In his debut book, Noah Dauber reads prominent works of political philosophy in early modern England—works by Thomas Smith, John Case, Francis Bacon, and Thomas Hobbes—in light of modern scholarship by social and institutional historians, to arrive at a new interpretive perspective that challenges, with considerable success, aspects of reigning interpretations. His central revisionary claim is that the “commonwealth” ideal of Henrician England did not evaporate after Kett's Rebellion in 1549, but continued to be a leading framework for English political thought up to the eve of the English Civil War, although in increasingly modified form. In this period, “commonwealth” had not yet acquired its post–Civil War signification as a republic with parliamentary sovereignty. Rather, the word typically referred to the more generic civitas, the national community or united body of the people, understood as a “cooperative whole composed of harmonious interrelated parts” (2). At the same time, it could also be used to refer more narrowly to the respublica, understood as the order of magistracies. And this slippage in usage, Dauber suggests, was indicative of underlying realities. Dauber's major investigation is of how early modern theorists conceived of the relationship, actual and ideal, between society (civitas) and the state (respublica), between private and public. What Dauber finds, in keeping with the findings of social and institutional historians, is that they viewed the two as more closely interwoven than historians of political thought have recognized; and that both ancient and contemporary works on the classical commonwealth provided the intellectual framework in which they conceptualized this interweaving.
The introduction and long first chapter establish the terms of the English discussion. Christian humanists such as Erasmus and More had aspired to a Christianized vision of the classical respublica, with self-love displaced by love of one's neighbor (15). This aspiration was largely taken over by Protestant reformers both on the Continent and in England (3). However, reformers questioned the ability of classical political and social arrangements, tainted as they were by self-love, to support the sanctification necessary to salvation or the moral regeneration necessary to neighborly love. Without faith and grace, these arrangements were a moral and spiritual nullity (16). Still, perhaps they were necessary means for conforming the unregenerate to the law (43). At the same time, the exigencies of maintaining social order led the reformers to sanction the use of coercion by rulers, especially in the wake of the Peasants Rebellion (62). This quickened interest in the use of the penal law by the ancients in enforcing social order and also religious conformity (38–39). In reform eyes, penal law could be more than penal. It could also be pedagogical, informing subjects of right and wrong (39), and could curtail corrupting influences. The result was a running debate within commonwealth thought on the proper mix and form of rewards and punishments as the means to social order and energized action. Much of the vocabulary for this debate was provided by Aristotle's theory of distributive justice—the distribution of rewards, honors, and punishments in accord with the degrees of persons (43–54). Could a ruler find a distribution of rewards alone—material goods, but much more importantly, honors, especially the honor of office—that would secure social peace, satisfying all and providing for the national defense? That is, could private interest be transformed into public interest, and society into state? Or did the competition for esteem render this impossible, and punishment necessary, to be meted out by a socially distant state? The authors examined in subsequent chapters provided varying answers to this question.
The first two authors Dauber examines—Thomas Smith and John Case—incline to the view that the pursuit of honor, if properly distributed, can suffice. In a departure from recent scholars, who read Smith's De Republica Anglorum as a treatise on the state advancing the king-in-parliament concept, Dauber, while acknowledging this dimension of the work, sees Smith as grappling more broadly with relations between state and society, with classical Rome as a guide. The commonwealth, for Smith, is not to be confused with the commoners (a mere “faction”), nor with an undifferentiated populus (a concept, he warns, that is apt to generate Caesaristic tyranny in the name of the people). Rather, the commonwealth is, like classical Rome, a society of orders (85). This understanding of commonwealth effectively erased the distinction between public and private (23). In a well-managed society of orders, everyone attains a form of honor fulfilling his role (96–98), and certain social roles include eligibility to govern. Most interestingly, Dauber shows how Smith drew on new classical scholarship coming out of Italy to place England at a point of “balance” within Roman history between the patricians and plebs (89–90). This allowed Smith to analogize social relations and citizenship in England to those of Rome, though with known facts about Roman factionalism suppressed (90). It also allowed him to identify England with Roman liberty (as part of an invidious comparison with Catholic Europe), if with a truncated conception of Roman liberty that gives scant attention to limits on magisterial authority noted in the Italian scholarship (110). Smith associates political liberty more narrowly with rule that advances the wealth of the people, not that of the ruler and his faction or family, and that is based on mutuality, conducted with the advice of the people. In contrast, political absolutism was not really political rule at all, but, as distinguished by Aristotle, a form of lordship or household rule, with subjects in the position of slaves (84).
A stronger monarchical conception of order is found in John Case's voluminous commentary on Aristotle, Sphaera Civitatis. Read by Dauber as a prophylactic against the spread of Presbyterian conceptions of church polity to the state (117), the Sphaera shares with Smith's De Republica a sense of England as a society of orders, but, in a naturalized Aristotelianism, it more explicitly grounds these orders in natural capacities rather than in constitutional distributions. Yet, although he defends monarchy and hierarchy, Case does not relinquish the commonwealth framework. In particular, he refuses to embrace Bodin's much-discussed model, which was derived from imperial rather than republican Rome, and which completely rejects any tie between social and political authority. Instead, Case bends Bodin to commonwealth understandings. He accepts Bodin's critique of mixed government, but only after redefining sovereignty as simply the highest power in the land (146–47). There was no question, then, that England was a monarchy. But, in perhaps his most interesting move, Case then deploys Bodin's distinction between the sovereignty and government to add the qualification that England is a monarchy with broad administrative participation.
Francis Bacon, writing in the midst of the profligate granting of honors by James I to secure allegiance and revenue, doubted the sufficiency of the quest for honor to bring contentment and military preparedness, and doubted in particular the efficacy of James's aspiration (which was in any case contradicted by his practice) to create an obedient model nobility that would inspire the rest of society to obedient public service through emulation. The commonwealth needed legal talent and vigor in the administration, so must be open to ambitious “new men” (like himself) serving as clients of the patron-king (178, 187). Private interest was thus essential to state service. But this scramble for honors was not self-regulating, and these lawyer-clients needed oversight, ideally by councils of judges (187).
Hobbes considerably sharpened Bacon's criticism of reliance on honor. Indeed, the entire project of securing order through distributive justice he judged a disaster. Treating the distribution of office and reward as a matter of justice only intensifies social strife, each feeling his object is deserved (213). Justice for Hobbes is not a question of distribution but of securing individuals so that their voluntaristic relations can flourish and bind (228). The central and fresh point of Dauber's reading of Hobbes is that, as this observation about voluntarism hints, Hobbes did not entirely jettison the commonwealth vision of society, or even the Reformed version of it. What he rejected was the thought that social order could be maintained by social processes outside of the state (212). It is maintained by fear and punishment—the penal state. But as Dauber emphasizes, once we pass beyond the moment of state founding, commonwealth preoccupations reappear in Hobbes. His proposed governance strategies for sustaining the state reveal once again a concern for a participatory dimension to the state (221–22). Indeed, Hobbes's policy program in general is quite close to traditional commonwealth programs (219–20). Meanwhile, his utter disregard for traditional rank and hierarchy (223) and his interest in creating the conditions for acts based on true conscience (209–10, 228) recall the Christianized respublica of the early Reformers. One might say that, for Hobbes, the penal state is the precondition for the Reformer's idealized commonwealth of uncoerced, neighborly relations. Tying Hobbes to Reform concerns with moral regeneracy certainly cuts against the grain of modern scholarship, and will be one of the more controversial, but potentially most productive, interpretive forays in Dauber's work.
This is a book written for specialists. Yet it does not take a great imaginative leap to find present-day relevance in the concerns of its subjects. The political fallout from today's rapidly growing inequality has suddenly revived the question of the relationship of distributive justice to social peace. Relatedly, the exodus of the white working class from the Democratic Party reminds us of the enduring relevance of the distribution of honor. Economically abused by both parties, but by the Republican Party most of all, the white working class nonetheless moves behind it, feeling it is held in less contempt there than among Democrats. Finally, given the mushrooming around the world of “populist” authoritarianism and illiberal democracy, Thomas Smith's warning about the political danger of undifferentiated conceptions of “the people” rings loudly. This is a well-executed study that pays reading even by the nonspecialist.
