“There is no social world without loss,” Isaiah Berlin observed. Martha Nussbaum's The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge University Press, 2001) elevated Berlin's observation of tragedy to an intricately argued and full-fledged theory. Nussbaum contends that many moral conflicts are tragic in that they involve deeply treasured and incommensurable goods that defy simplistic analysis and demand cautious and pragmatic balancing.
The crucial contribution of Marc O. DeGirolami's The Tragedy of Religious Freedom to both this literature of tragedy and to legal theory is to explain the tragic approach's special relevance to religious freedom disputes. DeGirolami's treatment is deeply humane and wears its considerable erudition lightly and elegantly. Where much legal theory soars into abstraction, DeGirolami's examples are grounded in worldly insight and empathy. This is fitting as DeGirolami targets reductive, formulaic approaches. These “comic monist” approaches wield master values such as equal liberty or neutrality as silver bullets promising to vanquish opposing concerns and slay the confusion that many religious liberty disputes appear to involve. DeGirolami, by contrast, practices a commendable humility. Religious liberty cases resemble forests teeming with rich, heterogeneous, and organic elements. DeGirolami would not tame this wilderness artificially by transforming it into a neatly manicured garden. His book offers thoughtful suggestions for how to resolve prominent cases, but acknowledges that others may weigh these cases’ complex factors differently to arrive at alternative conclusions.
Still, DeGirolami does not advocate succumbing completely to the anarchy of the wilderness, and he is appropriately skeptical of a purely ad hoc approach to religious liberty disputes. Jurisprudential theory may not yield monistic master values to be systematically applied in these cases, but it does offer virtues and habits of thought to take their place. Drawing upon Edmund Burke, the tragic approach preaches reverence for concrete traditions. The study of social history reminds us of the value of religious beliefs for their adherents and society overall. Attention to legal history and precedent suggests models for the careful accommodation of opposing values, and the wisdom previous generations culled from continually wrestling with the permutations of their interactions. Burkean gradualism reinforces tragic balancing by discouraging radical shifts in favor of one religious liberty value.
DeGirolami acknowledges that social and legal histories are indeterminate. Yet he persuasively retorts that predictability is an important, but not a paramount jurisprudential consideration. Besides, monistic approaches rarely yield the consistency they claim. Though the Supreme Court, for instance, remains formally pledged to Justice Scalia's 1990 ruling in Employment Division v. Smith denying exemptions from general laws for religious reasons, the Court has in fact carved out significant exceptions to this rule. Often the real difference in unpredictability between monistic and tragic approaches, DeGirolami contends, is the latter's frank acknowledgement of it, and the former's disingenuous denial.
It is a strength of DeGirolami's tragic approach that it rejects Scalia's dogmatic commitment to neutrality in free exercise cases. Yet his own claim that cases of religious exemption like Smith represent a tragic conflict requires further investigation.
The case DeGirolami makes for the profound importance of respecting exemption claims from believers is indisputable. One need not accept the very real possibility of divine wrath to realize that liberal democracies should, unless strictly necessary, avoid causing the psychological pain believers face when they must choose between punishment in this world on the one hand, and punishment in the next or infidelity to the deepest marrow of one's soul on the other.
The seriousness of the government's concerns in exemption cases, though, is far from self-evident. One rationale for denying objections is the government's concern with protecting order. Yet the historical record provides little evidence that more lenient exemption regimes cause great disorder. Smith overturned the more permissive approach the Court had taken since Sherbert v. Verner in 1963, which had allowed for exemptions in a variety of areas including unemployment compensation and excusal from formal schooling. Opening the floodgates slightly had not produced a torrent of disobedience, inefficiency, or bogus claims by insincere slackers. This track record suggests that Justice Scalia's concern that allowing Native American peyote users to work as drug counselors would dramatically weaken state or national drug laws was far-fetched.
If preserving order is not the source of neutrality's strength, perhaps the ability to quell protests of unfairness and civic strife is. Yet no substantial outcry by other religious groups or by atheists and agnostics preceded Smith. Indeed, the substantial outcry by a wide array of religious groups following Smith led to the speedy enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. More often than protesting exemptions, atheists and agnostics have lobbied courts and legislatures to extend them to nontheistic beliefs that are the functional equivalent of religious beliefs.
There are, of course, cases where the threat exemptions pose to order and neutrality are sufficiently extravagant that the state ought to win. Allowing Quakers in Pennsylvania during the Revolutionary War to be exempt from military service and an obligation to pay an equivalent in lieu of service, a conflict DeGirolami relates, might very well have been catastrophic to the colonists’ chances. Yet the strict-scrutiny test the Court used from Sherbert to Smith made allowance for these extreme exceptions without employing DeGirolami's tragic framework. The test recognized that order and neutrality in exemption cases are goods, but that the good of free exercise is much better.
For a conflict to rise to the level of tragedy, after all, it is not enough to show that the interests on both sides are of some merit. The goods on both sides of a conflict must be deeply held and of approximately equal value. Had Antigone's choice to bury her brother entailed canceling a long-planned vacation to a treasured destination rather than disobeying the state and her uncle, her conflict would hardly count as tragic.
DeGirolami's treatment of establishment clause cases persuasively identifies the vital values deeply held by secularists, and their opponents. His treatment of free exercise clause exemption cases, by contrast, does not sufficiently explain why the state's concern with neutrality is nearly as important as the right of free exercise. Even if the reader disagrees with the weighing of interests in free exercise presented above, the fact remains that tragedy cannot be assumed, but must be proved.
This is not only a philosophical lacuna, but one with potentially significant pragmatic consequences. Acknowledgment of tragedy requires a careful balancing of claims. If claims are of roughly equal value, they should win at a roughly equal rate. Claiming a tragic conflict where one does not exist allows the shallower good to succeed more often than it in fact should.
The great advantages of Marc O. DeGirolami's book over many other works in the religious freedom literature are its admirable aversion to dogmatism and an awareness of complexity. Its most notable flaw ironically is that it formulaically asserts tragedy in every major type of religious freedom cases even where it is likely that none exists.
As flaws go, though, that of inconsistency is venial. That DeGirolami is not always mindful of his own advice should not obscure the tremendous value of the advice itself and the considerable achievement of his book.
