In a recent set of papers, Aaron Spital has proposed conscription or routine recovery of cadaveric organs without consent as a way of ameliorating the severe shortage of organs for transplantation.Footnote 1 Under the existing consent requirement, organs can be taken from the bodies of the deceased if they expressed a wish and intention to donate while alive. Organs may also be taken when families or other substitute decisionmakers decide on behalf of the deceased to allow organ procurement for the purpose of transplantation. When patients or families do not consent to organ procurement, many transplantable organs are lost. This is a tragic yet avoidable situation. The dead are beyond any benefit or harm, and their organs could be used to prevent harm by saving and improving the lives of many people suffering and dying from end-stage organ failure.
Spital cites four main advantages of a system of cadaveric organ conscription over the existing system with the consent requirement.Footnote 2 The number of organs would increase substantially and the lives of many people with end-stage organ failure would be saved and extended. It would also be much simpler and less costly than other approaches to organ procurement that involve the process of obtaining consent. In addition, it would eliminate the stress that families experience when asked to consider donation at a time of grief from the death of a loved one. And it would result in a more equitable sharing of burdens and benefits among the human community. The organs from all those who die would go into the cadaveric organ pool, and all those who need an organ transplant would be more likely to receive one. This would be more equitable than the existing system because it would rule out free riders who can choose not to donate but can compete equally for an organ with others who donate.
Spital and James Stacey Taylor claim that conscription would obviate the need to pay for organs.Footnote 3 But it would not eliminate organ sales and markets altogether. Those believing that an organ from a living donor would mean longer graft survival would prefer to pay for an organ from a living donor than to wait for a cadaveric organ. There would continue to be ethical questions about whether certain individuals accepting payment for their organs were coerced or otherwise exploited. In general, though, a significant increase in the number of organs from deceased donors resulting from elimination of the consent requirement would mean fewer organs from living donors. This would decrease the overall risk to which living donors are exposed. Under conscription, there would be neither donors nor free riders because there would be no choice about what happened to one's organs. There would be no real sense of contribution to the organ pool because viable organs would be taken from those who have been declared dead as a matter of course.
There are two main objections to routine recovery of cadaveric organs without consent. First, removing consent could compromise physicians' duty of care to critically ill patients with viable organs. The needs of these patients could be overridden by the needs of potential transplant recipients. Second, routine recovery without consent could severely limit our ability to control the timing, manner, and meaning of death. Consent presupposes choice. Having a choice about whether or not to donate organs is part of a process of decisionmaking leading up to and extending beyond death, a process that is imbued with social, cultural, and spiritual significance. Eliminating choice at the margin between life and death could preclude the ability of patients and families to act in patients' best interests. It could also prevent families from experiencing the death of a loved one as more than just a biological event. Despite the flaws in the current system of cadaveric organ donation with consent, the reasons for retaining it outweigh the reasons for replacing it with a system of cadaveric organ conscription.
Implications for Physicians
Consent acts as a deontological constraint on physicians by ensuring that they respect the rights, needs, and interests of patients, as determined by patients or their families. These rights are not absolute and can be given less weight or overridden in certain circumstances. Nevertheless, a patient's right to an appropriate level of care, and to decide when to withdraw life-sustaining care, have considerable ethical weight and cannot easily be overridden.
Requiring consent from patients and families of noncompetent patients regarding critical care obligates physicians to separate decisions about end-of-life care from decisions about organ procurement for transplantation. Decisions of the first type pertain to critical care physicians. Decisions of the second type pertain to transplant teams. The obligations of these two medical groups correspond to the needs of two distinct groups of patients. Consent promotes due discharge of intensivists' duty of care to critically ill patients and prevents or minimizes the potential to ignore the needs of these patients in order to meet the needs of patients waiting for organ transplants. If routine recovery became standard practice, every critically ill patient would be a potential source of organs. Because patients and families would have no say in the matter, whether organs were procured would depend only on whether they were viable for transplantation. With viability a constant concern, there might be a tendency to prematurely withdraw life support from and not give appropriate care to patients. This could put intensivists in a conflict of interest between their primary duty to critically ill patients with viable organs and their secondary duty to promote transplantation. Without consent, the distinction between the duties of intensivists and transplant surgeons could become increasingly blurred, which could compromise the duties of the former. Even if this resulted in a perceived rather than real conflict of interest, public fears about inadequate care and premature declaration of death would have to be addressed to allay these fears and retain public trust in the organ donation and transplantation system.
In some cases where families consent to organ donation for a noncompetent dying patient, certain drugs may be administered to the patient before withdrawing life support. Heparin, phentolamine, and streptokinase, as well as cooling solutions, may be given intravenously to the patient to ensure that his or her organs are perfused and to reduce ischemia. This enhances the viability of organs and the quality of grafts once they have been transplanted. One concern about these interventions is that they may depress respiration and thereby hasten death, though there is disagreement about whether this is in fact the case. Another concern is that they are used for purely instrumental reasons. They cannot directly benefit the patient and are administered solely to facilitate transplantation and benefit organ recipients. In spite of these concerns, these interventions are ethically permissible when a patient or family consents to organ donation, because when they do this they implicitly consent to interventions necessary to realize the intention to donate.Footnote 4 They can indirectly benefit the patient or family by virtue of their knowledge that the drugs and cooling solutions will facilitate a successful transplant. Without implicit consent to these interventions, it would be difficult to justify them because they would have nothing to do with the patient's or family's wish and intention and would not be related to the care of the patient.
What would routine recovery mean for the possibility of organ procurement from individuals in an irreversible coma or permanent vegetative state, or from those with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS)? Although these conditions are irreversible, not all patients who have them are strictly speaking terminally ill. The suggestion of organ procurement from these individuals is controversial because of concerns about euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. For this reason, consent to withdrawal of life support and consent to organ procurement following the declaration of death would be necessary for this practice to be ethically permissible, if at all. Without consent reflecting the patient's or family's interests, and with physicians making all critical decisions, organ conscription from individuals with these conditions could not be justified and likely would not gain public acceptance.
More generally, conscription of cadaveric organs would probably put more emphasis on the timing of the clinical declaration of death and result in longer waits before life-sustaining care was withdrawn. Consent to withdrawal of life support and organ procurement focuses more on the patient's and family's interests and less on the declaration of death itself. This is one reason why some ethicists have questioned the Dead Donor Rule (DDR), which says that organs can only be taken from the bodies of individuals who have been declared dead. The idea that one need not be dead to donate organs motivates the claim that the DDR should be revised or abandoned.Footnote 5 This same idea underlies the suggestion that organs could permissibly be procured from patients in an irreversible coma, permanent vegetative state, or those with ALS. Instead of viewing death as one event in a process extending from the withdrawal of life support to organ procurement and transplantation, the inability to choose for or against donation may make families focus primarily if not exclusively on the timing of the patient's death. They may wait longer before requesting that life-sustaining care be withdrawn, because it would mean the end of the patient's biological and biographical life. By that time, organs might be beyond the point of viability and not transplantable. This would have the same effect as families waiting too long to decide about donation.
Implications for Patients and Families
Suppose that a young adult male is involved in a motor vehicle accident and has a severe brain injury, leaving him in an irreversible coma. He is transferred from emergency to the intensive care unit, where he is kept alive by a ventilator. His family is present and is the appropriate surrogate making decisions according to what he would have wanted in this situation. Given the grave prognosis and futility of continuing life support, physicians treating the patient discuss with his family the possibility of withdrawing life-sustaining care from him. In addition, he is identified as a potential source of organs for transplantation. If his wishes regarding organ donation are not known, his family may be approached by a member of the medical team and asked if they would want to donate his organs on his behalf. Life support is withdrawn, the intensive care doctors wait 5 minutes before declaring the patient dead, and organs are then removed for transplantation by the transplant team.Footnote 6
From a medical perspective, withdrawing life-sustaining care and removing organs for transplantation are separate acts because they involve distinct needs of distinct groups of patients: those with irreversible conditions not caused by organ failure and those with end-stage organ failure. But for families giving proxy consent to medical decisions, the two acts are linked. Both acts are judged to be in the best interests of the dying patient and the family. The justification for proxy consent by the family to withdraw life-sustaining care is that it does not benefit the patient. The timing of the withdrawal may be influenced by the question of the viability of the organs and the judgment that taking and using his organs for transplantation is what the patient would have wanted. Consent to these two acts would ensure that the family acted in a way that respected the patient's interests. Eliminating consent would leave it entirely up to physicians to determine the extent of care appropriate for the patient. This would mean a return to absolute physician paternalism. It would also raise the question of whether the interests and needs of potential transplant recipients trumped the interests and needs of critically ill patients without organ failure.
For some families, routine recovery would eliminate the added stress that they are forced to confront when asked to donate the organs of a loved one. For others, however, they would prefer to have this choice than not to have it. Having the choice to donate on behalf of a loved one may enable a family to construct meaning from their loss by understanding the death of the patient as an opportunity to benefit others in need. The ability to have this choice can enable them to channel their grief into something positive, transcending a narrow focus on their experience of loss through life-saving donation. Routine recovery would obviously benefit transplant recipients. But it would be entirely impersonal and might exacerbate rather than alleviate the emotional distress of families if they were passive observers of nothing more than an event ending the biological life of an individual. Donating organs results in physiological and psychological benefits for transplant recipients and psychological benefit for families. The problem is when families refuse to consent to donation, or when they deliberate for so long that the patient's organs are no longer viable for transplantation. Routine recovery without consent would avoid this problem. Yet it may fail to appreciate the emotional distress of families when they lose a loved one and preclude the choice that can enable families to work through this difficult period.
John Harris, whom Spital and Taylor cite in their discussion, reasons about this issue as follows. “If we can save or prolong the lives of living people and can only do so at the expense of the sensibilities of others, it seems clear to me that we should. For the alternative involves the equivalent of sacrificing people's lives so that others will simply feel better, or not feel so bad, and this seems nothing short of outrageous.”Footnote 7 The needs of those in end-stage organ failure are urgent and should be met, but not by disregarding families' emotional distress and how they deal with grief from the death of a spouse, sibling, son, or daughter. Ideally, families will consent to donation and thereby benefit transplant recipients. Religious reasons for refusing to donate are weaker than they used to be, because most religions now permit donation when it can save a life. In most cases, the cultural, social, or spiritual reasons for refusing donation are reflections of belief systems that influence the significance of death for the family. The fundamental issue is not how a family chooses to act in this situation, but simply having this choice. It is not something that most people would be willing to give up, even if the consequence of it would be fewer organs for transplantation and fewer lives saved.
What makes decisions at the end of life so momentous is that they involve not just the biological event of neurological or cardiocirculatory death, but also events leading up to and occurring shortly after death. The significance of these decisions involves not only our biological lives but also the consequences of these decisions and how they shape our biographical lives. These decisions and their consequences have a psychological impact on the families or intimate partners who survive us. Although death is a biological event, the meaning of death for one who is dying and for one's survivors is more than a function of biology or clinical criteria alone.
If I retain some cognitive and affective capacity when dying, the belief that my organs will be taken from my body, transplanted, and save and extend the lives of others can give me a sense of purpose as I confront my imminent demise. The content of this belief and of my agency in deciding to donate my organs extends beyond my death to include the anonymous recipients of my organs. Families or partners making these decisions when patients are not competent can also benefit psychologically from these decisions at and beyond the time of the patient's death. In the light of these considerations, the question that needs to be asked is: To what extent would people be willing to waive the opportunity to make decisions that confer meaning on death in order to increase the supply of organs and save more lives of people dying from end-stage organ failure?
Suppose that the organs of the brain-injured patient in the earlier example would be viable for only a relatively brief period of time. In current practice, organs would not be removed from a patient without first consulting the next of kin and asking for their consent to procurement for transplantation. Even if waiting for the family's decision to allow or refuse procurement meant that his organs would no longer be viable, the transplant team could not take the patient's organs without the family's consent. Without a consent requirement, the transplant team theoretically could remove the organs without contacting the family. By the time they arrived at the hospital, life support would already have been withdrawn, the patient would already have been declared dead, and his organs would already have been removed from his body. The family would have played no role in these actions and would not have been able to witness the passing of their loved one because these decisions would have been made entirely by the physicians. Most people would find such unilateral decisions to be ethically unacceptable, even if they resulted in a substantial increase in the number of transplantable organs.
Conclusion
In its recent report on organ donation, the Institute of Medicine concluded that a presumed consent policy should not be adopted in the United States at this time.Footnote 8 Presumed consent can be described as routine recovery in disguise, and the public is not ready for such a system. I have considered two reasons why the public would not be willing to accept cadaveric organ conscription and why it would not be ethically justifiable. The first is that routine recovery could put physicians in a perceived if not real conflict of interest between their primary duty of care to critically ill patients as a potential source of organs and their secondary duty to other patients as organ recipients. The second is that routine recovery could eliminate the value and significance of choice at the end of life. Spital and Taylor cite Robert Truog's claim that, while we are alive, organs should be considered personal property. After death, organs should be considered a social resource.Footnote 9 Most people would agree in principle with this claim. The problem is that some of the choices we make about medical care during the dying process have consequences that extend beyond death. If we respect people's choices about continuing or withdrawing life-sustaining care, and if agreeing to or refusing organ donation is a choice made during this time, then it would be difficult to exclude consent regarding donation from these choices.
A more reasonable alternative is to promote cadaveric organ donation as a communitarian obligation.Footnote 10 Assuming that people have benefited from healthcare and other social goods while alive, they would be obligated to give something back to the community when they die. Specifically, they would be obligated to donate their organs so that the lives of other members of the community could be saved and extended. Some may fail to discharge this obligation. But it would rest on the ability to choose. Without consent, organ procurement could not coherently be described as a “contribution” to the social or human community. The concept of contribution presupposes agency, yet routine recovery without consent would strip patients and their families of their agency regarding what happens to them and their organs when they die. Most people would support a system that increased the number of transplantable organs, but not at the expense of choice and their ability to make momentous decisions at the end of life. On both practical and principled grounds, the reasons against conscription of cadaveric organs outweigh the reasons for it.
