera in March 1979 in a convoy of fifty trucks and sixty buses (see Figure 3, below).Footnote 47
Convoy of buses stationed on the outskirt of Humera town.
The state farm was labor-intensive. To meet its labor demands, the government launched a labor-mobilization campaign that required citizens, including civil servants, students, and conscripted soldiers, to support agricultural work. The labor mobilization campaign was a regular annual practice, especially during the weeding and harvesting seasons. For example, in 1979—the first fiscal year of the Humera State Farm—20,725 peasant laborers, 12,225 from Gondar Province and 8,500 from Gojjam, were recruited to assist with the weeding and harvesting of sesame and sorghum.Footnote 48 Their duty was not limited to agricultural work; they were also required to combat rebel incursions into the border areas. This dual role was publicly stated in the Derg’s ideological motto: “We struggle while producing, and we produce while struggling. Producers hold firearms in one hand and a sickle and pickaxe in the other.”Footnote 49
In 1980, the Humera State Farm planned to cultivate 41,341 hectares of land but managed to cultivate only 40,916 hectares (33,315 hectares of sesame and 7,601 hectares of sorghum).Footnote 50 For this purpose, 4,800 laborers were engaged in vegetation clearing and 13,500 in weeding.Footnote 51 However, the farm produced fewer than four quintals of sesame and two quintals of sorghum per hectare. By 1981, the cultivated areas of the state farm exceeded 41,300 hectares. A year later, the state farm expanded further, reaching 49,000 hectares.Footnote 52 In the same year, the government established the Simien Farm Development Corporation, and initiated cotton cultivation. Between 1980 and 1982, the operation grew to include more personnel and more equipment. To support this growth and expansion, the government imported substantial agricultural machinery from socialist countries and established tractor garages and maintenance centers in Humera. In 1982, the government provided the Humera State Farm with an extensive range of equipment, including 305 tractors, 97 trucks, 200 plows, 124 subsoilers, 3 canal-digging machines, 29 seed drills, 24 seeders, 7 water pumps, 2 mobile garages, and 26 small cars.Footnote 53 The government also introduced improved varieties of sesame, cotton, and sorghum seeds. These seed varieties were stocky, disease-resistant, fast-growing, and highly responsive to fertilizers.
Although the production system received considerable political support, the Humera State Farm encountered multiple obstacles that hindered its development. The Derg intelligence sources show that the state farm was less productive compared to pre-1974 commercial farming.Footnote 54 Sources show that before 1974, farmers were producing between four and five quintals of sesame and sorghum per hectare.Footnote 55 The table above (Table 1) illustrates performance of the Humera State Farm during the first two years (1979–80).
Agricultural products in 1979 and 1980
Table 1 Long description
The table reports farmland area in hectares, total production in quintals, and production per hectare for sesame and sorghum across the 1979 and 1980 farming years, plus yearly totals. In 1979, sesame used 15,500 hectares and produced 28,340 quintals at 1.8 quintals per hectare, while sorghum used 5,800 hectares and produced 7,551 quintals at 1.3 per hectare. The 1979 total was 21,300 hectares and 35,891 quintals. In 1980, sesame expanded to 33,300 hectares and produced 60,885 quintals at 3.86 per hectare, and sorghum rose to 8,000 hectares and 10,415 quintals at 1.8 per hectare. The 1980 total increased to 41,300 hectares and 71,330 quintals, indicating much higher overall production alongside a large expansion in cultivated area. Sesame accounts for most of the land and output in both years and shows the biggest improvement in yield per hectare. Total rows do not provide a per-hectare figure, so overall yield changes must be inferred from the separate area and production totals.
Source: NALA 17.1, File 1.319/03, State Farm Report, 1973 EC.
The existing literature indicates that the state farms were inefficient as a production system, failing to meet state expectations and improve the lives of local communities. In analyzing the inefficiencies of state farms, Edmond J. Keller argues that the Derg regime prioritized political control over genuine food security.Footnote 56 Similarly, Clapham argues that state farms operated as an ideological showcase, rather than as an efficient production system. Large investments yielded minimal returns, signaling a misalignment between resource allocation and the outcomes achieved.Footnote 57 Moreover, a study by Shahidur Rashid, Meron Assefa, and Gezahegn Ayele highlights that the Derg nationalized rural land, required all commercial farms to remain under state control, and imposed fixed prices and sales quotas. These measures distorted markets and restricted private business owners’ control over capital.Footnote 58
However, local contexts in Setit Humera affected the development of the state farm from its inception. Its productivity was affected by several factors, including the illness and death of laborers, the hasty mobilization of the farm itself, poor agricultural management, shortages of skilled labor, delays in the delivery of essential inputs, inadequate road access, low-quality seeds, and inefficient water supply.Footnote 59 Peasant militia laborers who came from the highland areas faced significant environmental challenges in Humera due to its intense heat and incidence of malaria. As malaria in Setit Humera often occurred during critical agricultural seasons, frequent illness and the deaths of peasant laborers significantly reduced the efficiency of state farm production. Likewise, the shortage of skilled farm technicians significantly impacted productivity. The state farm experienced an acute shortage of skilled technicians in machinery maintenance, garage operations, and spare part management, particularly after the Derg intensified state repression in Eritrea. When the Derg launched the Red Star campaign in Eritrea in 1982, Eritrean-born farm technicians, who were predominantly responsible for machinery maintenance and garage operations at the Humera State Farm, frequently migrated to Sudan. Fear of persecution, detention, and the hasty generalization of Eritreans accused of collaborating with rebels prompted the outmigration of qualified technical personnel from the Humera State Farm.Footnote 60 The loss of skilled farm technicians created a significant deficit within the Humera State Farm workforce. To fill the gap, the state farm relied on unskilled laborers who lacked the prior technical experience. This caused operational inefficiencies and the implementation of substandard agricultural practices.Footnote 61
More importantly, the state farm experienced persistent mismanagement and labor exploitation, which caused far-reaching social and political repercussions. The Derg envisioned that the state farm would offer housing, employment opportunities, education, and healthcare for workers, promoting a unified socialist national consciousness loyal to the state.Footnote 62 In practice, however, the state farm diverged significantly from this promise and did little to improve the lives of the unemployed rural population.Footnote 63 Constructed with grass-thatched roofs, the shelters were of poor quality, inadequate, and unsuitable for seasonal laborers. In the Humera State Farm, the available accommodations were insufficient to house seasonal laborers, especially during the weeding and harvesting seasons. During these seasons, a single room was shared by five to seven producers.Footnote 64 Overcrowding became a serious issue, causing shortages of basic facilities and contributing to illness among seasonal laborers.
Rather than serving as a solution to rural unemployment, the Humera State Farm suffered from acute labor shortages and widespread worker resistance. Peasants in Gojjam, Gondar, Tigray, and Eritrea consistently resisted labor recruitment due to low wages, harsh climate, and fears of malaria and insurgent attacks.Footnote 65 Peasants who were conscripted from the highland areas were relocated to one of Ethiopia’s most malaria-infested regions without adequate protection or compensation. The labor mobilization campaign, characterized by authoritarian practices, did not prioritize the safety and interests of producers. The state farm relied heavily on peasant labor, yet this labor was poorly compensated. Wages fixed by the state remained unattractive and insufficient to sustain livelihoods. For example, permanent cultivator employees earned a monthly salary of seventy-eight Ethiopian birr, while civilian farm supervisors earned 100 birr.Footnote 66 Due to low wages and the lack of career development opportunities, employees suffered from poor job satisfaction, which in turn reduced operational efficiency on the Humera State Farm. Rather than incentivizing peasant producers, the state imposed a rigid quota system that compelled peasant associations at every woreda (district) and awraja (sub-province) to supply the required number of laborers. The recruitment of labor through a quota-based system was exploitative, as it did not consider the interests of producers and offered neither sufficient financial compensation nor adequate health protection.Footnote 67
The exploitative labor policy affected every section of society, including rural peasants, urban youth, high school students, women, and truck drivers. Farmers resisted labor recruitment because it separated them from their homes during critical farming seasons, such as plowing, weeding, and harvesting. Similarly, private truck owners and drivers consistently refused requests to transport agricultural products from Humera to the main storage center in Addis Ababa.Footnote 68 At times, these protests resulted in the imprisonment of drivers, the confiscation of vehicles, accusations and the levying of fines against truck owners, marking a significant episode of resistance against the Derg’s exploitative state farm policies. The state farm operated more through fear and mistrust than through voluntary participation motivated by economic incentives.
A Critical Juncture
The state farm development symbolized a socialist ideology that prioritized state control and security over agricultural production, labor mobilization, and marketing chains. The existing literature shows that state farms proved to be inefficient. Keith Griffin and Roger Hay argue that although the objective of state farms was to promote capital accumulation and produce marketable surpluses for urban populations, they were marked by slow growth and instability. This study further contends that sluggish agricultural growth, fragmented markets for agricultural output, and political instability undermined the performance of state farms.Footnote 69 Several works also contend that the farms relied mainly on peasant labor with limited incentives, a system that often generated local resistance and operational inefficiencies.Footnote 70 Moreover, top-down governance practices that disregarded local realities caused clashes between state interest and local realities. Plans drafted and approved centrally without local participation were poorly implemented on the ground. The lack of localized analysis to guide decision-making and inadequate feedback mechanisms from below hindered efforts to adjust flexible and context-based solutions.Footnote 71 Such structural challenges were common across all state farms, including the Humera State Farm. However, the context-specific factors that ultimately led to the collapse of the Humera State Farm were distinct from those affecting other state farms.
The Derg adopted a uniform governance model for all state farms established across Ethiopia. The state farm had a highly centralized leadership and organizational structure administered by the National Revolutionary Production Campaign and Central Planning Department. These bodies were responsible for overseeing the overall workflow, including technical activities and the mobilization of peasant labor. Because state farms were operating under highly centralized control, this top-down system often neglected the unique circumstances and local contexts, resulting in inefficiency and unfavorable outcomes.Footnote 72
The major factors that contributed to the collapse of the Humera State Farm included the changing security dynamics in the border regions associated with Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) attacks and Sudanese proxy support for rebel movements. In the late 1980s, the Humera State Farm was at a crossroads. Since it was situated in a politically volatile border region, military officers and local cadres were appointed to oversee every aspect of its operations. Peasant producers and technical experts were placed under the direct authority of these military officers and local cadres.Footnote 73 The appointment of military officers and local cadres to leadership positions within the state farm, prioritizing political loyalty over technical competence, contributed to mismanagement and the inefficient use of resources. Authoritarian oversight by the military officers and local cadres caused laborer discontent with state farm governance. Laborers, technical experts, and farm managers were given few opportunities for meaningful participation in farm development initiatives. Any form of criticism of the state farm and its administrative structure was subject to penalties, demotion, and repressive measures.Footnote 74
In 1985, Sudan increased pressure on the Humera State Farm project. Tensions intensified when the Derg government expanded the project across the colonial boundary unilaterally demarcated by the Anglo-Sudan government in 1903 and conducted a resettlement program in the disputed Setit Humera border region.Footnote 75 State intelligence sources indicate that, of the total area occupied by state farms, about 14,206 hectares, or thirty-four percent, were located in the western section of the contested area, beyond the limits of the colonial boundary, extending eleven kilometers into the disputed frontier.Footnote 76 The Derg responded that the state farm was consistent with the 1972 Exchange of Notes, in which Ethiopia and Sudan agreed to maintain the status quo regarding farmlands cultivated by farmers from both countries.Footnote 77 In July 1972, Ethiopia and Sudan signed an agreement to settle their boundary dispute. Concerning frontier areas north of the Daglish border region such as sections of Quara, Metema, West Armachiho, and Setit Humera, where Ethiopian farmers had substantial investments, both parties agreed to respect the existing status quo with regard to land ownership until a mutually acceptable resolution could be achieved.Footnote 78 Instead of responding militarily to the expansion of the state farm, Sudan intensified its proxy war against the Derg in the border areas. It continued to provide multifaceted support to the TPLF and the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), which had established strongholds along the border regions.
As part of its efforts to prevent insurgent infiltration into the border areas, the Derg carried out a resettlement program in Setit Humera and Metema borderlands in 1985. Peasants from drought-affected districts of Wore-Himanu, Wadla, and Gayent were relocated to the contested section of Setit Humera.Footnote 79 The resettlement program which was implemented following the outbreak of drought and famine in northern Ethiopia was hastily conducted without adequate preparations. It also served as a political instrument through which the state sought to assert control over the contested peripheries and monitor TPLF infiltration into the border areas. The resettlement program was also intended to sever contact between rebels and peasants in their home areas.Footnote 80
By the end of the 1980s, the borderlands experienced considerable political violence, which had a profound impact on the operational capacity of the Humera State Farm. Having established their power base in the border areas, the TPLF insurgents frequently attacked the Humera State Farm, disrupting its operations and the Derg’s effort to control the frontier regions. In collaboration with the Eritrean insurgents, TPLF fighters blocked key transportation routes such as the Asmara–Humera and Humera–Gondar roads. The blockage of key transport routes caused delays in the distribution of essential agricultural inputs, such as fertilizers and tractor fuel, and hindered the movement of seasonal laborers, ultimately crippling the farm’s supply chains.Footnote 81 In 1989, the TPLF insurgents gained control over strategic areas in Setit Humera such as Adime Harmaz, Adi Serijish Arimna, and Adi Taqir.Footnote 82 After establishing strongholds in these areas and mobilizing large combatant forces in Wolkait, the TPLF repeatedly confiscated tractors and agricultural produce from the Humera State Farm. Capitalizing on the Derg’s weakness, the TPLF mobilized the local population in Wolkait against the regime.Footnote 83
In 1990, the Derg attempted to recruit peasants from Wogera, Chilga, and Gondar awrajas, including workers from the Humera State Farm, to combat TPLF insurgents in the border regions.Footnote 84 However, this campaign of forced military recruitment failed. Fearing conscription, seasonal laborers and peasant producers deserted the Humera State Farm.Footnote 85 In 1990, the TPLF fighters captured Humera and confiscated state farm equipment and administrative assets, including tractors, farm containers, and agricultural machinery.Footnote 86 This marked the final collapse of the Humera State Farm.
In June 1990, the Derg closed the Humera State Farm office. A small number of skilled farm technicians were transferred to the Ayehu and Birr State Farm developments, while many other workers were dismissed.Footnote 87 Finally, the Derg was overthrown in May 1991, and a TPLF-led government assumed state power. This development had significant impacts on Setit Humera, including Wolkait. These resource-rich border areas were detached from Gondar Province and incorporated into the newly established Tigray Regional State. Eventually, the vast farmlands formerly owned by the Humera State Farm were redistributed to regional state-owned commercial farm enterprises, private investors, TPLF-affiliated returnees, and former TPLF combatants.Footnote 88 In 1992, the regional government of Tigray established a mechanized agricultural development in Setit Humera. One of the TPLF-affiliated commercial enterprises, known as Effort, established the Hiwot Mechanized Farm Development on more than 10,000 hectares of land in Setit Humera.Footnote 89 Additional large-scale commercial farm enterprises, such as Kebabo Farm Development, Banat Farm Development, and Niguara Farm Development, were expanded. Moreover, the TPLF government launched large-scale resettlement programs in Setit Humera and Wolkait. In June 1993, about 12,000 Tigrayan refugees who had been living in camps in Sudan were resettled in three designated sites in Setit Humera: Ada bai, Maikadra, and Rawiyan.Footnote 90 In the same year, about 23,000 former TPLF combatants were settled in Woinat (later renamed Division). A year later, in February 1994, additional 2,225 refugees were repatriated from the Sudanese Umrakoba camp and settled in Rawiyan. The Relief Society of Tigray (RST), with financial support from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the U.S. government, took responsibility for repatriating Tigrayan refugees from Sudan to Setit Humera.Footnote 91 Moreover, many rural and urban residents from different districts of Tigray, including private commercial farm investors, spontaneously settled in the extensive frontier areas of Setit Humera and Wolkait. They expanded commercial agriculture in Qorarit, Embagalay, Maigaba, and Rewisa.Footnote 92 The resettlement program was also part of the TPLF’s administrative strategy in the area and its efforts to shape the demographic composition of Setit Humera and Wolkait. Ultimately, the incorporation of Wolkait and Setit Humera into the Tigray administration triggered land and identity disputes between Amhara and Tigrayan ethnonationalists. The Amhara accused the TPLF-led government of unilaterally annexing these districts into Tigray. Competing claims between Amhara and Tigrayan elites over these resource-rich territories remain unresolved and continue to fuel political instability in northern Ethiopia.
Conclusion
The fall of the Derg in 1991 ushered in a new phase of political and socioeconomic transformation in the Setit Humera borderland. The TPLF-led regime incorporated Setit Humera, including Wolkait, into the Tigray Regional State and redistributed former state farmlands to ex-combatants, new commercial investors, and TPLF-affiliated enterprises. It also launched large-scale resettlement programs, relocating TPLF-affiliated Tigrayan refugees who had spent decades in exile in Sudan due to war and famine. These practices reshaped the region’s demographic and economic landscape. However, the incorporation of Setit Humera and Wolkait into the Tigray administration generated intense contestation between Amhara and Tigrayan elites. The Amhara, claiming historical and cultural ties to the area, accused the TPLF of territorial annexation and the marginalization of Amhara identity. These competing claims remain unresolved, contributing to recurring violence and ongoing political instability in northern Ethiopia.
The study contributes substantially to borderland studies, agrarian economic history, labor history, and development studies by situating the Setit Humera State Farm within the framework of state-driven development in contested borderlands. It reconceptualizes the transformation of the Setit Humera frontier region from a malaria-prone and uninhabited buffer zone into a contested hub of commercial agriculture, highlighting that this large-scale agricultural project was driven not only by economic motives but also by security concerns, territorial control, and geopolitical competition along the Ethiopia–Sudan border.
The study advances scholarly understanding of how authoritarian regimes implement development projects in contested border areas and mobilize labor not only for economic development but also to consolidate political authority. Building on these contributions, this study opens new avenues for research on borderland political economy and post-socialist land governance in Ethiopia, demonstrating how former state farms were repurposed after 1991. More importantly, this case reflects a broader pattern of authoritarian development policies framed through security imperatives, which tend to prioritize territorial control and regime stability over human welfare, ultimately producing vulnerability among ordinary people living in contested borderland areas.
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