Turkey's quasi alliance with Israel, formed in the 1990s and sustained throughout the first decade of the 21st century, came to an abrupt end on 31 May 2010, when a group of Turkish Islamists and a number of European sympathizers tried to breach Israel's blockade on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip. As a consequence of skirmishes between the Israeli army and sympathizers of Hamas on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara, nine Turks were killed by Israeli soldiers. This incident is bound to poison Turkish–Israeli relations for years to come.
In Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan, Alexander Murinson presents an in-depth analysis of the Turkish–Israeli–Azerbaijani entente and particularly warns of the looming crisis in Turkish–Israeli liaisons that are expected to emerge from the domestic politics of both countries. The book's scope is Turkish–Israeli cooperation in military and security affairs from 1992 to 2005, while the Azerbaijani dimension is more peripheral to the discussion. After the end of the Cold War, Turkey and Israel reconsidered their strategic importance to the United States and hoped to play a crucial role in the new unipolar international system. At the same time, an informal trilateral axis between Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan materialized as a consequence of the similarities between the three countries’ state identities. They are all garrison states facing existential threats to their territorial integrity, secular and Western oriented, and highly nationalist.
In terms of the concept of the garrison state, all three countries faced threats from their neighbors. Turkey faced irredentism from Syria over its Hatay province, and a number of its neighbors supported the separatist Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers Party) terrorist organization. Israel faced two Palestinian intifadas in the occupied territories. Azerbaijan lost its Nagorno-Karabagh territory to secessionist Armenian forces supported by Armenia proper. Military threats further consolidated an existing culture of national security in Turkey, Israel, and Azerbaijan.
In addition to such commonalities, the international system's change from 1989 through 1991 from a bipolar to a unipolar structure induced state and nonstate institutions—specifically the respective militaries and foreign ministries as well as transnational agents such as ethnic lobbies in the United States and multinational corporations—to contribute to this entente (p. 142).
This book is convincing and empirically strong. The author provides a sound framework of analysis for the trilateral liaisons situated in the constructivist school of thought in international relations theory. The subject of state identities shaping threat perceptions, however, needs further elaboration. In other words, the interaction between state identity and state interests in the shaping of Turkish, Israeli, and Azerbaijani foreign policies needs to be clarified, especially in light of the following reverse argument: were not the commonalities of threats, emanating, for instance, from Iran or Syria and directed toward Israel and Turkey, sufficient to trigger the establishment of the entente? Such an analysis would give priority to realist assumptions such as national interest, state security, and the like. It follows that realist and constructivist variables in foreign policymaking should have been addressed in a more systematic manner.
In his book, Murinson also introduces numerous significant players in these relationships. The author skillfully demonstrates the pro-Turkish affiliation of a number of founding fathers of the state of Israel, such as David Ben Gurion and Izhak Ben-Zvi. Furthermore, Azerbaijan's secularism and ties with Israel are convincingly narrated. One of the strengths of the book is that the author conducted extensive interviews with Turkish, Israeli, and Azerbaijani scholars, diplomats, generals, and politicians. He is familiar with the individuals who were instrumental in establishing this entente, as illustrated, for example, by his treatment of David Ivri, the director general of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and one of the key figures in the Israeli defense establishment. Murinson also points out divergences in Israeli opinion over establishing too close a relationship with Turkey and how that relationship might antagonize Egypt.
The role of the Jewish lobby and other transnational networks formed the fourth pillar of the Turkish–Israeli–Azerbaijani axis. Numerous Jewish intellectuals and pundits worked within and outside the U.S. government, advocating closer ties with Turkey in the 1980s, 1990s, and the early 2000s. Among them, Murinson mentions Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Daniel Pipes, and others. The Jewish Institute for National Strategic Affairs and the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) were among the Jewish organizations that lobbied against the anti-Turkish legislation in Congress initiated by Greek and Armenian lobbies. Other Jewish organizations such as Bʾnai Brith and the Anti-Defamation League worked for the lifting of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which proscribed Azerbaijan from receiving American aid as a consequence of the efforts of the Armenian lobby. It should also be added that Jewish organizations in the United States such as AIPAC and the American Jewish Committee supported the establishment of the Bakü-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Murinson should be commended for tying in this dimension of the trilateral relationship, as it has remained esoteric for many in the Middle East and the Caucasus and has even been the subject of conspiracy theories.
More recently, however, it is precisely the transnational networks dimension of Turkish foreign policy that is under threat in the Turkish–American–Israeli triad. More generally, one of the major reasons for the decline of the Turkish–Israeli axis according to Murinson is the rise of Islamic identity politics in Turkey in the aftermath of the establishment of the Justice and Development Party government in 2002, itself a reflection of the ideational changes in the Turkish body politic.
Despite the theoretical strengths of the book, there are a number of empirical shortcomings that need to be stressed. For instance, Murinson overemphasizes the Shiʿi identity of Azerbaijan when he mentions the deleterious effects of “the Israeli military campaign against the fellow-Shiite militant organization” Hizbullah on bilateral relations (p. 141). Israel's campaign against Hizbullah did not in fact cause any ill feelings toward Israel on the part of the Azerbaijanis precisely because of the secular nature of Azeri state and society. Azerbaijan has never had an interest in the Shiʿa of Iraq, Lebanon, or elsewhere.
Murinson also gives too much credit to the role of the military in Turkish foreign policymaking. This stems from the fact that the military played a critical role in the initiation of the Turkish–Israeli entente. Yet cooperation was not confined to military and intelligence sharing; it included political, economic, cultural, academic, and touristic exchange. These latter spheres might not have been the engine of the entente, but they should not be neglected or brushed aside.
The book contains a number of mistakes, including spelling and typing errors both in English and Turkish. The Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlıgı) is written as “Diyanet Bakanlıgı” (Ministry of Religion) (p. 30) and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Turkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi) is erroneously written as “Büyük Milli Meclis” (p. 36). The names of the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi), its former leader Alparslan Türkeş (p. 165, fn. 183), and the former director of Turkish intelligence Sönmez Köksal are all misspelled. On numerous occasions Murinson uses Turkish words without translating them into English. Furthermore, Murinson's insistence on Pan-Turkism as the ideological driving force of the Turkish intelligence service and his assertion that its recruitment is based on pan-Turkic ideology (pp. 60, 110) are hard to corroborate. This intelligence service, as with most state institutions in Turkey, is suspicious of any ideology that would jeopardize the security of Turkey. Therefore, if one had to label its orientation, Kemalism would be the more appropriate term.
Another empirical mistake is the characterization of Ariel Sharon as a former chief of staff of the Israeli Army (p. 55). Murinson is also incorrect in characterizing the Islamist National Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi) as a nationalist party (p. 32). Furthermore, Turkey was not trying to enter the Baghdad Pact in 1958 (p. 98); it was already a member of this regional organization at the time. In fact, the Baghdad Pact dissolved in 1958 as a consequence of the coup d'état of ʿAbd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq and evolved into the Central Treaty Organization without Iraqi participation. Another problematic argument is that the Laz and Syriac Christians were considered to be internal enemies (p. 31) of the Turkish state and that the government accordingly perpetrated attacks on them. Both assertions are untrue regarding the Laz, and it was the PKK that attacked the Syriacs during the 1980s and 1990s.
One of the major empirical problems of the book is the assertion that, ever since its establishment, Turkey wanted to be included in the “Euro-Atlantic security system aligned against Communist Russia” (p. 23). In fact, Turkey received economic assistance from Soviet Russia in its early days, and it did not align itself against the USSR until the latter half of the 1940s and more specifically until 1952, when it joined NATO. The author also asserts that Turkey's dream to become a member of the EU would be “the realization of Kemalist aspirations,” an argument often repeated by numerous other scholars and pundits. This, however, is a fallacy. The EU did not exist during the lifetime of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881–1938), and the delegation of sovereignty to the EU would contradict some of the basic tenets of Kemalist state structure, such as full independence. The latter principle might be one of the reasons why numerous Kemalists are lukewarm to the idea of EU membership in modern Turkey.
These shortcomings do not change the fact that the book is theoretically grounded and analytically nuanced. They also do not refute the book's basic analysis of the strategic cooperation that resulted from the Turkish, Israeli, and Azerbaijani states’ similar outlooks. Murinson is right to point to the problems inherent in the entente, and he is fully aware of the public sympathies in Turkey toward the Palestinian people (p. 111). He is also right on target when he states that the Turkish–Israeli axis was subject to the whims of domestic politics, especially in Turkey. The rise of Islamic political identity and feelings of solidarity toward the Palestinians were indeed factors that negatively influenced relations. Similarly, the rise of Likud under Benjamin Netanyahu did not help the bilateral relations either (pp. 115–16). Furthermore, the second intifada, known as the al-Aqsa Intifada, as well as the Israeli army's disproportionate retaliations against the Palestinians, further aggravated Turkish citizens and politicians.
The negative impact of an axis shift in Turkish–Israeli relations will undoubtedly be discussed in years to come. Murinson concludes the book rather pessimistically by quoting from another author to the effect that the Turkish political leadership has initiated the dismantling of the Turkish–Israeli entente. Whether there is a will among the parties to resuscitate this strategically embedded relationship remains to be seen.
