In this book, Hiroyuki Yanagihashi professes two goals. The first is to explain the development of the legal concepts of civil liability, direct agency, and the prohibition against ribḥ (interest) in Islamic legal thought during the formative and early classical Islamic period with special attention to the Iraqi/Hanafi and Medinan/Maliki traditions. The second is to advance a theory that explains “why and how the doctrine of Abu Hanifa in Iraq and that of Malik b. Anas in Medina were transformed into the Hanafi and Maliki schools respectively” (p. 5).
The book is divided into three main parts. In part one, the author analyzes transformations in the concept of civil liability as exemplified in legal discussions about pledges, rent, the sale of specific objects, and unauthorized agency. Yanagihashi shows that rules governing civil liability in the context of these diverse discussions were later synthesized by Hanafi scholars “to form the cluster of…rules governing usurpation, which, as a legal concept, seems to have been introduced for the first time in the first half of the eighth century” (p. 121). The author argues that the Medinan scholars, led by Malik, generally adopted the Iraqi doctrine of civil liability, albeit with modifications.
In part two, the author demonstrates that the legal concept of direct agency originated in an early doctrine that was later dubbed murābaḥa/tawliya (trust sale) or ishrāk and in the early notion of a salam/salaf sale, a transaction in which payment precedes delivery. The author argues that the original rules that defined these transactions were later modified in ways that ultimately led scholars to formulate the concept of direct agency. Specifically, the author shows that scholars devised direct agency in response to the introduction of new legal restrictions such as the prohibition against selling an object that one does not own and the prohibition against profiting from an object for which one does not assume legal risk.
In part three, the author shows how prohibitions against certain types of transactions “were put together to form a set of rules that collectively constitute the prohibition of ribḥ” (p. 212). The main argument is that the prohibition against levying interest on loans did not derive from the Qur

an, as early Muslim jurists thought, but rather originated in the prohibition of ribḥ of delay in an exchange between two objects that are equal in utility (according to Medinan jurists) or between two objects of the same kind (according to Iraqi jurists).
Although sometimes cumbersome, this book is an erudite, well-documented, and pioneering study that contributes to existing scholarship in important ways. It sheds new light on the emergence of important legal institutions that lie at the foundation of the Islamic law of property. Furthermore, it advances a new approach, adopted by very few academic scholars hitherto, of extrapolating the legal principles that guided early Islamic jurists through analysis of the rules they promulgated. In doing so, it reveals that early Muslim jurists engaged in consistent legal reasoning even before the four jurisprudential principles (usūl al-fiqh) were introduced and universally recognized.
It shows that early jurists did not simply introduce ad hoc solutions to legal problems but rather were guided by legal principles that they applied systematically. In addition, the book furthers our understanding of the relations between law and society by illuminating not only the legal constraints that led to doctrinal changes but also, in some cases, the particular sociopolitical circumstances that triggered them. Finally, the evidence presented here sheds light on the notion (advanced by Schacht and refuted by Hallaq and Hurvitz) of “regional schools” (or “ancient schools”). The author demonstrates that, around the 7th and early 8th centuries, it was not unusual to see relative uniformity of legal opinions along geographical lines. Thus, for example, Hijazi (and sometimes only Medinan) scholars often disagreed with Iraqi (and sometimes only Kufan or Basran) scholars. This fact raises many interesting questions that merit further attention. For example, are particular regions more likely to produce legal uniformity than others? Is such uniformity a result of local customs or do other social, political, or ideological factors better account for these local legal uniformities? Is uniformity of opinion in a specific region more likely to develop around particular types of legal issues?
Although the book generally achieves its goal of clarifying the development of certain legal concepts, it falls somewhat short of its aim of explaining “why and how the doctrine of Abu Hanifa in Iraq and that of Malik b. Anas in Medina were transformed into the Hanafi and Maliki schools respectively” (p. 5). Clearly, the evidence presented suggests that significant systemization of legal thinking among Iraqi and Medinan scholars with regard to civil liability, agency, and the prohibition of ribḥ occurred around the time of Abu Hanifa and Malik. What this evidence does not prove, however, is the author's assertion that Abu Hanifa and Malik were the exclusive or even the principal doctrinal sources for and systematizers of the legal thinking of their respective regions. The evidence, especially in the Hanafi case, is circumstantial and does not rule out the possibility that Abu Hanifa's contemporaries, such as Hammad b. Abi Sulayman (d. 120/737), are equally responsible for this systemization. Scholars interested in the development of Islamic legal thought and the relations between law and society will find the book most informative—well researched, well argued, and groundbreaking.
