If Israelis and Palestinians are ever to agree on a two-state settlement, the compromise will certainly look a lot like the Geneva Initiative. This draft peace agreement was hammered out in 2003 by Israeli and Palestinian negotiators who were not formally representing their governments at the time. However, many Geneva Initiative participants on both sides had been official negotiators and advisors before the collapse of peace negotiations in 2001, when Ariel Sharon was elected prime minister in Israel.
Among the Israeli participants in the Geneva Initiative—so named because of its Swiss-government sponsor—was Menachem Klein, a Jerusalem expert at Bar Ilan University in Ramat Gan, Israel, and a former advisor to Israel's negotiating team with the Palestinians. Klein has written an “insider's account” of the Geneva Initiative, full of interesting factual nuggets and insightful reflections on many key issues. Klein's encyclopedic knowledge of Jerusalem is apparent, and his discussion of the refugee issue (pp. 57–62) is particularly thoughtful, framed in a nuanced and perceptive manner.
The genius of the Geneva Initiative was to let each side “win” on one of the two key and emotionally powerful issues that separate them: Jerusalem and refugees. The Old City of Jerusalem houses many key places of worship for Jews, Muslims, and Christians, including the Western Wall of the Temple Mount, where pious Jews pray, the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock on the Muslim Haram al-Sharif, and the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and Via Dolorosa central to Christian historiography. The Geneva negotiators divided Jerusalem largely along the 1967 border and put all of the Old City, except for the Jewish Quarter, in the hands of the Palestinian state.
In exchange (although Klein never formulates it as a quid pro quo), Palestinians relinquish their right of return to what is now Israel. There are currently four million U.N.-registered Palestinian refugees, representing about half the total Palestinian population in the region. The Geneva Initiative does not actually state that there will be no right of return to Israel by Palestinians and even enumerates United Nations Resolution 194, which Palestinians point to as the legal basis of their right to return to homes lost in the 1948 war. However, the Geneva Initiative leaves it up to each state to handle all issues of immigration, thus giving Israel final say on which Palestinians, if any, it allows to return.
The Geneva Initiative thus allows Israel to maintain its essentially Jewish character, recognized as such by Palestinians, while Palestinians get to point to Muslim sovereignty over the {Haram al-Sharif}. Much of the rest of the Geneva Initiative is boilerplate for any prospective peace agreement: adoption of the 1967 border with minor land swaps that allow for Israel to annex several major settlement blocs in exchange for Israeli territory being given to Palestine (mostly around Gaza), the removal of Jewish settlers on Palestine's side of the new border, a safe-passage corridor linking the West Bank with the Gaza Strip, and appropriate security arrangements.
The Geneva Initiative had an immediate political impact when it was announced in late 2003, occurring in the midst of the second Palestinian uprising and under an Israeli administration fundamentally opposed to Palestinian sovereignty over the West Bank. Indeed, Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip was an effort to stop the Geneva Initiative from gaining momentum, as close Sharon aide Dov Weisglass later admitted to the Ha'aretz newspaper in Israel. Ariel Sharon's gambit was to give up control of impoverished Gaza (and its 1.5 million Palestinians) as a means of relieving international pressure on Israel to withdraw from the West Bank. Although the tactic seemed to work for several years, it is rather startling how the political discourse has shifted in Israel even among former rightists and proponents of Greater Israel. Ehud Olmert, Israel's prime minister until 2009 and former champion of Israel's colonization of the West Bank, now speaks openly of Israel's need to withdraw from most, perhaps all, of the West Bank and East Jerusalem if there is to be peace. Although Olmert has not embraced the Geneva Initiative per se, he and other former opponents now accept its core concepts.
As Klein notes, the Geneva Initiative has its critics on both sides. However, he is right to suggest that, in most cases, these critics would not agree to any peace deal that would be minimally acceptable to the other side. He also notes, correctly, that it is unlikely that the two governments would simply adopt the terms of Geneva as is; no doubt there would still be lots of negotiating to do. Still, the Geneva Initiative, and the courageous men and women who signed the document, show that a peace deal is possible between Israel and Palestine if there is the political will to do so. Some would even suggest that such a deal is inevitable.
Although Klein's account of the Geneva Initiative is laudable on several grounds, it is not without its deficiencies. The most obvious deficiency is the lack of an appendix that contains the actual language of the Initiative. The Geneva Initiative is readily available on line, of course, but the document should have been included in the book. In addition, the book is not tightly organized and tends to wander from idea to idea and episode to episode. Moreover, it is not chronologically consistent. None of these problems are unusual for a memoir-type book, but it does come off as sloppy for a book published by a university press.
