The introduction to this book begins by noting that Georgia, a small nation and minor power that for centuries has been surrounded by larger powers, has always been insecure and thus has needed to practice skilled diplomacy in order to guarantee the state's survival. It also observes that Georgians, having converted to Christianity in the fourth century, possess a self-image as Europeans that represents the source of their overwhelming elite and mass consensus on seeking membership in both the European Union and NATO. (That consensus, by the way, is immediately visible to any visitor to Tbilisi where EU, American, and Ukrainian flags are perhaps even more numerous in the city's ubiquitous street graffiti than are Georgian flags.) Once one moves beyond those observations, however, the picture gets complicated very quickly and little about Georgia's international posture and policies is simple. As a result, wide-ranging, highly informative, and thoroughly documented books on Georgian foreign policy are sorely needed. Tracey German, Stephen Jones, and Kornely Kakachia have compiled just such a book.

Georgia's Foreign Policy in the 21^st Century consists of four sections and eleven substantive chapters that deal with a variety of topics. All of them are written by top-notch scholars who execute their assignments masterfully. Part I, titled “The Uses of Identity in Georgian Foreign Policy,” begins with a chapter written by German and Kakachia that “explores the foreign policy behaviour of Georgia through the lens of the existing literature on small states” (16). Its empirical point of departure—that Georgia's persistent striving for formal membership in western IGOs (Intergovernmental Organizations) notwithstanding the conflict that is thereby generated with Russia represents “structure-deviant behaviour” (16)—will be explored further below. Lincoln A. Mitchell then analyzes the evolution of, and challenges facing, the democracy-building project in Georgia, with particular attention paid to western democracy-promotion efforts. Finally, Salome Minesashvili reminds us that the Georgian Orthodox Church is opposed to the “false liberalism” of the west and instead champions traditional values in a manner similar to that of Russia since Vladimir Putin's “civilizational turn” in 2012.

In Part II, “The Regional Context,” David Aprasidze argues that Georgia has “sought to distance itself” from the rest of the Caucasus and instead “invent a new Black Sea regional identity” based on cooperation with “countries which have signed association agreements with the EU (i.e., Ukraine and Moldova)” (71 and 78). George Sanikidze's examination of relations with Turkey and Iran contains a large amount of useful data on Georgia's economic relations with various Middle Eastern states. Levan Kakhishvili and Alexander Kupatadze present a wide array of data on Georgia's bilateral relations with the other members of the FSU (excluding the Baltics). They find that Georgian governments have consistently valued the countries of Central Asia “for their importance in terms of trade and economic relations” (121), but that Ukraine represents Georgia's main strategic partner in terms of both political and economic ties. The chapters in this section make clear that Georgians are firm supporters of Ukraine in spirit even if their state is too weak to provide much assistance in practice.

In Part III, “Georgia and the ‘West,’” Natalie Sabanadze examines Georgia's aspirations to join the European Union from the perspective of the EU. This factually rich chapter traces the history of the EU's outreach to the formerly communist world. Bidzina Lebanidze and Renata Skardžiūtė-Kereselidze seek “to explain the reasons behind Polish and Baltic support for Georgia's Euro-Atlantic integration” (159). Finally, Michael Hikari Cecire provides an in-depth overview of Georgia's myriad interactions with various NATO programs and structures under all of its post-communist governments. The point of departure for its numerous analyses and projections for the future is that Georgian membership in the alliance might be desired but “its prospects for full membership are broadly regarded to be indefinitely, if not permanently, foreclosed” (185).

In Part IV, “Georgia and the Great Powers,” Ghia Nodia elucidates Georgian-Russian relations through the metaphor of “two triangles”: 1) both Georgia and Russia view the west as a key actor in a trilateral set of relationships (202); and 2) Georgia's conflictual relationships with the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are directly affected (or, from the Georgian perspective, created) by Russia's protectorate over them (203). Mamuka Tsereteli's examination of US-Georgian relations provides yet another exceptionally informative overview of the full spectrum of bilateral interactions dating back to the perestroika period. Even the most seasoned observer will learn something new from its detailed analyses.

Georgia's Foreign Policy in the 21^st Century is not devoted to systematic exploration, development, or testing of any general theories, yet partial disagreement among its various authors can be detected concerning how to best explain Georgia's “structure-deviant behaviour”: the country's pro-western orientation and persistent striving for EU and NATO memberships have cost it dearly in traditional security terms; given Georgia's size, location, and lack of powerful allies, a much greater degree of band-wagoning with Russia would seem to have represented the strategically sound policy. To unravel this paradox, German and Kakachia utilize the concepts of status-seeking and identity. First, Georgia has sought “to signal its status and reliability as a ‘trusted partner’ to the international community, and to reposition itself within both the global and regional hierarchy” (16). Second, this enhanced status in turn serves to advance the goal of “reclaiming [Georgia's] rightful place within the European family from which it has been estranged for centuries” (20). Sabanadze utilizes a different concept—that of “value rationality”—to advance an almost identical explanation. “Georgia's pro-Western orientation stems largely from ideas and identity rather than from pragmatic or systemic factors,” she writes (147). If Georgia “accepts democratic decision making, good governance and rule of law as fundamental to its national and human security, then there are not options other than pursuing the European model of social, political and economic development” (148).

In contrast with these constructivist explanations, Cecire rejects the very premise that Georgian foreign policy represents structure-deviant behavior and instead advances a “straightforward” realist account: “Georgia's prioritization of NATO and the Euro-Atlantic West is an effort to attenuate its own weakness relative to Russia,” which constitutes “its chief rival and regional hegemon” (182). However, Cecire is the outlier in this volume; identity-based explanations of the sort advanced by German, Kakachia, and Sabanadze are dominant in most of its remaining chapters.

Acquiring an adequate understanding of Georgia's myriad relations with the outside world represents a challenging undertaking for non-Georgians (and probably even for most Georgians). Undoubtedly with that realization in mind, German, Jones, and Kakachia have put together a book that will be of great assistance to anyone who seeks to acquire that understanding. None of its chapters would be useful in a course on IR theory or security studies, but both post-Soviet specialists and practitioners dealing with the region would be well-advised to make themselves familiar with this book's contents.