The conclusion of this study of new laws in the UK ends with a note that ‘Without popular authority, the state will continue to blunder along in its futile, repressive and demoralising pursuit of absolute safety’ (p. 241). This closing line not only informs us of the author's critical approach to many of the new laws in Britain, but more importantly gives a strong indication of the breadth of the book and its attempt to situate the rise of the Insecurity State in the changing political and cultural climate – one that in particular has become essentially preoccupied with ensuring our safety, or as Ramsay would perhaps put it, defending our vulnerable autonomy. As such, this is not just an exceptionally useful and well-informed book about the changing nature of law in the UK, but it is more importantly an attempt to situate these developments in the changing nature of the state – indeed in the changing nature and norms of society, a society within which the ‘right to security’ has come to take precedence.
While being of great interest to anyone studying and concerned with law, this book is also, and perhaps more so, a competitor and challenger to some of the key criminological texts of recent years, most of all David Garland's The Culture of Control (Reference Garland2002).
Peter Ramsay has brought together in this excellent book a detailed analysis of new laws, starting with the ASBO (Antisocial Behaviour Order) and moving on to a variety of new forms of regulation like the vetting and barring scheme, even discussing the Human Rights Act, all within the framework of the right to security and what Ramsay calls the failure to reassure. More legally focused than Elizabeth Burney's (Reference Burney2005) or my own (Waiton, Reference Waiton2008) studies of antisocial behaviour, this book nevertheless takes us well beyond ‘mere’ law, situating these developments through an analysis of political theory to isolate the ‘ideology of vulnerable autonomy’ as the key normative development that explains how and why we now live in, and accept, or at least acquiesce in, the security state. In this respect it sits comfortably alongside the arguments about ‘post liberalism’ made by Helen Reece in Divorcing Responsibly (2003). Consequently, The Insecurity State is essential reading for both legal and criminological scholars interested in the problematic and changing nature of law and regulations in society.
Feeling secure
Beginning with a detailed examination of the ASBO – part of the New Labour ‘flagship’ Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (CDA) – Ramsay highlights the specific and peculiar nature of antisocial behaviour laws. As part of a new class of civic prevention orders, with the most extensive case-law of any of these new orders, the ASBO is, he argues, essentially a punishment for your failure to reassure. This should be seen within the context of the rise of community safety as a key strategic aim of local authorities in the UK. Garland argued that this had become the ‘chief consideration’ in the criminal justice system, with law enforcement a means to create community safety rather than an end in itself (Garland, Reference Garland2002, p. 171). Ramsay notes that protecting the feeling of security is not new – indeed many laws do this – however, the ASBO is somewhat different in that it is directly focused upon the subjective feeling of security. Indeed, the ASBO targets behaviour that might undermine our feeling of security, and does so in part by targeting an expanding range of behaviours – arguably, an infinite range of behaviours because a key criterion is the fear (or assumed fear) felt by an individual.
The ASBO may be used for behaviour that is annoying, offensive, shocking, intimidating, threatening, or criminal, but it must occur in a context where it would or would probably cause another person to fear for his or her safety. It is best understood as an administrative law that makes a risk assessment and is used as a preventative order rather than a form of punishment in and of itself. The CDA states, for example, that an order can be used ‘to protect relevant persons from further anti-social acts by the person’. Indeed, unlike the Public Order Act 1986, the ASBO does not simply punish past wrongdoings so much as demand a positive obligation that the individual act as a good citizen whose behaviour does not create fear amongst others. Persistent nuisance behaviour, for example, is punishable because it illustrates a lack of concern for the individual or public sense of esteem. Fear is, of course, a subjective emotion and the measure of this fear is here determined by the victim's interpretation: fear need not actually occur but can be presumed based on behaviour that is likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. In this respect, the interpretation of fear also becomes something that the authorities, at least in part, determine on our behalf.
These aspects of the ASBO are explicitly spelt out in the law itself, or have subsequently been clarified in individual cases. The end point, Ramsay notes, is that the ASBO is used in relation to conduct that actually causes fear, or more importantly, due to the open-ended nature of ‘fear’, targets conduct that would probably ‘cause the most sensitive person actually present’ to feel fear (p. 23).
Attorney General Lord Williams argued in parliament that all the ASBO asks is that the subject behaves ‘in a decent way’ (p. 28). However, this means that the ASBO is not punishing a wrong, nor simply deterring future wrongs, but is actually demanding correct civil behaviour that will reassure the public. Failure to reassure will consequently be punished. The ASBO is not dependent on proof of guilt of a criminal offence but can be issued purely based on a risk assessment that certain behaviour was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress.
To defend yourself against an ASBO you must demonstrate that your behaviour is ‘reasonable’, but, as Ramsay explains, there are many circumstances where fear may be caused but where the behaviour is not seen as harassment (or even wrong), consequently the judgment call on reasonableness is necessarily subjective and indeed political – something set out in, for example, Home Office guidance documents. Unlike criminal law, which has precise general rules and incorporates some wider discretion and morality, the administrative and subjective nature of the ASBO means that it is ‘all moral context and no rules’ (p. 35). Indeed, the emergence of the ASBO was quite clearly part of a wider political concern with what Labour MPs Hazel Blears and Frank Field called the ‘politics of decency’ (Blears, Reference Blears2004) and the ‘politics of behaviour’ (Field, Reference Field2003).
The ASBO is also targeted at individuals, rather than being a rule for all. We will all be arrested for murder, but it is often only the ASBO'd individual who is arrested for certain defined behaviour. Meanwhile, the use of ASBOs in cases where actual crimes have been committed illustrates the distinction Ramsay makes about what an ASBO is targeting. For a breach of ASBO to be used in a criminal case something is being added – the reason for this, often spelt out in court cases, is that, for example, the defendant, ‘ignored the impact of anti-social behaviour on the wider public which was the purpose of the legislation in the first place’ (p. 43). With sentences being increased via the use of the ASBO, which itself carries a maximum term of five years in prison, we can see how seriously the authorities now take the need to protect the public from fear. Breaching an ASBO may impact on nobody, but the threat is there and this threat or behaviour that may have alarmed someone is enough to lead to a prison sentence. Individuals are lectured in court to take their behaviour more seriously, to realise that it is not trivial, and to realise the fear they may cause.
Ignoring others' security or feeling of security is taken very seriously by the authorities and by new laws. Indeed, one could describe the ASBO as an order that creates a two-tier citizenship structure whereby full rights are conditional upon fulfilling prior obligations to others' security. But why, and why now, do we get these new laws?
An interesting answer, and one developed more fully by Ramsay, is that the ASBO approach is a recognition by the authorities that the criminal law in and of itself no longer protects people from fear and alarm. The use of civil proceedings, for example, Lord Hope argues, and the use of hearsay evidence, are a valuable safeguard, helping in Lord Hutton's opinion to strike a fairer balance between individual rights and the demands of the community, where ‘the community in this case is represented by weak and vulnerable people’ (p. 60). The causing of fear and the failure of the law as it stands is therefore a justification for relaxing the rules of evidence.
We already begin to see here arguably the key issue addressed by Peter Ramsay, namely the construction of communities, indeed of the individual subject, as a specific type: weak and vulnerable. As such, ‘causing fear’ takes on a whole new meaning, significance and dimension in how both politics and the law must progress.
The ASBO and similar laws, including the Criminal Behaviour Orders introduced by the Coalition Government to replace the ASBO, aim to protect a right to live free from the fear of crime, indeed from previously non-criminal forms of behaviour that may create fear. The assumption is that there is a reassurance gap in society that must be filled through the use of orders that regulate further the behaviour of citizens. Here we see the new framing of rights and responsibilities, where citizens are no longer simply free, but are free based on prior positive obligations centred around the necessary recognition that people and communities are fundamentally vulnerable and must be protected from fear.
Ramsay illustrates this point with reference to the rise of New Labour: their focus upon the right to a quiet life, and recognition (or belief) by the soon to be government that confidence in the criminal justice system had collapsed. Tackling petty crime and antisocial behaviour, it was argued, would put victims first and rebuild civic and community life. Overcoming fear was also essential for state institutions and political life. The emphasis developed within politics at this time elevated fear as an issue that needed to be tackled in its own right. Importantly, Ramsay notes that within this discussion and central to the development of the CDA was not simply an interest in creating order, but an internal interest expressed by politicians with the need to rebuild confidence in government itself. Reassurance policing developed on the back of the oft-repeated concern with ‘public confidence’, with a huge number of new laws developed to increase confidence in the authority's capacity to maintain order. Talk now was about ‘shifting the balance’ away from the defendant and towards the victim, with rights understood with this caveat in mind. For Home Secretary David Blunkett, ‘anti-social behaviour’ was understood to be ‘at the foundation and root of insecurity’; this was why for him Britain could be defined as being in its most ‘insecure moment’, and it was his job to resolve this problem to bring stability and order to society (p. 76). This required ‘a subtle positive obligation on the individual citizen to maintain an awareness of the effects of her actions on the security of others’ (p. 77).
Citizens need reassurance. But, asks Ramsay, what sort of citizen/subject is it who needs this level of reassurance? The answer is that it is the vulnerable person who no longer receives sufficient protection from existing laws who now needs this right to be reassured.
Here again Peter Ramsay builds up to his essential argument and explanation for why ASBO-type legislation has flourished and indeed appears to be commonsensical – a new norm–and that is the emergence, or the construction, of vulnerable autonomy as the fundamental way in which legal subjects are now understood and engaged by state agencies.
Vulnerable autonomy
Perhaps Ramsay's most important chapter addresses the ideology of vulnerable autonomy. Here he develops arguments made by the sociologist Frank Furedi about the way in which the public are now understood to be, and engaged with as, ‘fundamentally vulnerable’. For Furedi a major development in the culture and politics of Western societies (especially in Britain and the United States) is the transformation of the robust liberal subject into a more universally conceptualised fragile being who needs ever-increasing protection (Furedi. Reference Furedi1997, Reference Furedi2004).
In this chapter Ramsay expertly unpicks apparently contradictory political and sociological theories to illustrate the dominant, if sometimes obscured, key aspect of them all – the presumed vulnerability of the human subject. From New Labourite sociologist Anthony Giddens's Third Way understanding, to communitarianism, civic conservatism and, fascinatingly, even neoliberalism, Ramsay convincingly illustrates that, despite their often competing and oppositional political standpoints, each one can be understood to be holding within it a more important essential outlook predicated upon a theory of vulnerable autonomy.
From each perspective we are understood to be autonomous beings, but prior to that we must be understood and engaged with as essentially vulnerable. The implications of this at a legal, political and societal level are enormous, and yet this transformation in how the liberal subject is conceptualised, Ramsay argues, has to a large extent taken place behind our backs – it has become a relatively unquestioned norm, and our vulnerability is now treated as common sense.
For Ramsay, liberalism (in its ‘classical’ form) is in decline, and indeed being undermined by these competing ideas. Here he follows a similar line of argument to Helen Reece, who believes that ‘liberalism has been losing ground to its critics over the last few decades, in fields as diverse as politics and social policy, political theory and philosophical theory and law’ (Reece, Reference Reece2003, p. 4).
Theoretically, key to this change is the different way in which subjectivity is understood, most clearly set out in Joel Anderson and Axel Honneth's (Reference Anderson, Honneth, Christman and Anderson2005) discussion in ‘Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice’. For them, the preconditions of autonomy are self-respect, self-esteem and self-trust: intersubjective processes of mutual recognition are the fundamental building blocks of autonomy. However, this intersubjective reliance upon others' recognition means our autonomy is fragile, and our vulnerability to various forms of injury makes it essential that matters of justice centrally focus upon and help create the correct social contexts within which our vulnerable autonomy can survive. Rather than self-made liberal subjects we are intersubjects, dependent upon the behaviour of others to ensure our psychic wellbeing. This, Ramsay argues, is a useful ‘general statement’ about the theory of vulnerable autonomy, one that can be found implicitly in the most influential political theories of our time, theories that fundamentally promote both the vulnerability of the public and the need for positive duties to be carried out as part of our active citizenship.
Customs and traditions have declined, Giddens (Reference Giddens1991, Reference Giddens1998) argues, and a new individualism has emerged, making old welfare services and institutions outdated. A new form of active citizenship is therefore required. Moving away from class and more rigid forms of social cohesion, our more diverse individualised society needs a new basis for duties and rights, summed up in the slogan ‘rights and responsibilities’. For Giddens, welfare now has to move away from the problems of scarcity and economics and instead focus upon psychic concerns and wellbeing. Consequently, he argues, freedom from fear of crime is a major citizenship right. A protective cocoon is needed to foster our self-esteem – our ontological security – a cocoon that is maintained (and undermined) by our everyday interactions. Without the necessary level of respect in society we develop a state of existential angst: within Giddens's therapeutic outlook, we are, Ramsay notes, essentially vulnerable. Given this, our new welfare society must ensure social cohesion ‘by imposing responsibilities on individuals to consider others’ psychic needs' (p. 90). Though not novel, Giddens's understanding has been influential, an understanding that sees old moralities as being limited in their ability to create social cohesion amongst more reflexive individuals. The core duty now must be based upon a mutual regard for each other's vulnerable self-esteem.
Another influential political theory in recent years, indeed the most influential according to Reece (Reference Reece2003, p. 5), has been communitarianism, a theory most associated with Amitai Etzioni, one-time advisor to the White House in the 1980s. This is a theory that has appeal for those with a left or liberal sensibility, but can equally appeal to civic republicans.
Etzioni (Reference Etzioni2000) may find the authoritarian attempt to enforce community behaviour not to his taste, but in the end, as Ramsay notes, he is ‘willing to restrict legal rights or impose legal duties where necessary’ (p. 92). Essentially, communitarianism has a similar understanding of the subject to Giddens's, seeing it as intersubjectively formed – our autonomy being made by our connection with the community we live in. The liberal idea that the individual's inner decisions are in a meaningful and significant way their own decisions is diluted in communitarianism (Reece, Reference Reece2003, p. 18): we are, in essence, individuals formed by our associations rather than individuals who create associations (2003, p. 21). Liberal autonomy in this respect is a fiction or a mistake. We are what we inherit, bearers of tradition, rather than free-floating individuals. Working as it does with the understandable sense that there is a ‘decline of community’, and equally with the concern about the rise of (neoliberal, selfish or alternatively nihilistic) individualism, communitarians argue that actions taken by individuals against the community are irrational and work against the true autonomy of the community-based individual: unlimited freedom of choice without some public regulation can only diminish autonomy. Importantly, Etzioni sees the community as a kind of buffer against outside forces, especially the market, that can make us act in antisocial ways – we are, in other words (as ‘mere’ individuals), vulnerable.
Likewise, and ironically, Ramsay argues, neoliberal ideas developed by Frederick Hayek after World War II have a very similar starting point. For Hayek it was economic vulnerability that was key. Known for his influence for revitalising pro-market politics in the 1970s and 1980s, Ramsay correctly notes that in fact Hayek's writings in and since the Road to Serfdom (Reference Hayek1944) were more defensive than they are often perceived to have been, coming at a time when the Great Depression of the 1930s had been followed by fascism, World War II, the rise of the Soviet Union, and the political consensus at the time that the state needed to step in to regulate the market. Rather than celebrating the rationality or perfectibility of the market, Hayek's belief in the market was far more limited, seeing it as merely the least imperfect form of organising society. The market was accepted by Hayek to be an impersonal force that ‘no single mind’ could ever grasp. There were necessarily tensions he accepted, within a market society, and consequently a social glue was required from elsewhere – from tradition and religious faith.
According to Hayek, the market alone could not hold society together, and indeed rationality could not help in this regard; religion, on the other hand, could support social cohesion – it could be moral, unlike the market. As Ramsay argues, ‘The market is a spontaneous order that, he claims, is more economically efficient than state interference in the economy but nevertheless leaves individuals in a condition of vulnerable submission to impersonal forces and lacks an intrinsic morality or justice to justify their predicament’ (p. 99). The market left to its own devices exposed the people to unmediated vulnerability, to ‘changes whose cause and nature cannot be understood’, as Hayek (Reference Hayek1944, p. 209) himself put it.
Margaret Thatcher followed in Hayek's footsteps and promoted both the market and tradition in the form of Victorian values. However, this conservative attempt to revitalise the ‘glue’ of religion was doomed to fail. In Mythical Past, Elusive Future (1992), sociologist Frank Furedi's brilliant history of the twentieth century, Furedi notes how Hayek's later writings were almost entirely ‘devoted to the defence of tradition and religion’ (Reference Furedi1992, p. 158). But the incessant call for the revival of religion was based upon not religious passion but intellectual calculation (1992, p. 159). As Furedi notes, a viable religion, ethics or morality could not simply be made to order, and the formal character of it, in the 1980s, failed to turn the tide regarding religious morality and ‘family values’. Despite the political successes of the Conservative Party at this time, the ‘culture war’ was lost and major aspects of ‘tradition’ – women's place in the home, abortion and even the legalisation of homosexuality – were not challenged by that Conservative government. Moral panics occurred but there was no going back to a more traditional coherent system of ‘values’.
Interestingly, the success of Margaret Thatcher obscured a wider reality, which was the decline, rather than the growth, of morality in society. This had been a phenomenon that James Q. Wilson, famous for the ‘broken windows theory’, had observed in the early 1970s. Noticeably, Wilson went on to become an advisor of policing to Ronald Reagan and received the Presidential Medal of Freedom, the highest civilian honour in the US. In Thinking About Crime (Reference Wilson1975), Wilson bemoaned the demise of morality in American life. Men and women were no longer moral, but selfish individuals, consequently crime policy should operate according to this model of ‘man’. Interestingly, with regard to Ramsay's thesis, Wilson's ‘remedy’ was to argue that there was no overall solution to society's problems. What was needed now was pragmatism, and in particular a focus within policing and the criminal justice system upon helping, and limiting the number of, crime victims in society. In one respect, what Wilson was arguing was that politics should move to focus on advocacy for and defence of the public as potential victims.
In the UK, just at the time when Hayek's neoliberal ideals were being promoted most fervently, the necessary traditional glue that could help to cohere society was in decline. The postwar norms of formal political equality, moral pluralism, a preference for scientific expertise, and a degree of social equality could not be pushed aside by a call for long-gone ‘traditional values’. This was illustrated most clearly in the debacle of John Major's ‘back to basics’ campaign in 1993.
Insightfully, Ramsay notes that the more important underlying trend, not visible in the politically heated decade of the 1980s, was that policies began to be developed directly engaging with (Hayek's) vulnerable individuals – illustrated, for example, in the Public Order Act 1986. Out of the ashes of the neoliberal/traditional and religious outlook emerged new initiatives like the Citizen's Charter, that dropped the pretence to moral ‘man’. Now policies were developed between the individual and society simply through a marketised consumer choice charter. Here we simply got the vulnerable individual in the face of the market being encouraged to develop a closer relationship with this ‘impersonal force’ that no ‘single mind’ could ever grasp. But where is the social glue? In essence, the answer to this then and to this day was that there was no glue as such. Like the conclusion drawn by the right realist Wilson, all that could be done now was to develop a relationship with, and policies to engage with and protect, the perceived vulnerable subject.
This is illustrated well in the precursor to the Citizen's Charter, the Victim's Charter. The official construction of the citizen as consumer, Ramsay notes, ‘begins with the consumer-citizen as a potential victim of crime’ (p. 103). The active consumer now constructed as an individuated rational calculator, without the traditional morality, tended to interconnect victimhood with citizenship. The legitimacy of the government and of state institutions now developed more systematically around the perceived vulnerable individual.
Summing up, Ramsay explains that, without other sources of social cohesion, ‘neoliberalism imagined citizens in the mode of rational, self-interested actors but these citizens were accordingly also vulnerable to blind market forces. And this vulnerability itself has come to be regarded as a source of citizenship obligation’ (p. 110; my emphasis). Through an encouraged and indeed enforced awareness of each other's vulnerability, it is hoped that the problem of a lack of social cohesion will be overcome.
The outcome
From this vantage point Ramsay is able to demonstrate how many other aspects of law, aspects that often appear to be contradictory and even arbitrary, are in fact consistent when seen through the prism of vulnerable autonomy. The European Court of Human Rights, for example, can make decisions that appear to contradict one another, but they are, Ramsay demonstrates, in fact consistent in terms of defending, indeed prioritising, the ‘fundamental right’ of freedom from fear. Indeed, the Convention rights themselves are often trumped (as accepted by the Convention) when the right to security is involved. The right to security is not only accepted by the Convention, but built in to it. The communitarian understanding of the subject contained in the Human Rights Act similarly means that our obligations to fellow vulnerable citizens results in what Conor Gearty has described as an act that contains ‘a weak version of rights, riddled with exceptions’ (p. 123).
Looking at many of the opponents of the ASBO, Ramsay correctly observes that the nature of this opposition was similarly predicated upon a perceived vulnerability of citizens, or was focused on cases where the particular vulnerability of defendants could be used as a stick with which to beat the authorities. The result is simply to reinforce the idea of the vulnerable subject with each side using the notion of vulnerability to justify their cause. This is one reason, Ramsay suggests, that opposition to the ASBO was relatively unsuccessful at the time. Perhaps, he argues, this encouraged idea of universal vulnerability, rather than creating a new form of social cohesion, actually results in divisive competing claims for respect and victimhood. Indeed, at times of economic hardship and social disconnection it is often the ‘vulnerated’, those who are not merely at risk but who have already been disadvantaged or injured, who are perceived by society to be the greatest threat to our right to security.
Other initiatives and laws like the Civil Prevention Orders, control orders, the risk of sexual harm order and the vetting and barring scheme can similarly be situated as part of the enforced right to security predicated upon the theory of vulnerable autonomy. For example, with the vetting procedures, an administrative risk assessment is made of adults who come into contact with children, an assessment that can have profound repercussions for those deemed ‘inappropriate’ to work with children.
Ramsay goes on to illustrate how laws regarding everything from assault to fraud have developed similarly, and where, in cases like vagrancy and begging, the language used to justify police and legal action has shifted away from moral language or a discussion of ‘scroungers’ towards a concern with fear instilled by ‘aggressive begging’. This is a point that I made in The Politics of Antisocial Behaviour, that Tony Blair and Jack Straw had successfully shifted the political and moral terrain when discussing begging, away from the traditional denunciation of work-shy beggars towards a concern with the ‘vulnerable public’ who were now understood to need protection from not begging as such but from aggression (Waiton, Reference Waiton2008, p. 63).
Here, it is less the moral character of a person that is judged in and of itself today, more the risk presented by a beggar or an antisocial individual. Indeed, laws and legal judgments based on the notion of contra bonos mores (against good morals) are now seen as too vague in courts of law, and the once absolute notion of what is ‘good’ has been replaced by the relative sentiment regarding the subjective sense of feelings of insecurity.
Conclusion
Ramsay is insightful in his argument that the previous authority of the state to act as the arbiter of what is ‘right’ has been devolved to the individual citizen and their peace of mind and self-esteem. This is a key concluding point made by Ramsay: what appears to represent state power and sovereignty, the development and enforcement of new laws and regulation, in fact reflects the loss of authority by the state. The very fact that the vulnerable citizen has been normalised and institutionalised in law reflects the failure of law and government to act as a Leviathan. As Ramsay explains, ‘the laws’ premise is that the representative citizen does not believe that the sovereign's threat to punish those who might commit an offence is worth very much' (p. 217). The ‘state of nature’, the society before government and sovereignty have meaning, is implicitly embodied within today's legal changes and government policies. This is not an anomaly, an extreme or state of emergency on an otherwise stable state and civil society, but has become the institutionalised norm: ‘The content of these new laws amounts to an authoritative statement of the law's lack of authority’ (p. 217), and indeed exposes the ‘government's own lack of confidence in the integrity of the political community’ (p. 219). The government fails to reassure people not, as Garland argues, because of the high rate of crime, but rather because of their own internal loss of a sense of meaning, purpose and, ultimately, authority.
Ramsay believes that it is the state itself that has an exaggerated sense of its own lack of authority, but rather than tackle the difficult question of political sovereignty, this issue is bypassed by adopting the ideology of vulnerable autonomy, the result being that we are engaged with as potential victims, and perhaps especially as potential victims of crime. This, however, can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, which is perhaps one of the reasons that ASBOs were not taken very seriously by many of the people who received them, and the reason their introduction did not inspire confidence within communities. If these laws essentially reflect the lack of authority within state institutions, they are unlikely to encourage a sense of fearlessness amongst the public. The state's legitimising claim is based on its ability to protect the vulnerable, but at the same time this new form of self-legitimation has come from a belief that the state cannot protect the public; this results in an absurdity, and ultimately in a never-ending spiral of laws, with each new round of regulations not only failing to reassure but helping to institutionalise the cultural sense of vulnerability. The expectation of psychic protection, where none is felt to be forthcoming, results in escalating claims for laws and regulations. The result of the constant search for safety, with, for example, the vetting of millions of adults, as Ramsay observes, is that the public becomes more distrustful and demoralised, as the world is recast with only two players, the victim and victimiser.
