Both Pallister and Romero Ballivián’s books examine the nuts and bolts of elections in Latin America since the start of the third wave of democracy. Pallister’s book is an introductory survey of these topics, emphasising the study of the institutions that shape party systems. Romero Ballivián’s tome, which is twice as long, is more of an overview of electoral governance and its consequences for democracy. These authors, well-qualified for their jobs, are political scientists, one hailing from the United States and the other from Bolivia. Romero Ballivián, moreover, twice served as the head of Bolivia’s electoral management body (at the start and end of Evo Morales’s three terms in office), and as an international consultant.
These books address some of the same topics. Pallister’s chapters on electoral integrity, the legal framework of elections and campaign regulations cover much the same ground as Romero Ballivián’s chapters on electoral reforms (chapter II) and electoral justice (chapter VIII). Pallister also has chapters on candidates (chapter 4), political parties (chapter 5), campaign finance (chapter 7), voter participation (chapter 8) and voter behaviour (chapter 9). And Romero Ballivián analyses electoral violence (chapter III), electoral cycles (IV), local elections, referenda (VI) and constituent assemblies (VII).
My reading of this pair of books leaves me with five impressions. First, competitive elections are consolidated in most countries of the region. Neither President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil (2019–23) nor Evo Morales (2006–19) managed to eradicate them, though the latter came close to indefinitely running for consecutive re-election. The vast majority of countries also have average turnout rates, between 1990 and 2019, of 60 per cent or higher, according to Pallister (172; which I assume is of registered voters, but he does not say). Neither author addresses non-competitive elections in Nicaragua or Venezuela, nor considers cases like Mexico or El Salvador, where popular support has empowered dominant parties to reshape institutional rules in their favour. This is less a criticism of their books than a reminder that autocracy has returned and is a threat in several countries.
Second, democratisation has allowed for ideological change in the executive. In chapter IV, Romero Ballivián points out that presidents elected during the 1980s marked the transition from military to civilian rule in much of the region. The 1980s also were the lost decade of economic growth, which opened the way for the election of neoliberal presidents during the 1990s. The left then won election after election in the initial decades of the new millennium (the ‘pink tide’) before electoral majorities selected a more ideologically diverse set of presidents by the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century. Romero Ballivián does not theorise about these swings; Pallister, in his chapter on electoral behaviour, notes that surveys indicate that ‘Latin Americans who have positive perceptions of the economy are much more likely to support the incumbent party (195).’ This reminds us that, as Karen Remmer (in Comparative Political Studies 2012) suggests, the rise and fall of these ideological projects coincides with the lost decade of the 1980s and the commodities boom that lasted approximately between 2004 and 2015.
Third, the institutions and laws governing elections have undergone continuous reform. Most presidents can run for consecutive re-election, which has come through amending national constitutions. Electoral management bodies, for example, have more and more responsibilities. They not only organise elections and tally the vote, as Romero Ballivián reminds us, but also regulate campaign finance. A final example of reform-mongering is that mayors and municipal councils now run for election just about everywhere. The centralisation of unitary states, whereby the national executive would appoint mayors, is now a characteristic of the past in Latin America.
Fourth, the consequences of these reforms, along with the increasing importance of referendums and constituent assemblies, are that popular sovereignty plays a larger role in many political systems of the region. It is inconceivable that constitutions would be recast without elections for constituent assemblies and that voters would not get the final word on the approval of draft constitutions. But it is important to note that this is not a uniform development. Some presidents have used their popularity to reverse the expansion of popular sovereignty. From Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (1999–2013) to Nayib Bukele of El Salvador (2019–), some popular presidents have managed to centralise power in their hands as they dismantle democracy.
Fifth, violence is now a nontrivial problem in some political systems. Pallister writes little about this (198–9), and Romero Ballivián devotes an entire chapter to the problem, even if most of chapter III is a reminder that dictatorships used violence to remain in power. Violence has become part of electoral politics mostly at the local level in parts of Colombia, Mexico and the Central American countries of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras. It typically involves the drug trade, but Romero Ballivián notes that it appears in Peru, where illegal miners dig for minerals or unlicensed loggers exploit forest resources.
