The wave of scholarship unleashed by Alan Brinkley's 1994 American Historical Review article bemoaning the state of conservatism studies has shifted in recent years from a post-World War II focus toward a more expansive vision of change and development over time. Robert Mason's new book is a strong representative of this shift. The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan takes a broad approach toward examining the Republican Party's “minority problem” in the years between the onset of the Great Depression and the end of the Reagan administration. Mason provides a careful and nuanced explanation of the attempts – and predominantly failures – of the Republican Party to craft a cohesive and successful alternative to the immensely popular New Deal consensus.
Mason is careful to avoid the pitfall of positing a study of the GOP and then focussing exclusively upon presidential politics. His attention to distinct interests and conflicts among presidential candidates and candidate organizations, Congressional leaders and party professionals, helps demonstrate the degree to which these entities could work at cross-purposes. His research makes good use of an impressive variety of sources and his approach is both methodical and rigorously chronological. Throughout this period, he argues, Democrats were able to successfully
articulate the right kind of liberalism for electoral success: one that shrank from policies of economic redistribution; one that developed a welfare state catering to a broad middle class rather than targeted at a smaller constituency of the poor; one that avoided direct engagement with racial inequalities (until a variety of outside pressures forced the party as a whole to do so). (4)
Indeed, Mason demonstrates that it was not until the Great Society programs of the 1960s and the economic troubles of the 1970s began to alter Americans’ perspective of the New Deal order that Republicans experienced increasing success, although he accurately casts the subsequent reconfiguration as approaching party parity rather than realignment. Throughout, Mason explains that many Republicans remained convinced of the electoral possibilities of a principled opposition to the Democrats’ economic policy, blaming Republican weakness on inadequate organizational efforts, a “bought vote” during the 1930s, or a “hidden vote” that was insufficiently motivated to vote for “me too” candidates in the years following World War II. Mason contrasts these perceptions with a 1964 observation by scholars Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril that Americans tended to be “ideological conservatives” but “operational liberals” – in other words, that they preached an antistatist ideology of individualism and self-reliance but in practice accepted a statist response to social and economic problems (286). Republicans’ failure to appreciate this reality cost them dearly over the years of Mason's survey.
Perhaps counterintuitively, Mason's coverage of the more comprehensively studied postwar periods in this chronology is freshest and most cohesive. His work on the 1950s, in particular, stands out as a skilled interpretation of how Eisenhower's attempts at party revitalization contrasted – and sometimes conflicted – with the perceptions and interests of party professionals and conservative Republicans. That said, Mason's overview of the 1930s and 1940s, and especially his coverage of Wendell Willkie, complements other new work in this field such as Michael Bowen's recent and well-written volume on the Dewey–Taft struggle.
Mason indicates that Republican Party leaders sometimes looked outside the United States for solutions to their electoral problems, and especially toward the example of Britain's Conservative Party during the 1930s and 1950s – periods when Conservative strength contrasted with Republican struggles. He demonstrates that GOP leaders tended to take faulty lessons from their studies of Conservative politics, choosing to focus on their British counterparts’ organizational strengths rather than recognizing important policy differences. This transnational dimension of Mason's work raises intriguing questions, however, that were not fully explored in his two comparatively brief passages on the subject, and it remains a topic ripe for exploration. Perhaps further comparison of the two party systems would have entered areas of discussion outside Mason's purview, but more attention would have been very welcome.
While the most innovative component of Mason's research – the transnational dimension – is unfortunately also the least developed, his work provides a comprehensive overview of GOP politics during this transformative era. This comprehensive quality makes The Republican Party and American Politics from Hoover to Reagan especially well suited to a classroom setting. On the whole, Mason's volume represents a well-researched and valuable addition to this growing field of scholarship.
