In late 1615 Galileo came to Rome against advice in order to enter into the debate about Copernicus's heliocentric ideas. While he made the rounds of Roman salons arguing the case and both he and his supporters dealt with authoritative cardinals, Galileo cast about for the right agent to make his case directly to Pope Paul V. He finally hit on Cardinal Alessandro Orsini, twenty-three years old and new to the office. Galileo dedicated to him the most explicit statement yet of his cosmological beliefs, the ‘Discourse on the Tides’. Perhaps drawing on it, Orsini entered consistory (a formal meeting between Pope and cardinals) on 24 February 1616 and demanded that Pope Paul clear not only Galileo but all Copernicans of the aspersions recently cast on them in Florence and elsewhere. Visibly annoyed, Paul instead retorted that the matter had been turned over to the Inquisition, as in fact it had been. In highly irregular fashion, he then seems to have ordered that body to make its decision the very next day.Footnote 1 Eleven theological consultants reported on two propositions: first, the Sun was the centre of the universe; and second, the Earth moved. They declared the first ‘formally heretical’ and the second ‘at least erroneous in the faith’.Footnote 2
Galileo might have foreseen this outcome. One of those theologians' masters, Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino, among Paul's chief advisers and perhaps the most respected theologian in Rome, had warned Galileo before he ever thought to visit that staying too long would provoke a reaction.Footnote 3 It came the day after the consultants' report. The Inquisition's secretary (a cardinal and its highest executive under the Pope) formally notified his chief subordinate, Commissary-General Michelangelo Seghizzi, of Paul's order to Bellarmino to tell Galileo about the two censured propositions. On 26 February, Bellarmino and Seghizzi executed that order.
Summoned to Bellarmino's apartment, in the presence of Seghizzi, other witnesses and a notary, Galileo got a warning from the cardinal. Galileo objected in some fashion. As a result, Seghizzi, still on Paul's direct orders and in the name of the Congregation of the Holy Office, took action. He ‘gave a precept’ to Galileo to ‘abstain from teaching or defending or treating [tractare] this doctrine and opinion [Copernicus's] in any way at all’.Footnote 4 Galileo could scarcely think about Copernicus. Now he promised to obey. The sequel shows Galileo observing this precept in its full form reasonably carefully for almost a decade.Footnote 5 When he sought permission to publish his Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems in 1630, he failed to tell the chief papal censor, Niccolò Riccardi, about the precept and it became one of the two central elements in his condemnation.
This article will demonstrate two points: first, the precept was real and probably given in the strongest form; and second, it was almost certainly not legally improper. Although Galileo's trial (or trials; whether he had one or two is hotly disputed) has almost always been treated in terms of the large issues raised about religion and science, the focus here is limited to the legal meaning of 1616 and on understanding, not justifying or condemning, what happened.
As the popular historian Dava Sobel puts it without much exaggeration, ‘no other process in the annals of canon or common law has ricocheted through history with more meanings, more consequences, more conjecture, more regrets’ than Galileo's.Footnote 6 And as Adriano Prosperi, one of the deans of historians of the Inquisition, well says, that processo is ‘più intricato e problematico’ than most historians think.Footnote 7 The problem in establishing the events of 1616 concerns both the textual evidence of what happened, and the law and jurisprudence governing those texts and events. Some of each is more than a little tricky, causing problems both to the original actors and to historians. Here I shall deal primarily with the textual evidence, leaving for separate treatment what canon lawyers would have made of it. Most scholars have thought that the minute of 26 February recording the administration of the precept (item 2 below) makes the most trouble. This is not the case. That honour instead belongs to the same kind of note of the Inquisition's meeting a week later (the decretum of 3 March; item 3 below). Given improving knowledge of how the Inquisition worked, including how it produced and preserved its records, it becomes possible to create a consistent account of what happened in 1616, like that sketched above. Once that moment is better understood, so will the vital role it played in Galileo's second trial. A contribution to the calmer discussion of the relations between religion and the sciences involves getting to closer grips with the dynamics of Galileo's trials as legal events on their own terms, including his role in them, rather than a suprahistorical moment of conflict between ‘the Church’ and ‘science’ – thereby perhaps helping to cool the debate over Galileo's fate.Footnote 8
Six documents relate what happened in Bellarmino's palace on 26 February, all in the Inquisition's files, but only four of them in Galileo's dossier.Footnote 9 The first three of these are minutes:
1 Paul's order on 25 February to Bellarmino and Seghizzi via the Inquisition's secretary Cardinal Giovanni Garzia Millini (hereafter also ‘Paul's order’).
2 The precept dated the next day (see Appendix; hereafter also ‘the precept minute’); there is also an abbreviated (and irrelevant) eighteenth-century copy of both 1 and 2.
3 Report of a meeting of the Congregation of the Inquisition on 3 March 1616, found among the Decreta, the largest surviving – almost intact – run of its documents (see Appendix; hereafter ‘the decretum’).Footnote 10
The three remaining texts probably descend from item 2 and therefore have less authority about the events of 1616:
4 Part of the briefing document probably of September 1632 drawn up by the Inquisition's assessor; its precise legal status is ambiguous, but politically it spelled the end for Galileo.Footnote 11
5 The notorious ‘Summary’ prepared by that assessor's successor at the end of Galileo's trial in 1633.
6 Galileo's sentence.
Finally, there is a seventh text (item 7), Bellarmino's certificate requested by Galileo dated 26 May 1616 (‘Bellarmino's certificate’). Despite the fact that it says nothing directly about what happened on 26 February, nearly all commentators treat it as if it speaks most authoritatively to the point.
One other piece of evidence will be reserved for separate treatment – Galileo's deposition of 12 April 1633 – in large measure because it is the only one of these texts which on its face is likely to offer a slanted view of the precept. Despite the deep suspicions of many interpreters, there is much less reason to think any of the other documents were falsified or otherwise manipulated than to think that Galileo might have engaged in a little prevarication when on trial before the Inquisition. When carefully read, Galileo's testimony agrees closely with the interpretation argued here for the reality and force of the precept.
Since so many of those involved in compiling these texts were lawyers, we might hope that they would write especially precisely. Alas, they did not. At the most basic but largely insignificant level, they could not settle on a stable text of the strongest form of the precept even when allegedly quoting it directly.Footnote 12 A parody of the lawyer's maxim summum ius summa iniuria, ‘the strongest law [causes] the greatest injury’, should warn us immediately that trying for too much precision will harm our understanding of what happened. Any reconstruction is never going to meet the standard of legal proof; we are never going to know exactly what happened. The interpretation argued here is no more than the most probable.
The decretum of 3 March
The only seriously discordant document about what happened on 26 February 1616, item 3 (the decretum), has Bellarmino report simply that Galileo had ‘agreed’ to ‘abandon’ heliocentrism after being ‘warned’ to do so.Footnote 13 This statement appears to mean both that Galileo still had room for manoeuvre afterwards and that Commissary Seghizzi never did anything. The other texts disagree. Paul's order (item 1), the one missing from the Decreta but found in Galileo's dossier, said that Seghizzi should proceed to the precept if Galileo ‘refused’ to agree to Bellarmino's ‘warning’. It described the precept as enjoining Galileo ‘to abandon completely teaching, defending or treating this doctrine’ of the Earth's movement and the Sun's fixity, which is nearly the same thing as item 2 says. Item 4 read that Galileo could ‘in no manner whatever hold, teach or defend [Copernicus's ideas], in word or in writing’, or he would be proceeded against, and that he promised to obey. Item 5 combines all these texts, perhaps sloppily, perhaps maliciously, and has Bellarmino alone give Galileo the precept in its strongest form. Just to bring confusion full circle, item 6 (sentence) contains the most detailed account, having Bellarmino warn Galileo ‘benignly’ before Seghizzi gave him the strongest form of the precept. Item 7 (Bellarmino's certificate) makes no explicit reference either to precept or to warning.
Thus except for the decretum of 3 March (item 3), all the texts agree that Galileo got the precept in full form, leaving a little unclear only from whom, a point which may be entirely irrelevant. We could conclude that since we have item 3 outnumbered, we can discard it. This move would be silly, but it does highlight one crucial fact: item 3 stands alone both in its content and, more importantly, in its status and location. The second point is crucial to Galileo's second trial. Since it was not in his dossier, the Inquisition's staff in 1632–3 could not have been expected to know about it unless someone had ordered them to search all of the Inquisition's voluminous records.Footnote 14 The absence of an order for such a search might mean that it was never handed down and that item 3 therefore never came into evidence.Footnote 15 Hence the near-perfect consistency between the other two documents of 1616, the ‘Summary’ and the sentence.
The decretum of 3 March might seem the most authoritative document, since it records what happened at the Inquisition's Thursday meeting, the only one of its weekly assemblies that the Pope usually attended. Inclusion in the Decreta meant that the text became a precedent which the Inquisition relied on almost as much as common lawyers do.Footnote 16 Although both points are significant, neither is as weighty as it at first might sound. Above all, the Decreta were frequently sloppily kept. The minute of Paul's order (item 1), recording a direct, if informal, command from the Pope via the Inquisition's secretary to the two heads of its permanent staff, is a good example of the many notes in the decree registers scrawled in the margin or crammed in at the end of a meeting.Footnote 17 Since it had not gone through the congregation of cardinals, the Pope's order need not have been recorded there at all, although more than a few similar acts were. As just one example, take the informational note exactly like item 1 saying that Millini ‘told me, the assessor, that the Pope had ordered’ that recommendations – letters offering protection to suspects – were not to be accepted in Inquisition cases.Footnote 18 Or, even better, an entry in a case much like Galileo's – and a text very similar in form and content to the precept minute (item 2) – simply noting another papal order that did not require the Congregation's action:
8 March 1629. The Reverend Father Commisssary of the Holy Office reported that the Pope had ordered the bishop of Puzzuoli to be relegated to the monastery of Santa Prassede of the monks of Vallombrosa near Santa Maria Maggiore. In the execution of which order the present Reverend Father Commissary and I the notary took the aforesaid bishop to the aforesaid monastery super Rheda and there in my presence and that of the below written witnesses notified the same bishop of the Pope's order and ordered [praecipit] him not to leave the aforesaid monastery under penalty at the will of the Pope, and successive commended him to the abbot of the same monastery. ‘Super quibus etc’ [the boilerplate authenticating the document as a notarial act] in the aforesaid monastery in the rooms of the palace of the titular cardinal, in the presence of Angelo Finati of the diocese of Otranto and Anello de Sancto, priest of Puzzuoli diocese, witnesses.Footnote 19
It will bear remembering that the witnesses did not sign this minute, any more than they did Galileo's.
Next, the way the records were produced contained one notable weakness that bears directly on the status of item 3, the only one of these documents explicitly to identify itself as a second-hand summary. The notary said he had transcribed a text given to him by the assessor, the permanent head of the Inquisition's staff, who had taken notes on what Bellarmino had said during the secret part of the Inquisition's meeting which the notary could not attend.Footnote 20 Francesco Beretta alleges that the Inquisition's de facto head, Millini, kept close tabs on the assessor's accuracy.Footnote 21 Whether or not this claim holds in general, he failed this time. In the next clause of the same document the same notary, again following the assessor's lead, noted the Congregation of the Index's order that Copernicus's De Revolutionibus and two other books had been ‘prohibited and suspended, respectively’, and then reversed the sequence of those words followed again by ‘respectively’ at the end of the note. By also listing the books incorrectly relative to which was prohibited or suspended, the assessor/notary created an irresolvable mess.Footnote 22 There is every reason to think he did the same in item 2, the precept minute. Besides, as its context shows, the decree of 3 March did not primarily concern Galileo, who appeared in it only as advance recipient of the Index's action, so the notary (and maybe Bellarmino himself) worried less about getting what happened to him right.
The precept minute: a forgery?
From the moment serious study of Galileo's trial began in the late 1860s, item 2 has been the centre of attention and, because it is the most damaging to Galileo, of concerted efforts to dispose of it.Footnote 23 In fact, it is more dangerous than anyone has thought. Incredibly enough, one phrase in it that would by itself settle once and for all what happened has been overlooked.Footnote 24 It consists of two words, et constituto, which occur between ‘praedicto Galileo adhuc ibidem praesenti’ (‘the aforesaid Galileo being still present’) and ‘praecepit et ordinavit’ (both meaning ‘ordered’) in recording Seghizzi's action. Constitutus (‘Constituted’) appears at the beginning of a deposition before the Inquisition to signify the deponent's change in status qua deponent and thereby indicates the legal nature of the proceeding. Its predicate here is Galileo and in tandem with adhuc ibidem praesenti, the key word being the adverb, it signifies that at least the notary regarded both Bellarmino's and Seghizzi's actions as part of the same legal action. This is a point, by the way, which is only strengthened by the interpretation of successive ac incontinenti offered below. Further, there could be no question of a so-called charitable admonition, an act which by definition could not have legal significance, followed by a judicially binding precept. We shall return to this problem.
The campaign against the precept minute took two forms, put forward most forcefully by Emil Wohlwill.Footnote 25 He argued that it was a forgery and, even were it not, still illegitimate in law. Both criticisms shared a key point: the lack of the witnesses' signatures. Although the forgery thesis proved popular for a long time, only one well-informed historian still seriously entertains it, paradoxically the man who has done most to demonstrate its unlikelihood, Francesco Beretta. His case for forgery rests not on palaeographical or codicological grounds but on Wohlwill's original (if unacknowledged) argument about the contradiction between item 3 and item 1, leading to the slippage between item 2's two actions. Beretta argues that the ‘material authenticity’ of its second half is ‘very problematic’, before concluding that it was forged in 1632 in order to get Riccardi, who had licensed the Dialogue, out of trouble.Footnote 26 Many commentators have taken item 1 as ordering a procedure in two phases, a ‘warning’ by Bellarmino followed by a precept from Seghizzi. Beretta was the first to try to explain that ‘warning’, identifying it as a caritativa monitio recorded in the authentic part of item 2.Footnote 27 This assertion drives his case for forgery. Unfortunately, it is much less than certain that he is right about the nature of Bellarmino's action. The Inquisition regularly used a monitio in exactly the way I think that Bellarmino did, not as a charitable warning, but as a device to suspend process; by contrast, I have not found a single monitio in the registers qualified as ‘charitable’. As just one example of a usage that could be identical to what happened to Galileo, a decree of 18 August 1616 allowed a consultor of the Holy Office in Pavia to return there, ‘a monitio and judicial precept having been given him not to speak about his case’ (‘facta ei monitione et praecepto iudiciali de non loquendo de causa sua’).Footnote 28
Beretta admits that the palaeographical and codicological evidence is against him. Thus all of item 2 ‘appears’ to be in the hand of Andrea Pettini, the chief notary in 1616.Footnote 29 Further, he concludes that the first half of the precept minute is unequivocally authentic on formal grounds, and does not criticize the second in these terms.Footnote 30 He also proves that the entire document could not have been interpolated into the dossier at a later date.Footnote 31 Finally, Beretta shows that the allegedly missing witnesses' signatures would not have been expected given the kind of document item 2 is, an imbreviatura or minute.Footnote 32 Its authenticity derived not from those signatures but from its place in Galileo's dossier. The only signature required was the notary's and it was normal practice for Inquisition notaries to sign only once per file, at the bottom of the front cover.Footnote 33 Galileo's dossier lacks such a signature. Beretta rather tendentiously maintains that either it never had one or the signature had already been torn off before Galileo was sentenced, making the outcome illegal. This point will not bear the weight placed on it. Although it is hard to miss the damage to the dossier's cover, there is no way to say when that might have happened.Footnote 34 Nor does Beretta cite evidence for his description of normal practice which he appears to base on the surviving processi in Trinity College, Dublin, MS 1232.Footnote 35 This comparison may or may not be warranted, since these dossiers, first, concern cases of suspects who appeared spontaneously before the Inquisition and therefore merited substantially different treatment from other accuseds, which may well mean that their records were handled differently; and second, include multiple proceedings, not just one.Footnote 36 Nor even on these dossiers is the (same) notary's practice uniform. Some signatures appear to be autograph (e.g. fo. 1r), others fair copies probably written by a substitute notary (e.g. fo. 9r). In short, neither the signatures of the witnesses – which would not have been expected – nor the notary's – which unlike the witnesses's may really be missing – effect item 2's authenticity. If Bellarmino's was not a ‘charitable admonition’, not much is left of Beretta's case for forgery.
At the same time as Beretta, Matthias Dorn, a geologist, also undertook to demonstrate that the precept minute, item 2, had been forged.Footnote 37 In addition to recycling Wohlwill's twin claims (again, without acknowledgement) Dorn offered a quasi-scientific criticism based on observations by an apparently professional document examiner, one G. Schöneberg.Footnote 38 Almost certainly working at second hand from photographs supplied by Dorn, Schöneberg identified four differences in the hand of the first and second parts of the minute: first, in the form of characters, especially ‘d’; second, in what palaeographers call the ductus, the general way in which characters are formed, especially Oberlängenverzierungen, which means serifs on the ascenders; third, in the size of the characters; and fourth, in the ligature between majuscule ‘T’ and subsequent ‘e’.Footnote 39 These results are all open to serious question. Above all, small, sometimes very small, details best distinguish one hand from another, especially in the case of scripts as highly formalized as papal chancery hand. Many such will be hard to see in photographs. I have not been able to see the originals, but on the basis of twenty-year-old photographs and Henri de L'Epinois's much clearer (in part because more than a century older) photographic reproductions and on the strength of professional training in palaeography and thirty years' practice and teaching of it, I do not accept any of Schöneberg's points.Footnote 40 Neither of the most solid-looking ones, the first and fourth, is true. Compare the initial minuscule ‘d’ on ‘doceat’ (fo. 44r, right margin) to that on ‘defendat’ in the next line – both different in form, both allegedly in the hand of the forgerer – and to the initial ‘d’ on ‘de’ (in the phrase de lauda) in the third line of the first part of minute which is identical to the ‘d’ on ‘doceat’. For medial position ‘d’ compare for example that in ‘suprad[ic]to’ (middle of the second line, first part of the minute) to the same word in the first line of the second part (both words being almost identical, by the way, the minute difference being a function of their position in the text, the second at the upper margin allowing the writer more room to be florid). As for ‘T’ and ‘e’, we are lucky to have two instances at the beginning of the same word (‘testium’ on the third line from the bottom of fo. 43v, near the right margin, and ‘testibus’, the last word of the document), and both are identical, as they are to the majuscule ‘T’ on ‘Terrae’ (line 2, fo. 44r). Finally, any alleged difference in the characters' size could easily be explained by the fact that the first half of the text is written into a smallish space at the bottom of a mostly full page, while the second half is at the top of a new, otherwise blank one. Schöneberg did not perform the surest test to distinguish two hands, including their ductus, the measurement of the characters' slant. I do not detect any variation in slant from either set of plates. The second-surest measure, differences in unusual characters over which the writer therefore had to concentrate, is impossible since there are none to compare.
In the most recent consideration of the documents and events of 1616, Annibale Fantoli offers a number of extrinsic criticisms of Beretta's forgery thesis. One of the most powerful concerns the names of the witnesses. How, wonders Fantoli, would a forger in 1632 have known the witnesses' names?Footnote 41 It might be replied that a clever forger could have got them from the same place where I confirmed their identities, a biography of Bellarmino published in 1624 and again in 1631. The Cypriot Badino or Bandino de Nores was maestro di camera to both Cesare Baronio and then Bellarmino.Footnote 42 Agostino Mongardo served Bellarmino as a chamberlain (cubiculi administer).Footnote 43 In a note, answering an objection by Guido Morpurgo-Tagliabue, Fantoli hypothesizes that the version of item 2 as a public document (that is, with all the required signatures, properly sealed) is missing because it went not into Galileo's dossier but into one of the Libri extensorum.Footnote 44 Fantoli draws on Beretta's characterization of this once quite extensive series of volumes as ‘the registers of acts emitted in public form by the notary’, but it is difficult to put full faith in Beretta's broad-gauge conclusions about them since so few survive.Footnote 45 One that I examined, for example, ACDFSO, St.st.LL-5-g, marked as part of the series on its spine, contains no public instruments. Finally, like Morpurgo-Tagliabue, Fantoli adduces the apparent contradiction between items 1 and 2 as evidence of the second's authenticity.Footnote 46 Why, they suggest, would a forger have made such a gross mistake? Would he not have been sure to make his forgery consistent with an authentic document? And, I might add, especially if he had gone to all the trouble to ferret out real witnesses' names.
Bellarmino's ‘certificate’ and evidence from Galileo's trial in 1633
Galileo thought he got off lightly in 1616, failing so much as to mention the precept. Of course, he might for once have been playing by the rules, since the Inquisition's proceedings were supposed to be top secret. Since he made light of the Index's decree of 5 March against Copernicus, we may think that Galileo took none of this with the requisite seriousness.Footnote 47 But he did. He heard the rumours that ran through both Rome and Venice of his conviction and abjuration. Naturally, this news worried him. Here is where the seventh document comes in. Galileo asked Bellarmino to testify that he had not abjured or been otherwise punished. The cardinal agreed. He took care over his text, writing at least one draft before settling on the final form.
The letter is dated 26 May 1616 and reads as follows:
We, Roberto Cardinal Bellarmino, having understood that Signor Galileo Galilei is being slandered or accused of having abjured in our hands, and also of being ‘penanced’ [punished] for this with salutary penances, and having been sought out about the truth, we say that the said Signor Galileo has not abjured in our hands nor in those of others in Rome, nor anywhere else that we know, any opinion or doctrine, nor even more has he received salutary penances nor of any other sort, but has only had announced to him the declaration made by Our Lord [the Pope] and published by the Sacred Congregation of the Index, in which is contained that the doctrine ascribed to Copernicus that the earth moves around the sun and the sun is at the center of the world without moving from east to west is contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be defended nor held. And in testimony of this we have written and signed this document with our own hand.Footnote 48
Like Galileo, Bellarmino was an accomplished rhetorician, and he put his skills to use in this text. Not only did he carefully avoid assigning responsibility for the precept (letting himself off the hook, just in case), but he also adroitly, as if casually, said that Galileo had been warned not to defend or hold either of the two condemned propositions. Although the judges in 1633 took this passage as further incriminating Galileo, the opposite of the position taken by most modern historians, this fede (testimonial) says nothing directly about the event of 26 February.
One more kind of evidence bears on what happened – Galileo's testimony in his opening deposition on 12 April 1633.Footnote 49 Unravelling it is even more complicated than working through the texts already discussed.
Galileo was quickly asked whether he had been in Rome in 1616. His reply seems designed to misdirect, drawing his hearers away from the precept, even though he had not yet been asked about it. He began by alleging that he came to Rome in 1616 ‘to hear what was proper to hold’ about Copernicanism. He embroidered this assertion by further alleging that he met with five cardinals inquisitor at their invitation because they wanted help understanding Copernicus. This was safe, since four of the five had died and the last was a man Galileo thought he could either count on or expect to be out of Rome. Except for Galileo's obviously self-interested claim, there is no evidence that he ever met any of them to talk about anything, another instance like the long conversation he is supposed to have had with Paul V in the wake of his silencing.Footnote 50 Next, he played the Bellarmino card, accurately enough citing a letter from the cardinal to the author of the only book to be outright condemned in 1616, Paolo Antonio Foscarini, saying that Foscarini was wise to defend Copernicus hypothetically (as, of course, was Galileo), but Galileo overlooked the fact that it bore a date almost a year before the Index's decree.Footnote 51 Then came item 7, Bellarmino's certificate. It is highly important that Galileo, in the act of handing over an authentic copy of the text, testified that it said something other than it did, or rather said two contradictory things about it. Item 7 read that Copernicus's ideas were ‘contrary to Holy Scripture and therefore cannot be defended nor held’. Galileo first repeated Bellarmino's statement in the letter to Foscarini and then tried to make it appear that item 7 said the same thing, while quoting it accurately. Even Galileo's prodigious rhetorical powers had their limits. He made a bad mistake by introducing item 7, which plainly said ‘cannot be defended nor held’, at the same time as he tried to obscure it in a cloud of words. ‘In any manner whatsoever’ (as the precept minute reads) almost becomes superfluous.Footnote 52
At this point Galileo repeated his story of the interview with Bellarmino, perhaps inadvertently emphasizing the intensity of the prohibition given him. When pressed on the question whether Bellarmino had given him a precept as well, Galileo admitted ‘maybe’. Then he destroyed himself. ‘I do not claim not to have in any way violated that precept.’ Just in case his examiners missed this admission, he made a long further statement, in which he conceded that everything alleged about 26 February 1616 could be true, before quoting the strong form of the precept – ‘in no way whatsoever’ – as if he had received it in that form. He ended the interrogation by repeating what was at best an equivocation that he had not told the papal censor about the precept because the Dialogue did not defend Copernicus. However much bias the ‘Summary’ (item 5) may manifest against Galileo, it strictly accurately records this moment: ‘he confesses the precept’.Footnote 53
Galileo continued to follow this line in his brief defence document submitted on 10 May 1633, the same day as his third deposition, which seems to rule out much reflection on its content.Footnote 54 Reiterating the initial denial in his first interrogation that he had received a precept (which he twice also called a comandamento) from the Holy Office in 1616 by covering himself with Bellarmino's certificate, Galileo claimed to have had the order from Bellarmino orally. With ‘in any manner whatsoever’ removed from it as he said he remembered it (because that phrase did not appear in the certificate), he blithely observed ‘that there remains no reason to doubt that the comandamento made in it [item 7] is the same as the precept which was made in the decree of the sacred congregation of the Index’. He then insisted on the purity of his intention and that he had never set out to violate any comandamenti.Footnote 55 But then in his final interrogation on 21 June he changed his mind; at any rate he now spoke of ‘that precept’ he had received as the watershed in his intellectual life, after which he scrupulously and sincerely adhered only to Ptolemy's cosmology, as he continued to maintain throughout the balance of his last interrogation that he had always done.Footnote 56
Thus, except for the document of 10 May, Galileo himself seems to have admitted that he received a precept from Bellarmino, never saying anything of Seghizzi's action, and at least leaving open the possibility that the precept took the strong form. Galileo's own words isolate item 3 that much more.
Then comes the last and perhaps oddest moment in this whole tangled episode – Galileo's abjuration. His sentence is replete with accusations that he had violated the precept so it is no surprise that he confessed to having done so, saying that he had been properly condemned ‘because after having been legally informed [intimato] with a precept that I should entirely leave the false opinion [of the Earth's movement] … and that the said false doctrine could not be held, defended nor taught in any way whatsoever, not verbally nor in writing’, he had published his Dialogue anyway.Footnote 57 As he apparently told his first biographer, Giovanfrancesco Buonamici, the only thing Galileo refused to admit was that he had committed fraud in concealing the precept from Riccardi.Footnote 58
The legal impropriety thesis
Given this reasonably clear general line on the content and reality of Galileo's precept, the most important remaining point is a consideration of the evidence bearing on its legality. Critics of the precept minute rely on two principal arguments to make what has been dubbed the legal impropriety thesis.Footnote 59 First, Seghizzi failed to give Galileo a chance to accept Bellarmino's warning and, second, even if he had, the precept was still illegitimately administered. The first point depends on the meaning of the phrase successive ac incontinenti, usually translated as ‘immediately thereafter’. The second rests on a comparison with the ‘precept’ of 1632 ordering Galileo to Rome.
Successive ac incontinenti
To take these in order, ‘immediately’ makes it sound as if Seghizzi abused Galileo in his zeal for Holy Church. Twenty years ago Thomas Kurig, now an intellectual-property lawyer, put forward a radically new translation as a solution to the problem. His argument depended on two grammatical points. ‘Immediately’ (gleich darauf in German) is mistaken and ignores ac incontinenti. Successive should be translated not in a temporal sense but as ‘following thereon (expressing the papal will)’, while ac incontinenti is a causal dative modifying ‘Galileo’ and the phrase should therefore be rendered as ‘since Galileo was unwilling’ or ‘being impudent’.Footnote 60 The first of these at least raises a question about the usual translation. No doubt because of the incorrect linkage to incontinenti, successive lost its simple meaning of ‘after’ with no necessary implication of ‘right after’. Kurig's second point appears even more vital, if not as original as he claims; it had been made, if not published, already in 1964.Footnote 61 By almost literally translating si recusaverit of item 1, incontinenti would remove the most important contradiction between it and item 2. That contradiction has been overdrawn even without the correct translation of incontinenti, because recusaverit need not mean ‘refuse’. Recusare principally means ‘to object’, but it also has the sense ‘to be reluctant’ or ‘to be unwilling’. It is not necessary to belabour the point that this last meaning agrees exactly with incontinenti as translated by Kurig. Thus Galileo would not have had to do anything more than hesitate to obey or give some sign of annoyance and Seghizzi would have thought himself within his rights to give the precept.
Unfortunately, Kurig's elegant solution is wrong. I have found no other instances of incontinenti used in the way he suggests, in either a search of the Patrologia latina database, a less systematic survey of other medieval and early modern writing, or most importantly among the lawyers. Nowhere in their extensive attention to the word is a definition like Kurig's so much as hinted at. More curiously yet, none of the commentators I have checked discusses the phrase successive ac incontinenti.
When in doubt about the meaning of a term, the best historical move is to look for other contemporary uses, as Beretta does in this case. Several nineteenth-century scholars had already taken that route, including Philippe Gilbert and Franz Reusch. Both looked in inquisitorial manuals, Gilbert in Repertorium Inquisitorum (1575) and Reusch in Eliseo Masini's widely used text for provincial inquisitors, Sacro arsenale (first edition 1621 and frequently reprinted). A note added to a passage in the Repertorium by Quintiliano Mandosio, one of its editors, left incontinenti almost entirely indeterminate as to the length of time denoted.Footnote 62 Masini's book gave other examples of actions linked by successive ac incontinenti, as well as a larger number where just the first word appears.Footnote 63 In one of the instances having both, Masini set it parallel to the Italian immediatamente, a word at first glance at least as strong as its modern English cognate.Footnote 64 Yet Masini cannot have meant this, since his phrase connected two actions that could never happen ‘immediately’ after one another in a temporal sense: bringing a suspect from prison (even if in the same building) in order to confront another suspect. Thus on Masini's evidence successive must mean no more than ‘after’ (maybe even ‘as soon as possible after’) or perhaps better ‘directly’ in both the temporal and procedural sense. This comes close to Beretta's gloss on it of ‘in continuity with the previous event’ – that is, as part of the same legal action – even if he continues to use the temporal meaning of ‘immediately’.Footnote 65Successive by itself says nothing about whether Galileo had a chance to respond.
The entry in Du Cange might make it appear that successive is a fifteenth-century neologism, since the sole citation comes from a letter of Pius II of 1459 and most lexika have similarly impoverished entries for it.Footnote 66 The only other textual citation in any of them I have yet found, in Andreas Stübelius's Thesaurus latinitatis, is to Aelius Spartianus on Caracalla taken from Robert Constantin's Supplementum linguae latinae where Stübelius correctly emended the reading to successisse.Footnote 67 The full title of Constantin's work underscores the word's rarity: Supplementum linguae Latinae, seu dictionarium abstrusorum vocabulorum.Footnote 68 Johann Matthias Gesner cited the same passage without emendation in his slightly later Novus Linguae et Eruditionis Romanae Thesaurus.Footnote 69 In fact, although undoubtedly rare, a number of instances of the word come up in a search of the Patrologia latina database covering patristic and medieval writing before 1215.Footnote 70 The interval between then and the seventeenth century still needs investigation, but by the later period the word appears fairly frequently – two or three occurrences in Melchior Adam's Vitae Germanorum iureconsultorum et politicorum … et Germanorum Theologorum,Footnote 71 as well as two occurrences in a file of Inquisition cases.Footnote 72 Unlike its mate incontinenti, successive did not interest the jurists, either because of its rarity or perhaps because the meaning was obvious.
While still far from a common word, incontinenti has a much richer history. It appeared along with the then more usual ex continenti a number of times in Justinian's Code with such a variety of possible meanings as to generate a substantial amount of jurisprudential commentary.Footnote 73 Albericus de Rosate (c. 1290–1360) offered one of the most detailed discussions in his Dictionarium iuris tam civilis, quam canonici, which went through many editions.Footnote 74 He gave an almost bewildering number of definitions, most in the temporal sense from statim onwards, and a number of cognates (all meaning, at first glance, ‘immediately’) extending all the way to three days as the time limit for revoking an attorney's errors (citing C. 2. 9 and his own discussion in Commentariorum iuris utriusque summi practici Domini Alberici de Rosate Bergomensis pars Prima super Codice Footnote 75). His gloss on confestim, one of the synonyms he suggested for incontinenti, defined it again as sometimes statim, but sometimes ten days. The word also had nontemporal meanings, especially continuus, without any ‘extraneous acts’. In this case, the time period might be left entirely undefined; Albericus again suggested the figure of ten days. In his third entry he gave the example of merchants going off in search of a notary or a celebratory drink at the conclusion of a deal, both (especially the second) denoting a possibly protracted interval of time. Other commentators often cited Albericus's three days in the case of a man who died that long after being wounded.Footnote 76 Others stretched the time indefinitely, for example the great late fifteenth-century canonist Felino Sandeo, who left it up to the judge's decision how long an heir had to prove his claim incontinenti.Footnote 77 In short, the general opinion was that the word ‘receives a varying interpretation according to the matter … and we [in this case Bernabé Brisson, but it could be any of a number of commentators] interpret it with some modest space of time’.Footnote 78 German commentators introduced a distinctive subtlety, saying the term should not be interpreted literally but instead civiliter, moraliter, leaving its precise temporal component up to the judge's discretion, as Sandeo had thought.Footnote 79
As little as we know about its constituent elements, we have even less to go on about the phrase successive ac incontinenti. As far as anyone now knows, it appears for the first time in the precept minute and might therefore have been invented especially for Galileo.Footnote 80 (I make this point facetiously in order to underscore another crucial gap in our knowledge.Footnote 81) Wohlwill correctly identified it as a ‘formula’ while translating it in a number of different ways. But no one has yet tried to dig very far into its contemporary meanings.Footnote 82 This omission partly arises from lack of evidence since so much of the material produced by the Roman Inquisition has been destroyed. Thus far, the only evidence I have found in such sources comes from Trinity College, Dublin, MS 1232, which post-dates Galileo's trial.Footnote 83 Unlike most of these volumes, it is composed of case files rather than sentences. Beretta looked it over, but confined himself to the two instances of successive ac incontinenti, ignoring other terms being used in similar ways that may help to define the phrase. The first of the two occurrences he did discuss is much like the one in Masini in which a prisoner confronted another prisoner; that is, some indeterminate interval of time must have intervened between two acts. The phrase follows the accused's signature at the end of a verbale with the note that he was returned to prison and successive ac incontinenti searched.Footnote 84 The other case is even less help, except that there are two other phrases on the same page that appear to serve the same function. The passage begins with ‘successive et immediate ubi coram S. fuit ei dictum per Dominum an velit repeti testes examinatos in presenti causa quia dabuntur, etc’, to which the accused replied in the negative. ‘Successive et incontinenti supradictus D. fuit ipsi (?) assignatus terminus decem dierum ad faciendum suas defensiones’, which he also declined. ‘Deinde mandavit dominus reponi ad locum suum.’Footnote 85 Thus we have incontinenti parallel to immediate, but also to deinde, which simply means ‘thereafter’, almost the same thing as successive. There are many cases where deinde or even more basically tunc (then) do the work that successive ac incontinenti sometimes does.Footnote 86 In short, the translation of successive ac incontinenti as ‘immediately thereafter’ is open to doubt.
Seghizzi's caution
An external case can be made to support Seghizzi's caution. He had a distinguished record as an inquisitor and was a stickler for proper procedure. In 1601 he was made socius (official substitute) of the commissary, giving him experience of Roman procedure.Footnote 87 Then it was off to Cremona as inquisitor before earning promotion in 1609 to Milan.Footnote 88 In both places he bombarded Rome with questions, contributing greatly to the development of Inquisition jurisprudence by leading the Congregation to enumerate a number of general principles.Footnote 89 Further, the post of commissary of the Inquisition often served as a springboard to higher position, including cardinal. No one took it without knowing this potential, as Seghizzi did almost exactly a year before he gave Galileo the precept.Footnote 90 Fumbling such an important case, especially in Bellarmino's presence, would end any such ambition for Seghizzi. About the time of Bellarmino's certificate, negotiations began for Seghizzi's provision to the bishopric of Lodi.Footnote 91 This meant an exceptionally short tenure as commissary. We cannot say exactly what Seghizzi's move means because he died shortly thereafter, so it could be that he was banished for exceeding his orders. Two other explanations are more likely: first, a native of the place, he went home at his own request to acquire seasoning for promotion; or second, he was shouldered aside to make room for his more highly favoured successor, Desiderio Scaglia. Interestingly enough, Scaglia's socius (deputy), Deodato Seghizzi da Lodi, had already taken office on 7 September.Footnote 92 He must have been Seghizzi's relative. Even better for Seghizzi, his own socius, Jacopo Tinti, was made inquisitor of Casale in August 1616 and a year later moved to Como.Footnote 93 Since ordinarily the commissary probably named his own socius, the fact that Scaglia did not do so, together with Tinti's appointment and Seghizzi's own to his hometown see, make it look very much as if these were bribes intended to induce him to make way for Scaglia.
The ‘precept’ of 1632
Now to the parallel alleged between 1616 and 1632. Giorgio de Santillana probably made the most out of it and his argument has recently reappeared in much the same form in Fantoli's piece.Footnote 94 In using 1632 to shed light on 1616 de Santillana committed two mistakes as well as accidentally raising a serious problem for his case. The first was to think that the surviving version of the document of 1632 – with signatures appended – was the original. It is plainly headed ‘copia’.Footnote 95 Perhaps the original should have gone into the archives of the Florentine Inquisition, where it is also not to be found, but this does not clear away the mistake.Footnote 96
De Santillana shared his second mistake with everybody else. It can be read more charitably for that and for several other reasons. First, we have next to no evidence about how precepts were normally given. Second, taken by itself, the document of 1 October could look as if it recorded Galileo receiving one such. But did it? Matters become doubtful when we note that the text did not call what had happened a precept, coming no nearer than commandamento, one of the words Galileo sometimes used as a synonym. There was room for imprecision on the score of terminology, it is true, so maybe we can still salvage something for comparison to 1616. Turning to the act's context raises more problems, both about what to call it and about what happened.
The story in 1632 is even more complicated than that in 1616, in no small part because the event involved two Roman bureaucracies much more independent of each other than Inquisition and Index. This time it was the papal secretary of state, Urban VIII's nephew, Francesco Barberini on the one hand, and his uncle (and Urban's brother) Antonio Barberini, the Inquisition's secretary, on the other.Footnote 97 The initial order to summon Galileo to Rome appears in the Decreta. It ends by spelling out that the inquisitor in Florence was ‘to receive from him [Galileo] a promise to obey this precept which should be given to him in the presence of witnesses who in case he [Galileo] would not accept it [the precept] and not promise to obey could testify to the fact if need be’.Footnote 98 Except for the fact that the witnesses were there to authenticate Galileo's refusal rather than his acquiescence, the reverse of 1616, this appears to be a fairly straightforward order.
Its execution proved anything but. Antonio Barberini, who should have been entirely in charge, made the better job of it, getting things to his satisfaction in one try. He spelt out exactly what the inquisitor was to do:
‘But your lordship [the inquisitor] should summon him [Galileo] to a place where witnesses and the notary should be present, without indicating to the said Galileo why the aforesaid were present’ and order him to come to Rome before the end of October ‘and if he agrees to come, your lordship will induce him to testify to what you have told him and to what he has promised and if he does so, your lordship, after his departure, will procure that the witnesses and the notary, who will have been present, attest to the fact that the aforesaid testification had been written and signed by the same Galileo; but if he refuses to do what has been said, in that case, you will give him a precept in the presence of the notary and the witnesses and then draw up this act, that he should appear in Rome’.Footnote 99
According to Antonio, then, the order to come to Rome was not a precept, which Galileo was to receive only if he refused to obey.
Antonio was a theologian, so perhaps he did not have the law quite clear. Francesco, however, was a lawyer and he did much worse, taking two letters on the same day to get straight what should happen, the second apparently written almost immediately after the dispatch of the first but perhaps not encyphered for three days while the cardinal and his clerk scratched their heads over whether the first letter had done the job properly. (Francesco was only involved at all out of respect for Galileo's patron the grand duke.) The text of the first of these letters published in Favaro's great edition of Galileo's Opere obscures just how much trouble Cardinal Francesco and his clerk had in drawing up instructions for the nuncio.Footnote 100 The minute is an exceptional mess.Footnote 101 The passages about the precept had to be reworked at least twice and possibly three times.Footnote 102 The final version read that Galileo was to be given a precept by the Pope's order and asked to obey it in the presence of witnesses so that in case he refused he could still be ‘examined’.Footnote 103 In the second letter, Francesco came closer to the Pope's original order, adding both that Galileo was not to be told why the witnesses were there and that they were to authenticate his document only after he had left. After these two departures from the decretum and from Antonio's instructions, Francesco ended by agreeing with his uncle that Galileo would be given a precept only if he refused to obey the summons to Rome.Footnote 104 The nuncio could be forgiven for thinking that he had been ordered to act only if Galileo meant to publish something new.Footnote 105
As we have seen, Galileo's acceptance of the summons did not refer to it as a precept either. Nor during November and December do any of the surviving Inquisition documents call the action of 1 October a precept.Footnote 106 Even the decree of 30 December threatening to haul Galileo to Rome in chains does not do so.Footnote 107 In his first interrogation Galileo himself called it a comandamento (as well as saying that he had been ‘ordered’ – ordinato – to come to Rome).Footnote 108 Only one text other than the original note of the Pope's action calls it a precept – Antonio's letter of 10 January 1633 transmitting that order to Florence, saying that ‘by this congregation [of the Inquisition] … it is very badly understood [i.e. taken very badly] that Galileo Galilei has not promptly obeyed the precept given to him to come to Rome’.Footnote 109 This appears to be a helpful rewriting of the record in order to put Galileo into greater difficulties. If this interpretation is correct, it means that de Santillana was wrong about when that happened (in 1633, not 1616) and that the parallel he alleged between 1 October 1632 and 26 February 1616 probably fails.
Conclusion
In sum, it is likely that Galileo did indeed receive a precept, probably in the strongest form. I have suggested an interpretation of the only document causing difficulties for that conclusion, the decretum, which removes much of its force. It also seems likely that the entire action against Galileo of 26 February 1616 was legal. If so, caution should be the order of the day about the ‘legal impropriety thesis’ on grounds both intrinsic (primarily the meaning of successive ac incontinenti) and extrinsic (Seghizzi's career), as well as because it rests implicitly on comparative evidence which is not yet to be had (the ‘precept’ of 1632). Beyond this we cannot presently go, and it may well be that the apparent contradictions in the documents will prevent any greater degree of certainty. Nevertheless, given the probabilities demonstrated here, it would be wise to stop appealing to the law in any future attempt to demonstrate that the precept of 1616 was illegitimate.
Appendices
Documents numbered as in the text
2. Die veneris 26 eiusdem [February]. In palatio solitae habitationis dicti illustrissimi Domini cardinalis Bellarminii et in mansionibus dominationis suae illustrissimae, idem illustrissimus Dominus cardinalis, vocato supradicto Galileo, ipsoque coram domo sua illustrissima existente, in praesentia admodum reverendi Patris fratris Michaelis Angeli Seghitti de Lauda, Ordinis Praedicatorum, Commissarii generalis Sancti Officii, praedictum Galileum monuit de errore supradictae opinionis et ut illam deserat; et successive ac incontinenti, in mei etc. et testium etc., praesenti etiam adhuc eodem illustrissimo Domino cardinali, supradictus Pater Commissarius praedicto Galileo adhuc ibidem praesenti et constituto praecepit et ordinavit [proprio nomine]Footnote 110Sanctissimi D. N. Papae et totius Congregationis Sancti Officii, ut supradictam opinionem, quod sol sit centrum mundi et immobilis et terra moveatur, omnino relinquat, nec eam de caetero, quovis modo teneat, doceat aut defendat, verbo aut scriptis; alias, contra ipsum procedetur in Sancto Officio. Cui praecepto idem Galileus aquievit et parere promisit. Super quibus etc. Actum Romae ubi supra, praesentibus ibidem reverendo Badino Nores de Nicosia in regno Cypri, et Augustino Mongardo de loco abbatiae Rosae, diocesis Politanensis, familiaribus dicti illustrissimi Domini cardinalis, testibus etc. Footnote 111
3. Facta relatione per Ill.mum D. Cardinalem Bellarminum, quod Galileus Galilei Mathematicus, monitus de ordine Sacrae Congregationis ad deserendam opinionem quam hactenus tenuit, quod sol sit centrum sferarum [EN and Processo: spherarum] et immobilis [‘x’ in left margin, but no insertion; vertical stroke in right margin], terra autem mobilis, acquievit, [EN and Processo: ;] ac relato Decreto Congregationis Indicis, quo fuerunt prohibita et [above, ‘x’ in front and below fuerunt] suspensa, respective [ab.; EN and Processo add comma] scripta Nicolai [above] Cupernici [followed by mark keyed to marginal insertion] *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium, Didaci Astunica in Iob, [in margin] et fratris Pauli Antonii Foscarini Carmelitae, [EN: ;] S.mus ordinavit publicari [EN: publicam] aedictum a Magistro Sacri Palatii huiusmodi suspensionis et prohibitionis, respective. Footnote 112
