Asʾad Ghanem's second book on Palestinian politics, following his first study, The Palestinian Regime: “A Partial Democracy” (Brighton, U.K.: Sussex Academic Press, 2001), provides a comprehensive treatment of the Palestinian national movement and the conditions that led to its recent fragmentation. The author also describes Israeli policies during the post-Oslo period, explaining radical shifts in Israel's strategic thinking. The book ends with an assessment of missed opportunities for a genuine reconciliation between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and Hamas.
Ghanem's book opens with a revealing comparison between the conduct of Israel and the PLO during the Oslo negotiations. While a clear chain of command was established between the Israeli negotiating team and its superiors in Jerusalem, the PLO team carried on with total secrecy, reporting only to Arafat. Based on his own readings of Israeli memoirs, Ghanem claims that the Israeli team, and not the Palestinians, directed the talks and drafted the peace agreements. Arafat not only ignored Arab allies during the negotiations but also bypassed most PLO institutions, limiting himself to consultations with a few trusted advisors. The only gain Palestinians made through the Oslo negotiations was the achievement of a degree of international legitimacy, not as a state but as an unrecognizable structure called the Palestine Authority. The Israelis never intended the creation of the PNA to lead to full Palestinian sovereignty and independence. Any willingness on their part to grant the new Palestinian entity some breathing space, moreover, soon vanished as Israeli leaders such as Ariel Sharon became increasingly obsessed with a new danger to Israel's survival known as the Arab “demographic threat.”
The so-called Arab “demographic threat” was based on the work of Israeli demographer Sergio de la Pergula, who predicted an accelerating decline of Israel's Jewish population. Professor Arnon Sofer, a geo-strategist and a confidant of Prime Minister Sharon, magnified the perceived threat when he recommended the linkage of certain noncontiguous territories in order to prevent Jews from ever becoming a minority in any one area. Sofer was the main inspiration behind Sharon's withdrawal from Gaza as the Israeli premier faced the dilemma of choosing between Zionist expansionism and preserving the Jewish character of Israel. Not only was the Arab “demographic threat” the topic of extensive discussions at places such as the Van Leer Institute in Jerusalem but it was also debated by the U.S. Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency. West Bank Israeli settlers participated in these discussions. In this climate of heightened mistrust of the peace process, the Sharon government moved from seeking a solution to simply “managing the conflict.” Ghanem asserts that the Israeli government preserved the PNA as a useful tool for achieving Israel's long-term goals. It is no surprise, he adds, that despite its quelling of two intifadas, Israel refrained from dismantling the PNA.
Ghanem's discussion of the failure of the PLO as a national movement is by now a familiar story to Western and Arab commentators and scholars. It begins with Arafat's leadership style, which was characterized by his establishment of an ill-defined chain of command within Palestinian institutions in order to shore up his power and eliminate the possibility of any rivals challenging him. Not only did Arafat dominate Fatah's inner circles, bypass the Palestine National Council, and take control of the Palestine National Fund but he also refused to name a deputy. The author, however, is not true to the historical record when he claims that Arafat deliberately dispersed PLO fighters throughout the Arab world, when in fact this was forced upon him by the United States as a condition for granting him and his staff safe haven in Tunisia. But Ghanem is on solid ground when he describes the conditions that permitted Arafat, ostensibly the head of a revolutionary organization, to emulate the Arab states’ authoritarian and autocratic style of governance. The author refers to the continuing state of war enveloping the PLO as the leading cause of its pattern of quick and secretive decision making. Ghanem also argues that Arafat's control over finances prevented his aides from checking his actions. The author mentions as another factor the demise of various Fatah founding fathers, such as Khalil al-Wazir and Salah Khalaf, who could have challenged his monopoly over decision making. This explanation, however, is not totally convincing because the lone surviving founding father, Farouq Qaddumi, failed in checking Arafat's power or in reviving the moribund Palestine National Council.
In his rush to condemn the PLO in both of its historical phases—under Ahmad Shuqeiry and under Arafat until the establishment of the PNA—the author once more ignores the historical record. He claims that Shuqeiry, leader of the first PLO, was removed from office by his Fatah subordinates and replaced with a transitional figure named Yahya Hamoudeh as a revolt against Shuqeiry's autocratic tendencies. This is only half the story, however, as Shuqeiry was only replaced after publicly denouncing Nasser during the Khartoum Summit of 1967. It is also inaccurate to claim, as Ghanem does, that no group within Fatah or the PLO resisted the chairman. Leading figures of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) quarreled with Arafat and his lieutenants over control of their financial assets. In addition, Issam ʿAbd al-Hadi, the head of the GUPW, openly defied Arafat on the issue of the Oslo agreements and tendered her resignation.
The author's description of the politics of reform within the PNA, and the role of civil society in demanding the enactment of civil liberties and freedoms, is right on the mark. He points out that Sharon's demand for Palestinian reforms was really an attempt to tie Arafat's hands. He also ascribes much of the confusion within the PNA to Mahmoud Abbas’ inability to fill Arafat's shoes and faults the PNA for focusing on ending the occupation rather than building institutions. Yet Ghanem's most informative and analytical sections are those dealing with the PNA–Hamas split. Walking a thin line between admiring Hamas for its defiance of the PNA and criticizing Hamas for its refusal to share power even with its ally, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the author manages to present a balanced, if tragic, outline of this internal struggle. Ghanem declares that the fallout from Oslo and Hamas’ refusal to abide by the Oslo agreements are the main reasons for this split. The struggle over power and the distribution of cabinet portfolios, as well as Hamas’ rejection of the PLO as the “sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people,” eliminated any chance of reconciliation.
This is a valuable and timely study by a Palestinian professor at Haifa University. Ghanem's strength lies in his ability to utilize Hebrew and Arabic sources and in his extraordinary familiarity with Israeli politics and debates and, to a lesser degree, with those of the Palestinian national movement. My only quarrel with the author is over his lack of attention to well-known historical episodes of recent Palestinian history. He not only displays a dispassionate approach but also deliberately avoids any diversionary forays into the broader Arab milieu of post-Arafat Palestinian politics. Had Ghanem accounted for the latter, his study would have been vastly improved. Surely neither the PLO nor the PNA existed in a vacuum, and any fair appraisal of their descent into Arab-style dictatorship and into the practice of patronage must account for the impact of Arab regimes.
