A glance at the title and its coauthor—Olivier Roy, an established authority on transnational radical and militant Islamism—raises the expectation of the reader. The brevity of the book, however, immediately becomes a cause of concern. A cursory reading of the book not only confirms fears that it is incapable of doing justice to the vast subject matter but also reveals major shortcomings. These include factual inaccuracies, contradictions, spelling mistakes, few references, incorrect translations, and so forth.
Structurally, the book consists of six chapters, which include the introduction and conclusion. Chapter 2 examines radical Islamism in Central Asia. Afghanistan and the emergence of the Taliban and al-Qa

ida in the aftermath of the Islamist insurgency in the 1980s are addressed in chapter 3. The fourth chapter discusses the radicalization of Pakistani Islamists and other religious conservatives. Chapter 5 talks about the connections between the transnational al-Qa

ida and the nation-states-based militant Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The central role played by Islamabad and Pakistani Islamist groups in the making of the Islamist militants in Afghanistan and Kashmir is the topic in chapter 5. The book seeks to explain the Afghan–Pakistani link in the making of transnational radical and militant Islamism, and how Pakistan was and remains the hub of international Islamist militancy. The book does not even come close to doing justice to the authors' stated approach of highlighting the various moving parts that came together and allowed for the emergence of the global al-Qa

ida network and its allies.
The narrative—a compilation of a lot of information—is highly descriptive. An absence of a clear structure has the reader jumping from topic to topic. The account wanders with sundry points scattered throughout the volume, with abrupt mentioning of issues and actors, some of whom are not properly identified, with only a surname used on first reference. Former Afghan president Burhanuddin Rabbani is referred to as Rabbani only (p. 1). The name of the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi Yusuf, is flip-flopped as Yusuf Ramzi. In parenthesis, Yusuf is referred to as Wali Khan, which is the name of the terrorist architect's top aide. Three terms in the glossary are defined incorrectly—sahabah, tabligh, and zakat. Elsewhere, acronyms such as ISI (p. 14) and MEI (p. 17) are used without providing their full form. The distinct terms Islamic and Islamist are used interchangeably.
On pages 51 and 68, the authors claim that Lashkar-e-Tayyibah and Harakat-ul-Mujahideen—two Kashmiri militant groups—joined Osama bin Laden's World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, although these groups did not appear in the original press release issued by the front in 1998 at the time of its founding. There is a contradiction on page 23, where the authors claim that the militant Sunni sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahabah Pakistan (SSP) was founded with the backing of the then military government, interested in containing the rise of Shi

ism. In the same paragraph—two sentences later—they write that the SSP was founded in part because the Pakistani regime was repressing Sunnis to appease Iran. The Afghan Jamiat-ul-Ansar is translated on page 27 as Society of Partisans when it actually means Association of Supporters.
The authors also engage in certain sweeping assertions but do not offer evidence to substantiate the claims. In chapter 1, they assert that “avowed religious ideology does not have, or no longer has a direct relationship with activism” (p. 2) but do not offer proof for this inference. There are noteworthy analytical observations, but without any elaboration; for example, the September 11 hijackers are characterized as “second generation of Muslims who threw themselves abruptly into radicalization without passing through the intermediate stages of religious or political militancy” (p. 50). Several arguments, if further developed, could have compensated for other shortcomings in the research, which appears to be Web based as opposed to grounded in works of bona fide scholarship.
What is even more perplexing is that the book not only made it through peer review but also was published by Columbia University Press, a highly reputable publisher. The contents of the book suggest that the authors are not familiar with Pakistan, even though the junior author Abou Zahab is billed as “a specialist on Pakistan.” Moreover, disregard for the differences in core ideas, objectives, and modus operandi of various groups has the authors ignoring the major differences between radical and militant Islamists. Superficial reading of certain broad similarities such as the common goal of establishing an Islamic polity leads them to see similarities among diverse groups such al-Qa

ida, Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), and even the apolitical Tablighi Jama

at.
Because of a lack of a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the origins, trajectories, and evolution of the various Islamist organizations, the authors appear confused by different groups, various branches of the same group, and the factionalization of a given group. Roy and Abou Zahab discount deep theological, ideological, and political differences between HT and al-Qa

ida, which would explain their claim that the two organizations champion “the same ideas” with the exception “that the term jihad is absent from” HT's “vocabulary” (p. 10)—another gross factual error. Although arguing that the curriculum of the Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan took on a Wahhabi cast under Saudi influence and that the Taliban ideology exhibited a Saudi character, the authors ignore the theological and juridical differences between the Taliban (Deobandi-Hanafi in terms of jurisprudence and Maturidi with regards to theology) and al-Qa

ida (Wahhabi/Salafi as far as creed is concerned and Hanbali with respect to law).
Given the multiple problems associated with this work, it seems that the bulk of it has been written by the junior coauthor. This notwithstanding, one wonders why Olivier Roy, a scholar of great caliber—whose 1994 publication The Failure of Political Islam was a masterpiece—approved and signed on to such below the mark research.
