I. INTRODUCTION
Drug pilfering, called “diversion,”Footnote 1 has probably always occurred at some level within the health care system.Footnote 2 In recent years, however, it has become a problem of greater visibility. Over the past few years, numerous cases have made their way into the news about health care workers stealing drugs from hospitals or patients.Footnote 3 A notable case is that of David Kwiatkowski, a traveling health care worker who was injecting himself with fentanyl, eventually causing a hepatitis C outbreak in a New Hampshire hospital.Footnote 4 Kwiatkowski worked for more than a dozen health care facilities in at least seven states—each of which fired Kwiatkowski or forced him to resign when they discovered his theft of drugs.Footnote 5 Despite being caught on numerous occasions, he continued to find employment in health care facilities through staffing agencies.Footnote 6 Just before a patient was to be operated on, Kwiatkowski would inject himself with the patient’s fentanyl, then replace the missing portion of the vile with saline solution to conceal his theft.Footnote 7 Kwiatkowski’s actions caused thirty-two patients at Exeter Hospital in New Hampshire to contract hepatitis C—thereby exposing the hospital to massive liability.Footnote 8 Kwiatkowski pled guilty to obtaining controlled substances by fraud and tampering with a consumer product for which he received a thirty-nine-year prison sentence.Footnote 9
Unfortunately, Kwiatkowski’s case is not unique, but rather just one of numerous similar known cases.Footnote 10 Kwiatkowski’s case highlights a systematic problem with drug diversion in health care: the current legal system fails to adequately detect and stop drug diversion early on. The concern is not regarding remedies after the fact, but the need for a better legal system to stop dangerous drug pilfering early on to prevent harm. The current set of ex-post legal remedies provide accountability, but there are holes in the ex-ante prevention and detection processes. Prevention defects are evident because Kwiatkowski, and others like him, continued essentially unstopped, despite the colleagues’ knowledge of the issue and previous detection of their diversion.
Part II of this Note examines the current legal rules applicable to drug diversion in the health care setting. Part III analyzes the current legal frameworks of malpractice, negligence, and criminal sanctions, while Part IV argues these frameworks are insufficient to effectively prevent and quickly stop diversion. Part V offers a comprehensive set of practical regulatory and legal solutions that should be implemented to stop diversion early on.
II. BACKGROUND
The “opioid epidemic” refers to the substantial incidence of opioid drug addiction that has swept across the United States.Footnote 11 High prescription rates of opioid painkillers across the country have arguably fueled the opioid epidemic.Footnote 12 According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”), in 2017 over fifty-eight opioid prescriptions were issued per hundred people, totaling 191 million prescriptions in the United States.Footnote 13 Addiction, however, is not just a problem within the general population; it also touches health care workers.Footnote 14 Surprisingly, more than one in ten health care workers experience addiction to drugs or alcohol in their lifetime.Footnote 15 Additionally, over seventeen percent of physicians have used opioids in an unsupervised fashion.Footnote 16
Not only are health care workers fallible to human conditions like addiction, but they also have extraordinary access to addictive drugs. This access is a natural consequence of their profession, which tends to put them in the vicinity of highly addictive drugs and sometimes in the position of administering or caring for patients to whom such substances are dispensed.Footnote 17 It is not uncommon for a health care worker to work long stressful hours, which could precipitate substance abuse as a coping mechanism.Footnote 18 Even if the health care worker is not suffering from addiction, there could be a monetary incentive to steal drugs to sell for others’ use.Footnote 19 Having easier access than most, combined with any susceptibility to addiction or desire for money, may lead health care workers to divert drugs.
Drug diversion creates risks, not only for the affected health care workers, but also for their patients.Footnote 20 For example, drug addiction can cause health care workers to make mistakes when providing patient care.Footnote 21 An intoxicated health care worker is more likely to administer incorrect doses of medication and less likely to properly monitor patients.Footnote 22 Physicians who are under the influence could provide substandard care or procedures.Footnote 23 Additionally, when health care workers steal controlled substances, like opioids, they often attempt to hide their actions from others due to the legal and employment implications associated with stealing drugs from the workplace.Footnote 24 In attempting to hide their diversion of drugs, health care workers take risks that put the patients in jeopardy of harm. These risks can take the form of reusing needles or siphoning off the patient’s drugs, causing the patient to receive an inadequate dose of medication.Footnote 25 Reusing needles or diluting a medication can cause the patient to contract an illness or experience increased pain.Footnote 26 For example, to feed his addiction and avoid detection, Kwiatkowski took risky measures to steal opioids, which resulted in unsafe needle practices and the infection of patients with hepatitis C.Footnote 27 In addition, drug diversion creates liability for hospitals that employ workers who provide substandard care to patients.Footnote 28
On a number of occasions, different hospitals and staff members caught Kwiatkowski stealing, using, or being under the influence of drugs.Footnote 29 Over the course of eight years, however, he continued to work around opioids, thus putting patients at risk with his ongoing diversion.Footnote 30 A legislatively created system mandating random drug testing of health care workers could help identify and stop diversion issues early on.Footnote 31 While that solution may be simple, the anticipated collateral effects have prevented it from gaining traction with legislators.Footnote 32 For example, the New Hampshire General Court unsuccessfully proposed a similar testing system in Kwiatkowski’s wake.Footnote 33 Due to cost concerns for hospitals and other health care organizations, legislators removed the mandatory drug testing requirement from the bill.Footnote 34 Undertaking drug testing of all health care workers in a facility on a random periodic basis would be costly.Footnote 35 Incurring this expense may be feasible for some hospitals or facilities, but difficult for others to manage, compared to targeted drug tests when there is suspicion of drug diversion. Targeted suspicion-based drug testing would be more cost-effective; however, it relies on health care workers’ ability to notice diversion-like activity and report suspected diverters to the organization or authorities.Footnote 36 Therefore, if health care workers cannot themselves identify diversion-like activity or are not reporting suspected diversion, then suspicion-based drug testing would be ineffective.
Health care workers, however, generally have the skills to recognize a colleague’s drug diversion activity.Footnote 37 Many of the hospitals where Kwiatkowski worked had staff that noticed tell-tale signs of his drug use behavior.Footnote 38 These signs included: vials going missing after Kwiatkowski was seen entering the room,Footnote 39 Kwiatkowski being seen putting syringes in his pants,Footnote 40 syringes being tampered with only when Kwiatkowski was working,Footnote 41 and Kwiatkowski being found unresponsive in the bathroom,Footnote 42 shaking and appearing intoxicated,Footnote 43 and appearing at work with bloodshot eyesFootnote 44 and white foam around his mouth.Footnote 45 Some argue that a colleague’s realization of addiction may be delayed because poor work performance tends to be one of the last indicators of drug use.Footnote 46 That conjecture, however, discounts other obvious signals like bloodshot eyes, odd behavior near drugs, or the worker’s presence in rooms where he has no business being.Footnote 47 In Kwiatkowski’s case, colleagues picked up on symptoms like bloodshot eyes or odd activities that did not necessarily implicate poor job performance.Footnote 48 Therefore, under the right circumstances, health care workers are capable of identifying when their colleagues are acting suspiciously or appear to be on drugs.Footnote 49
At the same time, health care workers do not have the best track record for reporting suspected drug use or diversion.Footnote 50 A number of external factors can lead health care workers to fail to report their colleagues’ drug addiction, including: a feeling that someone else would address the issue,Footnote 51“intimidation, fear of occupational and financial reprisals, and the need to protect the physician’s practice or the hospital’s reputation.”Footnote 52 In addition, the stigma associated with “overreacting” and labeling someone as an addict may deter colleagues from reporting their suspicions.Footnote 53 These factors contribute to what Professor Marie Baldisseri calls the “conspiracy of silence,” in which health care workers tend to look the other way and report nothing, with the hope that the problem will resolve itself.Footnote 54 Alarmingly, studies have found that thirty-three percent of doctors who were aware of a colleague abusing drugs did not report that colleague.Footnote 55 While some of Kwiatkowski’s colleagues reported his behavior to superiors, others did not.Footnote 56 Therefore, given the “code of silence” culture of looking the other way, targeted drug testing would not be effective unless health care facilities have a fundamental change in the culture of reporting. Thus, to make targeted drug testing effective, regulators’ focus should be on changing the culture within the health care field to encourage health care workers to report suspected drug behavior.Footnote 57
Arguably, existing civil and criminal liability frameworks can effectively deter and counteract diversion. These frameworks include criminal sanctions regarding controlled substances,Footnote 58 and civil liability for medical malpractice and negligence.Footnote 59 Therefore, the following will explore the current civil and criminal liability systems that would hold a health care facility or its workers accountable for diversion. Exploring current frameworks will expose the potential holes in the current liability system and show that it is ineffective both at deterring the diverter and incentivizing fellow workers to report suspected diversion. Regardless of a health care facility’s incentive to prevent diversion, the workers themselves must have incentives to report suspected diversion or drug use because they are in the best position to notice suspect behavior. Currently, health care workers lack sufficient incentives to report their colleagues when they suspect diversion.Footnote 60 Without sufficient incentives, cost-effective targeted suspicion-based drug testing is likely unachievable.
While efforts to create dispensing procedures are important to prevent drug thefts,Footnote 61 they do not solve the problem at hand. Cases like Kwiatkowski’s make clear that drug theft can happen at any point along the distribution chain, including after drugs have been taken out or as they are dispensed to the patient.Footnote 62 Even with rigorous dispensing procedures, health care workers can still obtain the drugs they are looking for in other ways. Dispensing procedures can only go so far and likely cannot prevent diversion standing alone. As a result, the following will not further elaborate on dispensing procedures.
While this Note seeks to expose the gaps in the current liability system and examine how to improve reporting, the focus should not be on health care workers alone. Health care workers are gatekeepers, so it is important to consider that initial information transfer.Footnote 63 It is also crucial, however, to consider what happens after that information is conveyed to the appropriate parties. In the Kwiatkowski case, when workers did come forward or Kwiatkowski was caught, administrators at numerous facilities failed to put a full stop to his actions.Footnote 64 The hospitals fired Kwiatkowski or forced him to resign, which stopped the diversion and future harm only in that particular facility.Footnote 65 Kwiatkowski was then able to move on to other facilities and perpetrate harm elsewhere.Footnote 66 This result is startling considering Kwiatkowski was diverting drugs for eight yearsFootnote 67 across seven states.Footnote 68 In many incidents, management and the staffing agency clearly failed to contact the state licensing board, regulatory agencies, or credentialing organizations responsible for ensuring ethical guidelines were upheld.Footnote 69 When the Arizona Hospital staff found Kwiatkowski overdosed, it reported his conduct to the police, the American Registry of Radiologic Technicians (“ARRT”), and the state regulatory agency.Footnote 70 ARRT is a credentialing organization for radiological technicians,Footnote 71 used by thirty-seven states to “verify credentials”Footnote 72 and by employers as a prerequisite for employment.Footnote 73 While all three conducted some investigation, the police dropped the charges, which led ARRT to stop its investigation.Footnote 74 Once ARRT ceased its investigation, Kwiatkowski moved on to the next state, still fully certified to work.Footnote 75 Thus, any comprehensive set of legal changes would need a broader focus that encompasses stakeholders in addition to health care workers.
III. SANCTIONS AND THEORIES OF LIABILITY
Currently, in the case of drug diversion, depending on the factual circumstances, there are a few viable avenues of liability for the diverter, colleagues, or the health care facility.Footnote 76 The diverter himself, and possibly fellow health care workers, could be subject to criminal or civil liability,Footnote 77 whereas the health care facility would likely be subject to civil liability.Footnote 78 The diverter himself could be civilly liable under malpractice or ordinary negligence theories.Footnote 79 A host of federal and state criminal statutes dealing with drug use and diversion could also affect the diverter.Footnote 80 Hospitals would likely be liable for the harm caused by health care workers under vicarious liability theories.Footnote 81 The following will explore current potential civil and criminal liability.
A. Civil Theories
1. Malpractice
Medical malpractice is a state-based tort claim, so the elements differ depending on the jurisdiction.Footnote 82 Medical malpractice, however, generally requires that three elements existFootnote 83: (1) that a physician-patient relationship existed at the time;Footnote 84(2) that a violation of the customary standard of care occurred;Footnote 85 and (3) that the defendant’s negligence was the cause of the patient’s injury.Footnote 86
Generally, to have a viable malpractice claim the plaintiff must establish that there was a physician-patient relationship.Footnote 87 This relationship creates a duty of care that the physician owes the patient.Footnote 88 A physician-patient relationship is generally created when a physician accepts or undertakes to care for a patient.Footnote 89 Thus, the agreement does not have to be explicit or a contract to care for a patient; rather it can be implied by simply undertaking a patient’s care.Footnote 90 This is a “consensual” relationship between the parties which requires an “affirmative action” by the physician.Footnote 91 A relationship can therefore be formed simply by providing medical advice that would affect a patient’s medical care, regardless of a physician’s internal opinions about the relationship.Footnote 92
The customary standard of care normally requires expert testimony to establish the ordinary skill and care of a physician or medical professional given the circumstances.Footnote 93 The standard sometimes involves a “locality rule,” meaning that the standard of care is based on how a physician of ordinary skill in the particular locality where he works would have acted.Footnote 94 In other jurisdictions the standard may be more general, based on the average skill and care of a physician of his type generally, but also accounting for constraints and particularities of the locality.Footnote 95
Finally, there must also be a proximate causal link between the patient’s injury and the deviation from the applicable standard of care.Footnote 96 Often a medical expert assists in determining whether the particular deviation proximately caused the harm.Footnote 97 Sometimes, however, the physician’s negligence is so obvious that a jury could determine a causal connection between the negligence and the harm without the help of a medical expert.Footnote 98
2. Negligence
While malpractice would likely encompass most actions against nurses or doctors, it is not always the case; thus, it is important to mention ordinary negligence as well.Footnote 99 This theory is especially relevant because other parties, such as janitors,Footnote 100 who are not held to a professional standard, could still negligently cause harm.Footnote 101
Traditionally, malpractice actions were commonly brought against physicians, but not nurses.Footnote 102 Physicians were given greater responsibilities and held to higher expectations, which required malpractice as a standard to meet the responsibilities of the profession.Footnote 103 Nurses, on the other hand, were traditionally “not involved in diagnosis and treatment and were considered physician’s servants with servile tasks understandable by most lay persons,” and as a result, negligence was the standard action against nurses.Footnote 104 Today, nurses are generally held to higher standards and are given more room for independent judgement, resulting in more jurisdictions moving to a malpractice standard.Footnote 105 Jurisdictions are mixed, however, as to whether they classify nurses under an ordinary negligence theory or one of malpractice.Footnote 106 While in practical terms malpractice and negligence are not two separate torts,Footnote 107 in reality the distinction is important for two reasons: (1) the standard of comparison changes depending on whether the negligent act falls under ordinary negligence or malpractice;Footnote 108 and (2) the statute of limitations can differ depending on the action brought.Footnote 109 Therefore, a negligence action consists of four basic elements: (1) duty of care; (2) a breach of duty; (3) damages; and (4) causal relation between breach of duty and damages.Footnote 110
Given the facts, the tortfeasor must have had a duty of care to the injured party.Footnote 111 The standard of care for malpractice is generally that of a professional of ordinary skill and care in the given circumstances;Footnote 112 whereas, ordinary negligence applies the standard of a reasonable person, not that of a professional.Footnote 113 Similar to an action for malpractice, the breach must result in harm or damage that is both the proximate and but-for causes of the harm.Footnote 114
3. Vicarious Liability—Hospitals
Vicarious liability is the imposition of “indirect legal responsibility”Footnote 115 and liability for harm caused by another’s breach.Footnote 116 Vicarious liability, therefore can hold an otherwise innocent party accountable for the harms caused solely by another.Footnote 117 Furthermore, the vicariously liable party is responsible for the “entire burden of fault,”Footnote 118 thereby making the vicariously liable party responsible to the “same extent” as the tortfeasor.Footnote 119
Traditionally, hospitals, like other employers, were only vicariously liable for their employee’s acts.Footnote 120 This relationship is known as an “actual agency” relationship.Footnote 121 Thus, hospitals were not liable for the actions of non-employees, such as independent contractors.Footnote 122 The rationale for holding hospitals liable for the negligent harm caused by their employees is based on a hospital’s “right to control” the employee,Footnote 123 whereas a hospital would not have such a right with non-employees.Footnote 124 Thus, the general test for determining whether an actual agency relationship exists requires finding that the hospital had the right to control the employee with regard to the “details.”Footnote 125 Specifically, the hospital must have the right to control “both the means and the details of the process by which the agent is to accomplish his task in order for an agency relationship to exist.”Footnote 126
Hospitals, however, can still be potentially vicariously liable for those who are not actual agents of the hospital under an “apparent agency” theory.Footnote 127 Apparent agency exists when a hospital holds out or otherwise represents to another that an agent is its own, even if he is technically not.Footnote 128 An apparent agency theory generally requires three elementsFootnote 129: (1) that the hospital held the physician out as its agent via words or conduct;Footnote 130(2) that the patient ultimately relied on the hospital’s representation;Footnote 131 and (3) that the patient’s reliance on that representation resulted in a harm.Footnote 132
Apparent agency first requires that the hospital held out to the patient or public that the professional was an agent of the hospital.Footnote 133 Holding out, or the hospital’s representation to the public, can occur in numerous ways, but in essence revolves around whether a reasonable patient would, based on the hospital’s representations, believe the professionals are under the hospital’s control.Footnote 134 As the court in Sword v. NKC Hospitals, Inc. stated, the question is “whether the hospital ‘acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital.’”Footnote 135 Generally, when a hospital holds itself out to the public as a “provider of hospital care,” that creates an implied assumption that it is providing the care rather than an individual doctor or nurse.Footnote 136 Advertising campaigns, for example, tend to show that a hospital holds itself out as a provider of care.Footnote 137
The hospital, however, can make public representations to explicitly and specifically show that the professionals are not the hospital’s agents but independent contractors.Footnote 138 Requiring patients to sign waivers or including signs stating that the professionals are independent contractors and not the hospital’s agents may, in some jurisdictions, be sufficient to show that the hospital did not represent staff as its employees.Footnote 139 Other jurisdictions may not be so willing to accept a waiver or sign as negating apparent agency.Footnote 140 Additionally, waivers or signs by nature require notice to the patient regarding the professional’s status.Footnote 141 In emergencies, providing notice may be more difficult given the nature of the situation, but also because:
[G]enerally people who seek medical help through the emergency room facilities of modern-day hospitals are unaware of the status of the various professionals working there. Absent a situation where the patient is directed by his own physician or where the patient makes an independent selection as to which physicians he will use while there, it is the reputation of the hospital itself upon which he would rely. Also, unless the patient is in some manner put on notice of the independent status of the professionals with whom it might be expected to come into contact, it would be natural for him to assume that these people are employees of the hospital.Footnote 142
Patients must also have relied on the hospital’s representations when it comes to their care.Footnote 143 This generally means that the professional serving the patient was provided to them and not selected by the patient.Footnote 144 In effect,
[T]he critical distinction is whether the plaintiff is seeking care from the hospital itself or whether the plaintiff is looking to the hospital merely as a place for his or her personal physician to provide medical care. Except for one who seeks care from a specific physician, if a person voluntarily enters a hospital without objecting to his or her admission to the hospital, then that person is seeking care from the hospital itself. An individual who seeks care from a hospital itself, as opposed to care from his or her personal physician, accepts care from the hospital in reliance upon the fact that complete emergency room care—from blood testing to radiological readings to the endless medical support services—will be provided by the hospital through its staff.Footnote 145
Finally, it must be shown that the reliance on the hospital’s representation resulted in a harm.Footnote 146 Therefore, reliance alone is not sufficient, but the reliance must have led to “a change in position to” the patient’s detriment.Footnote 147
B. Criminal and Administrative Sanctions Under the Controlled Substances Act
In addition to civil liability, those who divert drugs within the health care setting could be subject to criminal sanctions.Footnote 148 Every state has its own set of laws and regulations regarding the use, possession, and distribution of drugs.Footnote 149 The federal government also has its own set of drug laws under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).Footnote 150 Congress promulgated the CSA with concern regarding “the diversion of drugs from legitimate channels to illegitimate channels.”Footnote 151 Most drug enforcement actions are on the state level, but the CSA allows the federal government to enforce its drug laws in all states.Footnote 152 Given the differing state drug laws and regulations, this Note will not dwell on individual state laws. Additionally, considering state and federal authorities tend to work together,Footnote 153 the following will be a general overview of current federal criminal drug sanctions.
The CSA created a schedule system that the federal government uses to regulate the “lawful production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances.”Footnote 154 The system uses a set of five different schedules to rank drugs based on: “(1) how dangerous they are considered to be, (2) their potential for abuse and addiction, and (3) whether they have legitimate medical use.”Footnote 155 The schedule system categorizes drugs with the highest potential for abuse and no “accepted” medical use under Schedule I.Footnote 156 Each progressing schedule after Schedule I has a lower potential for abuse than the prior schedule, with Schedule V containing drugs with the lowest potential for abuse of all schedules.Footnote 157 According to the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) Diversion Control Division, opioids such as fentanyl are Schedule II drugs.Footnote 158
The CSA requires those distributing or handling listed controlled substances to register with the DEA.Footnote 159 Additionally, the CSA makes it “unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally—(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; or (2) to create, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to distribute or dispense, a counterfeit substance” unless exempted from the law.Footnote 160 Furthermore,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally … who is a registrant to distribute a controlled substance classified in schedule I or II, in the course of his legitimate business, except pursuant to an order or an order form … [or] to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge.Footnote 161
The CSA also provides wide-ranging criminal penalties based on the controlled substances’ schedule, type, and weight.Footnote 162 These criminal penalties include wide-ranging prison sentences and large criminal fines.Footnote 163
To fall under the CSA, a criminal defendant must have acted “knowingly or intentionally.”Footnote 164 Under the CSA, knowledge or intent does not mean that the defendant knew he was violating the Act, or had the intent to violate the Act.Footnote 165 Mistake of law is not a defense to the knowledge or intent mens rea.Footnote 166 Rather, the knowledge and intent requirement demands that the defendant acts with knowledge of or intention to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess” the controlled substance.Footnote 167
Additionally, even though the CSA’s registration process allows certain parties such as doctors to handle and distribute enumerated controlled substances, the power to distribute is limited.Footnote 168 Medical professionals such as physicians can be held liable under the CSA for exceeding the authority granted to them.Footnote 169 Medical professionals who move from lawful distribution as set forth in the Act, to unlawful distribution or use of controlled substances will be in violation of the CSA.Footnote 170 Registered medical professionals are only protected from the CSA’s criminal penalties when they distribute controlled substances lawfully as allowed by the Act.Footnote 171
In 1975 the DEA implemented regulations on employee diversion reporting in health care.Footnote 172 21 C.F.R. § 1301.91 notably states:
Reports of drug diversion by fellow employees is not only a necessary part of an overall employee security program but also serves the public interest at large. It is, therefore, the position of DEA that an employee who has knowledge of drug diversion from his employer by a fellow employee has an obligation to report such information to a responsible security official of the employer. The employer shall treat such information as confidential and shall take all reasonable steps to protect the confidentiality of the information and the identity of the employee furnishing information. A failure to report information of drug diversion will be considered in determining the feasibility of continuing to allow an employee to work in a drug security area. The employer shall inform all employees concerning this policy.Footnote 173
In addition, 21 C.F.R. § 1301.76 requires a registrant to report the theft or “significant loss” of controlled substances to the DEA within one day.Footnote 174 At first glance, the regulations may seem to provide some punitive measures against those who have knowledge of a colleague’s diversion but choose not to report such conduct to a superior.Footnote 175 Neither 21 C.F.R. § 1301.76 nor 21 C.F.R. § 1301.91, however, have criminal penalties for violations, but rather only factor into potential administrative sanctions such as an employee’s ability to work within a drug security area and the registrant’s ability to keep their registration to distribute.Footnote 176 Moreover, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the DEA in his comments on 21 C.F.R. §§ 1301.90 and 1301.93 asserted, “[t]hese regulations are not mandatory procedures but are published to serve as a guideline to assist non-practitioners in implementing realistic drug security programs.”Footnote 177 Interpreted as a guideline to non-practitioner employers, 21 C.F.R. § 1301.91 is quite weak because its violation does not definitively result in a loss of ability to practice, nor does it result in any criminal sanctions.Footnote 178
IV. LIABLE PARTIES UNDER THE CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THAT LIABILITY
A. Who is Liable?
Now that the current legal liability framework applicable to parties in the case of diversion has been laid out, it is important to focus on the gaps in the current framework.
A hypothetical physician diverter could be liable under a malpractice theory.Footnote 179 First, if the diverter physician treated a patient while diverting drugs, he would have created the necessary physician-patient relationship.Footnote 180 Second, a physician diverter would probably violate the applicable standard of care because an expert witness would likely testify that stealing drugs from a patient does not fall within the customary standard of care for a physician of ordinary skill.Footnote 181 Finally, assuming that the physician’s diversion could be causally linked to some harm to the patient,Footnote 182 the elements of malpractice would be met.Footnote 183
The same analysis and result would apply to nurses or other health care professionals in jurisdictions that extend the malpractice professional standard to these groups.Footnote 184 As previously noted, however, not all jurisdictions apply a malpractice standard to nurses or health care workers, thus an ordinary negligence standard might apply as an alternative.Footnote 185 A hypothetical diverter to whom malpractice would not apply would nonetheless still likely face liability under ordinary negligence theory.Footnote 186 First, health care workers have a duty to not divert drugs from the patient or facility.Footnote 187 This legal duty is established by federal law making it unlawful to dispense controlled substances for use of those for whom they are not ordered or to otherwise dispense them outside the CSA’s authorization.Footnote 188 Next, by diverting controlled substances from a patient to oneself, the diverter has failed to abide by the applicable standard of care, thus breaching his duty not to dispense except as allowed by law.Footnote 189 If a harm can be causally connected to the diversion—presumably disease or increased painFootnote 190—then the elements of ordinary negligence would be met for the diverter.Footnote 191
Additionally, hospitals or other individual registrants could also be liable under theories of ordinary negligence resulting from duties created by federal regulations.Footnote 192 For example, in Walters v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside, the hospital had a legal duty to report the loss or theft of drugs to the DEA, derived from federal regulations requiring reporting of losses or thefts of controlled substances.Footnote 193 Thus, there is the potential for liability in negligence for failure to report by non-diverter registrants.Footnote 194
Hospitals or health care facilities could be vicariously liable for their employee’s negligence or malpractice under an actual agency theory.Footnote 195 This is because a hospital or facility has the right to control an employee diverter.Footnote 196 It is not uncommon, however, that doctors or others who could divert controlled substances are independent contractors instead of the facility’s employees.Footnote 197 In such a case, a hospital or facility would only be held liable for the actions of an independent contractor diverter where it had apparent authority over the diverter.Footnote 198 A hospital or facility could have apparent authority over the independent contractor diverter, where the facility held out or represented said diverter as its employee.Footnote 199 Additionally, the patient must rely on this representation in a way that caused the patient harm.Footnote 200 Thus, it is potentially tougher to hold a hospital or facility liable for an independent contractor diverter’s actions due to the highly fact-dependent nature of the inquiry; additionally, a facility may have waived the agency presumption through clear representations that the diverter was not an employee.Footnote 201
In addition to civil liability, diverters themselves would violate criminal drug laws, if not on the state level, then under the CSA.Footnote 202 To violate the CSA, a diverter must have knowledge or intent to possess or dispense a controlled substance outside the authority given to registrants.Footnote 203 Thus, most diverters would clearly violate the CSA by unauthorized diversion of controlled substances to themselves.Footnote 204
Those who have knowledge of others’ diversion but fail or choose not to report it would not be guilty of violating any part of the CSA.Footnote 205 While the DEA has promulgated regulations that require registrants to report theft, loss, or diversion of controlled substances to the DEA, these regulations do not impose criminal liability for failure to comply.Footnote 206 The DEA’s regulations are really guidelines.Footnote 207 At most, violations factor into the administrative suspension of a registrant’s ability to work within a drug security area or a possible negligence action.Footnote 208
B. Effectiveness of Liability
Given the above analysis, both a diverter and health care facility would likely be liable for diversion in some fashion.Footnote 209 Individual colleagues who have knowledge of diversion but fail to report it to anyone would at most be subject to administrative remedies or the possibility of a negligence action.Footnote 210 Thus, what incentives, if any, liability creates for each party to prevent diversion is key to understanding whether the current legal framework is effective in actually preventing diversion.
Generally, criminal penalties are more likely to deter diverters and potential diverters who are not doctors or other highly paid medical professionals as opposed to the potential for civil liability. This difference in deterrence stems from the assumption that a lower-paid health care worker is likely judgement proof, or in other words, unable to pay resulting tort damages.Footnote 211 A judgment-proof diverter is unlikely to incorporate potential monetary damage awards into his decision makingFootnote 212 because: (1) a plaintiff’s attorney will not bother bringing an action against a judgment-proof party;Footnote 213 and (2) even if an action was brought, the diverter would skirt the liability by being asset poor.Footnote 214 Even if the diverter were a highly-paid professional such as a physician, however, malpractice insurance could potentially protect a diverter from all or part of the civil liability, still providing a low deterrent effect.Footnote 215 Therefore, the deterrence factor for a rational potential diverter is the criminal sanctions likely to result regardless of personal wealth. This assumption relies on potential diverters being rational actors; however, there is evidence that drug addiction or use can cause diverters to act irrationally or make poor decisions compared to non-drug-using peers.Footnote 216 As a result, we cannot solely rely on imposing criminal punishment on the diverter to effectively prevent diversion.
Hospitals or medical facilities, on the other hand, have incentives to prevent diversion, stemming from possible civil liabilities.Footnote 217 A hospital or facility likely has substantial assets and an incentive to develop systems to detect and prevent diversion.Footnote 218 A hospital that has reachable assets will protect those assets, which is in stark contrast to the individual diverter who is likely judgement proof.Footnote 219 While a hospital’s liability is limited to the actions of its employees or those over whom it has apparent authority,Footnote 220 this opening is presumably broad and uncertain enough for a hospital or other facility to be incentivized to close this liability gap. Even though a hospital may have the incentive to prevent diversion, its power to enact effective reporting policies may be limited given lack of total control.Footnote 221 It is conceivable that, where an actual agency relationship exists, a hospital, which has the “right to control,” will simply implement strong reporting requirements of its employees and punitive measures for failure to comply.Footnote 222 Many health care professionals, however, are not actual agents but independent contractors, and a hospital does not have the ability to control the “means” and “details” of how these individuals carry out their work.Footnote 223 Given a hospital’s limited control over independent contractors, it may be simpler to make clear representations to the patients that the staff are independent to waive apparent agency liability, rather than attempt to impose reporting requirements.Footnote 224 Additionally, even if a hospital can implement reporting requirements effectively, the hospital may not transmit the information to authorities out of concern for reputational harms from the bad publicity.Footnote 225 This may explain why so many hospitals simply fired or allowed Kwiatkowski to resign.Footnote 226 Hospitals may just take their chances: if they report that a staff member was dangerously stealing drugs from patients, it certainly comes out in the press, but if they do not report, the problem may just quietly disappear and never resurface in connection with the hospital. Therefore, due to the independent staffing structure, bifurcation between medical staff and hospital administration, and potential reputational harm disincentives, hospitals and facilities may not be best suited to reliably report diversion.
That leaves third-party colleagues who are aware of or suspect diversion. Colleagues are arguably in the best position, if not the only practical position, to realize when a health care worker is diverting controlled substances. This position is clear from the case of Kwiatkowski, where each time his diversion was discovered, it was due to a colleague’s observation of the event.Footnote 227 As the law currently stands, colleagues who perpetuate the “conspiracy of silence” cultureFootnote 228 are only subject to administrative measures or potential civil liability.Footnote 229 Many colleagues of diverters, however, would not be concerned about civil liability because they are likely judgment proof or have malpractice coverage.Footnote 230 Thus, the main incentive for most health care workers to report would be the mere possibility of administrative constraints on their ability to work within a drug security area.Footnote 231 While this may provide incentive for some, it presumably is not sufficiently punitive to overcome the prevailing “conspiracy of silence” within the field.Footnote 232 This is especially true considering the low risk of administrative action for failure to report, because it would be difficult to prove that a colleague was actually aware of the diversion.Footnote 233 At the same time, thoughts that they could have mistaken the signs, belief that someone else will take care of it, or other stigmas associated with reporting a fellow colleague are present in health care workers’ minds when considering whether or not to report.Footnote 234 As a result, the current liability framework does not provide sufficient incentives, in the face of numerous and substantial social disincentives, to propel vital witnesses to report suspected criminal activity.Footnote 235
V. SOLUTION: IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS FOR COLLEAGUES FAILING TO REPORT DIVERSION
Those most likely to have vital information that could stop diversion if reported to appropriate parties have substantial social incentives not to report.Footnote 236 These social incentives in health care appear to outweigh incentives to report in many cases.Footnote 237 The ability to stop diversion early is therefore greatly inhibited and the potential harm to patients is increased when colleagues fail to come forward to law enforcement, hospital administration, and licensing agencies with suspected diversion.Footnote 238
One solution is to implement mandatory random periodic drug testing of all hospital workers.Footnote 239 Some legislatures, like the New Hampshire General Court, have rejected this suggestion due to the expenses associated with testing everyone.Footnote 240 Reliance on targeted suspicion-based testing and inquiries would clearly be more cost-effective and efficient.Footnote 241 Effective suspicion-based testing or inquiries, however, rely on colleagues to be diligent in reporting suspected diversion.Footnote 242 Therefore, changes in the legal framework to increase disincentives for failing to report could improve the efficiency of suspicion-based testing and inquiries into drug diversion.
To counteract the low incentives to report and high disincentives to not report suspected diversion, there should be criminal sanctions for failure to report drug diversion. Mandatory reporting laws are not a novel idea; for example, forty-nine states require and impose penalties on physicians and health care workers for knowingly or willfully failing to report suspected child abuse.Footnote 243 Forty states make failure to report child abuse a misdemeanor.Footnote 244 Currently, Florida has a mandatory reporting law requiring those who distribute controlled substances to report significant loss or theft of controlled substances to law enforcement within twenty-four hours, with the failure to do so resulting in a misdemeanor.Footnote 245 Adoption of similar laws elsewhere could incentivize colleagues of diverting health care workers to report drug diversion in the face of criminal penalties. While there are unlikely to be many prosecutions under this proposed statute given the challenge of proving knowledge of diversion, it may increase reporting out of fear that it could be a possibility. Fear of criminal punishment or the associated stigma could be a significant incentive to report.Footnote 246 Machiavelli once wrote, “love is held by a chain of obligation which, men being selfish, is broken whenever it serves their purpose; but fear is maintained by a dread of punishment which never fails.”Footnote 247 In other words, fear of punishment may be a better incentive for health care workers to report colleagues than the status quo incentives. Status quo incentives consist of: (1) the low possibility of civil liability; and (2) an ethical duty to do the right thing which may easily succumb to self-serving social impulses.Footnote 248 Enacting statutes to pressure reporting with fear of criminal punishment would also require that states make health care workers aware of the requirement.
Additionally, some states, like Kentucky, include in their mandatory reporting of child abuse statutes that the individual is not relieved of their duty to report by just telling a supervisor, but rather they must report to law enforcement as well.Footnote 249 Requiring the individual to report directly to law enforcement is essential to avoid hospitals failing to report due to fears of reputational harms.Footnote 250
Furthermore, mandatory diversion reporting statutes, should make clear that it is a crime for an employer to take negative action against an employee for reporting. Similarly, seventeen states have laws that prohibit an employer from retaliating against an employee for reporting child abuse.Footnote 251 Adopting similar measures in mandatory diversion statutes would incentivize employees to report, knowing that an employer cannot lawfully retaliate against them for doing so.Footnote 252
Some may argue that imposing criminal sanction on health care workers failing to report a colleague’s suspected diversion may result in an unjust burden. First, however, criminal penalties for failing to report does not create a new duty for health care providers.Footnote 253 Second, colleagues are in a unique position to have key information that could help prevent harm to the very people to whom they owe a duty of care.Footnote 254 Therefore, the burden from the imposition of minor criminal sanctions similar to those already imposed is outweighed by the benefits of the potential increase in reports of diversion and corresponding decrease in patient harm.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. legal system has not effectively adapted to deal with the problem of drug diversion in health care.Footnote 255 Addiction afflicts people across the career spectrum including those in the health care sector.Footnote 256 Further, addiction within health care is especially problematic in comparison to other careers given health care workers’ ready access to controlled substances like opioids. This access and addiction to the drugs they work around has led some health care workers to divert controlled substances from the hospital or patient to themselves.Footnote 257 This diversion not only causes harm to the diverter but also has a high potential to harm the very patients they are entrusted to care for, whether via transmitting diseases or providing subpar care to the patient.Footnote 258 The problem of diversion is intensified because of the cultural persistence of the “conspiracy of silence,” which is the tendency of health care workers to remain silent about suspected diversion by their colleagues.Footnote 259 As a result, cases of diversion can go unreported and allow the diverter to cause harm to more patients as time accrues.Footnote 260 Even when colleagues do gain the courage to report diversion to their superiors, it is not always handled in such a way that will put an end to the diversion. A hospital presumably has reputational concerns to consider and may allow the diverter to quietly move along without taking the proper actions to stop the diverter. These factors can and have led to disastrous results.
The current criminal and civil liability frameworks provide some incentives for involved parties to take preventative measures or report, but they are insufficient to adequately stop diversion quickly. Hospitals do have some incentive to enact procedures to prevent diversion;Footnote 261 however, given staff makeup and reputational concerns, these procedures can have limited effect. Diverters themselves are not deterred because they are likely judgment proof,Footnote 262 and their addiction affects their ability to make rational choices to avoid criminal sanctions.Footnote 263 The colleagues of diverters are in the best position to realize when diversion is occurring; however, the current liability framework does not provide sufficient incentives to report.Footnote 264 A diverter’s colleague is likely judgment proof, or might have malpractice insurance; thus, there is a low expected cost from civil liability associated with failing to report. Additionally, the current framework generally only imposes administrative penalties for failure to report suspected diversion and not criminal sanctions.Footnote 265 This framework is coupled with the social disincentives and stigmas a diverter’s colleague faces when it comes to reporting their colleague’s drug diversion.Footnote 266
While mandatory random drug testing of all health care employees has been suggested as a possible solution, the costs associated with implementation have caused legislators to be wary of such a system.Footnote 267 Without reliable reporting by health care workers, however, the more cost-effective suspicion-based testing or suspicion-based inquiries are rendered ineffective at quickly stopping diversion. Thus, changes to the legal framework should be targeted to disincentivize failure to report a colleague, thereby increasing the likelihood of suspected diversion being reported.
To provide adequate incentives for health care workers to report suspected diversion, the federal government or states should enact mandatory reporting laws with criminal penalties attached. Physicians and health care workers in most states already have similar reporting requirements with penalties for failing to report child abuse.Footnote 268 Combined with an information campaign that makes the legal duty clear to health care workers, the fear of criminal punishment, and a clear directive to report could increase reports of diversion. Thus, by changing the legal framework to impose criminal sanctions for failure to report drug diverting colleagues, the cost-efficient suspicion-based system of diversion detection could be made much more effective and reliable.
Many thanks to all that assisted in this Note, to my family for their constant support, and the staff members of the American Journal of Law and Medicine for all their hard work.
