Charter 08 is the most important proposal for a liberal Chinese constitution. This excellent book, based on Hong Kong University Law Faculty conferences, treats the charter and its co-author, Nobelist Liu Xiaobo, in diverse ways that complement each other neatly.
Four initial chapters (by Jean-Philippe Béja, Joshua Rosenzweig, Liu's legal defense team, and Cui Weiping) profile the laws and trial by which Liu was imprisoned for “subversion.” Four more (by Pitman Potter and Sophia Woodman, Feng Chongyi, Karen Lee, and Michaela Kotyzova) ask about the charter as a factor in China's potential democratization. The final five (by Fu Hualing, Michael Dowdle, Eva Pils, Willy Lam, and Teng Biao) explore the liberal movement's links to current politics.
Liu Xiaobo has two different aims: “Living in truth” is a personal commitment to reject the lies and repressions that are endemic in an authoritarian state. His second commitment is more social, less personal; it is the hope of creating a tolerant democracy in China. These goals interact, and overall the book is stronger in describing and criticizing current Chinese laws than in suggesting the political mechanisms by which censorship may be reduced. One law prescribes punishment for “spreading rumors or slanders . . . to subvert the state power or overthrow the socialist system,” and such vague words encourage judges to be arbitrary.
What has reduced government capriciousness in other countries? The answer is political struggle. Some such conflicts have been nonviolent but tense, when leaders such as Gandhi provoked state violence in order to raise public consciousness of their causes, or leaders such as Mandela withstood government force while reserving the right to respond in kind without actually doing so. China's new class of cadres in medium-size jurisdictions will not readily give up local violence that they have used to repress speech against their corruptions. Charter 08 rejects revolutionary violence; China has been there and done that. Liu Xiaobo is “a bookish man” who says he has “no enemies,” but he wants changes that powerful conservatives in the many-layered Chinese state fear. He is willing to be a jailbird, but not a patsy.
Expressing liberal ideals may not by itself create liberal democracy. What else is needed? The “political science literature” shows more consensus than might be expected. Social pluralism correlates with liberalism, especially above levels of GDP/capita that China is fast approaching. The mechanism by which it does so depends on the incentives of ruling elites to allow legitimate dissent. In poor countries, militaries have often terminated established democracies; but as socioeconomic indices rise, elites allow elections they imagine they can win. Illiberal politicians (Hitler, Marcos, Thaksin) have been legitimated by elections. A populist demagogue, such as a latter-day Bo Xilai, might attract voters too—but over time, pre-election open debate becomes normalized along with liberal uncertainty about who will win. Some historical periods have seen advances of democracy (or autocracy) internationally. High GDP/capita economies with more than twenty million citizens are all unapologetic liberal democracies. Charter 08 norms are relevant to this process mainly because liberal institutions require advocates.Footnote 2
Former premier Wen Jiabao spoke about democracy, and some of Wen's statements have been censored, but (unlike former general secretaries Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang) Wen was not purged. It is difficult to assess the sincerity of top Party reformers. Their public expressions may just “let off steam” rather than intend serious change. Yet eventually, many Chinese could hold such leaders to their words. Some Party liberals, such as Li Rui or Zhu Houze, were invited to sign Charter 08 but declined, apparently hoping to keep pushing from within the leadership. China's leadership is now unconvincing as a monolith. It holds together by claims of patriotic accomplishment but is riven by China's growing social pluralism.
Future liberal proposals in China might have fewer “Western” characteristics. Charter 08's call for separation of powers lists Montesquieu's three (executive, legislative, and judicial)—but interestingly, Taiwan's constitution adds others such as the Examination Yuan or the Control (audit) Yuan, which have distinctively Chinese forebears. Many modern governments give independent powers to central banks, civil service boards, and regulatory agencies.
The charter's treatment of economics and elections—money's distortions of democracy—might also be taken further. “Private property rights” in an “open market economy” figure in the charter for reasons of which Hayek would approve. But this document does not adumbrate the role of (socialist) regulation in defining those rights or their links to speech, market fairness, or equal democratic opportunity. This is hardly a severe critique; the constitutions of many “democratic” countries have not fully faced these problems either. There is future work to be done.
Chinese thinkers might contribute to it. Confucius and Mencius linked the dignity of a ruler to his ability take critical advice. Liu's original field was literature, not law. He speaks against “vulgarity,” but he also criticizes “anti-democratic practices of young intellectuals.” He rejects the Confucian tradition that intellectuals should become “counselors to the prince,” because that linkage taints their integrity. Liu values intellectuals’ bonds with farmers and workers, a majority that may catalyze political change. Charter 08 (appended in this book) demands that “officials in key positions at all levels of government must be the product of elections,” although it specifies “direct elections” only for legislatures. Comparisons with liberal transitions in many countries suggest that the other demands—for separation of powers, free speech, rule of law—should have priority.
This book summarizes crucial ideas for China's future. Everyone interested in that topic must read it.
