Both political scientists and the public in general worry about the power of organized interests. Promises to limit the power of organized interests in Washington, D.C. (“drain the swamp!”), are almost invariably popular with the American public. As Moosbrugger notes, this concern was present from the early days of the American republic, very much on the minds of writers of the American Constitution (especially Madison): Moosbrugger argues convincingly, however, that serious investigation of the conditions under which interest groups are powerful must proceed on a comparative basis so that we can observe variation in the factors thought to explain their power.

Moosbrugger offers both a theoretical explanation for the strength of interest groups and empirical case studies of policies to reduce the use of nitrogen in farming in four countries, the UK, Germany, Austria, and Sweden. Her theoretical argument, the “vulnerability thesis” argues that political systems with clear accountability mechanisms produce worse public policy than systems in which accountability is obscured, for example by the need to form coalition governments. The worst case, therefore, is the UK, because its political system provides the clearest accountability of governments to voters. The majority party usually (2010–2015 being a peacetime exception) is unconstrained by the need to form coalitions, controls the legislature, and is unconstrained by judicial interpretation of the constitution. Moobrugger argues that British governments are in consequence incapable of making decisions to advance the public good at the expense of an organized interest for fear of electoral punishment by that group resulting in their loss of office. Conversely, in systems in which accountability is clouded, governments can advance the public interest without fear of electoral retaliation.

The case studies of policies on the use of nitrogen by farmers in the four countries fit her theoretical argument neatly. The British relied on voluntary measures to address the problem until forced by the EU to adopt more stringent measures, with which the British were slow to comply. Other countries, especially Sweden, moved faster and more vigorously. Austria provides a particularly interesting case supporting the theoretical argument; it moved forward with regulations on nitrogen only after the dominance of a single party, the Social Democrats, had ended giving way to coalition governments.

Moosbrugger has therefore produced a clear theoretical argument and case studies that meet the predictions she derives from it. Both the theoretical argument and the case studies are open to some challenges, however.

The theoretical argument is not new that competition in countries such as the UK, between disciplined parties, for almost (constitutionally) unlimited power, advantages concentrated interests. A vigorous exchange between Brian Barry and J. Roland Pennock in the Journal of Politics in 1971 even related the theoretical issue directly to agricultural subsidy policy, a subject on which Pennock had written previously. Barry responded to Pennock by pointing to the capacity of strategically-placed politicians (such as, in those days, Congressional committee chairs) to extract benefits for their constituents and by arguing that majoritarian systems would produce policies aimed at benefiting majorities, not minorities. Buchanan and Tullock had argued in The Calculus of Consent that competition for critical support from identifiable groups in order to achieve or defend a majority would result in over-spending on policies whose beneficiaries are concentrated in a minority of districts or constituencies. Although this tussle focused more on spending (retirement pensions, agricultural subsidies et cetera) than on regulation, it would have been valuable to see Moosbrugger address it.

Moosbrugger’s argument about the basis of interest group power turns on the incentives created by party and electoral systems. Her argument might well fit other policy examples. For example, it is obvious that British governments shirk decisions that are for the wider good but to the disadvantage of electorally critical geographic areas. The failure for seventy years to approve the construction of a third runway for Heathrow Airport is a case in point; the unpleasant effect on west London constituencies of low-flying aircraft approaching the airport has outweighed the costs of delays and inconvenience to passengers.

However, electoral forces are not the only factors that explain the power of interest groups. Consider, for example, the corporatist political system Moosbrugger so much admires. The power within them of unions and employers’ organizations was related to the need to maintain competitiveness in world markets, not electoral calculation. Maintaining a low-inflation, growth-oriented coalition between these actors was essential. Moreover, most observers think that corporatism has been atrophying in countries most associated with it while electoral systems have been unchanged. Interests in other countries have been advantaged by their ability to make plausible threats to move to a different country, state, or city of public policies to their liking are not adopted. Interest group power might also be explained as organizational strength—the capacity to lobby, possession of relevant expertise, the capacity to produce compliance by members, et cetera—rather than electoral competition. This is not to argue for or against any of these factors being decisive; it is merely to argue that Mossbrugger might have considered the plausibility of factors other than electoral and party systems as determinants of the influence of interest groups.

Mossbrugger’s case studies are interesting but are also open to objections. The focus of the use of nitrogen in farming seems oddly narrow. It would have been valuable to consider the attitudes of the countries she covers to the economically-wasteful and environmentally-destructive Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU. It is highly likely that the British would have emerged as its strongest critic, which, if true, would have been a major objection to Moosbrugger’s thesis. Moreover, Moosbrugger provides no evidence or even citations to studies of whether or not British political parties actually did compete for a farm vote. It is possible but not likely in the period she studies that that they did; however, the failure to establish that such competition occurred leaves a major empirical hole in her argument. Similarly, while the British are castigated as environmental laggards in her work, Moosbrugger does not provide an adequate discussion of environmental policies in the UK in general. Though referenced, Vogel’s work on the impact of different regulatory traditions (with a long history of consensual regulation in the UK in many policy areas) would have been an additional dimension to the analysis though requiring a shift away from her exclusive emphasis on party and electoral systems as causal factors. Finally, Moosbrugger might wish to consider whether the interest group systems she describes are as stable as she implies; as noted earlier, corporatism is a much less compelling account of policy making in Sweden today than in the period covered in this study.

Few, particularly post-Brexit, will wish to defend the British political system. Indeed, even its survival seems in doubt. It is still striking, however, to see it being condemned for being too accountable. The warmth of Moosbrugger’s enthusiasm for imperfect democratic accountability comes as a shock, making her book is a stimulating contribution.