Mark Blaug passed away on November 18, 2011. To honor his memory, two events were held in March 2012: a Memorial Conference at the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, Rotterdam (NL), and a seminar hosted by the Scottish Centre for Economic Methodology at the University of Glasgow (UK). As Marcel Boumans and Matthias Klaes point out in their editorial Introduction, this book contains a collection of papers given at these two events and includes some additional papers submitted by people who were not able to attend the meetings “at such short notice” (p. 5). In addition, the book carries a Foreword by Alan Peacock and consists of two parts: part I has four chapters—written by John Maloney, Ruth Towse, Bruce Caldwell, and Thomas Mayer—that are devoted to personal appreciations and memoirs of Blaug; part II has twelve chapters—written by Richard G. Lipsey, David Laidler, Geoffrey M. Hodgson, Jack Vromen, Harro Maas, Roger E. Backhouse, John B. Davis, Marcel Baumans, Andrea Salanti, Victor Ginsburgh, Christian Handke and Erwin Dekker, and D. Wade Hands—that discuss some of Blaug’s favorite topics and put forward critical assessments of his specific contributions to the issues at hand. An extensive bibliography of Blaug’s publications and on-line sources ranging through twenty-nine pages rounds off the book. (The interested reader may also refer to Backhouse’s Reference Backhouse2012HOPE obituary and the 2013 EJPE—Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics—winter special issue for further contributions on Blaug’s biography and scholarly achievements.)
No doubt, those who have already gone through Blaug’s autobiography (Blaug Reference Blaug1994) will appreciate the chapters in the first part of the book, and readers of these chapters will be stimulated to get acquainted with Blaug’s autobiography. Particularly touching are the personal memoirs by his wife, Ruth Towse, herself a distinguished cultural economist, where we learn not only that Blaug was fond of ‘jazzy’ titles (p. 14), but also that he produced his works “as an oyster produces pearls —out of sheer irritation.” This was true “especially in his later years” (ibid.).
Readers browsing the many and different topics addressed by the authors of the chapters of part II get a vivid touch of the extension of Blaug’s interests and literacy, such as his view of the controversial nature of the quantity theory of money; the notion of competition as an evolutionary process and not as an equilibrium end-state; his diagnosis of the unhealthy status of much of contemporary economics; the role and prospects of the history of economic thought subdiscipline within the broader field of economic research, and the causes and possible therapies of contemporary economists as regards their entrenched cliophobia; the problematic coexistence of rational and historical reconstructions of past economics; the trade-off between rigor and relevance within contemporary economic theory; the assessment of Sraffian economics; the role of Karl Popper’s and Imre Lakatos’s philosophies of science within the methodological debate in economics; William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen’s cost disease; and the subsidization of performing arts and the economic analysis of cultural policy. Moreover, as a fitting tribute to the friend and the scholar, the authors develop their chapters as if they were actually discussing the topic with Blaug and acknowledge that in all likelihood he would have had the last word. A fitting example of this common attitude is chapter 6 by Richard Lipsey. Lipsey discusses at length a number of issues within modern economics, many of which were also addressed by Blaug himself. Some of these issues are purely methodological, such as falsifiability, formalism, and the debate concerning testing-also-the-assumptions versus testing-only-the-predictions of a given theory. Others are more normative-oriented, such as the intuition-based versus the theory-based debate concerning policy advice. Finally, others are strictly theoretical, such as the role of the price system, the notion of competition, technological change, risk and uncertainty, growth, Keynesian (old and new) versus New Classical macroeconomics, and so on and so forth.
Blaug was a well-recognized historian and methodologist of economics. Not surprisingly, seven out of twelve chapters of part II are devoted to historiographical and methodological matters and at least four of them are devoted to the topic of rational and historical reconstructions and the (alleged) trade-off between rigor and relevance. Both present reviewers had the opportunity to enter into exchanges with Blaug on these issues (Blaug Reference Blaug1999, Reference Blaug2002a, Reference Blaug2003a, Reference Blaug2009; Kurz and Salvadori Reference Kurz and Salvadori2002, Reference Kurz and Salvadori2011; Signorino Reference Signorino2003a and Reference Signorino2003b). Accordingly, we hope readers will forgive us for our deliberate choice, in what follows, to focus on these items: along the way, we also take the opportunity to sketch some arguments we would have loved to have discussed with Blaug.
We start from the issue of rational versus historical reconstructions, an issue that looms large in chapter 10 by Harro Maas, and chapter 12 by John Davis. The former provides an illuminating analysis of the evolution of Blaug’s thought concerning the debate on absolutism versus relativism in the writing of the history of economic thought, to make use of Blaug’s juvenile dichotomy, or rational versus historical reconstructions, as he preferred to express himself at a later age. At the start of his carrier as an historian of economic thought, Blaug was a staunch supporter of the absolutist point of view: he claimed that past economics had to be consistently reconstructed and evaluated by means of the analytical concepts and vocabulary provided by modern economics. Such an historiographical project was straightforwardly announced in the very opening sentence of the Introduction of Economic Theory in Retrospect, a book whose title itself is a manifesto in miniature: “This is a critical study of the theories of the past; it concentrates on the theoretical analysis of leading economists, neglecting their lives, their own intellectual development, their precursors, and their propagators. Criticism implies standards of judgment, and my standards are those of modern economic theory” (Blaug Reference Blaug[1962] 1985, p. 1).
As is well known, in his later contributions Blaug drastically changed his mind on the comparative worth of rational and historical reconstructions of past economics:
Although I have been guilty myself of the very sin I have just deplored, I have come to the conclusion that the only approach to the history of economic thought that respects the unique nature of the subject material, rather than just turning it into grist for the use of modern analytical techniques, is to labor historical reconstructions, however difficult they are. (Blaug Reference Blaug2001, p. 152; emphasis added)
The “sin” Blaug refers to is the attempt by
some historians of economic thought to sell the subject to their departmental colleagues by reducing history of economic thought to the history of economic analysis, and then by dressing up past ideas in modern garb, often in the form of mathematical models that look just like something that might have appeared in the latest issue of the American Economic Review or the Journal of Political Economy.
The sin has a proper name: “I call these “rational reconstructions” (Blaug Reference Blaug2001, p. 150).
How to explain such a radical change of perspective? Alan Peacock remarks in his Foreword that Blaug the historian of economics was “not simply hopeful that appreciation of scholarship encourages us in good habits of reasoning”: Blaug’s aim also was “to convince us that the knowledge of the history of economic ideas is a necessary element in the training of an economist,” though “he knew that success in his mission was far from guaranteed” (p. viii). Evidence to support Peacock’s guess on Blaug’s hidden motives when, in his younger years, he endorsed rational over historical reconstructions may easily be found in Blaug’s Reference Blaug1994 intellectual autobiography. To explain his early historiographical choice, Blaug pointed to the necessity of selling the commodity labeled “history of economic thought” to a set of highly reluctant buyers:
The history of economic thought was a compulsory graduate course in the 1950s but these students were typical American graduate students: they wanted to learn the tools and techniques of modern economics and to hell with such scholarly subjects as economic history and the history of economic thought. I was aware from the moment the course began that I had to sell the history of economics as somehow relevant to these young Turks. No wonder then that I taught the subject by emphasizing the filiation of purely analytical concepts and continually emphasizing the modernity, and sometimes lack of modernity, of the ideas of the past. (Blaug Reference Blaug1994, p. 18)
As time went by, Blaug became increasingly aware that, though his Economic Theory in Retrospect was widely sold and studied, even more than Joseph Schumpeter’s 1954 classic History of Economic Analysis, at least by the students and scholars attending the libraries of Harvard and MIT (chapter 10, p. 127), the subdiscipline of the history of economic thought had fallen more and more outside the canon of the average economist’s education (Blaug Reference Blaug2001). The average PhD student in economics, while heavily trained in subjects such as advanced econometrics or mathematics, is offered negligible (if any) training in the history of economic thought. Why? Whig historiography is among the most likely candidates to the role of villain of the story. If dead economists produced wrong ideas, then the study of past economics is inevitably a veritable waste of time. Similarly, if and when dead economists produced right ideas, these ideas are but a primitive and imperfect version of the ideas currently employed by living economists: again, why bother to study them? George Stigler, Blaug’s doctoral supervisor, has put the point harshly but effectively:
The young theorist, working with an increasingly formal, abstract, and systematic corpus of knowledge, will seldom find it necessary to consult even a late-nineteenth-century economist. He will assume, just as the mathematician or chemist assumes, that all that is useful and valid in earlier work is present—in purer and more elegant form—in the modern theory. Indeed, the young economist will increasingly share the view of more advanced formal sciences that the history of the discipline is best left to those underendowed for fully professional work at the modern level. (Stigler Reference Stigler1969, pp. 217–218)
To rescue the history of economic thought from the charge of being concerned with morbid antiquarianism and to vindicate the scientific status of professional historians of economic thought, the mature Blaug has been led to reconsider his early historiographical views and to downgrade rational reconstructions of past economics. But, how on earth could Blaug possibly persuade his fellow economists that the study of history of economic thought contributes (algebraic) value-added to the collective house of economic knowledge, to paraphrase Paul Samuelson (Reference Samuelson1974)? A brilliant answer to such a question is provided by John Davis. In chapter 12, he convincingly links Blaug’s changing attitude as concerns the relative worth of historical and rational reconstructions with the evolution of his thought on the issue of the growth of knowledge in economics. Davis claims that Blaug
turned economists’ own market theory tools against them in using an economics of scientific knowledge approach to argue that the ‘marketplace of ideas’ was neither competitive nor efficient in regard to the production of economic knowledge. From this he was able to argue that the way in which economics developed as a science inevitably involved loss of content, thus undermining the steady progress idea associated with the Whig view, and allowing him to define a role for the history of economic thought in advancing scientific knowledge. (p. 160)
Davis’s reconstruction of Blaug’s mature thought on the issue of rational and historical reconstructions gives us the opportunity to sketch an argument we dare to think Blaug would have judged worthy of his attention (if not of his approval). In our view, rational reconstructions may be cleansed of Whig incrustations just thanks to an elaboration of Blaug’s ‘loss of content’ argument; indeed, one of the main shortcomings of Whig historiography is its strong teleological flavor; that is, the (often implicit) belief that the history of science reveals an in-built and, in the long run, irresistible drive toward progress (Mayr Reference Mayr1990). By contrast, the actual progress of economic knowledge is based on an ongoing process of selection by the ever-changing historical communities of practicing economists concerning which lines of inquiry to pursue and develop and which to neglect and abandon. Ultimately, the time and financial/intellectual resources constraints are always binding! At this juncture, the crucial question is: how to effectively rescue from oblivion those pieces of valuable economic analysis that happened to be neglected by the current generation of economists mostly because, for a variety of reasons, they have been neglected, at their turn, by the previous generations of economists? Our answer to this question is that, as the tools of economic analysis continuously develop, the scope for such rescue operations improves. Let us elaborate on this point a little further. As epigraph to his Logik der Forschung (1934), Karl Popper, Blaug’s favorite philosopher of science, quoted Novalis’s (Friedrich von Hardenberg) dictum “Hypotheses are nets: only he who casts will catch.” Seen in this light, scientists are a kind of hunter; empirical regularities, their target preys; and theories, their weapons. Some decades later, in an oft-quoted passage, Sir John Hicks adopted a similar point of view on the relationship between facts and theories in the realm of science:
Our theories, regarded as tools of analysis, are blinkers.… Or it may be politer to say that they are rays of light, which illuminate a part of the target, leaving the rest in darkness. As we use them, we avert our eyes from things which may be relevant, in order that we should see more clearly what we do see. It is entirely proper that we should do this, since otherwise we should see very little. But it is obvious that a theory which is to perform this function satisfactorily must be well chosen; otherwise it will illuminate the wrong things. (Hicks Reference Hicks[1976] 1983, pp. 4−5)
Mutatis mutandis, contemporary analytical tools and concepts may help present-day historians to detect an analytical argument actually existing within the historical texts under scrutiny but which would have likely escaped their attention if they would have not employed (some of) the analytical categories elaborated by later economists. From this perspective, we fully agree with what the young Blaug wrote in the Preface to the first edition of Economic Theory in Retrospect:
Students are often told of the inspiration to be derived from the study of the history of economics. They are not so often reminded of the inspiration which the historian of economic thought derives from a study of contemporary economic theory. In truth, one should no more study modern price theory without knowing Adam Smith than one should read Adam Smith without having learned modern price theory. There is a mutual interaction between past and present economic thinking for, whether we set it down in so many words or not, the history of economic thought is being rewritten every generation. (Blaug Reference Blaug[1962] 1985, p. vii; emphasis added)
Rational reconstructions of past economics by means of the contemporary one are, by their very nature, highly speculative and selective. The crucial question is whether a given rational reconstruction turns out to be too speculative and selective or even positively misleading, an historical travesty, to make use of one of Blaug’s expressions. The danger of ‘creating’ rather than ‘reconstructing’ the historical texts cannot be lightly dismissed. Moreover, it may not be ruled out that basically the same outcomes may be achieved through historical reconstructions in Blaug’s sense; that is, “attempts to give an account of past thinkers’ system of thought ‘in their own terms’, that is, in terms these thinkers would have accepted as a correct description of what they had done” (Blaug Reference Blaug1990, p. 28). (Yet, we ought not to forget that Blaug’s definition of historical reconstructions, if interpreted stricto sensu, involves a counterfactual that cannot be falsified or, obviously, verified.) To be sure, rational reconstructions of past economics by means of contemporary analytical categories are far from being a free lunch or an unmixed good. Yet, occasionally they may display valuable comparative advantages over other tools of historical inquiry. After all, to kill a bird, it takes either a stone or a bow and an arrow or … a precision rifle!
Chapter 11, by Roger Backhouse, attempts a reconstruction of the evolution of Blaug’s views on Piero Sraffa’s 1960 book Production of Commodities, and the ensuing, so-called, Sraffian economics and Sraffian interpretation of Classical economics. Backhouse tries to elucidate the reasons why “to the end of his life, Mark Blaug was obsessed with Sraffian economics” (p. 146; emphasis added). Backhouse observes that Blaug’s response to Sraffa’s 1960 book was “slow” (p. 147). While there is no mention of Production of Commodities in the main text of the first two editions of Economic Theory in Retrospect, subsequently Blaug produced an extensive analysis of Sraffa’s contribution in the pamphlet The Cambridge Revolution: Success and Failure, published in 1974 and revised in 1975 (though Backhouse refers only to the first edition). This pamphlet is plagued by quite a few misunderstandings of Sraffa’s slim book, many, but not all, of them corrected in the second edition (see Steedman Reference Steedman and Moseley1995). In his 2012 obituary, Backhouse describes Blaug as a scholar who loved to get the big picture but was both impatient with details and happy to be controversial (Backhouse Reference Backhouse2012, p. 569). Similarly, Boumans and Klaes recollect in their Introduction that Blaug “was not only a ‘voracious’ reader, but also ‘wrote faster than God could read’” (p. 2). As a consequence, he “was impatient about minor details” (p. 4) and even he “was prepared to exaggerate when this was necessary to make a point effectively” (ibid.). One of these obvious mistakes is also referred to by Backhouse (though he forgets to inform his readers that it is actually an overstatement, to say the least) and concerns the idea that the overriding, if not exclusive, aim of Sraffa’s book was to solve a technical problem (the invariable measure of value) David Ricardo unsuccessfully wrestled with until his untimely death. If this had actually been Sraffa’s basic aim, the wide interest that Sraffa’s 1960 book has aroused would hardly be understandable. On the contrary, the Standard commodity—i.e., what is considered to be the solution to the aforementioned problem—is an argument that could entirely be dispensed with and replaced by the Perron–Frobenius Theorem. Indeed, the proofs concerning the Standard commodity in Production of Commodities are substantially proofs of parts of that theorem, a theorem that Sraffa did not know and that his ‘mathematical friends’ never mentioned to him (see Kurz and Salvadori Reference Kurz, Salvadori, Baranzini and Harcourt1993, Reference Kurz, Salvadori, Cozzi and Marchionatti2000).
Backhouse analyzes Blaug’s attitude towards the Sraffian interpretation of Ricardo to reach a conjectural interpretation of Blaug’s “obsession” in truly Freudian terms: “he was still trying to defend his rejection of Marxist theory, for if the Sraffians were right, there might be more to the ‘surplus’ approach than he had admitted” (p. 157). Be that what it may, Blaug’s steadily growing hostility towards Sraffa’s contribution is a kind of corollary, or inevitable by-product, of his entrenched belief that the work done by Sraffa and the so-called Sraffians ultimately turns out to be but a species of a larger genus, that of general equilibrium theory (see Blaug Reference Blaug, Boehm, Gehrke, Kurz and Sturn2002b, Reference Blaug2009). Though this is not the place to discuss in due detail Blaug’s views on General Equilibrium Theory and Sraffa and his related views on Sraffa’s (and the Sraffians’) interpretation of Ricardo, some observations are appropriate.
We are convinced that to fully comprehend Blaug’s views on the subject, a fruitful starting point is what he labeled as the “formalist revolution” of the 1950s. According to Blaug, such a formalist turn entailed for economic science a trade-off between rigor and relevance: for Blaug, empirical relevance has been sacrificed on the altar of formal rigor and, as a consequence, manifold currents of the economic literature have been transformed into an apparently endless collection of intellectual games played for their own sake (Blaug Reference Blaug and Mäki2002c, Reference Blaug2003b; see also chapter 8 by Geoffrey Hodgson on Blaug’s diagnosis of current economics as a ‘sick’ discipline). Blaug’s hostility towards ‘empty formalism’ or ‘armchair theorizing’ led him to pass (mostly negative) judgments on a great number of contemporary research topics: not only general equilibrium theory and Sraffian economics, but also welfare economics, Coasian economics, game theory, mechanism design theory, new classical macroeconomics, and real business cycle theory, to mention just a few. Taking Blaug’s 2009 analysis of contemporary economics at face value, one is led to conclude that for Blaug, only social choice theory and its crown jewel, Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem, pass both tests, that of formal rigor and that of empirical relevance. In particular, game theory was a red flag to him: as noted by Jack Vromen (chapter 9), Blaug considered evolutionary economics “as one of the most hopeful and fruitful developments in economics” (p. 98). Yet, he had serious misgivings as concerns evolutionary game-theoretic analyses: Vromen explains Blaug’s dismissive attitude by his “dislike of game theory tout court,” a dislike “clearly related to his scathing critique of the dominance of ‘ugly’ formalism in mainstream economics” (ibid.).
Indeed, the very notion underlying Blaug’s critical assessment of contemporary economics—i.e., there exists in economics a broad spectrum between two rival goals labeled rigor and relevance—is controversial. To take just an example from outside economics: practicing physicists do not consider mathematical physics, theoretical physics, and experimental physics as rival disciplines ranging from the most rigorous to the most relevant. Rather, they consider them as complementary disciplines, each with its own canon of rigor and relevance. Hence, regardless of one’s own personal sympathy with Blaug’s indictment of formalism in contemporary economics, the fact remains, as noted by Andrea Salanti (chapter 14), that
it is not enough to point out the irrelevance of any theory with no empirical sound implications or at least potentially falsifiable consequences, because it would be all too easy for opponents to raise objections about Popperian falsificationism, mainly on the basis that a strict application of falsificationist criteria either would lead us to discard a too huge amount of current economic theory, or would leave unanswered the question of the multiplicity of theoretical approaches in economics embedded in so many different strands of heterodoxy (p. 202).
Similarly, Marcel Boumans (chapter 13) acknowledges that “to say that a theory should be falsifiable is simply too vague to understand different practices” (p. 188). Boumans’s chapter is indeed a polite and friendly criticism of Blaug’s view that “relevance means having empirical content and being capable of answering any practical question, whereas rigor is taken as a synonym of irrelevance, associated with empty formalism” (p. 177).
To conclude: we guess that Blaug would have appreciated the title of this book, a smart paraphrase of his 2000 EJHET paper on Henry George, the economist of the past who determined (with Karl Marx) the decision by the seventeen-year-old Mark Blaug to study economics (Blaug Reference Blaug1994, p. 12). Blaug was a fierce combatant and relished intellectual disputes. Since he would have found no rhetorical praise in the various contributions of this book, but a frank discussion of his hits and misses, we venture to say that he would have enjoyed the content of this book and not simply its title. We liked it and surely many readers will too.
